



From Doug Karlberg <douglaskarlberg@yahoo.com>

Sent Monday, February 23, 2009 1:19 pm

To salmonbycatcheis@noaa.gov

Subject Chinook salmon bycatch EIS

Attachments Final governor Denby Loyd.pdf

468K

Reviewer,

I am a 37 year commercial fisherman. I am also involved in a small village salmon processing plant in Kaltag, Alaska.

I have attached a Microsoft Word document that is included to further flesh out the record.

I have reviewed your EIS and found it deficient in a couple of areas.

First, if I assume that the goal of the Council is to reduce salmon bycatch, then the Council should look at its own records at the bycatch rates for the CDQ groups. To ignore their clear success at reducing bycatch over the last 15 years, is irresponsible. CDQ groups have operated under hard salmon caps and have produced an admirable record of how to fish pollock cleanly, while still obtaining their goal of pollock quota. This phenomena is too relevant to not highlight this and and quantify it properly, which this document does not do well.

Clearly, by any measure of "your" CDQ bycatch data, one has to wonder why the Council has not noticed this before. From the data one clear and inarguable method of reducing salmon bycatch, is to tranfer additional pollock quota to the CDQ groups. This would certainly be in line with promotion of clean fishing, and penalizing dirty fishing.

Second, the economic impact analysis id deficient as the impacts of salmon which have the opportunity to spawn return in larger numbers that recognized by your economic analysis. Salmon allowed to spawn multiply at an exponential rate, which is the foundation of all salmon fisheries, and cannot be ignored. Any analysis of this exponential increase available to salmon that are unharvested and allowed to spawn, will increase the economic impact to coastal communities which have a long historical dependance on these resources.

The Council hs tried exotic measures to reduce this bycatch in the past, which have failed. Hard quotas are the only assured method with a proven track record that is successful.

Any hard quotas should have the following priorities:

- 1) Escapement
- 2) Protection of those who are the long term historical dependant users of this salmon resource.

There is simply no defendable rational excuse for the in-river users being on hard quotas, and the trawlers being on unlimited quotas. This clearly places the whole burden of conservation on the backs of those who have successfully managed this resource for eons, from the backs of those who have drug their feet from participating in conservation of these magnificent salmon, until we find ourselves now in a crisis. This crisis could have been addressed previously without any where near the economic pain that it requires today, but the blame for this can be found directly in the prior behavior of the trawl industry.

The villages did not cause this crisis.

If the salmon bycatch quota has to go to zero, then so be it. The trawlers fishing practices got themselves into this predicament, and the trawlers should have to bear the burden of their own actions. This is what accountability means. To place this burden upon the backs of the villagers is clearly inequitable, and inhumane.

Racism has long been practiced in the North Pacific by both the seafood processing industry, and the predecessor of the NMFS, the Bureau of Fisheries. To not recognize this simple fact in the Environmental Justice Section of this EIS is frankly an embarrassment. This is not a procedural failure, but a moral failure. I don't believe for one second that this "oversight" is a coincidence. Neither will the public believe this a coincidence.

This practice of racism is not debatable. The Bureau of Fisheries kept the Aleuts as slaves on the Pribilofs, which is right in the middle of this billion dollar resource, for over 100 years.

Twenty year ago today the US Supreme Court rendered these words about the salmon processing industry, which many of the pollock participants also are involved in:

"The harshness of these results is well demonstrated by the facts of this case. The salmon industry as described by this record takes us back to a kind of overt and institutionalized discrimination we have not dealt with in years: a total residential and work environment organized on principles of racial stratification and segregation, which, as JUSTICE STEVENS points out, resembles a plantation economy. This industry long has been characterized by a taste for discrimination of the old-fashioned sort: a preference for hiring nonwhites to fill its lowest level positions, on the condition ...

... that they stay there. "

This racial stratification still occurs under this Council's watch. It is still going on, but the Council tries to ignore this racial discrimination practiced by the seafood processing industry. The foot notes to your own EIS proves that this racial discrimination continues, with nary a word from the Council, -- except higher quotas to those corporations practicing racial discrimination.

This long term stripping of the villages or their resources has gone unabated, with the sole exception of the CDQ program. The CDQ program has not been without its problems, but in the larger picture, the CDQ program has brought more economic development, real opportunities for employment, than any other program in the long sordid history of the seafood processing industry. The CDQ's with 10% of the Bering Sea quotas has done more in less than ten years, then the other 90% has done in 90 years.

How can any American with a straight face defend this history and also defend giving Japan and Norway more fishing quotas than the local villages.

The question before the Council is not a fisheries management question. It is not a political question. It is a moral question, with serious political consequences.

The integrity of NOAA, NMFS, and the Council are at stake.

Here are a couple of examples of how people argue moral questions. See if any of this sounds familiar.

Negative Stereotyping

Discourse often involves sweeping generalizations about members of the other group. People in moral conflicts tend to invidiously categorize and denounce the personalities, intelligence, and social manners of those with whom they disagree. They may form negative stereotypes and attribute moral depravity or other negative characteristics to those who violate their cultural expectations, while they ignore their own vices and foibles, perceiving their own group to be entirely *virtuous*. This is what social psychologists call the *attribution error*.

Effects of Moral Conflict

Not surprisingly, moral conflict often has harmful effects. Participants in moral conflict often behave immorally, even according to their own standards of behavior, because they believe the actions of their enemies force them to do so. If a group is regarded as morally depraved, its members may come to be regarded as less than human and undeserving of humane treatment. The demonization or dehumanization of one's opponent that often occurs in moral conflict paves the way for hateful action and violence. It often leads to human rights violations or even attempts at genocide, as parties may come to believe that the capitulation or elimination of the other group is the only way to resolve the conflict.

Any of these arguments sound familiar??

Is the stripping of salmon resources away from the villages economic genocide??

My last comment is that with the suicide rate for Native Alaskans rising to the epidemic point, this simple fact should be added to your Environmental Justice Section of this EIS. This continually rising suicide rate is simply unacceptable, and one of the clear solutions is real economic opportunity. The CDQ's have finally provided this. Expand them. The continual stripping of resources from Native Alaskan's, by the rich and powerful; by campaign contributions, has to stop, as this has been widely recognized by various experts as the root cause of much of this suicide.

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Fair Fight?

Who's lives depended on this resource first?

10,000 years versus 25 years.

Vulnerable villages depending on a single resource, their only resource!!

Villages versus multi-national Corporations.

10,000 years a renewable versus a 25 year rapid decline in resources under Federal Control.

Extinction: Culture and fish - a twofer!!



SOME SHIPS CAN CATCH 1,000 TONNES OF FISH EACH DAY

Who is going to help?

Who is going to hurt?

What will happen if nothing is done?

Commissioner,

Below I will lay out my concerns, suggestions, and general observations. If I am too blunt, I apologize ahead. Hopefully you will appreciate my honesty, and the time that it saves from the chore of having to read between the lines. I have formed my opinions with the benefit of 37 years of commercial fishing in Alaska, as well as substantial experience in other states and countries. Racism, greed, ineptitude, and government cowardice, big money buying political influence, economic genocide of a culture. Its all here; Read on.

I am the fella who is attempting to re-establish a commercial fishery in the middle Yukon. We have been successful in getting the plant and fishermen up and running this last season, providing employment in a village which needed it. With more than a little joy, we got 50 people back to work during the salmon season, for the first time in 12 years! Yippee!

This has been a challenging project, but I may now be forced to close this plant down. Not my first choice, but I think a person needs to be realistic. Regardless of the

printed quotas I am in grave doubt that this fishery will ever have enough access to the resource here necessary to support a commercial buying operation.

Until there is a harvest regime change, nobody will have any commercial interest in the middle Yukon. It took two years to get this plant up and running. If we shut it down all this is lost, and whoever is tempted to restart this plant will have to go through this same two year process. The problem is not with the chum salmon resource, on the contrary, the Yukon River chums salmon runs are probably the healthiest in the state, ...

.....but who in their right mind, would consider a commercial operation, without an adequate supply of fish?

I have a couple of weeks, but if I do not get clear indications of harvest intent from senior managers at ADFG that we will have adequate access to the resource in quantities to support a commercial fish buying operation, I will make an announcement and close the facility; obviously, contingent upon a harvestable surplus of chums, which ADFG has no control over. I have lost confidence in regional ADFG staff, as I simply do not trust what they tell me. This last year staff provided me rationalizations, excuses, political spin, and what I would like now is simply an honest straight forward answer.

If there is another million plus harvestable fish traveling by Kaltag;
Is ADFG going to give us all the opportunity, necessary to harvest our quotas, or not?

Overview : How We Got Here

First this crisis, became a crisis, because it suffered from benign neglect. This dire situation could have been addressed years ago, if some of the folks at the state and federal level had paid appropriate attention to the building crisis. Blame is not a solution, but it does illustrate effectively, which agencies need to have their mission refocused and reprioritized. ADFG leadership during the buildup to this crisis, has been ineffective.

Without serious, long term attention and real fixes, this situation will continue to rear its head. Just as this situation was predictable, the outcome this next winter is predictable, absent a clear change in actions, by regulatory agencies.

The greed and a long history of racial discrimination in Alaska, presents a target rich environment of sad stories, which are only waiting to be told. One more fishless summer and the harsh winter situation will be a video camera away from *60 Minutes*.¹

I would hate to be on the wrong side of this story.

