Refining the Proposed Action and Purpose and Need Statement for GOA Rationalization
NMFS Staff Report
June 2003

Overview

Over the past year, the Council has developed a suite of elements and options for consideration as part of the GOA Rationalization SEIS process. Through the development of these alternatives, the Council has used the SEIS public scoping process and public testimony to identify this suite of alternatives, elements, options. This process has refined the proposed action, purpose and need, and alternatives, elements, options for consideration for GOA Rationalization. These refinements are being incorporated into the SEIS that Council and NMFS staff are currently preparing. The Council should consider reviewing the revisions in the proposed action and the purpose and need statements described here. Adopting this refined language will ensure that the alternatives, elements, options under consideration specifically address the goals of GOA Rationalization, fulfill the requirements of NEPA, and provide the public with guidance about the proposed action and how the alternatives, elements, and options address the stated purpose and need. The proposed action and purpose and need statement can be modified again in the future as the Council develops a more precise approach and suite of alternatives, elements, and options.

Background

In April 2002, the Council recommended initiation of the GOA Rationalization SEIS, and adopted a problem statement and a list of objectives for rationalization (**Attachment 1**). Using guidance from the Council's problem statement and objectives, the Council's GOA Work Group committee, and suggestions by NMFS and Council staff, NMFS published a notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an SEIS for GOA rationalization in the *Federal Register* on May 29, 2002 (67 FR 37393) (**Attachment 2**). The NOI invited public comment on the proposed action, the scope, and alternatives. The NOI defined the purpose and need, scope, and potential alternatives rather broadly because the Council had not refined the proposed action and a broad range of public comments was desired. The scope and proposed action in the NOI were developed at an early stage of the SEIS process and public comments have helped the Council to further refine the purpose and need.

Proposed Action

During the public scoping process, the public identified "rationalization" as the proposed action that the GOA Rationalization SEIS should address. The NOI provided a rather broad description of the proposed action as it was understood at that time. Since the publication of the NOI, the Council has considered public comments and through its deliberations has refined the proposed action. Specifically, the Council has developed a suite of alternatives, elements, options that would allocate harvest and possibly processing privileges and has eliminated an alternative to modify the existing license limitation program because it was not believed that such an alternative would address the purpose and need. **Based on the actions taken by the Council, we recommend that the proposed action be described as follows:**

> The Council is proposing a new management regime that rationalizes groundfish fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska west of 140 degrees longitude. A rationalization program includes policies and management measures that may increase the economic efficiency of GOA groundfish fisheries by

providing economic incentives to reduce excessive capital investment. These management measures would apply to those species, or groups of species identified by the Council as benefitting from additional economic incentives that may be provided by rationalization. This rationalization program would exclude the hook-and-line sablefish fishery currently prosecuted under the IFQ Program. Rationalization also may provide economic incentives to reduce excess capital through the establishment of transferable harvesting privileges or other share-based systems for allocating access to the fishery resources.

Purpose and Need for the Action

The reason for defining a clear purpose and need statement is to ensure that the alternatives that have been developed by the Council are adequate to meet the identified problem. Guidance concerning the purpose and need is provided in The NEPA Book (Bass et al. 2001) and How to Write Quality EISs and EAs (The Shipley Group 1998).

> *The statement of purpose and need helps the lead agency select the range of alternatives to be evaluated in the EIS. This section explains the underlying purpose and need to which the agency is responding in proposing the alternatives, including the proposed action (40 C.F.R. 1502.13), and the benefits that would be realized by carrying out the proposed action. Make your purpose and need an honest, full explanation of why the agency is considering an action.* ***Explain who wants to do what and where and why they want to do it.*** *If the purpose and need for the project are rigorously defined, the number of solutions which will satisfy the conditions can be more readily identified and narrowly limited. If properly described, it also limits the range of alternatives which may be considered reasonable, prudent, and practicable in compliance with the CEQ regulations.* ***The federal agency's preferred alternative is the one that it believes would best fulfill the purpose and need of the action.***
> *(Bass et al. 2001, The Shipley Group 1998)*

The purpose and need statement recommended here incorporates the problem statement and the objectives adopted by the Council in April 2002. **Based on the actions taken by the Council, we recommend that the purpose and need be described as follows:**

> The purpose of the proposed action is to create a management program that provides greater economic stability for harvesters, processors, and communities. The allocation of harvesting and possibly processing privileges would allow harvesters and processors to manage their operations in a more economically efficient manner. Rationalization of the harvesting sector eliminates the derby-style race for fish by providing economic incentives to consolidate operations and improve operational efficiencies of remaining operators. Greater economic stability may improve stock conservation by creating incentives to eliminate wasteful fishing practices. Rationalization programs may provide additional opportunities to address conservation goals by providing opportunities to utilize fishing methods that reduce bycatch and gear conflicts. Rationalization programs may also reduce the incentive to fish during unsafe conditions.
>
> The need for the proposed action is reflected in the increasing participation in the Gulf of Alaska fisheries, as well as increasing catching and processing capacity, which has intensified the race for fish with the attendant problems of:
>
> 1. reduced economic viability of the harvesters, processors, and GOA communities
> 2. high bycatch,

3. decreased safety,
4. reduced product value and utilization,
5. jeopardy to community stability and their historic reliance on groundfish fishing and processing,
6. limited the ability of the fishery harvesters and processors to respond to changes in the ecosystem
7. limited the ability to adapt to Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) requirements to minimize bycatch and protect habitat,
8. limited the ability to adapt to changes to other applicable law (i.e., Endangered Species Act).

All of these factors have made achieving the goals of the National Standards in the Magnuson-Stevens Act difficult and encourage reevaluation of the status quo management of the GOA groundfish fisheries. The management tools in the existing FMP for GOA groundfish do not provide managers with the ability to improve the economic efficiency of the fishery and effectively solve the excess harvesting capacity and resource allocation problems in the GOA groundfish fisheries. The Council has determined that some form of rationalization program is warranted.

Attachments

Attachment 1: April 2002 Problem Statement
Attachment 2: Notice of Intent to Prepare a SEIS.

Attachment 1: Problem Statement for Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Rationalization – April 2002 (Council Version)

Increasing participation in the Gulf of Alaska fisheries, as well as increasing catching and processing capacity, have intensified the race for fish with the attendant problems of:

- reduced economic viability of the harvesters, processors, and GOA communities
- high bycatch,
- decreased safety,
- reduced product value and utilization,
- jeopardy to community stability and their historic reliance on groundfish fishing and processing,
- limited the ability of the fishery harvesters and processors to respond to changes in the ecosystem
- limited the ability to adapt to Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) requirements to minimize bycatch and protect habitat,
- limited the ability to adapt to changes to other applicable law (i.e., Endangered Species Act).

All of these factors have made achieving Magnuson-Stevens Act goals difficult and force reevaluation of the status quo.

Staff Discussion Paper
Entry Level Pelagic Shelf Rockfish Fishery
NMFS Staff: Alaska Region

Overview

This analysis reviews the potential implications of establishing an entry level rockfish program for jig vessels and longline vessels under 60' length overall (LOA) as part of the GOA rationalization SEIS. This analysis identifies: (1) current harvest levels in the pelagic shelf rockfish (PSR) and Pacific Ocean Perch (POP) fisheries; (2) potential harvests and exvessel values anticipated under the various options; (3) potential levels of participation in an entry level PSR or POP program; and (4) administrative concerns or issues that may need to be addressed.

Summary of Key Issues

1. The PSR and POP fisheries are almost exclusively offshore trawl fisheries, largely prosecuted by the catcher/processor fleet, except in the Central GOA.
2. Existing data do not indicate any significant participation by fixed gear vessels, nor specifically by longline and jig vessels under 60' LOA in either of these fisheries.
3. An entry-level fishery would likely shift effort to nearshore fishing grounds more accessible to the small-boat fleet.
4. Current fishery data indicate that most of the fishery occurs in deeper offshore waters that may be difficult for smaller vessels to effectively exploit.
5. Based on current exvessel values and possible TAC allocation to this entry level fishery it does not appear to offer a substantial economic return.

Pelagic Shelf Rockfish

6. The PSR fishery is not fully utilized, but is well-utilized in the Central GOA.
7. The range of allocations to an entry-level PSR fishery is relatively small and has limited economic value based on current TAC and exvessel price estimates.
8. Establishing an entry level fishery could shift effort into nearshore areas and increase harvests on dark dusky rockfish, yellowtail and widow rockfish, and could affect the bycatch rates on other rockfish species.

Pacific Ocean Perch

9. The POP fishery is fully utilized and an entry-level fishery would reallocate from existing participants.
10. Longline and jig gear may not effectively harvest this species.
11. The range of allocations to an entry level POP fishery are larger and may be more economically viable.

Nature of the PSR Fishery

The pelagic shelf rockfish (PSR) assemblage in the GOA is comprised of three species: dusky rockfish (*Sebastes ciliatus*), yellowtail rockfish (*S. flavidus*), and widow rockfish (*S. entomelas*). Pelagic shelf rockfish can be defined as those species of *Sebastes* that inhabit waters of the continental shelf of the Gulf of Alaska, and that typically exhibit a midwater schooling behavior. Gulfwide, dusky rockfish is the most

important species in the assemblage, whereas yellowtail and widow rockfish are generally considered minor species in Alaska waters. Roughly 99 % of the total harvests in the PSR complex are of dusky rockfish during the 1998-2001 time period (data are not currently available for 2002 harvest composition) (Clausen et al. 2002).

Until 1998, black rockfish (*S. melanops*) and blue rockfish (*S. mystinus*) were also included in the PSR assemblage. However, in April 1998, a GOA Fishery Management Plan amendment went into effect that removed these two species from the federal management plan and transferred their jurisdiction to the State of Alaska. Total harvests in the PSR fishery during the 1995 - 2002 period are shown in **Tables 1 and 2.** The percentage of harvests by gear type during this period are shown in **Table 3**.

Table 1: Harvests in the PSR Fishery by Regulatory Area in Metric Tons

Year	WG	CG	WY	SEO	Total GOA Harvest	GOA ABC
1995	108	2,247	471	64	2,891	5,190
1996	182	1,849	190	75	2,296	5,190
1997	96	1,959	536	38	2,629	5,140
1998	60	2,477	553	22	3,113	4,880
1999	130	3,835	672	22	4,659	4,880
2000	190	3,074	445	22	3,731	5,980
2001	121	2,436	439	12	3,008	5,980
2002	181	2,670	448	4	3,303	5,490

Notes: (1) Total Harvests prior to 1999 may include harvests of Blue and Black Rockfish which are no longer managed in the PSR complex. (2) Data Source: NMFS Alaska Region.

Table 2: Percentage of TAC Harvested in the PSR Fishery by Regulatory Area

Year	WG	CG	WY	SEO	EG (WY & SEO)
1995	12%	50%			50%
1996	20%	58%			25%
1997	17%	55%			58%
1998		76%	--	--	58%
1999	25%	114%	91%	9%	
2000	35%	75%	77%	3%	
2001	22%	60%	76%	2%	
2002	36%	77%	70%	1%	

Notes: (1) Total Harvests prior to 1999 may include harvests of Blue and Black Rockfish which are no longer managed in the PSR complex. (2) Data Source: NMFS Alaska Region.

PSR is typically harvested as a target species assemblage, roughly 99% of all harvests in the Western, Central, and West Yakutat Management Areas during the 1995-2002 period (**Table 3**) are made by trawl gear. Within the fixed gear harvests, roughly 99% of that harvest is by hook and line gear. Although, the PSR fishery is opened for fixed gear on January 1, most of the harvest occurs during the trawl fishery in July. NMFS opens rockfish in July to trawl gear to minimize bycatch of halibut which tend to move further inshore during the summer months and out of the deeper waters where the PSR and other rockfish fisheries occur. The typical pattern for trawl fisheries is to prosecute POP, then Northern Rockfish, and then PSR rockfish. NMFS typically closes the PSR fishery during the summer, usually in late July, along with other rockfish fisheries to ensure that the TAC is not exceeded due to the high catching capacity in the fleet relative to the TAC. NMFS also considers potential bycatch of sablefish and other species in the rockfish assemblage during inseason management. This closure occurs prior to reaching the TAC for PSR. There is no gear split in the GOA between fixed and trawl gear, nor is there a specific allocation between the inshore and offshore sectors. Therefore, longline and jig fisheries are essentially unrestricted in their access to the PSR fishery for roughly six months, and harvests during that time period are very limited.

Based on the relatively limited harvests by fixed gear, this analysis did not estimate the number of vessels by LOA that may have fished for either PSR or POP. Such an analysis would require examining individual fish ticket data and is beyond the scope of this limited analysis. However, a review of existing data indicates that during the 1999 - 2002 time period most of the fixed gear harvests of PSR are from C/P vessels in the Western Gulf and West Yakutat management areas, and from inshore vessels in the Central Gulf. A review of harvest patterns prior to 1999 is difficult because Blue and Black rockfish were managed by NMFS during this time period, and these catch data are not easily distinguished from other PSR species without more detailed analysis. The catch data by sector are not presented here due to potential confidentiality requirements that may exist given the small amount of harvests and the possibility that less than four vessels harvested PSR during this time period in a given management area in a given year. More detailed analysis can be provided at a later date if required.

Table 3: Harvests of PSR by gear group in the WG, CG, and WY Management Areas in Metric Tons

Year	WG Trawl	WG Fixed Gear	CG Trawl	CG Fixed Gear	WY Trawl	WY Fixed Gear	Average Percentage of WG, CG, WY Harvests by Hook and Line & Jig
1995	68	40	1,827	421	446	90	19.1 %
1996	71	110	1,582	267	180	85	20.1 %
1997	24	72	1,753	206	496	78	13.5 %
1998	58	1	2,394	83	548	27	0.4 %
1999	128	3	3,825	11	667	5	0.4 %
2000	187	2	3,063	11	445	1	0.4%
2001	119	2	2,421	14	438	0	0.5%
2002	175	9	2,664	16	448	0	0.8%

Notes: (1) Harvests prior to 1999 may include Blue and Black Rockfish which are no longer managed with the PSR complex. (2) Prior to 1999 there was not a separate allocation of PSR to West Yakutat. (3) The SEO and WY Areas were managed under a single EG TAC. (4) In 1997, the CG PSR fishery was allocated to a nearshore and an offshore TAC. (5) Data Source: NMFS Alaska Region.

The vast majority of harvests in the PSR occur in Federal waters. Analysis by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) indicates that a small proportion of total harvests occur in the parallel fishery during the period from 1998-2001 (**Table 4**). Several of the most heavily targeted trawling grounds may be 40-60 miles from the nearest port and equally distant from shore. Catches of PSR are concentrated at several offshore banks of the outer continental shelf, especially the "W" grounds west of Yakutat, Portlock Bank northeast of Kodiak Is, and around Albatross Bank south of Kodiak Island and the highest catch-per-unit effort in the commercial fishery is generally at depths of 100-149 m (Clausen et al. 2002).

Most of the dusky rockfish harvested in the trawl fishery is a lighter colored rockfish. However, the North Pacific Groundfish Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Reports (SAFE) report notes that "two distinct species of dusky rockfish likely occur in the Gulf of Alaska: an inshore, shallow water, dark-colored variety; and a lighter-colored variety found in deeper water offshore. No actual reclassification of dusky rockfish has yet been made, but a publication is currently in preparation that will propose the formal separation of the two varieties into distinct species (Clausen et al. 2002)." This reclassification could affect future stock assessments and management strategies.

Total harvests of dark dusky rockfish may be greater within nearshore waters than harvests statistics indicate. The 2002 SAFE report notes that "in past years sizeable portion (perhaps 25%) of the fish reported as 'black rockfish' in the Kenai Peninsula jig fishery may have actually been dark dusky rockfish. Dark dusky rockfish and black rockfish often co-occur in nearshore kelp beds of the Gulf of Alaska, and they are superficially similar in appearance, especially in body color, which leads to misidentification." The total harvests of the dusky rockfish component of the PSR fishery could be higher than current catch statistics indicate if misidentification occurs in other areas of the State during the Blue and Black rockfish fishery. The 2002 SAFE report also notes that once additional confirmation on the taxamonic differences between dark and light dusky rockfish is available it may be appropriate to consider deferring management of that species to the State of Alaska in a separate FMP amendment (Clausen et al., 2002).

Table 4: Pelagic Shelf Rockfish Harvest in Metric Tons from State Waters during the Parallel Fishery.

Year	WG Trawl	WG Fixed Gear	CG Trawl	CG Fixed Gear
1995	Conf.	54.8	1.4	128.9
1996	Conf.	105.8	19.9	174.2
1997	Conf.	91.5	6.1	118.5
1998	Conf.	Conf.	4.5	2.4
1999	Conf.	Conf.	Conf.	3.4
2000	0	Conf.	Conf.	5.8
2001	Conf.	Conf.	Conf.	10.5

Note: (1) Harvests prior to 1999 may include Blue and Black Rockfish which are no longer managed with the PSR complex. (2) Data Source: ADF&G.

It is not clear from the existing data whether a PSR fishery specifically for jig gear and longline vessels under 60' LOA would provide considerably more fishing opportunities than currently exist. Harvest patterns indicate that the fishery is conducted largely offshore by trawl vessels. During the 2002 fishery, 93% of the Western Gulf, 50% of the Central Gulf, and 100% of the West Yakutat PSR fishery was harvested by trawl catcher processor vessels. Traditionally, the Central Gulf is the only region with a substantial portion of the PSR fishery harvested by inshore vessels. A more detailed analysis would provide specific information on the harvest patterns and location of the existing fishery. Based on the available data it does not appear that there is any significant harvests by longline or jig vessels under 60' LOA.

Other factors that would need to be considered prior to establishing an incentive fishery would be the potential effects of a separate allocation on sablefish, halibut, and other rockfish bycatch in a small open-access or incentive fishery. Currently, bycatch in the PSR fishery is most commonly associated with northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, and harlequin rockfish. There is no information on the bycatch of pelagic shelf rockfish in non-rockfish fisheries, but it is presumed to be small. Presumably, an allocation of halibut and sablefish bycatch would need to be made to the entry level PSR fishery in order to provide adequate bycatch to prosecute this fishery. The amount of bycatch that might be required was not analyzed.

If a small longline and jig fishery did develop, it may occur in nearshore waters during the summer and halibut bycatch could increase relative to the existing deep water trawl fishery. This could affect the bycatch that may occur in nearshore fisheries, specifically shortraker, rougheye, and thornyhead rockfish which typically occur closer to shore. Also, it is not clear if modifying the gear types and locations of the PSR fishery would have an impact on the distribution of catch within the PSR complex. As noted earlier, roughly 99% of the PSR assemblage harvests is dusky rockfish. Modifying the gear and location of the PSR fishery could increase harvest rates on yellowtail and widow rockfish. Both of these species appear to be largely limited to the Southeast Outside and West Yakutat management areas based on stock assessment surveys, so an entry-level fishery in the Western or Central Gulf may not result in increased harvests of yellowtail and widow rockfish. Additional monitoring would be needed to ascertain the effects of a small-boat fixed gear fishery on removals from the PSR assemblage.

Dr. David Clausen, principal stock assessment author for the 2002 SAFE Report raised a number of concerns in his review of the proposed entry level fishery, specifically, that light dusky rockfish and POP are plankton feeders typically consuming mostly euphausiids. This may limit the success of using baited hooks to target

these species (D. Clausen pers. comm. 2003). Dr. Clausen notes that the "establishment of a jig or longline fishery for PSR could result in an overharvest of dark dusky or yellowtail rockfish. Both these fish can be caught with hook and lines (D. Clausen pers. comm. 2003)." Dr. Clausen also notes that the State of Alaska is concerned about harvest rates in the blue and black rockfish fishery and additional management measures may not be appropriate until these concerns have been addressed and the taxanomic reclassification of dark dusky rockfish is completed.

Economic factors may affect the viability of an entry-level longline and jig fishery for vessels under 60' LOA. PSR tend to be a relatively low-valued species. Creating a rationalized fishery could improve the handling, marketing opportunities, and the exvessel value that fishermen may receive for their product. The potential increase in value has not been estimated. The entry-level entry level rockfish fishery is not a rationalized fishery, and potential increases in exvessel value may not extend to this fishery. The potential future economic value of this incentive fishery is not known. Current exvessel prices may provide some indication of the possible future value of this fishery. **Table 5** summarizes the possible amount of allocation and value of a PSR entry-level fishery using the 2003 TAC and reported exvessel prices. The average exvessel value per vessel is unknown and potential ranges are not analyzed here.

Table 5: Percentage Allocation to the PSR Entry Level fishery based on 2003 TAC and reported exvessel prices.

% of TAC Allocated	WG Allocation	WG Est. Exvessel Value	CG Allocation	CG Est. Exvessel Value	WY Allocation	WY Est. Exvessel Value
3%	15.3 mt	$1,700	104.4 mt	$11,500	19.2 mt	$2,100
5%	25.5 mt	$2,800	174.0 mt	$19,100	32 mt	$3,500
10%	50.1 mt	$5,600	348.0 mt	$38,300	64 mt	$7,000
15%	75.1 mt	$8,400	522 mt	$57,500	96 mt	$10,500

Notes: (1) Estimated Exvessel value is based on an exvessel price of $0.05/pound. Actual exvessel values in specific ports or from specific processors may differ.

Nature of the POP Fishery

Unlike the PSR fishery, the POP fishery is fully utilized (**Table 6 and 7**). Allocating a percentage of TAC to an entry-level fishery would be a reallocation away from existing participants. The POP fishery is typically targeted before the PSR fishery. However, there are only minimal harvests by non-trawl vessels. Over the past several years, more than 99.9% of all harvests were by trawl vessels based in an analysis of existing data. POP is harvested in offshore regions, almost exclusively within Federal waters other than a small amount of catch within the parallel fishery in some of the past seven years. These data cannot be reported due to confidentiality requirements established by the State of Alaska. During the 2002 fishery, 98% of the Western Gulf, 42% of the Central Gulf, and 99% of the West Yakutat POP fishery was harvested by trawl catcher processor vessels. Traditionally, the Central Gulf is the only region with a substantial portion of the POP fishery harvested by inshore vessels. As with the PSR fishery, the allocation to an entry-level fishery could have limited economic value (**Table 8**).

Table 6: Harvests in the POP Fishery by Regulatory Area in Metric Tons

Year	WG	CG	WY	EG (WY & SEO)	WG, CG, WY	GOA TAC (w/o SEO)
1995	1,422	2,598	--	1,722	5,742	5,556
1996	987	5,145	--	2,246	8,378	6,959
1997	1,832	6,720	--	979	9,531	9,190
1998	846	7,452		610	8,908	10,776
1999	1,935	7,910	627	--	10,472	9,430
2000	1,160	8,379	616	--	10,155	11,320
2001	944	9,249	623	--	10,816	11,760
2002	2,723	8,262	748	--	11,733	11,610

Note: Harvests prior to 1999, include allocations to the SEO management area. Data Source: NMFS

Table 7: Percentage of TAC Harvested in the POP Fishery by Regulatory Area

Year	WG	CG	WY	SEO	EG (WY & SEO)
1995	140%	96%			90%
1996	78%	154%			95%
1997	124%	126%			41%
1998	47%	113%			26%
1999	105%	117%	76%	0%	
2000	94%	91%	73%	0%	
2001	74%	96%	72%	0%	
2002	104%	101%	96%	0%	

Note: (1) Harvests prior to 1999, include allocations to the SEO management area. Data Source: NMFS

Table 8: Percentage Allocation to the POP Entry Level fishery based on 2003 TAC and reported exvessel prices.

% of TAC Allocated	WG Allocation	WG Est. Exvessel Value	CG Allocation	CG Est. Exvessel Value	WY Allocation	WY Est. Exvessel Value
3%	81 mt	$9,000	255 mt	$28,000	24 mt	$3,000
5%	130 mt	$14,000	426 mt	$47,000	41 mt	$4,500
10%	270 mt	$30,000	851 mt	$94,000	81 mt	$9,000
15%	400 mt	$44,000	1277 mt	$141,000	122 mt	$13,500

Notes: (1) Estimated Exvessel value is based on an exvessel price of $0.05/pound. Actual exvessel values in specific ports or from specific processors may differ.

Management of an Entry-Level Rockfish Fishery

If an entry-level fishery is established, then those vessels which are also eligible to fish in the rationalized harvest share fishery, could also fish in this incentive fishery unless those vessels are explicitly excluded. If "rationalized" vessels participate in both the entry-level and the rationalized fishery, this could undermine the goals of the entry-level fishery and create a race for fish among rationalized vessels as they target the entry-level fishery first before using their harvest share allocation. This could have an effect on bycatch of other rockfish species, sablefish, and possibly halibut. NMFS would have to establish an adequate bycatch allowance for the entry-level fishery. The allocation of bycatch to this fishery could affect the available bycatch in the rationalized PSR and/or POP fisheries.

To exclude vessels from the entry level fishery, NMFS would establish regulations forbidding any vessel that is used in a rationalized PSR fishery from fishing in the entry-level fishery. "Use" would need to be defined as the use of that vessel or any quota share deriving from that vessel. Conceivably, vessels which sold their PSR and/or POP harvest share would be eligible to participate in the entry-level fishery. Alternatively, NMFS could establish regulations that explicitly exclude all vessels that use harvest share in any fishery from participating in the PSR fishery. This would more strictly limit potential participation in this fishery. If participation in an entry-level fishery is limited to vessels not participating in the rationalized fishery, it may be unduly restrictive. Currently, there is very limited participation by jig gear or longline vessels under 60' LOA. Based on historical harvest patterns, it is not clear that small-boat fixed gear vessels would target the PSR or POP fisheries. The depth and location where these fisheries occur may limit participation further. Additionally, since the PSR and POP fisheries typically occur exclusively within Federal waters only those vessels with a valid LLP would be eligible to participate, unless Federal LLP requirements were modified.

Monitoring a limited entry-level fishery could prove problematic because some of the vessels that would be fishing in this fishery are currently unobserved under existing regulations (i.e., vessels under 60' LOA), and catch reporting would be limited to fish ticket data on landings, or weekly production reports from processors. Requiring onboard observers would likely prove uneconomical for the fleet given the estimated relatively low value of the fisheries. These data monitoring limitations reduce the ability of NMFS to effectively manage the fishery in "real time". If the harvest rates are relatively limited, and the quota allocation is sufficiently large, then it may be possible to effectively manage this fishery using existing landing data. The potential harvest rate in an entry-level is unknown, and would vary with the number of vessels participating.

If the entry-level allocation is small and harvest rates are high, a more restrictive management system would need to be used. This could include keeping the fishery closed if the harvest rates were too high relative to the accuracy of the available monitoring tools. If the fleet exceeded the entry-level allocation it could result in a reduced allocation in the following year. If the entry-level allocation was exceeded and the combined entry-level and rationalized fishery harvests would exceed the ABC, then NMFS may need to take inseason management measures to restrict the rationalized fishery harvests. This could include reducing the amount of IFQ per QS to ensure that total harvests were maintained below the TAC, or closing the rationalized fishery to avoid exceeding the ABC. The TAC has been set at the same level as the ABC for PSR and POP. The gap between the TAC/ABC and the Overfishing Level (OFL) for these species is relatively "tight" compared to other groundfish stocks (e.g., Pacific cod) and inseason management of the entry-level fishery would need to ensure that the overall TAC/ABC is not exceeded. **Table 9** shows the TAC, ABC, and the OFL for PSR and POP based on the 2003 harvest specifications. The POP OFL is roughly 15% greater than the TAC/ABC and inseason management of an entry level fishery for this species would need to be particularly conservative to ensure the ABC and OFL are not exceeded.