I had one ADFG personnel complain to me that the “*natives were too drunk and lazy to go fishing*”. Racism and stereotyping die a hard death, more often than not, hidden from view. ADFG continually using personnel from the urban areas to parachute into these villages, is simply not conducive to bridging the vast cultural gulf that divides these

Alaskans. ADFG should do more to hire Alaska Natives as resource managers.¹ ADFG Native hires comprise only 1.6% of employees. This is dismal.

Issues At Hand

In my short experience with this fishery a few things are clear to me. *One*, this is first and foremost a moral challenge. *Second*, this is a humanitarian crisis. *Third*, there is a real threat to the extinction of the Yukon Chinooks salmon, and the Alaska Natives who have depended upon it for literally centuries. *Fourth*, the major burden for the preservation of the Yukon Chinook is being borne by the Alaska Native communities lining the Yukon, and this is unfair and inequitable.

These villages did not just irrationally happen to be located where they are. They have been located where they are for eons, because of the access to the fish in the Yukon. In short, the Alaska Natives inhabiting this region have a prior and superior established claim to the resource, than the newcomers who have just come on the scene in the last 20 years. This is only fair.

Fifth, there is a quiet cry for help coming from these communities. They don't have the power to go up against the Seattle interests. It is hopeless. If ADFG cannot hear this plea, or is unwilling to extend a helping hand to people, who deserve a helping hand on some of these issues, then their fate is sealed. More political lip service raising false hopes, is not only disrespectful, but *cruel*.ⁱⁱ

ADFG Role

In a remote area that only has one food, and economic resource, which is fish, ADFG needs to play a more active role. ADFG has for too long simply pointed the finger at the Feds or some other issue, removing themselves from playing any role in alleviating the hardships being endured before their eyes. This is a moral failure on the part of ADFG to recognize the humanitarian needs of these people.

This failure to assist in bettering the situation that these villages find themselves in, has caused a crisis directly between ADFG and the local inhabitants. In short the locals don't like, trust, or respect ADFG. Managing people who do not respect your agency is an impossible task. Without assigning blame, *there needs to be a visible change at the top of the managing personnel at ADFG for this region.*

ADFG cannot send the same people back to the village and convince the people that real changes are in the works. I have a hunch that sending the same ADFG personnel that watched this crisis occur, to then have them say they "*are here to help*", may not instill the confidence needed to move forward. There is a local crisis of confidence that needs to be addressed in a way that instills confidence amongst villagers.

¹ In 1992, only 4.8 percent of the State of Alaska's executive branch work force of 13,703 individuals was comprised of Alaska Natives; of particular note are the Department of Law, the Department of Natural Resources, and the Department of Fish and Game, with percentages of full-time Alaska Native employees at 3.8 percent, 2.1 percent, and 1.6 percent, respectively.

Suggested Solution

I don't know the exact method of doing this, but I will suggest two methods that I believe would help. First and foremost, there seems to be a real gap between ADFG personnel actually understanding the real challenges facing these communities. People know lip service when they hear it.

ADFG personnel need to be better integrated into the communities. They need to be real local leaders. Promoting biologists from the communities would go a long way towards rebuilding trust in ADFG. Really it is about time.

Bulletproof glass in the new ADFG Emmonak offices, is clearly not the answer. I call it Fort Emmonak, after the famous Fort Apache, which was designed to control the Indian population. Trust matters, and bulletproof glass is visible public display of mistrust.

ADFG becoming biological advocates protecting these fragile communities would, in my opinion, go a long ways towards cementing a new relationship with these communities. ADFG utilizing their substantial biological talents could assist in the debate over high seas interceptions of both king and chum salmon. Clearly my conversations with trawl skippers indicate a recent movement of trawlers closer to the Yukon, as Pollock become more difficult to find. Time is of the essence.

Expecting these villages to compete with the Federal and private biologists lobbying the North Pacific Council is simply not realistic. The villages will get slaughtered. ADFG will not. Isn't it time that ADFG stood up for the villages? They are Alaskans too.

This crisis could get worse..... *No, it will get worse, if nothing is changed.*

My second suggestion for a long term permanent solution is to lobby Congress for a change in the CDQ program. Clearly the evidence is in statewide and natives and rural villages coastwise have withered since the introductions of individual fishing quotas to large and often multi-national corporations. The issuance of these free quotas was tainted with campaign contributions. To think that Alaska only received 10% of the quotas, has got to be one of the worst deals for splits in state versus federal resources since Manhattan Island, was purchased for beads.

What Congress giveth, Congress can take away.

There are no guarantees in Congress, but the desperation is many of these villages is so real, that this may be an opportune time to lobby Congress to alleviate some of their struggle by giving them access to the resources out their back door.

The CDQ program has for the first time put villagers in good jobs. Winter jobs, that are invaluable in a community that only has summer employment opportunities. And for the first time in history, they have a legitimate opportunity to rise to a higher paying job in the seafood industry. To describe the old, white boys club in Seattle's seafood industry as a racially neutral bunch, may be an understatement.

Because this solution does hold promise for a permanent economic solution, that involves no state subsidies, and gives Alaska a significant share on an industry that will pay dividends for centuries, and because it is renewable, this solution should be considered seriously. Native oversight of incidental catches of salmon is a powerful incentive to limit the incidental catch of salmon. They have to live in the communities in which these salmon are so crucial to survival. Native trawlers fish more responsibly.

Aftermath of the Problem

Look, the trawl fishery impacts are severe. On top of the obvious reported by incidental catch, there is the small matter of what happens to both Chinooks and chums that have one of their primary food sources depleted. Yep, both Chinook and chum need to eat, or forage on Pollock. This negatively affects both the weight and survival rates of chums and Chinook. The problem of lower weights of Yukon Chinook is widely reported. Call it a hunch, but it might be they are not getting enough food. It's a theory that is widely accepted when applied to other animals and fish. Less pounds are caught, and less fish return. A double whammy.

The reason that Pollock and salmon are caught at the same time in trawls, is that *salmon are eating Pollock!* Forage impacts are too simple to understand, and not quantify their negative impacts. Undernourished salmon are more susceptible to disease also.

“The National Research Council recognized nearly a decade ago that several regions where pollock were once abundant have been heavily exploited and the pollock stocks in those regions have suffered major declines). Intense concentration of the pollock fisheries on spawning aggregations since the 1980s has been accompanied by serial declines in pollock abundance in the Gulf of Alaska, Bogoslof/Aleutian Basin), and Aleutian Islands, leading to the closure of the latter two areas in the 1990s.

Pollock's central importance as a forage fish in the Bering Sea food web has been known since the 19th century, hence pollock's scientific name, Theragra, from the Greek Ther = beast, agra = prey or food.¹ Pollock is widely consumed at every stage of its life cycle by mammals, birds and fishes, but three of the four defined "stocks" in the fishery management plans (FMPs) remain at or near historic low abundance levels today. The Aleutian Basin and Aleutian Islands stocks are closed to directed pollock fishing due to low abundance, and the Gulf of Alaska is experiencing historic low pollock abundance. Thus, fully 96% of all pollock caught off Alaska are now taken from the eastern Bering Sea.

The abundance of Bering Sea pollock has declined steadily since 2003 under intense fishing pressure and is now estimated to be at the lowest level since 1980, when the stock was recovering from the first wave of foreign trawling during the 1970s. The projected 2008 Bering Sea pollock abundance will be the lowest in the history of the U.S.-managed fishery, and the proposed 2008 fishery quota of 1 million tons (2.2 billion pounds) could drive the stock to collapse. Given the risk of a fishery catastrophe and ecological havoc caused by the loss of the most important forage fish off Alaska, NMFS should require a far more precautionary approach.

The impacts of these trends on pollock predators in the ecosystem could be devastating.”


Second, there is mortality from trawl contact when small Chinook and chum salmon “squeeze” through the mesh of a trawl scraping protective scales off in the process. Fed biologists are correctly recognizing the uncounted mortality of immature Pollock, and it would be biologically dishonest to not recognize the effects of trawl contact, on salmon.

Sadly the North Pacific Management Council press releases highlight that they encourage clean fishing and low bycatch rates, and punish those fishermen that do not comply. This is a bold face lie. Let’s look at the facts, shall we?

The multi-national corporations own 90% of the Pollock trawl quota, and Alaskan Natives own 10%. Does one fleet care more about the fishery to “fish clean”? The Alaska Native village fleet via the CDQ program fishes four times cleaner on salmon bycatch that the white trawl fleet does. This dirty fishing by the corporate fleet is not a one year anomaly, but a 13 year pattern. The Federal managers have ignored that it is possible to harvest Pollock with a dramatically lower impact on salmon. Why have they ignored this, if they say that they are promoting clean fishing practices. Greed? Corruption? Incompetence? Cowardice? Conflicts of interest? And a billion reasons to under-report salmon by-catch!


This data proves that simply giving Alaska Native villages more Pollock quota, would dramatically reduce salmon by-catches by 75%. If this bycatch had not occurred the magic of compounding 900,000 spawning four times, could have been 4,000,000 Chinook, that would have compounded if returned, not simply 900,000.² **That’s impact!!**

The reason for this is simple; Alaskan Native villagers care about their communities resources!



² Calculation based upon a 2 to 1 returning adults to spawner ratio.

Commercial Chinook Harvest --
Bering Sea Pollock Bycatch vs Yukon River



Now both of the above uncounted mortality issues I cannot quantify, but the incidental catch in the Bering Sea that are reported can be estimated and valued. My back of the napkin figures put the loss of economic values from incidentally caught salmon destined for the Yukon plus the loss of economic value of the forgone chums salmon harvests that have gone up the river to spawn, at a whopping \$116,000,000 for the last five years. This is based upon the first wholesale value of the fish. This amounts to an average of \$18,500,000 annually for the last five years. This forgone harvest amounts to an approximate 50% increase in per capita income for the region.

Much of this lost economic impact, is being made up by the taxpayers of Alaska.

Bluntly, if they had not lost this income, we would not be dealing with a crisis. So logic tells us that restoring this income, will go a long way to eliminating the crisis.

The trawl industry responds to this, by putting their crews under gag orders.

Opportunity : Breadth of Impact

This summer I estimate that there will be \$20,000,000 worth of chums entering the Yukon River and available for harvest. Will this fish be harvested? Only the government knows?

Having said this though while a CDQ increase holds great promise, it is not a short term solution. The most obvious short term partial solution is to tap the record chum salmon

runs. As the chum runs have had an over escapement for the last six years, leaving this over escapement untapped, would be the only fishery in the state to do so. Considering the economic plight of the area, heaven and earth should be moved to have a robust harvest, where possible. The days of poverty-stricken hungry villagers watching a river full of chums swim by, should be over.

Down river has problems with an incidental catch of Chinook. Two methods proven to harvest chums and reduce the catch of kings, are very fine mesh gillnets and fish wheels.

Fine twine mesh gillnets allow the Chinook to break through the gillnets and escape while the chums remain caught. This method has been used on the Columbia River for years. I don't have the details, but if it improves the chances of catching chums and fewer Chinook, then it should be tried – now.



Small mesh gillnets also have a proven track record of reducing the incidental take of Chinooks. These nets catch Chinooks but do not normally kill them because the Chinooks only get caught by their teeth, and not their gills. These Chinooks caught this way when placed into a recovery box, will resuscitate quite nicely. Takes some work and training, but these methods are not new, but are tried and proven methods of reducing

incidental harvests of Chinook.

Fishwheels are a proven method of catching chums and not Chinooks. This clean harvesting method is a *no brainer*.

Here are the facts from ADFG own catch statistics on gillnets versus fish wheels from 1980 – 1997. Yukon River harvest areas Y-1-3. Average 4.2 chums caught for every Chinook. Probably this is better today. For fish wheels in area Y-4. 189 chums per Chinook. Manned fish wheels can send a incidentally caught Chinook over the side alive. The rule of thumb is that 90% of the Chinooks thrown back alive survive to procreate. This brings a fish wheel ratio up to 1800 chums for every Chinook caught. This is as clean a fishery as it gets. Certainly better than any other in the state, which do get harvest opportunities.

To add insult to injury, the locals, and ADFG personnel have confirmed that the majority of the Chinook caught in fish wheels are the small immature males commonly called jacks. For years these small kings have been removed by the wheels from the fishery.

When the wheels quit fishing, complaints about the size of Chinooks began. I wonder if there is a connection? 17 years of taking the small Chinook from the gene pool.

The Yukon River harvest area Y-4 has a maximum quota of 335,000 summer chums. With fish wheels as a harvesting method and promptly returning Chinook alive into the river, we would only kill **186** Chinook to take our maximum allowable quota.

.... And the factory trawlers cannot spare 186 Chinook in their fishery, to allow these folks to fish??

When queried about lack of fishing opportunities, ADFG Area Manager Mr. Hayes ignored the data, and told me that he couldn't let us fish because of "*public perception*". I suggested the Mr. Hayes offer an ADFG press release explaining to the public the legitimate differences between the gears types, which are quite significant.

Mr. Hayes ignored my suggestion and continued to put out dire Chinook predictions, without ever mentioning the record chum salmon runs that were going un-harvested, and causing over escapement.

If Emmonak is still not able to fish because of Chinook conservations concerns, we will catch their share of the chums in Kaltag and send them the money. Considering the struggles these villages are facing, lame excuses are simply not tolerable. Hell, the over escapement might even kill the healthy runs we have today, which will begin anew an economic down cycle. The Yukon summer chums are in danger of collapsing from over-escapement.

I am sensitive to public perception, but the ADFG as well as the State does have the ability to influence public perception. If Michael Moore gets a hold of this story, the ADFG will have an even larger public perception problem, not to mention sending the Republican Party into the stone ages. I digress.

There is not yet enough public awareness of the cultural and economic problems in the Yukon area. That, however, is coming. With no action, a larger negative picture will be painted about the ADFG's role in perpetuating this problem. It's a documentary waiting to be made.

With a small plant capacity and only 7 wheels, our harvesting capacity on a daily basis is a mere fraction of the former fishery. There is only a single buyer and markets are tightly controlled. Mr. Hayes does not seem to grasp this significant difference. This is not Bristol Bay with 2500 fishermen.

This last season he spoke of harvest windows. This is a legitimate management tool, but not for 7 wheels. Historically there were 120 wheels, and they fished 7 days a week, non-stop from June 20 – Aug 1. This is 4800 wheel days. This year we began with a short opening on 9 July and ended the season with a whopping total of 74 wheel days, and there was an 800,000 fish over escapement.

In Kaltag we received no fishing opportunities until after the peak of the chum run had passed. I cannot tell you how demoralizing this is locally, in-season.

Every one knows they are going to lose money for the season, *before the first fish is caught!*

In general, these issues causes frustration within the village. Common sense policies help build trust. Dumb and illogical decisions add to an already frustrating situation. Unneeded harvest “windows” and stopping fishing to preserve Chinooks, when we don’t catch any, only makes this situation worse.

Speaking of windows is so inappropriate for the current fishery. Why? Because of economics. Small processing plants require a steady stream of fish to maintain quality and to ensure commercial viability. Every processor has left this river. Even if you let the fishermen fish, who is going to buy the salmon? ADFG personnel do not have a comprehension of what the basics of what it takes to have a processor remain commercially viable. Fishing, processing, and basic economics are inter-connected. If ADFG does not begin to comprehend this, then all commercial fishing will cease to exist on this river.

With no buyers, even if the fish come back, there will be nobody to sell them to. At present, there are three fish buyers left. One is for sale, one is considering closing, and all three are losing money. Wake up and smell the roses.

Here is an example. If you look at fishing or fish buying like a slot machine that you put a quarter into the slot and pull the handle. If you pull the handle and lose, that is not the end or the world, as long as you know that sometimes you will win. The system that is now in the Yukon is like a slot machine that you put a quarter in, and when you do win, it is only a nickel. This is slot machine that never ever pays out anything. Nobody will play. This is precisely why the oldest processor on the Yukon pulled up stakes and left town after 41 years.

Fishing and fish processing has plenty of risks. Poor fish runs, high fuel prices, bum markets all are assumed as risks. What is not assumed as a risk is that if there is an abundance of fish that you will not be allowed to harvest. If you ever want to have any chance of economic activity based upon this resource, ADFG better state in unambiguous terms that this slot machine is not rigged.

If people think that there will not be reasonable and commercially viable access to the resource, then there will never be a commercial fishery, and complaints from the villages will only increase.

This is precisely where the Kaltag project is today. I am wondering whether this project will ever be commercially viable. The problem is not with the resource. I understand those risks. The problems is that I do not have the confidence at this point that Kaltag will

have access to the resource required to make the project commercially feasible. The runs are strong, but it seems like at every corner we have had to argue with ADFG personnel to simply get access. If we do not have some sort of sign from ADFG that we will get access to these large runs of chums, then the game is rigged, published quotas meaningless, and we might as well turn off the life support.

This would be a shame, as in the last two years we have gone from one wheel, to seven wheels, and finally it looks like we will be up to fifteen wheels, which is enough to be commercially viable, but only if we have access to commercial quantities of fish from the back to back record runs of chums.

We employed 50 people in a village of approximately 200, for the first time in 12 years. To date I have invested \$250,000, my life savings. I am proud of what we accomplished this last summer, but a person needs to be realistic. We are sitting on a \$200,000 grant, but I am uncomfortable even taking this sorely needed grant money, if in my judgment this project is commercially unviable. This would be close to fraud.


There is a very serious issue, and absent a clear commercial direction from ADFG this project may be DOA very soon. It is sad that we are even having this conversation with ADFG, as no commercial fishing interests need to have this conversation anywhere else in the state.

Struggling Yukon River Region

Which brings me to a perceived discrimination by ADFG with the Yukon River area. It may be unfair, but the perception came in loud and clear to me. One, is the lack of support for commercial fishing, and locally they know that is not the case elsewhere in Alaska. I have been elsewhere in Alaska, and the locals are correct.

Beginning in the 1980's the State of Alaska embarked on a large scale hatchery program to raise salmon. This program was financed and subsidized by the state. The returns from these hatchery programs have catapulted the production of hatchery salmon from zero to as high as 80,000,000 fish. The majority of the state benefited from this subsidy, capital loans, and the ongoing economic boom that these hatcheries provided.

Western Alaska did not participate in this state program, but boy did they have to pay a price; for the subsidies and economic development that the other salmon producing areas in the state. Out of the five species of salmon by far the two that are easiest to be raised are chums and pinks. The number of chums produced in hatcheries has tripled from the 80's which when coupled with pinks which also compete for the low price protein sector of the salmon market, The introduction of hatcheries has devastated the chum fishery in western Alaska, especially the Yukon river fishery.ⁱⁱⁱ



There is a local perception of inequity in state funding support as compared to other regions, in these areas below. This inequity also fosters a feeling of unfair treatment.