Table 9: TAC, ABC, and OFL for Pelagic Shelf Rockfish and Pacific Ocean Perch based on 2003 Harvest Specifications

Species	Regulatory Area	TAC	ABC	OFL
PSR	WG	510	510	
	CG	3,480	3,480	
	WY	640	640	
	GOA	5,490	5,490	8,220
POP	WG	2,700	2,700	3,220
	CG	8,510	8,510	10,120
	WY	810	810	
	EGOA (WY & SEO)	2,450	2,450	2,900

An additional management concern is the taxanomic uncertainty over dark dusky rockfish. As noted earlier, some of the species identified as black rockfish may in fact be dark dusky rockfish, possibly a separate subspecies or species from dusky rockfish. Establishing an entry-level fishery could target the nearshore component of dusky rockfish which appear to be more typically composed of dark dusky rockfish. Redirecting a portion of the PSR fishery to nearshore waters could have unknown effects on a potentially distinct component of the dusky rockfish biomass. The potential effect of this shift is unknown without additional research. An entry-level fishery would effectively reallocate a portion of the fishery to longline and jig gear. This could redistribute effort to the other components of the PSR complex -- yellowtail and widow rockfish, or increase bycatch rates on other rockfish species, or halibut. Equally unknown are the potential effects on benthic habitat of increasing longline effort in nearshore areas.

An incentive fishery, on relatively small quotas by unobserved vessels using landing data for inseason management is imprecise, and could result in overages. Finally, given the already complex management system envisioned for GOA Rationalization, an additional entry-level fishery increases the overall administrative burden of NMFS and is likely to provide limited additional economic opportunity for small boat fishermen. Further development of this component of the rationalization program could redirect staff effort away from other components of GOA rationalization.

Literature Cited

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GOA Groundfish Rationalization: Staff recommendations on Element 9. Communities
May 15, 2003

The purpose of this paper is to further clarify and/or refine the options applicable to communities as presented under Element 9 of the Council's Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Rationalization: Alternatives, Elements, and Options (version dated 4/7/03). The paper is organized into the four proposed categories of community protection options: regionalization, community fisheries quota (CFQ), community purchase program, and community incentive fisheries trust (CIFT). The shaded areas represent the element or option being considered, and staff discussion of that option follows. Staff has focused their efforts on identifying potentially problematic options due to data, implementation, or enforcement concerns, with special consideration given to the common elements of existing or proposed regulations governing communities.[1]

Overall, the analysts need to understand whether the Council intends to consider all four of the community protection options under Element 9 (regionalization, CFQ, community purchase program, and CIFTs) in conjunction with one another or whether it intends to consider some or all of the options only as alternatives to one another. This question is especially pertinent to the three proposed programs that affect harvester shares, and less so to the regionalization option, which affects processor shares. For instance, it is unclear whether the Council would consider selecting a CFQ program and a community purchase program, or whether the intent is that only one of these two programs would be selected. Another example is whether the Council intends to consider a CFQ program and a CIFT in conjunction with one another or whether these programs should only be analyzed discretely.

Note that under the current options, up to 50% of the total harvest shares could be reserved for communities if both the CFQ program and the CIFT were implemented. If communities were also eligible to purchase harvest shares, holdings by communities could potentially exceed 50%. The complexity associated with tracking and monitoring community held QS will also increase with several programs working simultaneously. If more than one community program is desired, it may be beneficial to establish consistent requirements and restrictions among the programs. **Clarification of the Council's intent, specifically, whether any of the proposed options may be selected in combination, is necessary for staff to analyze the cumulative impact of any and/or all of these options.**

Staff has several suggestions for rewording the options so that they are easier to understand and analyze. These suggestions are made (using italics for additions and strikeout for deletions) in the options listed, with explanations provided in the following discussion. Staff also provides discussion regarding the analytical approach that will likely be used for some options. Staff should be informed if any of the recommendations or the described approach are inconsistent with the Council's intent. In addition, staff provides some comparison to other existing and proposed programs, specifically the CDQ Program and Gulf community quota share purchase program (for halibut and sablefish), in order to facilitate a discussion about NMFS's ability to both implement and enforce several of these proposed options. This is consistent with the agency's need to identify potential implementation and enforcement obstacles early in the process.

[1]Programs considered in evaluating the options under Element 9 were as follows: CDQ Program, Gulf community QS purchase program (draft proposed rule), and crab rationalization (final action taken by Council).

Element 9. Communities

NOTE: Bering Sea and Western Alaska CDQ communities may be excluded from the community programs.

Staff interprets the statement above as notifying the public that BSAI communities (CDQ or otherwise) are not included in a Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization program. If so, the Council may want to reaffirm and strengthen this statement to indicate that BSAI and CDQ communities will not be included. Staff understands this program as applicable only to those communities that are located in the Gulf of Alaska management areas identified under Alternative 2, 3 or 4: Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat.[2] Communities in these areas are adjacent to statistical areas 610, 620, 630, and 640 (see Attachment 1). This would not include communities located adjacent to the BSAI statistical and reporting areas.[3] By definition of the program, CDQ communities are located in the BSAI. It would also not include communities adjacent to the Eastern GOA Regulatory Area Southeast Outside District (Area 650). The Council does not currently include Southeast Outside (SEO) in the identified management areas for gulf rationalization, except for the purpose of managing bycatch of shortraker, rougheye, and thornyhead rockfish. **If any of these are incorrect assumptions, staff should be notified prior to developing the analysis.**

Option 1. Regionalization

The following applies to both Central and Western Gulf areas:

- **If adopted, all processing share allocated to shorebased processors will be categorized by region.**
- **Processing shares that are regionally designated cannot be reassigned to another region.**
- **Catcher vessel harvest shares are regionalized based on where the catch was processed, not where it was caught.**
- **Catcher processor shares and incentive fisheries are not subject to regionalization.**
- **Qualifying years to determine the distribution of shares between regions will be consistent with the preferred alternative under "Element 1, Qualifying Periods".**

Central Gulf: **Two regions are proposed to classify harvesting and (if adopted) processing shares: North - South line at 58° 51.10' North Latitude (Cape Douglas corner for Cook Inlet bottom trawl ban area).**

The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased catch and subject to the North - South distribution: Pollock in Area 630; CGOA flatfish (excludes arrowtooth flounder); CGOA Pacific ocean perch; CGOA northern rockfish and pelagic shelf rockfish (combined); CGOA Pacific cod (inshore); GOA sablefish (trawl); WY pollock

Western Gulf: **The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased catch: Pacific cod in Area 610; pollock in Area 610; pollock in Area 620**

Option 1. **Dutch Harbor (Akutan)/Sand Point**
Option 2. **Kodiak/Sand Point**

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[2]Yakutat is located on the boundary of WY and SEO, but is technically located within SEO (Gulf Area 650). However, staff notes that, based on the Council's expressed preference, Yakutat will be included for consideration of the community options for the Gulf rationalization program.

[3]The Bering Sea Subarea of the BSAI includes that portion of the EEZ contained in statistical areas 508, 509, 512, 513, 514, 516, 517, 518, 519, 521, 523, 524, and 530. The Aleutian Islands Subarea includes that portion of the EEZ contained in statistical areas 541, 542, and 543. (50 CFR 679.2)

Option 3. **Both**

Staff understands the regionalization option for the **Central Gulf** to mean that there would be a 'north' and 'south' region, as delineated by the line at 58° 51.10' North Latitude (see Attachment 2). In effect, the distribution of processing that occurred between regions during the qualifying years selected in the preferred alternative under Element 1 would be maintained under this provision. This provision does not identify specific communities in which processing must occur, it only ensures that the distribution of processing that historically occurred south (and north) of the designated line will continue to occur under the Gulf Rationalization program. This provision applies only to the species identified above.

No regional boundaries have been identified for the **Western Gulf** at this time. The Council noted that boundaries would be defined at its June meeting. Without clear boundaries, it is not possible to analyze regionalization specific to the Western Gulf, although analysis of the impact of the regionalization option for the Central Gulf may proceed in the absence of Western Gulf boundaries. Staff assumes that Options 1- 3 are placeholders for specific boundaries to notice the public of the general intent of regionalized shares for the Western Gulf. At the time the specific boundaries (lat/long) are proposed, these placeholders will no longer be necessary. Staff did not think it was appropriate to suggest boundaries to meet the intent of this option, but a detailed map of the Gulf of Alaska is provided to aid in boundary identification by the Council and the public.

Option 2. **Community Fisheries Quota (CFQ)**

Issue 1. **Administrative Entity**

- **Option 1.** **Gulf wide administrative entity**
- **Option 2.** **Regional administrative entities (Western Gulf, Central Gulf, Eastern Gulf)**
- **Option 3.** **Community level**

Issue 2. **Eligible Communities** ***(GOA communities only)***

- **Option 1.** **Population** ***(based on 2000 U.S. Census)***
  - **a.** **Less than 1,500 residents**
  - **b.** **Less than 2,500 residents**
  - **c.** **Less than 5,000 residents**
  - **d.** **Less than 7,500 residents**

- **Option 2.** **Geography**
  - **a.** **Coastal communities without road connections to larger community highway network**
  - **b.** **Coastal communities adjacent to salt water**
  - **c.** **Communities within 10 miles of the Gulf coast**
  - **d.** **Communities on the south side of the Alaska Peninsula that are adjacent to the Central and Western GOA management areas (including Yakutat), within 5 nautical miles from the water, but not to include Bering Sea communities included under the CDQ Program.**

- **Option 3.** **Economy (based on all fisheries)** ***(propose to eliminate, see p. 5)***

Staff will analyze other proxies that could be used to describe fishery dependence, such as the number of permits as a proportion of the population, historic processing, fishing data, or other data sources.

a. GOA fisheries-dependent communities defined as communities with a range of 10 - 30 percent of their base industry economy in harvesting or processing related activities

b. GOA fisheries-supplemented communities defined as communities with a range of 5 - 10 percent of their base industry economy in harvesting or processing related activities

c. ~~All GOA communities~~

Issue 3. Species

Option 1. All rationalized groundfish species

Option 2. Limited to species that can be caught without (hard on) bottom trawling

Issue 4. Allocation

Harvester Shares:

Option 1. 5% of annual TAC

Option 2. 10% of annual TAC

Option 3. 15% of annual TAC

Option 4. 20% of annual TAC

Processing Shares:

Option 5. 5% of annual processing allocation

Option 6. 10% of annual processing allocation

Option 7. 15% of annual processing allocation

Option 8. 20% of annual processing allocation

Issue 5. Harvesting of Shares

Option 1. Limited to residents of eligible communities that own vessels

Option 2. Limited to residents of eligible communities

Option 3. No limitations on who harvests shares

Issue 6. Use of Revenues

Option 1. Community development projects that tie directly to fisheries or fishery related projects and education.

Option 2. Community development projects that tie directly to fisheries and fisheries related projects, education, and government functions.

Option 3. Education, social and capital projects within eligible communities as well as governmental functions.

The intent and structure of the **CFQ program option** is most similar to the current Western Alaska CDQ Program, in that the quota (as a percentage of the annual TAC), is allocated directly to the administrative entity representing one or more communities. Most regulations relevant to the program would then apply to this administrative entity rather than the eligible community itself. However, in contrast to the CDQ Program, the current list of options does not include requirements regarding the make up of this entity or how it makes

decisions.[4] Moreover, while the type of allocation program proposed mirrors the CDQ Program, the current options do not pose similar administrative oversight or information requirements. This may be a reasonable approach in that the Western Alaska CDQ Program is likely a much larger program in terms of the value of the allocations and the revenues generated from those allocations[5] than the proposed CFQ program in the Gulf of Alaska. Because of the relative value of the CDQ Program, the potential losses are much greater and thus may warrant a higher level of government oversight. (Increased government oversight would still be necessary under a CFQ program if the Council wants to restrict the type of project on which an administrative entity can spend its revenues, but it may not warrant the same level as the CDQ Program. This is discussed further under Issue 6.)

Under **Issue 1**, three potential administrative entities are identified to receive and hold quota share (QS) on behalf of an eligible community or communities. The intent is for the entity to lease the resulting IFQs to residents of the eligible community or other eligible recipients. **Staff assumes that Options 1 - 3 under Issue 1 are not mutually exclusive;** thus, the Council could select one or more of these options and allow the eligible community to choose how it wants to organize itself within the bounds of the preferred options. In effect, the Council could select all three options and give eligible communities the opportunity to consolidate as much as is politically and logistically feasible. Given that the administrative costs of organizing and managing a representative entity may be fairly high in some communities, it may be important to allow this flexibility and not limit the choices to the Council at this point.

The current options under **Issue 1** also do not specify how NMFS will determine whether an administrative entity is deemed 'qualified' to represent a community or group of communities. In the Gulf community QS purchase program for halibut and sablefish, the entity is required to submit a detailed statement of eligibility to NMFS, including; (1) articles of incorporation as a non-profit entity within the State; (2) a statement designating the community or communities represented by that non-profit entity; (3) management organization; (4) the names, addresses, and affiliation of its board of directors or other governing body; (5) a detailed statement describing the procedures that will be used to determine the distribution of IFQ to residents of the community; and (6) a statement indicating support for and accountability of the non-profit entity to that community from a governing body representing the community. While the Gulf community QS purchase program for halibut and sablefish may have different overall requirements (e.g., the administrative entity must be a newly-formed non-profit organization; the entity can only lease IFQs to residents of its member communities), **the proposed CFQ Program will also require a process in which administrative entities can be qualified by NMFS to represent one or more eligible communities**.

In addition, the Gulf community QS purchase program specifies that while several entities may apply for status as a qualified administrative entity, only one may represent a given community. Thus, under that program, the first entity that meets the eligibility requirements will be deemed qualified by NMFS to receive QS on behalf of the community(ies) it represents. Note that one of the qualification requirements is that the administrative entity receive and submit to NMFS a statement of support from the governing body of each community it wants to represent. Because each governing body can only support one administrative entity, the entity which receives

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[4]The CDQ Program requires that a 'qualified applicant' for CDQ allocations must be a local fishermen's organization or a local economic development organization incorporated under Alaska state law or Federal law. It may be a for-profit or a non-profit corporation, and the board of directors must be at least 75 percent resident fishermen, with one board member from each represented community. Under State regulations, the Board is required to have established investment criteria and to consider that criteria in its decision making.

[5]The 2002 total revenues from the six CDQ groups combined is almost $70 million (from the 4th Quarter 2002 reports, unaudited as of 5/27/03).

this statement, and meets the other qualification requirements, will be deemed the qualified entity to receive QS on behalf of the community or communities. This approach is also used in the Western Alaska CDQ Program.