- ✓ Transportation funding
- ✓ Economic development funding
- ✓ Capital loans for economic development
- ✓ Fishing and fish processing modernization grants

Economic development without access to the fisheries resource, is a hopeless waste of money.

The second is more controversial, and that is roe stripping. At least in Y-4 this has been a traditional roe stripping area. It is not without controversy, but there are dire economic conditions present that require consideration. The fairness of allowing roe stripping elsewhere in the State, but not in this poor region galls many. They have a point, which is simply in the last ten years there has been 8.5 million pounds of roe landed in the State. The villagers understand that the State is either turning a blind eye or buckling to powerful commercial interests elsewhere, but not in their region. And you know what? They have a legitimate point.

Most salmon processors elsewhere started out roe stripping and then they reinvested the capital to process carcasses. They were allowed to roe strip in the beginning. Now we find ourselves at the beginning fighting theoretical rules which did not exist for other processors at their beginning.

Most fishermen also realize that subsidies from the state to other regions for transportation and hatcheries have done more to destroy their carcass value and fishery in general. This is also a valid point.

I suspect that to gain respect and cooperation on many of these issues, fair equitable treatment with the other citizens in the state are essential.

Which brings me to another suggestion for improvement. The difficulty with sending salmon carcasses to market is simply the cost of fuel. In fact there is not another single expense that permeates the cost structures of every little thing in this area. I wonder if the fuel supply line for the whole river cannot be made more efficient. I worry that with single supply lines the rule rather than the exception in the bush, that communities are all too frequently at risk of monopoly pricing or poor management. I wonder if fuel along the river including the transportation, should not be consolidated into a utility. If smart management of the fuel needs of the people on the river could drive a \$1 a gallon out of the price structure, when multiplied by the number of gallons used annually, this might be a very large savings indeed.

Considering the extreme vulnerability of this region to the price of oil, and the cost of oil being below the cost of many producing nations, it might be a very wise strategic move to lock oil prices for this region now for some years into the future. This is complicated, but done every day by some pretty smart people. I suspect that the State of Alaska has some of these smart people on their payrolls in their oil division.

Further, assistance to add frozen freight on the river system would raise the price for fish, and lower the cost for groceries. This is a win-win. Economic development of value added fish processing contributes additional income that stays in the village. Eco-tourism has some added potential, if done with sensitivity to the villages. Capital for any projects in this area is almost non-existent, even before this world financial meltdown. Good projects out here should receive assistance, as long as they are financially prudent.

Long Term Impacts : End Game

It's imperative, especially now, to look at the long term end game of this situation. We are on a path, not dissimilar to previous situations. The end game is predictable if we look around the world.

In its simplest form, this is a battle over a resource. On one side there are the indigenous inhabitants who feel they have a prior and superior claim to the salmon resource, having successfully survived on, and nurtured this renewable resource successfully for centuries.

A clear record of preserving the health of the resource. On the other side is a roaming multi-national factory trawl fleet which has literally collapsed all major global fish stocks, before lighting in Alaska, on the last major significant stock of whitefish, left on earth.

Today, the decisions over who gets first priority to these stocks are decided by a rigged game, corrupted by money and influence peddling. All parties know this. The trawlers strategy is simple. Cut off the resources and starve or freeze them out, preferably both. Eliminate this publicly powerful prior claim to the salmon resource. Remember trawlers have already played this game out previously, in other oceans.

Will this strategy work? Nope.

The salmon are vulnerable in ways that are distinctly different than from where these trawl fleets have come from. America has an entirely more stringent legal environment than third world nations. Bribery of fisheries officials until the last fish is extinct will not work here. Courts will take over before this happens.

I have seen this exact situation with my own eyes, in China, Vietnam, and Iran. The local folks will continue to over harvest and support themselves. They feel screwed and entitled to the resource. It was stolen from them, and they will steal it back. The salmon are too vulnerable in the river, and people are too poor, hungry, and angry. This is precisely what has been occurring with the salmon resources in Eastern Russia for the last decade.

This my friends, is an unjust situation, and is fertile ground for mass civil disobedience. Wide spread poaching will occur, and the mighty Yukon King salmon will precipitously decline to the point where there will be no choice to have it listed as an *endangered species*.

Nobody will be able to stop this in so remote a region. You cannot arrest them all, and frankly even if you jailed them, you would have to give them a warm cell, three squares a day, and a TV, which may be an improvement in life for some of them.

This is a game changer. Shortly thereafter another rigged group will form to develop a rebuilding harvest plan, and a lawsuit will follow minutes thereafter, and at that point a Judge will run the fishery. Judges cannot be rigged, which is a step up from the system in place now. Judges don't allow lobbyists to testify, or rigged science. Aboriginal claims are fairly heard.

If poaching occurs non-stop, there simply will be no choice but to close all harvesting impacts on the Yukon Chinooks salmon, *including trawling*. One might conclude that this would be a pyrrhic victory, but locally it will be seen as for the first time the factory trawlers experiencing the same pain that villagers have been experiencing, for some time now. The trawl fleet has managed to ensure that not a single pound of their quota has ever gone un-harvested because of conservation measures; too bad the villages cannot say the same thing.

Conclusion

I have mentioned the trust and respect of the villagers previously. It is important to understand that ADFG, NMFS, various politicians, and the trawlers all need the trust, respect, and cooperation of these villagers. It truly is in everyone's, *best interests*.

It is in the trawlers best interests that these summer chums be harvested fully.

The solution for this situation is simple, you need to enable villagers access to their resources, or this situation will get worse and continue to occur. Exodus of local residents to the cities, and in some cases with few skills or resources, will not solve the problems, it will only transfer the burdens to the state.

No amount of Madison Avenue public relations campaign will transfer this David and Goliath situation from the trawlers to the villagers. One group are poor artesiansal fishermen with only one resource to depend on for survival, and the other wealthy trawlers that have a history of decimating resources, which is nothing to be proud of.

Any attempts to paint the villagers as villains will ultimately only backfire.

This story if broken to the American public, will spark outrage at the treatment of the villages, the rape of the resource, money's corrupting influence on fisheries management, an the uncaring ineptitude of a host of government officials.

I recognize that changes will have to occur in these villages. Considering the cost of living, these villages represent the poorest of any Americans, but starving them out, is morally repugnant; ***This is economic genocide.***

I simply cannot believe how many government employees visited the villages and saw with their own eyes, the poverty, the hopelessness, and a teen suicide rate³ that takes your breath away, and chose to say nothing. These folks certainly had no spines, and sadly may also have no hearts.

I chose not to commit what Abraham Lincoln called the "*sin of silence*".

Action now, will allow long term success without continuous state monitoring. When you understand the economic injustices imposed by subsidies to state hatcheries, lack of transportation subsidies that exist residents everywhere else in the state, the blatant interceptions of salmon, and the destruction of the forage food source for the Yukon salmon, is there any surprise that these villages depend on government assistance. Historically, this has become much worse since the unfair impacts occurred. Surprised?

³ **T**he steep, steady rise in the Native suicide rate during the 1980s continues an upward trend that dates back to the mid-1950s; in the quarter century between 1964 and 1989, the rate of Alaska Native suicides increased 500 percent.

Where are the NGO's? Environmental organizations have taken note, and are adding Pollock to their list of "at risk" ecological concerns. The sustainable fishery certification organization, Marine Stewardship Council, has been noticeably absent during this debate. It may be because MSC receives revenues from each pound of pollock product sold, aligning their financial interests with commercial interests, pound for pound. It is almost like MSC is privately saying, "*Fish baby fish*".

Unbelievably, the government and MSC, actually allows fishing companies representatives to vote on their own quotas.

Context for this dismal treatment at the hands of Federal fisheries managers can be put in context by reading my endnotes. The same subliminal racial discrimination based arguments are being made today. History repeats itself. Read this.⁴ And this.^{iv} This racially unfair situation is occurring again. Have we not learned anything?

The letter from Emmonak was published on the internet. Times have changed, and this story cannot be buried, as injustices in the past have been by Federal managers.

Join us in fighting this injustice. It is the right thing to do, and it feels good too.

Thank you for your time, and consideration of my thoughts. My sympathies for the length of my recorded observations, perspectives, and opinions. I am not a writer, I am a fisherman. For the quibblers, I rounded some of these numbers.

Consider forgoing imitation crab, or fish sandwiches next time you dine. Look at the poverty and misery that the harvest of these fish creates. Please, don't be a part of it.

Warmest personal regards,

Doug Karlberg

Doug Karlberg
Kaltag Fisheries LLC
Ph. 360.961.2618

"If you look for truth, you may find comfort in the end; If you look for comfort you will find neither comfort nor truth -- Wishful thinking always ends in despair."

- C.S. Lewis

CC: Mr. Denby Loyd
Ms. Cora Chrome
Fisheries Officials
Legislators

Media
Environmental organizations
Social welfare organizations
Congress

⁴ I was told that the Department of Interior expected an explosion, that a Communist party group in New York City planned to 'blow the lid' off the Pribilof program; and consequently, the Department wanted to clean up the operation and eliminate injustices as quickly as possible. 1965.

ⁱ So much cultural destruction has taken place, such a large proportion of Alaska's most valuable natural resources have been taken from Natives' ownership and control, and so much potential for social and political equity has been foregone that it is difficult to envision, let alone articulate, a basis for achieving total fairness for this and future generations of Alaska Natives.

Rampant unemployment and the virtual non-existence of other economic opportunities for large portions of the Alaska Native population — together with the spiritually and psychologically debilitating intervention of governmental services to fill the social and economic void — has created a culture of dependency.

Second, commercialization of species created a downward push on the availability of fish and wildlife stocks for subsistence taking. Commercial pursuits also placed restrictions of time on traditional hunters and fishers.

It is almost rhetorical to point out that in order to survive in the face of raging seas, arctic storms, and oftentimes scarce food supplies, Alaska Natives were capable, independent, and strong of will.

From an economic perspective, the first six decades of this century — or, the period of global incorporation — set the pattern that still exists today: i.e. Alaska Natives, though integrating in varying degrees into Alaska's expanding mercantile and resource extraction economies, remained largely on the sidelines. During the early part of the twentieth century, exploitation of Alaska's resources kept pace as the United States industrialized. "Alaska Natives rarely reaped advantages from this development. Non-Native entrepreneurs employed them when it made economic sense and ignored them when it did not."

While Aleuts were employed in that industry, the role of the Aleuts has been characterized as one of "virtual involuntary servitude."¹⁹ And in Bristol Bay and Kodiak, where commercial fisheries were expanding year after year, most of the jobs in canneries and aboard for-hire fishing vessels operated by the canneries went to imported laborers. The following passage, which pertains specifically to the Yukon-Kuskokwim delta area during this time period but which has a much wider descriptive application, is instructive:

Although the Yukon-Kuskokwim region was integrated into the worldwide economy, albeit in a peripheral way, the Natives had less access to information, productive resources, and capital, and less control over local business than did their white counterparts.²⁰

At the same time, pressures on fish and wildlife resources — brought about by Alaska's escalating non-Native population and intensified commercial harvesting — compromised the ability of Natives to adequately meet their subsistence needs.

Political pressure intervened, to prevent famine and the eventual starvation for native Alaskans. A rare political victory. Economic success has been elusive, as control of

access to the natural resources has always been controlled by outside politicians who were persuaded by campaign contributions.

In a physical sense, the federal War on Poverty — designed to close the gap nationwide between economic classes — brought benefits to Alaska Natives. But, finally able to catch their collective breath after generations of pursuit, Alaska Natives found themselves a culturally and spiritually crippled people. Rather than feeling comfort in government-built homes and contentment in government-funded food supplies, Alaska Natives felt, instead, emptiness and an overwhelming sense of loss. The statistics show that when the levels of public expenditures over the past 30 years are placed side-by-side with the data on individual, family, and societal well-being, the social and psychological condition of Native people has varied inversely with the growth of government programs intended to help them.

It was during the period when anti-poverty programs were being introduced throughout Alaska that Natives began to turn to alcohol in alarming numbers. Sadly, the result would be a new cycle of trauma and death — but this time self-inflicted. By the early 1970s, alcohol was identified as being a leading cause of death among Alaska Natives. The Alaska Native suicide rate, which did not significantly differ from nationwide averages through the 1950s, began to take a dramatic turn upwards.²³ Other indicators of serious social and behavioral health breakdown — e.g., assault, murder, sexual crimes including those against children, avoidable accidents, and psychological depression — began to multiply throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As with Native suicides, these anti-social behaviors and conditions were, by and large, directly related to the use and abuse of alcohol.

Alaska Natives experience some of the highest rates of accidental deaths, suicides, alcoholism, homicides, fetal alcohol syndrome, and domestic violence in the nation. Alaska Natives — many of them young men — fill the state's jails at a rate exceeding 250 percent of their numbers in the general population. Native children are not obtaining adequate educations, and Alaska Natives remain on the economic fringes of one of the richest states, per capita, in the union. Just as in the times when attempted assimilation was most blatant and pronounced, the validity of the Alaska Native cultural perspective continues to be ignored.

What the federal and state governments can do is offer mutual respect and assistance. They must be willing to give control of local issues back to Alaska Natives. They must step aside in many areas so that Alaska Natives can attempt to reconstruct honorable and dignified lives for themselves.

This will not be an easy task. People who have become accustomed to living without power tend to avoid the obligations that accompany it. Likewise, the external forces that

take power — even with the best intentions — generally resist giving it back. In that regard, the following words from the works of Leo Tolstoy are appropriate to consider:

"I sit on a man's back choking him
and making him carry me.
Yet, I assure myself and others
that I am sorry for him
and wish to lighten his load
by all possible means —
except by getting
off his back."

ii KEY FACTS & FINDINGS

The following are selected statistical and other findings of the Alaska Natives Commission. Presented by issue area, these data are intended to acquaint the reader with key information about the many topics studied by the Commission. Volumes II and III of the Final Report contain additional statistics and analyses by issue area. Unless otherwise noted, statistics and findings were developed by the Alaska Natives Commission based on a number of federal, state, and private sources, including 1990 Census data.

Many of the causes for today's upheaval in Alaska Native communities and families can be found in their history, specifically, Alaska Natives' experiences since contact with Europeans, and in the cultural, social, political and economic climate created for them by both the federal and state governments.

At the core of many problems in the Alaska Native community are unhealed psychological and spiritual wounds and unresolved grief brought on by a century-long history of deaths by epidemics and cultural and political deprivation at others' hands; some of the more tragic consequences include the erosion of Native languages, in which are couched the full cultural understanding, and the erosion of cultural values.

In one out of every eight villages, unemployment among Native men is in excess of 50 percent; in one-third of all Native villages, male unemployment— at 32 percent — is nearly quadruple the statewide average unemployment rate.*

**With severely limited employment opportunities in most villages, percentages of so-called "discouraged workers," who are not reflected in official unemployment counts, are thought to be much higher than official estimates.*

An estimated 21.5 percent of Alaska Native families had incomes below the officially established "poverty" line income (\$12,674 for a family of four) in contrast to 6.8 percent of all Alaskan families.

Knowingly in some cases and unknowingly in others, many Alaska Natives have turned to government subsidies, income maintenance programs, and other components of the transfer economy to make ends meet.

Education

In urban areas, about 60 percent of Alaska Natives entering high school do not graduate; while in rural areas only 12 to 15 percent do not graduate. However, the high rural graduation rate is countered by much lower-than-average student achievement levels.

Despite the seeming association between small rural schools and low performance, specialists in rural education point out that they can offer advantages such as low student-teacher ratios and opportunities for teachers to significantly influence the lives of their students.

High school graduation rates among rural students have greatly increased as a result of replacing boarding schools with small schools in the villages; achievement test scores of students in small rural high schools are, however, lower than statewide norms.

Suicide

The Native suicide rate has continued its upward climb in recent years, reaching nearly 69 per 100,000 population in 1989; death from suicide of an Alaska Native occurred once every 10 days, on average, during the 1980s, and preliminary figures from 1990-1993 indicate that the Alaska Native suicide rate is continuing to climb.

While about one in four of non-Native suicides in Alaska are committed by 15-to-24-year-olds, virtually half in the Native community are committed by this age group.

The steep, steady rise in the Native suicide rate during the 1980s continues an upward trend that dates back to the mid-1950s; in the quarter century between 1964 and 1989, the rate of Alaska Native suicides increased 500 percent.

During the 1980s, males accounted for 86 percent of Native suicide victims; the suicide rate for the latter part of the 1980s for males aged 20 to 24 years was in excess of 30 times the national rate for all age groups combined.

Native suicides occur more frequently in rural Alaska; while 61 percent of Alaska Natives live in village Alaska, over two-thirds of Native suicide deaths occurred in this geographic area during the 1988-89 period.

iii Alaska Salmon Enhancement: A Successful Program for

Hatchery and Wild Stocks *150 UJNR Technical Report No. 30*

Alaska now has 33 production hatcheries in a balanced program designed to enhance fisheries while maintaining healthy wild stocks. Some hatcheries release over 100 million juvenile salmon annually. Statewide totals are 1.2 to 1.4 billion annually over the last decade.

Chum Salmon

Chum salmon are harvested commercially by purse seines, drift and set gillnets, and, in large Western Alaska rivers, by fishwheels. Between 1970 and 2000 chum salmon have accounted for 10% of Alaska's total salmon harvest. Between 1995 and 2000 the average annual chum salmon harvest across Alaska totaled 20 million fish, with the commercial catch in 2000 above this average at a record 24 million (ADF&G, 2001).

In contrast to pink salmon, statewide hatchery production of chum salmon in Alaska exceeds wild stock contributions in commercial catches. **Chum salmon hatcheries during the past six years have produced from 9-18 million fish, while wild stocks have contributed 4-9 million** fish annually to the commercial harvest (Fig. 4). Currently 60-70% of the commercial harvest of chum salmon in the state occurs in the Southeast Region where hatcheries produced an even greater portion (80%) of the catch in 2000 (McNair, 2001).




Figure 4. Statewide contributions of wild and hatchery chum salmon in Alaska commercial fisheries between 1995-2000.

The following true story is one of the only comprehensive peeks at a culture of racism that was practiced, long after the US had freed the slaves.

The practice of virtual slavery existed in these remote parts of Alaska hidden by government officials from the public and press until 1964. This program was run by the Bureau of Fish and Wildlife, which has changed its name to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which is still managing fisheries in the remotest parts of Alaska today.

This is but a snippet of this incredibly researched and untold story.

It is impossible to understand the current situation, without understanding the context of this situation between the Alaska Natives, their vast fisheries resources, and the incredibly corrupt allocation of these resources by the Federal government.

Here is a little context.