This approach mitigates the need for NMFS to develop a separate process for evaluating and selecting one of several entities competing to represent the same community(ies). It also gives the governing body of the community control over the entity to which they will entrust the responsibility of managing and distributing quota share. Because small, remote communities are not always organized similarly, incorporated, or may have several governing bodies, it is also necessary to determine the type of governing body that will speak on behalf of the community. The Gulf community QS purchase program regulations will establish a hierarchy that specifies the type of governing body that can recommend a non-profit entity, depending on the governance structure of the particular community. It is anticipated that this same approach would also be employed under the proposed CFQ program for Gulf rationalization.

Given the concerns encounteredpreviously in somewhat similar community programs, the Council may want to: 1) include options for minimum requirements to guide NMFS in its determination of a qualified administrative entity, or 2) provide rationale as to why these requirements were necessary in prior programs but are not warranted here.

Under **Issue 2**, staff suggests stating explicitly that only GOA communities in the Western, Central, and West Yakutat management areas will be considered for inclusion under a Gulf rationalization program (unless the Council adds specific individual communities for inclusion). Staff also suggests revising **Option 1 (a - d)** to delete the word 'resident' and add that the population of the community will be determined based on the most recent (2000) U.S. Census data. This is consistent with the Gulf community QS purchase program method by which to determine eligible communities and mitigates problems with petitions by individuals who do not live in a Census Designated Place. In addition, because some coastal communities' overall population numbers may vary widely depending upon whether seasonal residents are considered, use of the U.S. Census data provides consistency and mostly mitigates problems with determining total population numbers. (The State of Alaska also uses the U.S. Census data to report population numbers for the CDQ communities, but considers significant evidence if it demonstrates that the population would vary by season.) In effect, should a community maintain that its actual population differs significantly from the report of the U.S. Census, the burden would be on representatives of the community to provide evidence to that fact.

Experience with prior programs (Gulf community QS purchase, CDQ Program, and the recent halibut subsistence action) has also shown that it may be necessary to establish a minimum population size to determine whether a place is a designated 'community'. This provision would be similar to that established by the State of Alaska for defining a community for revenue sharing purposes.[6] The limitation on minimum population size would reduce the potential for future petitions for inclusion into the program by a small group of individuals living in a place solely for the purpose of participating in the program. It is anticipated that this approach will be used for any option which necessitates a determination of 'eligible community' under the Gulf rationalization program.

Under Issue 2, Option 2(d), staff suggests revising the wording to: "Communities within 5 miles of the Gulf coast." Staff is uncertain as to the need for additional language in (d), if the Council confirms that any community program is applicable only to those communities that are located in the Gulf of Alaska management areas identified under Alternative 2, 3, or 4: Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat. As Gulf

[6]Alaska Statute (AS) defines a community as a place where more than 25 people reside as a social unit (AS 29.60.120), and current Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) defines a "social unit" under 3 AAC 130.093.

communities in these specific areas, all of the eligible communities would be located on the south side of the Aleutian Islands, Alaska Peninsula, or continental Alaska as defined by statistical areas 610, 620, 630, and 640 (see Attachment 1 for figures and coordinates). As CDQ communities are by definition located in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands, CDQ communities are inherently excluded from the definition of a GOA community. In addition, staff recommends changing the option to reference five (statute) miles from the coast, as opposed to nautical miles, since only distances at sea are measured in nautical miles.

Staff has already apprised the Council that **Issue 2, Option 3** will not be possible to analyze due to data limitations and will require a fairly substantial amount of staff time with limited benefit. The Gulf community QS purchase program included a similar option for consideration: "communities must be fisheries dependent as determined by fishing as a principle source of revenue to the community." That analysis showed that this criterion is relatively ambiguous and not well-suited to a quantitative assessment; thus, it was not used as a criterion by which to evaluate community eligibility. Even though Option 3 specifies the range of revenues that constitutes fisheries dependence in this case, it is not possible to accurately determine the percentage of annual revenues for each community that may be attributed to fisheries.

Further, this may not be a necessary step to determining fisheries-dependence, as annual revenues and other economic indices are not the only relevant indicators to determine fishing dependence. The National Research Council reports on the issue of fishing-dependent communities, that for small, isolated communities such as many of those in Alaska: "the notion of dependency may include geographic isolation; lack of employment alternatives; social, economic, and cultural systems that have developed in these locations; and their dependence on fishing as a source of nutrition, livelihood, and life-style."[7] NOAA also recognizes that these same types of indicators, either the level and type of fishery related activity, or the economic, social and/or cultural role and importance of fisheries, can be used to define a "fishing dependent community".[8]

This point has spurred the inclusion of the statement under Issue 2, Option 3, that staff will analyze other proxies that could be used to determine fisheries-dependent communities. This could also be a time consuming process, as staff will need to plan to develop reasonable proxies in consultation with the interested public and present some measure of dependence in the analysis for consideration by the Council. In the Gulf community QS purchase program for halibut and sablefish, eligible communities must have had historic participation in the halibut or sablefish fisheries, defined by a recorded commercial landing of either halibut or sablefish between 1980 - 2000 according to Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) data for permit and fishing activity. This definition provided a means for the Council to consider those communities for which halibut or sablefish has some historic importance, but was not purported to represent fisheries dependence. This is an example of the type of proxy that may be applicable in the Gulf CFQ program.

Overall, the desire for inclusion of the proposed criteria is understandable, as the Council may want the option to select only communities that have some proven level of dependence on fisheries in the GOA. However, concerns with staff's ability to provide sufficient data to prove a specific level of dependence, combined with the relative necessity of this data in the context of the overall analysis, may warrant eliminating this criterion (Option 3) from the options for analysis. In order to provide some perspective on the number of communities involved, staff has provided a list of potentially eligible communities that appear to meet the least restrictive

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[7] Sharing the Fish, National Research Council, 1999, p. 19.

[8] NOAA Fisheries (HQ) is currently developing a Sociocultural Practitioner's Manual to assist in data collection and analysis related to the social and cultural sections required by NEPA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This manual is currently in draft form and is expected to be published sometime in 2003.

criteria proposed under Issue 2[9] and are Census Designated Places, without taking into account fisheries dependence. **Staff has identified 29 coastal communities in the Western Gulf, Central Gulf, or Western Yakutat management areas that may meet this criteria (see Attachment 3). This represents an estimate of the maximum number of communities at issue, without accounting for fisheries dependence.[10]**

Should the Council retain Option 3 as a potential criterion, staff recommends deleting (c), as it is not necessary and may be confusing in combination with the other options. If at final action the Council decides not to apply an economic threshold by which to determine eligible communities, it would exercise that option by simply not choosing Option 3.

Finally, consistent with previous actions on community programs, staff also suggests providing an explicit list of all eligible communities in the Council's preferred alternative at final action. In effect, an eligible community would have to meet the eligibility criteria and be included on the list (which would be part of the final rule). Any additional communities that want to be included in the program after final action would be required to petition the Council for inclusion using the normal Council process. Requiring each community to be on the Council's list of eligible communities eliminates any ambiguities regarding whether a community is believed to have met the eligibility criteria at the time of final action and defines a process by which non-eligible communities can petition their status within the program.

Staff has no recommendations under **Issue 3** or **Issue 4**, other than to request that the Council provide rationale for the inclusion of Issue 3, Option 2 in the community protection options. Providing rationale for this option would guide staff as to whether this is the appropriate analytical document in which to address this issue.

Under **Issue 5**, there are three options by which to limit the harvest of CFQs. While it is clear that the options delineate a decision as to whether CFQs can be leased to residents of non-eligible communities, Council intent remains unclear whether Option 1 or 2 would restrict the administrative entity to leasing CFQs only to residents of the particular eligible community or communities it represents.

A common element to many of the Council's prior and proposed actions regarding communities is the identification of a legal administrative entity that represents the community in a fishery allocation program. In the CDQ Program, the CDQ group can lease CDQ to any licensed fisherman or entity, regardless of the community in which the fisherman or entity may reside. Some CDQ, such as halibut, is leased to resident fishermen if there exists a resident fleet, while most groundfish CDQ is leased by catcher processors or large catcher vessels that deliver to shoreside processing plants in relatively large ports. Overall, the CDQ group is responsible for showing how its activities meet the goal of the program and benefit its member (eligible) communities, whether it is through promoting small boat fisheries for local residents or using CDQ royalties to fund activities and projects in the communities.

In contrast, under the Gulf community QS purchase program, the overall goal is to sustain community residents' participation in the halibut and sablefish fisheries. To meet this objective, the Council specified that a new non-profit entity must be formed to represent one or more eligible communities, and that leasing of the

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[9]The least restrictive combination of criteria under Issue 2 is as follows: 1) population of fewer than 7,500; 2) no road connections to larger community highway network; and 3) within 10 miles of the Gulf coast.

[10]Staff notes that all but four of the twenty seven communities on the draft list have commercial permit and fishing activity as documented by CFEC in the last ten years (1993 - 2002). All but seven are determined by the State of Alaska to have met the customary and traditional use threshold for halibut. Only four communities did not meet either threshold.

annual IFQs shall be limited only to the residents of the ownership community. In effect, the entity could not lease IFQs to another eligible Gulf community that it does not represent.

The goal of the program, the communities involved, and the scale of the fisheries at issue appear to have been the main determinants for whether to limit leasing to community residents in previous programs. While this issue will be explored in detail in the analysis, **the Council should clarify at this point whether Option 1 and 2 under Issue 5 restrict the leasing of annual IFQs to residents of any eligible Gulf community or just those eligible communities that the entity represents.**[11]

Staff also assumes that should Option 1 or Option 2 be selected under Issue 5, implementation of the leasing restrictions which would directly tie the use of IFQ to the residents of a given community would be similar to the Gulf community quota share purchase program. In order to address the difficulties associated with proving that a person is a resident of a particular community, the regulations implementing this program will require that an individual provide a statement that they are a U.S. citizen, maintain a permanent mailing address and domicile in the community of interest, and are qualified to receive IFQ under the existing regulations.

Issue 6 poses implementation and enforcement concerns that may be worth considering early in the process. The options under this issue propose to restrict the type of activity on which an administrative entity may spend its revenues. It would therefore require NMFS to make a judgement about whether an activity or expenditure of an administrative entity representing a community complies with regulations describing permissible uses of revenues. This provision is similar to the existing CDQ Program, which requires that CDQ groups must invest primarily in fisheries-related projects, but typically allows for a lesser level of investment in financial instruments, charities, training, education, and administrative expenses. While these types of non-fisheries related activities have not been discouraged by State or Federal managers, they are not currently clearly identified in regulation as categorically exempt from the requirement that CDQ projects be fisheries-related.

The 'lessons learned' associated with the implementation of these restrictions in the CDQ Program are valuable. One primary lesson is that the rules and regulations governing how the community groups spend revenues must be clear and interpreted in a consistent manner. The CDQ Program was recently reviewed and modified by the Council in June 2002. One of the modifications to the program was to explicitly outline in regulation the fisheries and non-fisheries related activities and projects on which the CDQ groups may spend revenues. In the past, there have been concerns regarding the threshold used to determine 'fisheries related' projects, as well as questions about non-fisheries related activities that have been generally accepted by the State CDQ Team but not described in regulation.

While the addition of explicit regulations governing allowable investments and expenditures will help to more effectively implement the CDQ Program, there remain several questions regarding the type of activity that would qualify under each category of allowable investment. For instance, whether "education" means education services and curriculum development, which are common investments by CDQ groups, or whether it also includes infrastructure and capital development projects. The need to clarify allowable uses also exists under proposed Issue 6, Options 1 - 3 for the Gulf rationalization program. As currently stated, it would be extremely difficult to implement meaningful, enforceable regulations consistent with the proposed options.

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[11]Staff also notes that the proposed Gulf rationalization program may include QS for both target and bycatch species. The current options propose to restrict leasing of IFQ held by communities only to eligible community residents. Inclusion of bycatch species in this program may necessitate eliminating this restriction in the case of bycatch species IFQ and allowing leasing of bycatch species IFQ between any and all QS holders. This issue will be addressed in the analysis.

Comprehensive definitions of "education," "governmental functions," and "social and capital projects" need to be developed. Unless these terms are explicitly defined for analysis, a community could justify using its CFQ revenue on practically any project under the criteria in Option 2 or Option 3. In addition, the Council may want to add an option which would allow community entities to use revenues for purposes of program administration.

A second lesson relates to the cost and staff time associated with implementing (and enforcing) this type of provision. While the initial task of qualifying administrative entities to represent one or more communities will require additional staff time and effort on behalf of NMFS, it is assumed that the actual transfer of QS to eligible community entities would be similar in process to that necessary for individual quota share holders in the rationalization program. However, while limiting the use of revenues to fisheries related or other activities may be an appropriate policy goal, it does necessitate an additional level of government oversight. This is because it requires that agency staff make a judgement about whether each activity of a community group complies with the regulations. Thus, while clear rules and regulations are beneficial, restrictions such as these also require available staff to review the information submitted by the community group relevant to their investments and activities and to follow up on any perceived problems.

Should this level of administrative oversight be deemed necessary, the structure is not yet addressed in any of the proposed options. Government oversight in the CDQ Program, for example, has two primary elements: (1) requirements to provide information to the government about the activities of the CDQ groups, their affiliated businesses, and vessels and processors participating in the CDQ fisheries; and (2) requirements that certain activities by the CDQ group and their subsidiaries be approved by the State of Alaska and NMFS before they are undertaken. As noted previously, however, the CDQ Program is likely a much larger program in terms of the value of the allocations and the revenues generated from those allocations than the proposed CFQ program in the Gulf of Alaska. In addition, CDQ is not required to be leased to eligible community residents due to various reasons, thus, there must be sufficient oversight to verify the link between benefits derived from the program and eligible communities. Given the differences in the CDQ Program, it may warrant a higher level of government oversight and accountability than is necessary in the GOA program.

Despite the likely differences in scale between the CDQ Program and the proposed CFQ program in the Gulf of Alaska, implementing and enforcing a provision which limits the use of revenues by Gulf communities to certain activities will require an increased level of oversight. Thus, the feasibility and implementation issues associated should be fully considered when developing this option for analysis. **In sum, including restrictions on the use of revenues necessitates a higher level of government oversight than would likely otherwise be necessary under the program. The Council should identify whether these restrictions are necessary and, if so, provide rationale for their inclusion in the program.**

Another fundamental component of the CDQ Program is the competitive allocation process. Currently, the allocation process is the mechanism by which the CDQ groups' investments are kept within the bounds of the program's intent. The State makes complicated, multi-criterion decisions in allocating quota to CDQ groups, with final approval by NMFS. Related to this issue is the determination of which types of projects should be considered fisheries-related, and whether the CDQ groups have complied with the regulations limiting their use of revenues. Thus, in order to implement a regulation which prohibits some activities by a community entity, one must have an administrative structure by which to evaluate an entity's activities and enforce the regulation. In the CDQ Program, the allocation process can act as means to 'penalize' a CDQ group if its activities are not found to be consistent with the program's intent and regulations.

In the proposed Gulf rationalization CFQ options, however, it is unclear whether the allocations of CFQ would be competitively based or divided equally among community entities. There are no options proposed for establishing a method by which to allocate QS among individual communities, nor is there proposed any other mechanism by which a community entity's CFQ could be reduced or eliminated should the entity not comply with the revenue or other restrictions. Unless the CFQ allocations are intended to be made in perpetuity, the Council may also want to consider including options which would require a community entity to submit relevant and sufficient information by which agency managers could evaluate whether an entity is meeting the requirements of the program.

A comparison of program elements within the CDQ Program, Gulf community QS purchase program, BSAI Crab Rationalization Program, and the community programs proposed under Gulf rationalization is provided in Attachment 4. This comparison identifies the primary elements included in existing programs and is intended to help assess whether additional elements need to be included in the proposed options for community programs under Gulf rationalization.

In summary, the differences in the elements of the programs (shown in Attachment 4) may be linked to the different policy objectives associated with each program. For instance, the CDQ Program has fairly rigorous monitoring and reporting requirements because: it directly allocates a public resource to groups of communities in those particular fisheries; it is a large scale program which generates significant revenues for the CDQ groups; it limits the spending of those revenues to permissible activities; and, NMFS must ensure that the benefits from the program are provided to the residents of the communities in the manner determined by the Council. The purpose of the program to benefit member communities thus drives the need for particular requirements or elements, specifically those related to accountability and government oversight.

Another example is the Gulf community QS purchase program, the purpose of which is to sustain participation in the halibut and sablefish fisheries by eligible communities. This program requires a lesser level of accountability than the CDQ Program, likely for several reasons: community groups are purchasing quota share within the existing IFQ Program as opposed to being granted a direct allocation; there are no restrictions related to how the community entity can spend revenues; and, the program is not expected to generate a comparable revenue base for the administrative entities. Because the fisheries at issue in the Gulf community purchase program are smaller in scale, and because the program requires that the IFQs must be leased to community residents, it is not anticipated that the administrative entity will derive substantial revenues from the leasing of IFQ. Rather, the restriction on leasing is intended to ensure that community residents will have the opportunity to sustain their participation in the halibut and sablefish fisheries. (Which is a much different goal than trying to maximize royalties from leasing quota share.) Therefore, while the level of government oversight and control over communities purchasing QS under that program is greater than that to which individual QS holders are subject, it is still a much lower level of oversight than is required in the CDQ Program.

It is assumed, if not always stated, that the policy objectives of the different programs drive the various levels of government oversight and other program restrictions. Thus, the process of reflecting upon the benefits realized by requiring a certain level of oversight or restrictions on the use of revenues among various programs is very valuable. Engaging in this process may assist the Council in the development of community options under Gulf rationalization by helping to determine the responsibilities of the government related to oversight that are necessary and appropriate to meet the different policy objectives of each of the proposed community programs. Including a statement on the overall goal or purpose of each of the proposed community program options would help in developing appropriate program elements to meet the stated goal.

For instance, one thing to consider in the approach to developing the options for the CFQ Program is whether the goal of the program is: (1) to provide sustained participation in the Gulf of Alaska fisheries by local resident fleets of eligible communities; (2) to provide new or enhanced opportunities in the Gulf of Alaska fisheries by local resident fleets of eligible communities; (3) to provide benefits, in the form of revenues, investments, or other activities, to the eligible communities; or (4) something else.

Option 3. Community Purchase Program

Issue 1. Eligible Communities *(GOA communities only)*

Option 1. Population *(based on 2000 U.S. Census)*

a. Less than 1,500 ~~residents~~
b. Less than 2,500 ~~residents~~
c. Less than 5,000 ~~residents~~
d. Less than 7,500 ~~residents~~

Option 2. Geography

a. Coastal communities without road connections to larger community highway network
b. Coastal communities adjacent to salt water
c. Communities within 10 miles of the Gulf coast

Option 3. Economy (based on all fisheries)

Staff will analyze other proxies that could be used to describe fishery dependence, such as the number of permits as a proportion of the population, historic processing, fishing data, or other data sources.

a. GOA fisheries-dependent communities defined as communities with a range of 10 - 30 percent of their base industry economy in harvesting or processing related activities
b. GOA fisheries-supplemented communities defined as communities with a range of 5 - 10 percent of their base industry economy in harvesting or processing related activities
c. ~~All GOA communities~~

With regard to the existing proposed options, staff recommends the same modifications to Option 1 and Option 3 as proposed under the CFQ program options. This includes the recommendation to state explicitly that only GOA communities in the Western, Central, and West Yakutat management areas will be considered for inclusion under a Gulf rationalization program.

Overall, the effect of the current options for the Community Purchase Program is limited to selecting criteria by which to identify eligible communities to purchase and hold quota share for lease to eligible recipients. Beyond identifying eligible communities, there is no proposed structure to the program. Should the Council want to select a community purchase program in the preferred alternative, it will also need to develop the specific elements of the program that the Council would like to apply. For instance, similar to the CFQ program, the Council should define or identify an administrative entity to purchase, hold, and lease the QS/IFQ on behalf of the eligible communities. In addition, the Council may want to consider whether to require other restrictions or provisions that are currently proposed in the CFQ program or the Gulf community QS purchase program (GOA Am. 66) that the Council approved in April 2002.

As stated previously, a comparison of program elements within existing community programs and the community programs proposed under Gulf rationalization is provided in Attachment 4. This comparison identifies the primary elements common to community programs and is intended to help assess whether additional elements need to be included in the proposed options for community programs under Gulf rationalization. Because the community purchase program identified in Option 3 is lacking all elements of a program structure except for the criteria to determine eligible communities, it may benefit the Council to evaluate the elements in existing programs and decide if any of these elements are worth mirroring or modifying for inclusion.

Option 4. Community Incentive Fisheries Trust (CIFT)
The CIFT has full ownership of CIFT harvest shares and holds these shares in trust for the communities, processors, and crew members in the region to use a leverage to mitigate impacts directly associated with the implementation of a rationalization program.

Issue 1. Harvest Share Distribution
- **Option 1. 10 - 30 percent of harvest shares shall be originally reserved for GOA CIFT associations. These harvest shares will be subtracted from the overall pool before the individual distribution of harvest shares.**

Issue 2. CIFT Designation
- **Option 1. One CV CIFT for the GOA (excludes SEO)**
- **Option 2. Regional CV CIFTs:**
  - **Suboption 1. Central GOA (Kodiak, Chignik)**
  - **Suboption 2. Western GOA**
  - **Suboption 3. North Gulf Coast (Homer to Yakutat)**
- **Option 3. CP-based CIFT**

Defer remaining issues to a trailing amendment.

Staff has no recommendations for the CIFT options at this time, noting that the some of the fundamental elements of this program have been deferred to a trailing amendment. As the options are currently proposed, staff anticipates analyzing only the basic allocation issue (i.e., how much QS each potential CIFT region would receive) and the CIFT designation. The effectiveness of this option will rely heavily on the extensive administrative process and structure that is necessary to implement this program, as well as the level of governmental administrative oversight required for reviewing, certifying, and monitoring the CIFT. If selected, the majority of these issues will need to be further defined in the options for the trailing amendment.

Summary

The following represent clarifications or suggestions noted by staff in this paper:

General

1. Clarify whether the proposed community options (regionalization, CFQ, community purchase program, CIFTs) are exclusive or whether they may be selected in conjunction with one another.

2. Reaffirm that BSAI communities (CDQ or otherwise) are not included in any Gulf rationalization community protection options. Clarify that communities adjacent to the Eastern GOA regulatory area Southeast Outside District are also not included.

3. Accept or deny staff's rewording/reorganization throughout Options 1- 4.

4. Provide a statement on the overall goal or purpose of each of the proposed community program options in order to guide development of necessary and appropriate program elements.

Regionalization options

5. Provide regional boundaries for the Western Gulf, if desired.

Community Fisheries Quota (CFQ) options

6. Confirm that Options 1 - 3 under Issue 1 are not mutually exclusive; meaning, the Council could select all three options and allow the eligible community to choose how it wants to organize within the bounds of the preferred option(s).

7. Provide options for requirements to determine qualified administrative entities representing communities (p.5) or rationale as to why they are unnecessary.

8. Determine whether to eliminate Issue 2, Option 3 (economic criteria for fisheries dependent communities) under the CFQ program.

9. Provide rationale for including Issue 3, Option 2 (limiting species to those that can be caught without bottom trawling).

10. Clarify whether Issue 5, Options 1 and 2, restrict an administrative entity to: 1) leasing IFQ only to residents of the community or communities it represents **or** 2) leasing IFQ only to residents of any eligible community.

11. Provide more detailed definitions under Issue 6, Options 1-3, of the following: 'education', 'government functions', 'social and capital projects.'

12. Determine whether restrictions on the use of revenues is necessary to meet the policy objectives of the CFQ program. If so, provide options for government oversight (i.e., information requirements) and supporting rationale.

13. Review the comparison of existing and proposed community programs in Attachment 4 to determine whether additional elements need to be included in the proposed CFQ program.

Community Purchase Program options

14. The current options only define community eligibility. Determine whether to approve additional elements to define the structure of this program (see Attachment 4).

List of Attachments

Attachment 1: Figure 1 to 50 CFR Part 679 - BSAI Statistical and reporting Areas map and coordinates
Figure 3 to 50 CFR Part 679 - GOA Statistical and reporting areas map and coordinates

Attachment 2: GOA Map with Central Gulf regionalization option delineated

Attachment 3: Draft list of WG, CG, and WY communities that meet the following criteria: 1) population of fewer than 7,500; 2) no road connections to larger community highway network; and 3) within 10 miles of the Gulf coast

Attachment 4: Comparison of program elements in existing and proposed community fisheries programs: Western Alaska CDQ Program; Gulf community QS purchase program (Am. 66); BSAI Crab rationalization, proposed Community Fisheries Quota program; proposed Community Purchase Program; and proposed CIFT program.



Figure 1 to Part 679--Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands statistical and reporting Areas
a. Map

Figure 1 to Part 679. BSAI Statistical and Reporting Areas

b. Coordinates (**Updated April 1, 2002**)

Code	Description
300	Russian waters. Those waters inside the Russian 200 mile limit as described in the current editions of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part) and NOAA chart INT 814 Bering Sea (Northern Part).
400	Chukchi Sea. North of a diagonal line between 66°00' N, 169° 42.5' W (Cape Dezhneva, Russia); and 65°37.5' N, 168°7. 5' W (Cape Prince of Wales, Alaska) and to the limits of the U.S. EEZ as described in the current edition of NOAA chart INT 814 Bering Sea (Northern Part).
508	South of 58° 00' N between the intersection of 58° 00' N lat with the Alaska Peninsula and 160°00' W long
509	South of 58°00' N lat between 163°00' W long and 165°00' W long
512	South of 58°00' N lat, north of the Alaska Peninsula between 160°00' W long and 162°00' W long
513	Between 58°00' N lat and 56°30' N lat, and between 165°00' W long and 170°00' W long
514	North of 58°00' N to the southern boundary of the Chukchi Sea, area 400, and east of 170°00' W long.
516	South of 58°00' N lat, north of the Alaska Peninsula, and between 162°00' and 163°00' W long
517	South of 56°30' N lat, between 165°00' W long and 170°00' W long; and north of straight lines between 54°30' N lat, 165°00' W long, 54°30' N lat, 167°00' W long, and 55°46' N lat, 170°00' W long
518	Bogoslof District: South of a straight line between 55°46' N lat, 170°00' W long and 54°30' N lat, 167°00' W long, and between 167°00' W long and 170°00' W long, and north of the Aleutian Islands and straight lines between the islands connecting the following coordinates in the order listed: 52°49.18' N, 169°40.47' W 52°49.24' N, 169°07.10' W 53°23.13' N, 167°50.50' W 53°18.95' N, 167°51.06' W
519	South of a straight line between 54°30' N lat, 167°00' W long and 54°30' N lat, 164°54' W long; east of 167°00' W long; west of Unimak Island; and north of the Aleutian Islands and straight lines between the islands connecting the following coordinates in the order listed: 53°58.97' N, 166°16.50' W 54°02.69' N, 166°02.93' W 54°07.69' N, 165°39.74' W 54°08.40' N, 165°38.29' W 54°11.71' N, 165°23.09' W 54°23.74' N, 164°44.73' W
521	The area bounded by straight lines connecting the following coordinates in the order listed: 55°46' N, 170°00' W, 59°25' N, 179°20' W, 60°00' N, 179°20' W, 60°00' N, 171°00' W, 58°00' N, 171°00' W, 58°00' N, 170°00' W, 55°46' N, 170°00' W
523	The area bounded by straight lines connecting the following coordinates in the order listed: 59°25' N, 179°20' W; 55°46' N, 170°00' W; 55°00' N, 170°00' W; 55°00' N, 180°00' W; and north to the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current edition of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part).
524	The area west of 170°00' W bounded south by straight lines connecting the following coordinates in the order listed: 58°00' N, 170°00' W 58°00' N, 171°00' W; 60°00' N, 171°00' W; 60°00' N, 179°20' W; 59°25' N, 179°20' W and to the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current edition of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part).
530	The area north of 55°00 N lat and west of 180°00 W long to the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current edition of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part).
541	Eastern Aleutian District. The area south of 55°00' N lat, west of 170°00' W long, and east of 177°00' W long and bounded on the south by the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current editions of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part) and NOAA chart 530 (San Diego to Aleutian Islands and Hawaiian Islands).
542	Central Aleutian District. The area south of 55°00' N lat, west of 177°00' W long, and east of 177°00' E long and bounded on the south by the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current editions of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part) and NOAA chart 530 (San Diego to Aleutian Islands and Hawaiian Islands)
543	Western Aleutian District. The area south of 55°00' N lat and west of 177°00' E long, and bounded on the south and west by the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current editions of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part) and NOAA chart 530 (San Diego to Aleutian Islands and Hawaiian Islands)
550	Donut Hole. International waters of the Bering Sea outside the limits of the EEZ and Russian economic zone as depicted on the current edition of NOAA chart INT 813 Bering Sea (Southern Part).