Century of Servitude – by Dorothy Jones

These stormy, windswept, isolated islands with a narrow resource base captured the United States' interest; in fact, the Pribilof fur seal industry was one of the government's main motivations for purchasing Alaska from Russia in 1867. Though many visitors raved about Alaska's rich resources -- fossil ivory, whales, walrus, many species of cold water fish, vast amounts of timber, and numerous fur-bearing land and sea mammals - only the Pribilof fur seals, estimated at two million animals, produced commercial profits of any significance. During Congressional hearings in 1868, experts I gave glowing accounts of the profits from the industry.

Clearly, the government had a vested economic interest in the Pribilofs, which it sought to protect by public monopoly and which it justified in terms of humanitarianism.

Counteracting these few officials was the louder and more persuasive voice of the fur trade lobby. Its spokesmen argued that a private lease was congruent with American

sentiment and furthermore that it would still assure Treasury revenues in the form of rent and taxes.³⁶ John Miller, one of the most persistent spokesmen for a private monopoly, was president of the recently organized Alaska Commercial Company (formed by a merger of several trading firms including the two that had purchased property from the Russians and been given permission to land on the islands in 1869). A former military officer and friend of General Grant, Miller had access to many legislators as well as to the President.³⁷

Given the tenor of those times, Miller's agitations fell on receptive ears. It was a period of rapid industrial development, great land steals made possible by prodigious corruption in government circles, and the growth of giant corporations accompanied by intense exploitation of laborers who had no power to bargain individually; it was the era of the post Civil War robber barons; it was the gilded age of capitalism.

In this national mood, Congress in 1870 enacted legislation instructing the Secretary of the Treasury to grant an exclusive private lease.³⁸ The Secretary awarded the lease to the Alaska Commercial Company which, although the lowest bidder (in terms of rent and royalties to the government), had the advantages of already possessing property on the Pribilofs, experience in the fur trade, and influence in the White House.³⁹

The American version of private monopoly control of the Pribilofs did not duplicate that of the Russians'. The legislation gave the company a monopoly on trade only; the government retained authority to regulate the seals and the Aleut sealers. In essence, the legislation and the lease that followed it established a dual system of government-company administration of the Pribilofs.

The company { Alaska Commercial company} administered the Pribilof operation from its San Francisco office.

At Congressional hearings in 1888 to investigate the Alaska Commercial Company, Treasury Department agents repeatedly asserted their sovereignty over the Pribilof Aleuts. Here are some examples.

I am the representative of the Government.... The agents have absolute control of the natives.... *The Government Agents are required to see that the natives are kept in subjection [emphases added] and that they perform their duties toward the lessee.¹**

***The Government agent is a sovereign there and his word is law.*²**

I issued an order - there *the agent is supreme ruler* and when an agent issues orders, they are generally obeyed promptly.³

From the beginning, the prevailing sentiment in the Pribilof management system was clear. What was good for the company and the government was good for the Aleuts, and that, indeed, Aleuts' welfare directly depended on the profitability of the seal harvest. With this assumption, federal officials could, with a clear conscience, concentrate on the seals and forget about the people.

Agents' increasing domination extended to all areas of Aleuts' lives political, social, economic, and personal, but this did not seem to disturb federal officials who were preoccupied if not dazzled by the great financial returns from the seal industry.

The company's intensive promotion drive brought a substantial increase in the value of fur seal skins; the average price during the twenty years of its lease was three times greater than it had been in 1868. With a harvest of 100,000 seals a year selling at an average price of \$14.67,³⁴ the company was making money hand over fist - an estimated \$20 million gross and \$18 million net in this twenty-year period.³⁵ The government's share was also impressive - a gross of \$6 million and a net of over \$5 million.³⁶ Henry Elliott, a conservationist and expert on the Pribilof Islands, noted in 1877 that the gross revenues to the Treasury not only covered all management costs but were six times greater than the federal government's total outlay for all services and programs in Alaska.³⁷

Agents also violated Aleuts' freedom in the use of their money. The company did not pay sealing wages directly to the Aleuts. After the shares were announced, the company deposited the money with its cashier, designating the amount of credit due each hunter. When a hunter needed money, he presented his passbook to the cashier and received silver in payment. Agents soon placed restraints on the amount of money a sealer could withdraw. They rationalized this infringement in terms of the need to stretch Aleuts' wages until the next sealing division.⁴⁴ However, as with the work classifications, manipulation of Aleuts' access to their money proved to be another powerful weapon for controlling Aleuts' work behavior.

Agents were able to coerce Aleuts' labor by dint of their enormous sanctioning power extending beyond the manipulation of classifications and money withdrawals. When Aleuts refused to work, agents fined them, put them in irons, threatened them with exile, and in some cases, actually banished them from the islands. The daily logs of a St. Paul agent give a detailed account of the imposition of these sanctions.

The government adopted other practices akin to serfdom, such as restricting Aleuts' movements to and from the islands. Technically, Aleuts were not confined to the islands, and the company observed a policy of offering free passage on its boats; but in practice, Aleuts could not leave or return to the islands without official permission.

Agent coercion reared its head in the education area too. Aleuts had no formal system of education until the Russian Orthodox church organized schools. In the 1830s Father Veniaminov started schools for both boys and girls in the Pribilofs, teaching the Russian language to aid his conversion goals and also teaching the Aleut language, for which task he codified the language and composed a grammar, dictionary, primers, and other books. Veniaminov admired the rapidity with which Aleuts became literate and bilingual. They were quick learners in many areas. Some became noted as chess players, and some, educated in Russia, became doctors and navigators. Aleuts placed high value on the Russian Orthodox church, to which they converted en masse, and Russian education, both of which came to be vital symbols of their cultural identity.

This educational honeymoon was short-lived. By 1873 agents began to complain about increasing Aleut resistance to the American schools, stemming from parents' fear that "in learning English their children will forget their Russian and weaken their attachment to the church." Aleuts resisted not learning English per se but the low priority agents placed on Russian education. The priests were allowed to teach Russian school only after the eight-month American school session ended. By 1873 the school population had dwindled to just a few students.

Education was one of the few areas of people management that commanded federal administrators' attention, even to the point of issuing explicit instructions to agents to compel Aleuts' school attendance. With this mandate, agents applied increasing pressure; they hit children and incarcerated both parents and children. An agents' daily log entry gives a vivid account of these pressures.

These punishments, as humiliating and intimidating as they were, did not by themselves effect the Aleuts' compliance but the imposition of fines did. Agents began to fine parents for every day a child was absent. Continued resistance by Aleuts threatened their very livelihood and they submitted, but covert resistance to the schools, manifested in a refusal to learn, continued for many years.

We asked at the outset of this chapter how agents achieved sovereign power over the Pribilof Aleuts. They had a chance for despotic rule and they took it, with the support of the Washington office.

Top managers' complicity cannot be excused on the basis of ignorance; they had access to the daily logs, correspondence, and reports that revealed agents' activities. By action or inaction, by silence or approval, by covert or overt means, managers supported the development of a politically repressive system on the Pribilofs, reflecting their dominant interest in economic, not humanitarian, goals. Moreover, they faced virtually no pressure to protect Aleuts' welfare and rights. Legislators certainly exerted none, although they were also aware of human abuses on the islands, abuses that were repeatedly mentioned in the 1876 and 1888 Congressional hearings.

In response to most such revelations, legislators often changed the subject or called a recess; they too seemed to consider the human condition peripheral to the Pribilof mission. Company managers also maintained silence about Treasury agents' excesses, probably because they did not want to hurt their chance for a lease renewal by offending government officials. Without counteracting pressure from any sources, agents, with the support of the federal government, could and did establish a form of totalitarian rule.

It is important to underline that in a period of steamrolling exploitation of workers by private industry, *it was the government*, not the private company, that established the serf-like features of labor relations in the Pribilofs - restrictions on travel and forced labor; it was the government, not the private company, that promoted political domination of Aleuts; it was the government, not the private company, that supported and encouraged agent totalitarianism in the Pribilofs.

Chapter 3. From Wage Earners to Wards, 1890-1909

At the beginning of the second twenty year lease, the Aleuts were wage earners. By its end they had become government wards supported by charity "hand-outs." A drastic change, yes? — brought about by the government's efforts to maintain its Pribilof

priorities in the face of a changing external environment. The seal herd was in precipitous decline due to the growing popularity of pelagic (high seas) sealing, which is very wasteful.

However, before tracing these developments, I shall first describe the events leading to the dramatic demise of the Alaska Commercial Company in the seal islands. When it came time for the United States to grant the second lease in 1890, the Alaska Commercial Company's reputation was badly tarnished. In the early part of its lease, the company had 'faced continuous attacks by rival bidders and other San Francisco traders. In pursuit of their interests these free entrepreneurs organized the Alaska Trader's Protective Association, later renamed the Anti-Monopoly Association of the Pacific Coast. The Association vented its dissatisfactions in the *Alaska Herald* newspaper published in San Francisco between 1868 and 1876. *Herald* articles charged the company with mistreating Pribilof Aleuts and surreptitiously exceeding its annual seal quota. They also accused the government of suppressing a pro-test petition from the Aleuts. Allegedly, the Aleuts had given the petition to special Treasury agent Buynitsky in 1869, to another agent in 1870, and finally, in 1871, sent the petition directly to the *Herald*. The petition asserted that the Aleuts had been reduced to a state of slavery, compelled to labor, were at the mercy of the company, and were shut off from all intercourse with other portions of the public. Company spokesmen declared the petition a gross fabrication.¹

These charges attracted nationwide attention. The virus of war and boom gave rise to rampant scandals involving both government and industry, and especially government corruption in relation to the great land steals. With growing 'public concern about the concentration of wealth and the alliance between the government and big business, Congress in 1876 undertook an investigation of the Alaska Commercial Company.