NOTE: A statistical area is the part of a reporting area contained in the EEZ.



Figure 3 to Part 679. Gulf of Alaska statistical and reporting areas

a. Map

Figure 3 to Part 679. Gulf of Alaska Statistical and Reporting Areas
b. Coordinates ***(Updated 4/1/02)***

Code	Description
610	Western GOA Regulatory Area, Shumagin District. Along the south side of the Aleutian Islands, including those waters south of Nichols Point (54°51' 30" N lat) near False Pass, and straight lines between the islands and the Alaska Peninsula connecting the following coordinates in the order listed: 52°49.18' N, 169°40.47' W; 52°49.24' N, 169°07.10' W; 53°23.13' N, 167°50.50' W; 53°18.95' N, 167°51.06' W; 53°58.97' N, 166°16.50' W; 54°02.69' N, 166°02.93' W; 54°07.69' N, 165°39.74' W; 54°08.40' N, 165°38.29' W; 54°11.71' N, 165°23.09' W; 54°23.74' N, 164°44.73' W; and southward to the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current editions of NOAA chart INT 813 (Bering Sea, Southern Part) and NOAA chart 500 (West Coast of North America, Dixon Entrance to Unimak Pass), between 170°00' W long and 159°00' W long.
620	Central GOA Regulatory Area, Chirikof District. Along the south side of the Alaska Peninsula, between 159°00' W long and 154°00' W long, and southward to the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current edition of NOAA chart 500 (West Coast of North America, Dixon Entrance to Unimak Pass).
630	Central GOA Regulatory Area, Kodiak District. Along the south side of continental Alaska, between 154°00' W long and 147°00' W long, and southward to the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current edition of NOAA chart 500 (West Coast of North America, Dixon Entrance to Unimak Pass). Excluding area 649.
640	Eastern GOA Regulatory Area West Yakutat District. Along the south side of continental Alaska, between 147°00' W long and 140°00' W long, and southward to the limits of the US EEZ, as described in the current edition of NOAA chart 500 (West Coast of North America, Dixon Entrance to Unimak Pass). Excluding area 649.
649	Prince William Sound. Includes those waters of the State of Alaska inside the base line as specified in Alaska State regulations at 5 AAC 28.200.
650	Eastern GOA Regulatory Area, Southeast Outside District. East of 140°00' W long and southward to the limits of the US EEZ as described in the current edition of NOAA chart 500 (West Coast of North America, Dixon Entrance to Unimak Pass). Excluding area 659.
659	Eastern GOA Regulatory Area, Southeast Inside District. As specified in Alaska State regulations at 5 AAC 28.105 (a)(1) and (2).
690	GOA outside the U.S. EEZ as described in the current editions of NOAA chart INT 813 (Bering Sea, Southern Part) and NOAA chart 500 (West Coast of North America, Dixon Entrance to Unimak Pass).

NOTE: A statistical area is the part of a reporting area contained in the EEZ.


Attachment 2: North-South Regionalization and NMFS Management Areas in the GOA
Note: Species to which regionalization may apply are noted within each management area. No East-West regionalization lines have been specified.
North - South Regionalization
58 deg. 51.10' North Latitude
Cordova
649
Homer
Yakutat
KODIAK
640
Pollock
630
Pollock
650
Chignik
DUTCH HARBOR
SAND POINT
620
Pollock
610
Pollock and Pacific Cod
147 deg. W.
140 deg. W.
154 deg. W.
159 deg. W.
170 deg. W.
Central GOA (620 and 630):
Flatfish (w/o arrowtooth)
Pacific Ocean Perch
Northern Rockfish
Pelagic shelf rockfish
Pacific cod
Sablefish (trawl)

Draft list of WG, CG, and WY communities that meet the following criteria: 1) population of fewer than 7,500; 2) no road connections to larger community highway network; and 3) within 10 miles of the Gulf coast

	NAME	CLASS	POP	AREA
1	Akhiok	Second Class City	80	CG
2	Aleneva	Census Designated Place	68	CG
3	Chenega Bay	Census Designated Place	86	CG
4	Chignik	Second Class City	79	CG
5	Chignik Lagoon	Census Designated Place	103	CG
6	Chignik Lake	Census Designated Place	145	CG
7	Chiniak	Census Designated Place	50	CG
8	Cold Bay	Second Class City	88	WG
9	Cordova[1]	Home Rule City	2,454	WY
10	Halibut Cove	Census Designated Place	35	CG
11	Ivanof Bay	Census Designated Place	22	WG
12	Karluk	Census Designated Place	27	CG
13	King Cove	First Class City	792	WG
14	Kodiak	Home Rule City	6,334	CG
15	Kodiak Station	Census Designated Place	1,840	CG
16	Larsen Bay	Second Class City	115	CG
17	Nanwalek	Census Designated Place	177	CG
18	Old Harbor	Second Class City	237	CG
19	Ouzinkie	Second Class City	225	CG
20	Perryville	Census Designated Place	107	WG
21	Port Graham	Census Designated Place	171	CG
22	Port Lions	Second Class City	256	CG
23	Sand Point	First Class City	952	WG
24	Seldovia	First Class City	286	CG
25	Susitna	Census Designated Place	37	CG
26	Tatitlek[1]	Census Designated Place	107	WY
27	Tyonek	Census Designated Place	193	CG
28	Womens Bay	Census Designated Place	690	CG
29	Yakutat[2]	First Class City	680	WY/SEO

Note: Only communities located in the Western Gulf (WG), Central Gulf (CG), and West Yakutat (WY) areas are included, based on staff's understanding that this program applies only to those communities that are located in the GOA management areas identified under Alt. 2, 3, or 4. If Southeast Outside (SEO) communities were included, an additional 28 communities would be added to this list.

Note: Staff is aware that some communities listed may be contiguous to a larger eligible community (e.g., on Kodiak Island). The analysis will consider whether these communities should not be considered eligible communities to receive an allocation of CFQ but whose residents may be considered eligible to lease IFQs from the larger eligible community.

[1]Cordova and Tatitlek are considered located in the West Yakutat area. Though located within PWS (Area 649), these communities are inside the longitudinal line used to designate the WY (Area 640) and CG (Area 630) boundary.

[2]Yakutat is located on the boundary of WY and SEO, but is technically located within SEO (Gulf Area 650). Staff has included Yakutat in this list based on the Council's expressed preference to include Yakutat in community options for the Gulf rationalization program.

Common elements of existing or proposed regulations governing community programs

Program	Western Alaska CDQ Program	Gulf community QS purchase program	Crab Rationalization: Community purchase provision	GOA Rationalization: Community Fisheries Quota (CFQ)	GOA Rationalization: Community Purchase Program	GOA Rationalization: CIFTs
Status and Purpose	Existing program (implemented in 1994) is being revised per BSAI Am. 71. The CDQ Program is allocated a percentage of the BSAI TACs (CDQ reserves). Applies to all species except squid.	Approved by Council in April 2002 (GOA Am. 66); PR being drafted. Allows eligible GOA communities to purchase halibut and sablefish QS.	Approved by Council in April 2003. Would allow communities which have at least 3% of the initial PQS allocation of any BSAI crab fishery to purchase harvest shares.	Council is developing options for analysis. Would allocate a percentage of TAC to eligible communities. Applies to species in preferred alt for Gulf Rationalization.	Council is developing options for analysis. Would allow eligible communities to purchase QS. Applies to species in preferred alt for Gulf Rationalization.	Council is developing options for analysis. Would allocate a percentage of the total QS issued to persons to a CIFT. The CIFT would redistribute to harvesters that meet contractual terms. Applies to species in preferred alt for Gulf Rationalization.
Allocation vs. right to purchase quota share	Allocation	Right to purchase	Right to purchase	Allocation	Right to purchase	Allocation
Program Elements **1. Eligible communities.** Specific eligibility criteria would be in regulation and could also be in the FMP or MSA.	Eligibility criteria in regulation and MSA. Regulations include the eligibility criteria and a list of eligible communities.	Eligibility criteria will be in regulation and FMP. Regulations will include list of specific communities that meet the eligibility criteria.	Eligibility criteria proposed (see above).	Eligibility criteria proposed.	Eligibility criteria proposed.	Individual community eligibility is not applicable.
2. Administrative entity. Communities must have a legal entity that represents them in a fishery allocation program. Most regulations apply to this entity.	"Qualified applicant" for CDQ allocations must be: a local fishermen's organization or economic development organization incorporated under State or Federal law. The BOD must be at least 75% resident fishermen and each community must have at least one representative board member. A CDQ group is a qualified applicant with an approved CDP.	Requires formation of a new non-profit entity to represent communities.	In CDQ communities, the CDQ groups are eligible to purchase shares. For non-CDQ communities, each community must identify an entity permitted to purchase shares on its behalf.	Includes proposed options for an administrative entity: Gulf -wide, regional, or on an individual community basis.	**No options** have been proposed.	Includes options for CIFT designation (as the administrative entity): Gulf-wide, regional, or CP-based.
3. Qualification of administrative entity. NMFS must qualify or certify an administrative entity prior to it receiving or purchasing QS.	A qualified applicant may apply for CDQ allocations by submitting a proposed CDP to the State during the CDQ application period. NMFS reviews the CDPs and approves those that it determines meet all applicable requirements. The applicant must also provide a letter of support from its member communities.	Requires submission of a detailed statement of eligibility to NMFS and the State prior to being considered eligible to purchase QS on behalf of a community. The State may comment on the statement of eligibility but does not have a formal role. The required elements of the eligibility statement will be in regulation.	No new qualification process is necessary for CDQ communities. For non-CDQ communities, regulations will require submission of information to NMFS similar to the Gulf community QS purchase program.	**No options** have been proposed.	**No options** have been proposed.	This element would likely be included in the issues deferred to a trailing amendment.
4. Administrative Oversight. Entities representing communities must submit information to NMFS.	The CDQ group must submit a community development plan, amendments to the plan, annual audited financial statements, annual budget report, and annual budget reconciliation report to NMFS and the State. The main role for NMFS is to determine whether the report is submitted, contains the required information, and is consistent with the goals of the program. The State has the primary role in daily administrative oversight.	Requires an annual report to be submitted to NMFS, detailing the use of QS and IFQ by the community QS holder and community residents. The required elements of the report will be outlined in regulation.	For CDQ communities, the existing CDQ regulations and oversight would apply. For non CDQ communities, the administrative entity would be required to submit an annual report and meet performance standards similar to the Gulf community QS purchase program.	**No options** have been proposed.	**No options** have been proposed.	This element would likely be included in the issues deferred to a trailing amendment.

Continued on next page

Program	CDQ Program	Gulf community QS purchase program	Crab Rationalization: Community purchase provision	GOA Rationalization: Community Fisheries Quota (CFQ)	GOA Rationalization: Community Purchase Program	GOA Rationalization: CIFTs
5. Ownership and transfer restrictions. Regulations may govern the ownership and transfer of quota between communities and other QS holders in a program.	Federal regulations exist to govern the transfer of quota among CDQ groups. No quota transfer is allowed outside the CDQ Program.	Includes restrictions on the type and number of 'blocked' shares and the category of QS communities may purchase. Some provisions are similar to those that apply to individual QS holders. New features include the requirement to lease IFQs only to residents of the owner community and restrictions on the allowable reasons for a community to sell its QS.	No ownership or transfer restrictions apply specific to community held harvest shares.	Includes options to limit the leasing of IFQs to residents of eligible communities or residents of eligible communities that own their own vessels.	**No options** for ownership or transfer restrictions have been proposed.	This element would likely be included in the issues deferred to a trailing amendment.
6. Use of revenues. Regulations may govern permissible activities or expenditures by a community entity.	CDQ groups must invest primarily in fisheries-related projects, but a smaller portion of their revenues may be spent on financial instruments, education, charities, training, and administrative expenses. The CDQ allocation process has been the primary mechanism to enforce this provision. The regulations are currently being revised to allow for some level of non-fisheries related investments.	No restrictions on the use of revenues generated from leasing the IFQs, but there are requirements that limit the reasons why a community entity may sell QS (see above).	No restrictions on the use of revenues generated from leasing the IFQs or the sale of harvest shares apply. The CDQ Program rules would continue to apply to CDQ groups.	Includes options to limit the use of revenues to fisheries related activities, education, government functions, and/or social and capital projects.	**No options** have been proposed to limit the use of revenues or restrict the sale of QS held by communities.	This element would likely be included in the issues deferred to a trailing amendment.
7. Use caps or allocation limits. Regulations may limit the amount of QS allocated to a community program or purchased by a community entity.	The CDQ Program is allocated 10% of pollock, 7.5% of crab and all other groundfish species, 20% of sablefish, and 20 - 100% of the halibut TACs in the BSAI. Portions of the CDQ and PSQ reserves for each subarea are allocated to CDQ groups in accordance with approved CDPs. NMFS can allocate no more than 33% of the total CDQ for all subareas and districts combined to any one CDQ group.	Individual communities are limited to the same use caps as individual QS holders in the IFQ Program. In addition, all participating communities are cumulatively limited to 3% of the halibut QS and 3% of the sablefish QS in each Gulf area, in each of the first 7 years of the program (21% total by area).	Individual communities will be held to the same use caps as individual harvest share holders in the crab rationalization program.	Includes options to limit harvester QS allocated to communities to 5 - 20% of the annual pool, and to limit processor shares allocated to communities to 5 - 20% of the annual processing allocation.	**No options** have been proposed to limit the shares purchased by communities. If no options were proposed, it is assumed that individual communities would be subject to the same use cap as individual QS holders, if applicable.	Includes options to reserve 10 - 30% of the total harvest shares for CIFT associations.