And so the government, responsible for protecting Aleuts from potential abuse by a private company, itself created a system of political and economic domination and abuse, justified in terms that the Aleuts were wards of the government. And we see the forces that led the government to set up such a totalitarian system on the Pribilofs. The system grew from a set of priorities that placed economic incentives and market place standards first and the Aleuts' welfare last. Because Aleut labor was essential to its economic goals, the government assured the Aleuts' physical survival. But Aleut autonomy and freedom were not necessary to achieve its mission; in fact, officials saw them as a deterrent.

More germane to bringing revenues into the treasury was forced labor, emasculation of the Aleuts' political authority, and punishments, including exile, for Aleut defiance. Nonetheless, in the economically prosperous years of the first lease, the government was satisfied that the Aleuts earned a reasonable wage and were paid in cash as were other American workers. In the years of the second lease, with the threatened extermination of the seals, a severe economic downturn, and an actual loss in federal revenues, cost considerations became the dominant concern. With a tradition of ignoring and even trampling on the Aleuts' rights, it was a simple short step to denying them their right to cash wages and to payment for labor performed. And given the times in which they lived, when the Indian wars were still in progress and when Indians were defined as wards with no civil rights, it was a simple step to justify any treatment of the Pribilof

Aleuts in terms of Indian wardship status. When government agencies in general and the Pribilot management agency in particular became more bureaucratically sophisticated, the Pribilof program routinized its operations and codified abusive practices that agents had informally introduced in the past and that Washington officials had implicitly blessed. Economic and political domination of the Pribilof Aleuts became official federal policy.

The Pribilof program was in trouble. The seal decline had reached crisis proportions - from an estimated two million animals in 1870 to only about 133,000 in 1910.¹ The program faced other threats to its stability in the 1910s such as continued revenue losses and a national scandal.

The crisis in seals could not be blamed on the private lease system but it came to be associated with it

More important in discrediting the private lease system, however, was the emergence of a conservation lobby in the United States, activated by Theodore Roosevelt's succession to the Presidency in 1901. Before that, people had thought of natural resources primarily as a source for industrial exploitation. Roosevelt, however, popularized a conservation concept that stimulated the organization of national conservation groups, such as the Campfire Club of America. The Senate established a committee on conservation. And, in 1909, President Taft appointed a fur seal advisory board composed of prominent biologists, all but one of whom had visited the Pribilofs.³ These groups clamored for an end to the private lease system and a moratorium on sealing in the Pribilofs to give the herd a chance to recover.

Congress responded to these pressures with the 1910 Fur Seal Act.⁴ The Act ended the private lease system and assigned sole responsibility for the Pribilof program to the Department of Commerce and Labor. The Department and its Bureau of Fisheries were responsible not only for regulating the harvests and protecting the herd, but for harvesting and marketing the skins. Like its predecessor, the Act provided for the welfare of Aleuts. But additionally it required the Department to pay Aleut sealers fair compensation for their labor, though it offered no standards for determining what constituted fair compensation.

In 1915 it negotiated a contract with a St. Louis firm, Funsten and Brothers, to process and market the skins. Six years later, it signed a new contract with Funsten's successor, Fouke Fur Company (Fouke had been president of Funsten's),⁷ which, aside from periodic supplements and one short interruption, is still in effect.

(This virtual sales monopoly existed for over 60 years. Like the current IFQ processing restrictions, in which the government mandates that fishermen sell their catch to a designated processor. The Funsten Company realized that you did not have to control harvesting to have a monopoly. Forced sales to one government designated company, was sufficient to obtain a monopoly.)

With all the instability of this period, the Bureau of Fisheries also faced a national scandal. Since the beginning of sole federal jurisdiction, the record increasingly reveals instances of federal employee drunkenness and sexual abuse of Aleut women. In 1911

the St. George physician confessed to seduction of two girls who had come to his office for professional services. One of the girls became pregnant as a result and died in childbirth. The agent was irate.

At 2 p.m., word was brought by that the Orloff infant had died and at 7 this evening Nadessa died having been unconscious about 36 hours.

An examination of the recent report by Mr. Henry W. Elliot of his visit to the Seal Islands in the summer of 1913 shows a number of extracts from the island logs. It is observed that the agents . . . making entries into the logs have not confined them- selves to statements of facts. They have apparently felt free to incorporate into the logs personal opinions and comments. Matters of these kinds have no legitimate place in the official log.

You are directed hereafter to record in the log all important facts as to the daily occurrences on the islands, *omitting expressions of opinion and personal comments.*³⁰

Agents must have received similar instructions regarding annual reports, for these became increasingly routine, divested of the rich comments and descriptions in earlier reports and confined to such pedestrian matters as records of harvests and payments to Aleut sealers.

This change in agents' role may have sprung from an additional source. Now that the federal government was solely responsible and accountable for the Pribilof program, managers wanted tighter control over agents; they wanted, not agent independence as in the past, but agent loyalty, reliability of response, and obedience to rules and regulations issued from above. Whatever motivated these changes, the upshot was to silence agents and divest them of most of their power.

Chapter 5. A Colonial Regime, 1918-1942

One day I picked up my bag of groceries. We got only two cans of tuna fish, number 2 size, that was our whole supply of meat for the week. It was my wife's birthday. So I thought, what the heck, we'll have a party and use both cans. We ate potatoes and rice for the rest of the week.¹

Forty years after the event, this old Aleuts' words still echo with anguish.

Dramatic economic and social reforms swept the nation in the 1930s; collective bargaining rights; wages and hours legislation; social security benefits, welfare benefits that, among other things, replaced relief baskets with cash; and an enlightened Indian Reorganization Act. Indeed, the future looked brighter to the average American; it retained a dismal hue in the Pribilofs.

The Pribilof management system had become set in concrete. Social systems tend to develop a life of their own, a set of attitudes, norms, and practices that, although originally adopted as means to an end, become ends in themselves; they become

comfortable, familiar, automatic sets of responses. How often managers explained their practices by saying, "but that is the way it has always been done. "

By the 1920s this familiar, comfortable system in the Pribilofs had the awmarks of a typical colonialism. In part, this reflected national attitudes toward Alaska—the pioneer philosophy of grabbing what was available and getting out fast. Alaska was a highly specialized source of raw materials and profits for the home country. A federal government-private corporate regime for the control and exploitation of these resources dominated Alaska's development at least until World War II. Prior to that time, white Alaskans' efforts to control their resources and destinies and achieve political independence met with indifference.²

This colonialist attitude obviously influenced the evolution of the Pribilof management system. But that system was not simply a subset of the broader Alaska pattern; it was a different variety of colonialism because Aleuts are a racial minority whom government subjected to far more blatant domination than Alaska whites ever experienced. The Aleuts could not, as the whites did, move freely, marry whom they pleased, organize to promote their interests, engage in free trade, or receive New Deal benefits. Furthermore, while few interest groups protested Alaska colonialism, none expressed concern about that on the Pribilofs. Remember, the Pribilofs were extremely isolated, especially prior to air service. The government allowed few visitors and maintained a policy of secrecy about its operations. The only outside group with knowledge of events on the islands, the Russian Orthodox church, remained silent because the church discouraged secular activities.. The Pribilof situation was simply hidden from public visibility, insulated from interest-group pressures. A far more extreme form of colonialism developed in the Pribilofs, closely resembling that of European nations in Africa and South America.

The colonial concept is useful in explaining why in the 1930s the Aleuts' situation worsened as that of other Americans improved. A colonial relationship characteristically involves a developed industrial nation(1) appropriating and exploiting the resources of an underdeveloped one, (2) using the labor power of workers in that nation to develop the resource; (3) paying the workers near-starvation wages buttressed by special goods and services to keep them alive and functioning, (4) undermining them psychologically to keep them abject and thus available for such exploitation, and (5) dominating their political life to assure access to the human natural resources.³

The United States, of course, was not a foreign government, but :the Pribilofs was a case of internal colonialism. The issue of resource appropriation in the Pribilofs is not clear cut. The government's right to claim ownership of a wildlife resource for conservation purposes is well established, but noc right to own the resource for commercial development and profit making. Aside from these unique attributes, the government's relationship with Pribilovians was typically colonial—in paying near-starvation wages supplemented by goods and services, in political and economic domination, and in psychological debasement.

Colonialist structures are accompanied by an ideology that depicts the colonized as less than human, as bereft of ordinary human feelings—therefore undeserving of human rights. If colonial administrators perceivede their subjects as fully human, they would lack the justification andthe will to keep them oppressed. With this mentality,

administratorstrate indignities on the colonized that they would consider outrageous if anyone directed the same behavior toward them.⁴ This ideologicalization inevitably leads to blaming the victims for their condition. One wonders, how, when colonialist ideologies and practices conflict with the values of the home country, administrator loyalty is maintained. It is bought by special rewards in money, status, prestige, and privilege, rewards symbolizing a superior status by dint of class, race, and occupational position.

But why the resistance to compensating Aleuts like other American~ workers? Was it simply a question of bureaucratic lethargy, of thoughtlessly continuing a traditional practice? In part it was both, especially in context of management's entrenched colonialist mentality. Listen to superintendent's view of Aleuts in 1936.

... it is true that the natives will spend their money for luxuries instead of ties. It would not be so bad if they would look after their luxuries, but we all know that they won't.

It is going to still take years of training before the natives will understand the of either money or merchandise, and they never will unless we train them to do and make them suffer when they waste their funds.¹⁴

Why should managers concern themselves with paying Aleuts in cash they were convinced Aleuts were incapable of managing it?

But pause a moment. Bureaucratic habits and regressive attitudes persist precisely because they serve a purpose; in this case, the purpose to do not just with the in kind payments but a combined system of M and bonus payments. Because Aleuts were totally dependent on the as the only source for cash, managers' manipulation of the bonus was a powerful means of control. A high-ranking official in 1941 openly acknowledged this function of the bonus.

An interesting feature of the Sealing and Foxing Division is that at times it is very valuable from the standpoint of administration and maintaining control over natives. Upon several occasions when infractions of the rules have occurred, the agent demoted a man from one sealing class to a lower class, thus reducing the amount of his income. The possibility of such action has been a strong deterrent to violation of the rules.¹⁵

The most compelling incentive to retaining in kind compensation, however, was still its cost-saving value. The presence of surplus federal revenuesw from the seal industry did not relieve Congressional pressures on the program to make money. On the contrary, this expectation intensified in , because of the losses suffered during the lean years and the moratorium on commercial harvests¹⁶ the new international obligations; and the Great Depression, during which Congress at times impounded the Pribilof budget.¹⁷ These pressures embroiled the Bureau in cost considerations. And managers appreciated the cost-saving value of the in kind wage payments. The Pribilof superintendent in 1925 cast light on how this process worked, how the supplies could be manipulated to effect wage reductions and iegulate Aleuts' cash expenditures.

We are now paying the natives a considerable amount of money each season in cash. In a great many instances, in fact in most cases, a large proportion of this money is being spent for items which are not of any real value, and are not essential . . .

There are, however, a great many items in the schedule which the natives should not be supplied free of charge, but they should purchase them with their own funds. It will therefore be necessary to make reductions in the number of absolutely unessential items heretofore furnished. ¹⁸

These "absolutely inessential items" probably referred to such goods as a pair of dress shoes, a second dress, candles, matches, kitchenware, bedding little else was available in the government store. But the point is, by manipulating these supplies, management effectively -reduced wages and accomplished this in a less visible manner than would have been possible had Aleuts received a full cash wage. Yes, economic incentives played a powerful role in management's determination to retain the system of in kind and bonus wages, a system which it justified in terms of Aleuts' inability to handle money.

Keeping people on the edge of hunger and denying them the smallest consumer pleasure reflects the dehumanizing process in the colonial relationship; it demoralizes people and demoralization renders them abject and dependent on whatever crumbs are thrown their way.

To plunge the sword of debasement yet deeper, management discriminated against Aleuts even in the distribution of domestic animals-reindeer, sheep, and cows.

The government had cows but they gave the meat to the white people. We only got beef on Christmas and Easter.

Racism and segregation are bedrocks of a colonial system, serving several functions-keeping the oppressed demoralized and without spirit, rewarding managers with symbols of superiority, and most importantly, keeping staff and victims separated lest association breed empathy--sympathetic employees might speak out, protest, cause an investigation, and thereby threaten the system. Better to encourage employees to think of the Aleuts as "thorough-bred animals."

They told me I was in the fifth grade but I noticed they gave me the same books I used in the fourth grade. ⁶⁰

What does it mean for the Bureau to insist on American education and then provide such a grossly inadequate one? Again it reflects the colonialist nature of the system on the Pribilofs. The Bureau needed not educated Aleuts but work horses who knew enough English and arithmetic to manage their jobs. And specifically, the Bureau did not want enlightened Aleuts who might organize around their dissatisfactions or take Bureau positions, acts that could threaten the underpinnings of the segregated system.

With this deficient education, Aleut learning was probably unremarkable. Teachers certainly thought so. But as in most explanations of Aleut capabilities, the whites in charge tended to question not the adequacy of the programs they introduced but of the

Aleuts. The 1927 head teacher at St. Paul explained the low levels of Aleut learning in the following terms:

That the pupils are retarded is beyond a doubt. This is charged to:

1. To an innate lack of mental ability.
2. Use of the Aleut language.
3. General inertness and irresponsibility.

Most social organizations begin as entities designed to fulfill certain functions and goals. To survive they must take into account and adapt to the demands of the interest groups that surround them. But the Pribilof system was uniquely isolated and insulated from such demands. Its functions were highly specialized and did not attract general interest. Its operation took place in a remote part of the country, unseen by others. Management maintained a policy of secrecy about the program and required special permits for all visits. Through staff selection policies, centralized control, and attractive rewards in status and prestige, top management succeeded in neutralizing middle and lower-level managers. And the Russian Orthodox Church, the only outside organization with knowledge about conditions on the islands, remained silent in its avoidance of secular involvements. All of these factors protected management from having to respond to interest-group pressures and from having to update its practices to conform to changes in national laws and attitudes.

That was the situation at the time of the World War II evacuation of the Pribilof Aleuts, a time when management, in its most execrable acts to date, exposed the Aleuts to subhuman conditions in camps. In an incredible denial of the evidence of their senses, managers believed that they were as immune from public scrutiny and criticism in a populated area immersed in the war effort as they had been on the isolated Pribilof Islands, and tried to keep the Aleuts virtually imprisoned in the camps. Believing that other institutions would support their peculiar relationship with the Aleuts, managers asked the draft board to exempt Aleuts from military service; when that failed, they tried to prevent the Aleuts from taking jobs outside the camps; when that failed, they importuned the United States Employment Service to place the Aleuts in groups isolated from other workers and to pay their wages in a lump sum to the federal agents; when that failed, managers kept tabs on the Aleuts who left the camps and threatened them with permanent loss of Pribilof residency rights if they hesitated to return to the islands when management commanded.

With these pressures, the Aleut sealers returned to the islands for the 1943 sealing season despite the presence of the Japanese in the Aleutians, and nearly all the Aleuts returned for good in 1944. Once back on the islands, still with its head in the sand, management assumed that it could restore the former colonial relationship.

But the tide had ineluctably turned. Visitors to the evacuation camps threatened to expose the anachronistic Pribilof management system. Fredericka Martin, who during her stay on the islands in 1941 made a pervasive commitment to reform the Pribilof system, wrote articles decrying conditions on the islands and sought and won support from an ever-growing number of sympathizers. The Indian Rights movement took up the banner of the Aleuts' cause and attracted the interest of prominent attorneys, including

Felix Cohen, the foremost authority on Indian law in the nation. And the Aleuts themselves, emboldened by their experiences and contacts in Juneau during the evacuation, resolved to emancipate themselves from federal government control. These forces combined to shake Pribilof management from its lethargy, to awaken it to the reality of a new interest group environment. At first, managers resisted change, attempting to discredit the Aleut activists and their supporters. But reform pressure mounted until they were forced to adapt to some of the demands. They introduced a wage reform in 1950 and a more meaningful one in 1962 that gave Aleuts nearly equal status to that of other federal workers.

Management proposed converting to a seasonal sealing operation and abandoning the islands for the rest of the year. This plan involved relocating Aleuts to other places, but when most of the Aleuts refused to be relocated, the abandonment idea was discarded. It was replaced by a plan to transfer responsibilities for island management, excluding the seals, to the Aleut people. Beginning in 1960, management policy emphasized emancipating the Aleuts in order to equip them for management responsibilities. Aleut independence, Aleut training, Aleut political autonomy—these became the policy motifs of the 1960s and 1970s. What the reformers left undone, management completed in response to the unfavorable economic outlook in the seal industry.

Nevertheless, management reappraised and reformed its ideology and personnel policies to effectuate emancipation. By this time, the management institution had undergone another reorganization. In 1956 the Fish and Wildlife Service established two bureaus, Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, and Commercial Fisheries, each with its own director. The latter retained responsibility for the Pribilof program. Furthermore, the Fish and Wildlife Service abolished its fisheries office in Alaska when Alaska assumed responsibility for its own fisheries management in 1959. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service hired the head of the former Alaska office, Donald McKernan, a biologist, as director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries.

Immediately, McKernan tried to replace the conservative Olson, who perceived Aleuts as incapable and inferior, with Howard Baltzo. McKernan had worked with Baltzo in the past. A twenty-year veteran of the federal fisheries service, Baltzo had struggled tirelessly against the salmon packers to protect the fishery and had earned a reputation as a principled, courageous, person. However, the substitution of Baltzo for Olson proved difficult to effect. As Olson resisted it, McKernan allowed him to remain titular general manager of the Pribilofs until his retirement a short time later. In the interim, McKernan created a new job title for Baltzo, program director, which carried de facto management responsibilities for the islands.¹⁰

Baltzo's perception of his function derived from second-hand information.

I was told that the Department of Interior expected an explosion, that a Communist party group in New York City planned to 'blow the lid' off the Pribilof program; and consequently, the Department wanted to clean up the operation and eliminate injustices as quickly as possible.

Baltzo clearly perceived his role as emancipator of the Aleuts: "Nothing existed in writing until the emancipation was well along, but my job was make the natives independent and bring them into the mainstream."¹¹ As the new policy direction had not yet filtered down to middle-level administrators, the Washington office granted Baltzo direct and ready access. Frequently Baltzo bypassed the Seattle regional office in making decisions.¹² McKernan and Baltzo acted as a team in the emancipation drive, often against the opposition of the old-guard managers who remained in the Service. A new twist, yes? For the first time in the history of federal government administration of the Pribilofs, the management bureaucracy contained a pro-Aleut faction, or to be more precise, a partially committed pro Aleut faction, for traces of colonialist mentality persisted.