Note: Right of first refusal provisions are not included in the above comparison of community programs. The crab rationalization program allows CDQ groups or community groups representing qualified communities a first right of refusal to purchase processing shares (based on history from the community) which are being proposed to be sold for processing outside the boundaries of the community of original processing history. The Gulf rationalization program has proposed a similar option for Gulf communities, based on the provisions of the crab rationalization program.

Note: The table also identifies elements for which no options have been proposed, in order to highlight such elements for the Council in the event it would like to include options. This does not mean to imply that options for those elements must be included in that program.

AGENDA C-1(d)
JUNE 2003

Gulf of Alaska Rationalization
Harvest Data and Allocation Estimates

The attached two documents are intended to provide the Council with preliminary information concerning the harvest allocations under the different qualifying year options in the Council's April 2003 motion. The two documents are:

1) Preliminary Catch History Allocation Estimates - DRAFT, September 2002
2) Status of Gulf of Alaska Fisheries - Part 4 of the January 2002 Discussion Paper concerning Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Rationalization

The first document should help the Council assess some of the qualifying year options that are under consideration. The absence of 2002 data, however, prevents any assessment of the qualifying year options that rely on that year's harvests. Note that several of the allocation options presented in this document use the percentage-based method, which is under consideration only for Pacific cod allocations. Also, the allocation estimates in these documents are preliminary. In addition to these estimates, Council staff will attempt to provide allocation estimates for the qualifying year options that include 2002 catch history at the meeting. Because complications in preparation of the data cannot be fully predicted, we cannot commit to having those estimates for this meeting.

The second document is intended to provide additional background information concerning participation. This document does not examine any allocations, but does provide some information concerning total harvests by different groups of participants in the fisheries in most of the years being considered for the qualifying period.

Preliminary Catch History Allocation Estimates

Draft

Prepared for the

North Pacific Fishery Management Council

September 2002

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1 Catch History Based Rationalization Program

The tables that follow are based on the "GOA Working Group Draft List of Alternatives, Elements, and Options as of May 22, 2002." The list of alternatives describes a catch history based rationalization program for the Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat subareas of the Gulf of Alaska Groundfish FMP. Groundfish fisheries in the remainder of the Eastern Gulf would not be included except for "sideboarding" purposes. The program would include trawl and non-trawl gear and would exempt jig and other gears.

Catch History Calculation Methods: As with all catch-history based rationalization programs one of the more critical components, at least for the future participants, is the methodology by which shares of catch history are calculated. The Catch History Based Rationalization Program developed by the GOA Rationalization Committee includes a total of 10 distinct options for catch history calculation. The options vary with the specific years included; and whether the calculation uses the vessel's total pounds over the included years to calculate shares, or whether the calculation uses the vessel's percent of annual harvest averaged over the included years. In all cases only retained landings will be included.

The ten different calculation method options are listed below with a shorthand code that will be used to designate each method throughout the rest of this document:

1) 95-01d1#s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2001, excluding the vessel's worst year; calculates shares by summing the vessel's catch over the included years and dividing by the sum of included catches of all vessels (the "denominator").

2) 95-01d2#s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2001, excluding the vessel's worst two years; calculates shares by summing the vessel's catch over the included years and dividing by the sum of included catches of all vessels.

3) 95-01d1%s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2001, excluding the vessel's worst year; calculates shares by averaging the vessel's proportion of annual retained harvests over the included years and dividing by the sum of all included vessels' average proportion.[1]

4) 95-01d2%s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2001, excluding the vessel's worst two years; calculates shares by averaging the vessel's proportion of annual retained harvests over the included years and dividing by the sum of all included vessels' average proportion.

5) 95-00d1#s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2000, excluding the vessel's worst year; calculates shares by summing the vessel's catch over the included years and dividing by the sum of included catches of all vessels.

6) 95-00d2#s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2000, excluding the vessel's worst two years; calculates shares by summing the vessel's catch over the included years and dividing by the sum of included catches of all vessels.

7) 95-00d1%s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2000, excluding the vessel's worst year; calculates shares by averaging the vessel's proportion of annual retained harvests over the included years and dividing by the sum of all included vessels' average proportion.

[1] In methods using the vessel's percentage (proportion) of annual retained harvest, the vessels percentage must be divided by the sum of the averages of all included vessels—this ensures that the total shares of all vessels sums to 100 percent.

8) 95-00d2%s—Includes retained catch from 1995-2000, excluding the vessel's worst two years; calculates shares by averaging the vessel's proportion of annual retained harvests over the included years and dividing by the sum of all included vessels' average proportion.

9) 98-01d1#s—Includes retained catch from 1998-2001, excluding the vessel's worst year; calculates shares by summing the vessel's catch over the included years and dividing by the sum of included catches of all vessels.

10) 98-01d1%s—Includes retained catch from 1998-2001, excluding the vessel's worst year; calculates shares by averaging the vessel's proportion of annual retained harvests over the included years and dividing by the sum of all included vessels' average proportion.

It should be noted that the GOA Working Group included the optional provision to exclude catches that were used to produce fish-meal. The data currently available to the analysts does not allow for the determination of whether the fish was made into meal or whether it went into other product forms. There is some question whether any data exist that would allow this determination on a vessel-by-vessel basis. This is because official processed product information is collected by NMFS from directly from processors, which report all products produced during the week without explicitly linking a particular product to particular deliveries. Fish-tickets, which are the official record of catch delivered to processors, may indicate that some portion of the vessels' harvest is destined for fish-meal and prices for those particular fish may reflect a lower value. However, there is no official assurance that all of those fish were, in fact, processed into fish meal, or that other fish were not also produced into fish-meal.

Included Species: Species that will be included in the program vary by gear. For trawl vessels, the species included in the program are: pollock, Pacific cod, rockfish (excluding thornyheads), shallow-water flatfish, or alternatively all flatfish excluding arrowtooth flounder. Note that this preliminary analysis includes all flatfish excluding arrowtooth flounder, and does not explicitly show catch history calculations for shallow-water flatfish. For non-trawl gears Pacific cod and rockfish (excluding thornyheads) are included.

It should also be noted that the full-program developed by the Gulf Working Group includes provisions for the allocation of incidental catches of other species on a proportional basis. The additional assignment of incidental catches—for example the assignment of incidental catch amounts of pollock to catch history amounts of Pacific cod—will require additional proportioning to ensure that no more than 100 percent of the TAC available is allocated. The assignment of incidental catch amounts is not included in this preliminary analysis.

As indicated in the previous paragraph, the catch history rationalization program includes provisions to allocate additional amounts of each incidental catch species proportional to amount of the catch history shares of the included species. Therefore, this preliminary analysis of catch history shares includes all retained catch of the included species, regardless of the target fishery in which they were harvested.

Other Issues

State-Managed Pacific Cod Fishery: To the extent possible landings of Pacific cod in the state-managed fishery have been excluded from the data. An exception to this generalization is the 2001 data—while preliminary 2001 data are included, the analysts were unable to parse the state-managed fishery data.

Currently Groundfish LLP Endorsements: Under the current Groundfish LLP program, vessels participating in federal waters must be endorsed to fish in specific sub-areas of the GOA with trawl gear or with non-trawl gear or with both gears. Vessels that fish only in state waters are not required to

have LLP endorsements. During the qualifying period, many vessels that made landings did not have all of the endorsements currently needed to participate in federal waters. This preliminary analysis has included the catches of vessels that are not currently endorsed under the GOA Groundfish LLP program. A separate table for each subarea, species and gear combination documents the extent of the participation of non-endorsed vessels.

Table Descriptions: The tables that follow are organized by Area-Western Gulf tables are in Section 2, Central Gulf table are in are in Section 3, and West Yakutat tables are in Section 4. Within each section, there are six subsections corresponding to the six different species and gear combinations. Within each species-gear subsection there are five tables. Each of the tables contains elevens columns including the first column that contains row headings. The remaining 10 columns correspond to the different allocation methods. The included tables are:

Table 1: **Summary Table of Catch History Options by Allocation Method Options:**

This table includes "denominators" for each methods as well as rows showing number of qualifiers and proportion of catch history by residence, and by CV/CP vessels.

Table 2: **Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants by Allocation Method Options:**

This table shows endorsed and non-endorsed vessels and proportions of catch history by endorsement status. The table also shows numbers of endorsed non-endorsed vessels by residence.

Table 3: **Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off by Allocation Method Option:**

This table compares outcomes under the different methods and shows the number of vessels that are "better off" or "worse off" under the various allocation methods.

Table 4: **Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off by Allocation Method Option (continued):**

This table is a continuation of the Table 3.

Table 5: **Participation by Number of Years by Allocation Method Option**

This table documents the number of vessels by the number of years of participation in the fishery. The number of years in the fishery is an important determinant of how well the vessel will fare under the catch history allocation method. Vessels with fewer years of participation will do better if the number of included years is fewer, or if the number of "drop years" is higher. Vessels with greater numbers of years in the fishery are more noticeably affected by the use of pounds or percentages in the calculation method.

2 Western Gulf Catch History Tables

2.1 Western Gulf Pollock Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 1. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Western Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	175,709.87	169,021.56	1.13	1.31	145,991.57	137,538.63	1.16	1.37	93,067.03	1.23
Qualifiers	174	174	174	174	167	167	167	167	128	128
Total Alaskans	41	41	41	41	37	37	37	37	34	34
Total Others	133	133	133	133	130	130	130	130	94	94
Endorsed	136	136	136	136	130	130	130	130	113	113
Not Endorsed	38	38	38	38	37	37	37	37	15	15
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	31.37	30.53	32.07	31.27	27.47	26.57	28.89	28.20	33.77	34.26
Others Percent of Total Shares	68.63	69.47	67.93	68.73	72.53	73.43	71.11	71.80	66.23	65.74
Total Qualified CVs	136.00	136.00	136.00	136.00	129.00	129.00	129.00	129.00	107.00	107.00
Total Qualified CPs	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	21.00	21.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	98.83	98.79	98.86	98.82	98.62	98.54	98.69	98.61	99.63	99.59
CP Percent of Total Shares	1.17	1.21	1.14	1.18	1.38	1.46	1.31	1.39	0.37	0.41

Table 2. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Western Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	96.55	96.41	96.72	96.60	95.94	95.69	96.24	96.00	97.28	97.51
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	3.45	3.59	3.28	3.40	4.06	4.31	3.76	4.00	2.72	2.49
Alaskans Endorsed	37	37	37	37	33	33	33	33	32	32
Alaskans Not Endorsed	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	2
Others Endorsed	99	99	99	99	97	97	97	97	81	81
Others Not Endorsed	34	34	34	34	33	33	33	33	13	13
Endorsed Total	136	136	136	136	130	130	130	130	113	113
Not Endorsed Total	38	38	38	38	37	37	37	37	15	15
All Vessels with Landings	174	174	174	174	167	167	167	167	128	128

Table 3. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	14	92	85	43	46	41	42	93	94
Alaskans	0	9	17	20	20	21	21	20	16	16
Others	0	5	75	65	23	25	20	22	77	78
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	160	82	89	131	128	133	132	81	80
Alaskans	0	32	24	21	21	20	20	21	25	25
Others	0	125	56	66	107	105	110	108	55	54
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	160	0	116	95	44	43	64	41	93	91
Alaskans	32	0	23	18	19	20	21	20	16	14
Others	128	0	93	77	25	23	43	21	77	77
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	14	0	58	79	130	131	110	133	81	83
Alaskans	9	0	18	23	22	21	20	21	25	27
Others	5	0	38	54	105	107	87	109	55	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	82	58	0	14	55	57	43	44	93	93
Alaskans	24	18	0	9	21	22	20	20	16	16
Others	58	40	0	5	34	35	23	24	77	77
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	92	116	0	160	119	117	131	130	81	81
Alaskans	17	23	0	32	20	19	21	21	25	25
Others	74	92	0	125	96	95	107	106	55	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	89	79	160	0	51	56	42	44	91	92
Alaskans	21	23	32	0	20	22	18	20	15	15
Others	68	56	128	0	31	34	24	24	76	77
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	85	95	14	0	123	118	132	130	83	82
Alaskans	20	18	9	0	21	19	23	21	26	26
Others	64	76	5	0	99	96	106	106	56	55

Table 4. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	131	130	119	123	0	17	96	77	95	98
Alaskans	21	22	20	21	0	9	13	13	16	16
Others	110	108	99	102	0	8	83	64	79	82
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	36	37	48	44	0	150	71	90	72	69
Alaskans	16	15	17	16	0	28	24	24	21	21
Others	20	22	31	28	0	119	45	64	50	47
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	128	131	117	118	150	0	127	99	94	96
Alaskans	20	21	19	19	28	0	23	14	15	15
Others	108	110	98	99	122	0	104	85	79	81
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	39	36	50	49	17	0	40	68	73	71
Alaskans	17	16	18	18	9	0	14	23	22	22
Others	22	20	32	31	8	0	26	43	50	48
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	133	110	131	132	71	40	0	16	96	95
Alaskans	20	20	21	23	24	14	0	9	16	16
Others	113	90	110	109	47	26	0	7	80	79
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	34	57	36	35	96	127	0	151	71	72
Alaskans	17	17	16	14	13	23	0	28	21	21
Others	17	40	20	21	82	101	0	120	49	50
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	132	133	130	130	90	68	151	0	94	95
Alaskans	21	21	21	21	24	23	28	0	15	15
Others	111	112	109	109	66	45	123	0	79	80
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	35	34	37	37	77	99	16	0	73	72
Alaskans	16	16	16	16	13	14	9	0	22	22
Others	19	18	21	21	63	84	7	0	50	49
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	81	81	81	83	79	80	78	80	0	75
Alaskans	25	25	25	26	25	26	25	26	0	22
Others	56	56	56	57	54	54	53	54	0	53
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	47	47	47	45	49	48	50	48	0	53
Alaskans	9	9	9	8	9	8	9	8	0	12
Others	37	37	37	36	39	39	40	39	0	40
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	80	83	81	82	76	78	79	79	53	0
Alaskans	25	27	25	26	25	26	25	26	12	0
Others	55	56	56	56	51	52	54	53	41	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	48	45	47	46	52	50	49	49	75	0
Alaskans	9	7	9	8	9	8	9	8	22	0
Others	38	37	37	37	42	41	39	40	52	0

Table 5. Participation by Number of Years in the Western Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	55	55	55	55	65	65	65	65	56	56
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	43	43	43	43	35	35	35	35	41	41
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	26	26	26	26	21	21	21	21	8	8
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	16	16	16	16	20	20	20	20	23	23
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	20	20	20	20	14	14	14	14	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	2	2	2	2	12	12	12	12	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	12	12	12	12	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	14	14
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	9	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	4	4
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	6	6	6	6	2	2	2	2	2	2
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	14	14
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	2	2	2	2	7	7	7	7	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	44	44	44	44	54	54	54	54	42	42
Others with Landings in 2 Years	34	34	34	34	25	25	25	25	37	37
Others with Landings in 3 Years	20	20	20	20	19	19	19	19	6	6
Others with Landings in 4 Years	14	14	14	14	15	15	15	15	9	9
Others with Landings in 5 Years	16	16	16	16	12	12	12	12	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	5	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0

2.2 Western Gulf Pacific Cod Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 6. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Western Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	88,525.67	83,175.18	1.12	1.23	80,560.85	73,879.34	1.13	1.24	41,002.49	1.15
Qualifiers	189	189	189	189	187	187	187	187	142	142
Total Alaskans	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	49	49
Total Others	135	135	135	135	133	133	133	133	93	93
Endorsed	154	154	154	154	153	153	153	153	127	127
Not Endorsed	35	35	35	35	34	34	34	34	15	15
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	54.88	54.54	54.62	54.30	54.64	53.85	53.89	53.13	59.71	59.16
Others Percent of Total Shares	45.12	45.46	45.38	45.70	45.36	46.15	46.11	46.87	40.29	40.84
Total Qualified CVs	154.00	154.00	154.00	154.00	152.00	152.00	152.00	152.00	120.00	120.00
Total Qualified CPs	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	22.00	22.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	95.43	95.19	94.52	94.09	95.76	95.44	95.12	94.55	94.73	93.22
CP Percent of Total Shares	4.57	4.81	5.48	5.91	4.24	4.56	4.88	5.45	5.27	6.78

Table 7. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Western Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	98.39	98.28	98.64	98.51	98.25	98.09	98.41	98.21	99.34	99.45
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	1.61	1.72	1.36	1.49	1.75	1.91	1.59	1.79	0.66	0.55
Alaskans Endorsed	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	46	46
Alaskans Not Endorsed	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3
Others Endorsed	104	104	104	104	103	103	103	103	81	81
Others Not Endorsed	31	31	31	31	30	30	30	30	12	12
Endorsed Total	154	154	154	154	153	153	153	153	127	127
Not Endorsed Total	35	35	35	35	34	34	34	34	15	15
All Vessels with Landings	189	189	189	189	187	187	187	187	142	142

Table 8. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	30	120	109	41	42	70	59	107	108
Alaskans	0	20	34	35	22	24	29	27	24	24
Others	0	10	86	74	19	18	41	32	83	84
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	159	69	80	148	147	119	130	82	81
Alaskans	0	33	20	19	31	29	24	26	29	29
Others	0	123	49	61	114	115	94	103	52	51
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	159	0	123	122	29	41	108	62	104	109
Alaskans	34	0	33	38	12	23	34	27	23	24
Others	125	0	90	84	17	18	74	35	81	85
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	30	0	66	67	160	148	81	127	85	80
Alaskans	20	0	21	16	41	30	20	26	30	29
Others	10	0	45	51	116	115	61	100	54	50
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	69	66	0	29	45	44	38	41	98	104
Alaskans	20	21	0	20	18	21	21	23	16	22
Others	49	45	0	9	27	23	17	18	82	82
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	120	123	0	160	144	145	151	148	91	85
Alaskans	33	32	0	33	35	32	32	30	37	31
Others	84	88	0	124	106	110	116	115	53	53
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	80	67	160	0	66	41	33	39	93	103
Alaskans	19	16	34	0	17	15	16	20	14	21
Others	61	51	126	0	49	26	17	19	79	82
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	109	122	29	0	123	148	156	150	96	86
Alaskans	34	37	20	0	36	38	37	33	39	32
Others	72	82	9	0	84	107	116	114	56	53

Table 9. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	148	160	144	123	0	33	110	58	105	111
Alaskans	32	42	36	37	0	23	37	27	24	25
Others	116	118	108	86	0	10	73	31	81	86
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	39	27	43	64	0	154	77	129	82	76
Alaskans	22	12	18	17	0	30	17	26	29	28
Others	17	15	25	47	0	121	60	102	52	47
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	147	148	145	148	154	0	121	110	104	110
Alaskans	30	31	33	39	31	0	36	38	22	24
Others	117	117	112	109	123	0	85	72	82	86
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	40	39	42	39	33	0	66	77	83	77
Alaskans	24	23	21	15	23	0	18	16	31	29
Others	16	16	21	24	10	0	48	61	51	47
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	119	81	151	156	77	66	0	30	104	111
Alaskans	25	20	33	38	17	18	0	21	22	24
Others	94	61	118	118	60	48	0	9	82	87
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	68	106	36	31	110	121	0	157	83	76
Alaskans	29	33	21	16	36	35	0	32	31	29
Others	37	70	15	15	71	83	0	122	51	46
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	130	127	148	150	129	77	157	0	108	105
Alaskans	27	27	31	34	27	16	33	0	19	20
Others	103	100	117	116	102	61	124	0	89	85
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	57	60	39	37	58	110	30	0	79	82
Alaskans	27	27	23	20	27	37	21	0	34	33
Others	28	31	16	17	29	70	9	0	44	48
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	82	85	91	96	84	85	85	81	0	98
Alaskans	30	31	38	40	30	32	32	35	0	37
Others	52	54	53	56	54	53	53	46	0	61
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	60	57	51	46	58	57	57	61	0	44
Alaskans	19	18	11	9	19	17	17	14	0	12
Others	40	38	39	36	38	39	39	46	0	32
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	81	80	85	86	78	79	78	84	44	0
Alaskans	30	30	32	33	29	30	30	34	12	0
Others	51	50	53	53	49	49	48	50	32	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	61	62	57	56	64	63	64	58	98	0
Alaskans	19	19	17	16	20	19	19	15	36	0
Others	41	42	39	39	43	43	44	42	60	0

Table 10. Participation by Number of Years in the Western Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	51	51	51	51	53	53	53	53	51	51
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	34	34	34	34	37	37	37	37	31	31
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	31	31	31	31	28	28	28	28	13	13
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	15	15	15	15	17	17	17	17	47	47
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	9	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	10	10	10	10	42	42	42	42	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	39	39	39	39	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	9	9
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	28	28
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	6	6	6	6	27	27	27	27	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	24	24	24	24	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	44	44	44	44	46	46	46	46	42	42
Others with Landings in 2 Years	29	29	29	29	31	31	31	31	24	24
Others with Landings in 3 Years	27	27	27	27	23	23	23	23	8	8
Others with Landings in 4 Years	11	11	11	11	13	13	13	13	19	19
Others with Landings in 5 Years	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	4	4	4	4	15	15	15	15	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	15	15	15	15	0	0	0	0	0	0

2.3 Western Gulf Flatfish Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 11. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Western Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	7,388.68	7,027.37	1.14	1.29	6,338.30	5,976.28	1.17	1.37	3,466.08	1.18
Qualifiers	123	123	123	123	118	118	118	118	101	101
Total Alaskans	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	26	26
Total Others	96	96	96	96	91	91	91	91	75	75
Endorsed	106	106	106	106	103	103	103	103	90	90
Not Endorsed	17	17	17	17	15	15	15	15	11	11
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	8.71	9.15	9.57	10.12	5.99	6.34	6.91	7.38	16.03	16.23
Others Percent of Total Shares	91.29	90.85	90.43	89.88	94.01	93.66	93.09	92.62	83.97	83.77
Total Qualified CVs	91.00	91.00	91.00	91.00	86.00	86.00	86.00	86.00	78.00	78.00
Total Qualified CPs	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	23.00	23.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	6.41	6.71	5.61	5.90	6.12	6.46	5.18	5.49	6.35	5.96
CP Percent of Total Shares	93.59	93.29	94.39	94.10	93.88	93.54	94.82	94.51	93.65	94.04

Table 12. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Western Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	89.60	89.07	90.35	89.78	87.88	87.14	88.70	87.91	96.65	96.29
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	10.40	10.93	9.65	10.22	12.12	12.86	11.30	12.09	3.35	3.71
Alaskans Endorsed	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	25	25
Alaskans Not Endorsed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Others Endorsed	80	80	80	80	77	77	77	77	65	65
Others Not Endorsed	16	16	16	16	14	14	14	14	10	10
Endorsed Total	106	106	106	106	103	103	103	103	90	90
Not Endorsed Total	17	17	17	17	15	15	15	15	11	11
All Vessels with Landings	123	123	123	123	118	118	118	118	101	101

Table 13. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	5	54	44	36	35	57	53	51	51
Alaskans	0	1	9	7	15	14	19	18	5	5
Others	0	4	45	37	21	21	38	35	46	46
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	118	69	79	87	88	66	70	72	72
Alaskans	0	26	18	20	12	13	8	9	22	22
Others	0	89	49	57	73	73	57	60	48	48
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	118	0	70	52	36	36	60	57	51	51
Alaskans	26	0	17	9	15	15	19	19	5	5
Others	92	0	53	43	21	21	41	38	46	46
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	5	0	53	71	87	87	63	66	72	72
Alaskans	1	0	10	18	12	12	8	8	22	22
Others	4	0	42	51	73	73	54	57	48	48
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	69	53	0	5	75	63	35	35	51	47
Alaskans	18	10	0	1	19	17	15	15	5	5
Others	51	43	0	4	56	46	20	20	46	42
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	54	70	0	118	48	60	88	88	72	76
Alaskans	9	17	0	26	8	10	12	12	22	22
Others	44	51	0	89	39	49	74	74	48	52
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	79	71	118	0	78	74	34	35	53	49
Alaskans	20	18	26	0	21	19	15	15	6	5
Others	59	53	92	0	57	55	19	20	47	44
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	44	52	5	0	45	49	89	88	70	74
Alaskans	7	9	1	0	6	8	12	12	21	22
Others	36	42	4	0	38	40	75	74	47	50

Table 14. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	87	87	48	45	0	5	58	47	53	52
Alaskans	12	12	8	6	0	1	12	8	6	5
Others	75	75	40	39	0	4	46	39	47	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	31	31	70	73	0	113	60	71	65	66
Alaskans	15	15	19	21	0	26	15	19	21	22
Others	16	16	50	51	0	85	44	51	43	43
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	88	87	60	49	113	0	61	56	53	53
Alaskans	13	12	10	8	26	0	14	11	6	6
Others	75	75	50	41	87	0	47	45	47	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	30	31	58	69	5	0	57	62	65	65
Alaskans	14	15	17	19	1	0	13	16	21	21
Others	16	16	40	49	4	0	43	45	43	43
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	66	63	88	89	60	57	0	5	55	54
Alaskans	8	8	12	12	15	13	0	1	6	6
Others	58	55	76	77	45	44	0	4	49	48
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	52	55	30	29	58	61	0	113	63	64
Alaskans	19	19	15	15	12	14	0	26	21	21
Others	32	35	15	14	45	46	0	85	41	42
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	70	66	88	88	71	62	113	0	55	54
Alaskans	9	8	12	12	19	16	26	0	6	6
Others	61	58	76	76	52	46	87	0	49	48
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	48	52	30	30	47	56	5	0	63	64
Alaskans	18	19	15	15	8	11	1	0	21	21
Others	29	32	15	15	38	44	4	0	41	42
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	72	72	72	70	70	70	68	68	0	48
Alaskans	22	22	22	21	21	21	21	21	0	17
Others	50	50	50	49	49	49	47	47	0	31
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	29	29	29	31	31	31	33	33	0	53
Alaskans	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	0	9
Others	25	25	25	26	26	26	28	28	0	43
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	72	72	76	74	71	70	69	69	53	0
Alaskans	22	22	22	22	22	21	21	21	9	0
Others	50	50	54	52	49	49	48	48	44	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	29	29	25	27	30	31	32	32	48	0
Alaskans	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	17	0
Others	25	25	21	23	26	26	27	27	30	0

Table 15. Participation by Number of Years in the Western Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	30	30	30	30	32	32	32	32	45	45
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	31	31	31	31	27	27	27	27	27	27
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	20	20	20	20	22	22	22	22	8	8
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	15	15	15	15	21	21	21	21	21	21
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	14	14	14	14	12	12	12	12	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	9	9	9	9	4	4	4	4	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	6
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	7	7	7	7	10	10	10	10	6	6
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	3	3	3	3	8	8	8	8	12	12
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	7	7	7	7	5	5	5	5	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	29	29	29	29	31	31	31	31	39	39
Others with Landings in 2 Years	24	24	24	24	17	17	17	17	21	21
Others with Landings in 3 Years	16	16	16	16	19	19	19	19	6	6
Others with Landings in 4 Years	12	12	12	12	13	13	13	13	9	9
Others with Landings in 5 Years	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0

2.4 Western Gulf Rockfish Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 16. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Western Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	10,326.05	9,934.06	1.15	1.31	9,123.60	8,731.60	1.18	1.39	5,789.29	1.23
Qualifiers	103	103	103	103	99	99	99	99	78	78
Total Alaskans	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	18	18
Total Others	80	80	80	80	76	76	76	76	60	60
Endorsed	92	92	92	92	88	88	88	88	73	73
Not Endorsed	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	5	5
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	20.42	21.22	17.23	18.05	23.08	24.11	20.11	21.25	19.89	16.82
Others Percent of Total Shares	79.58	78.78	82.77	81.95	76.92	75.89	79.89	78.75	80.11	83.18
Total Qualified CVs	77.00	77.00	77.00	77.00	73.00	73.00	73.00	73.00	61.00	61.00
Total Qualified CPs	26.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	17.00	17.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	0.54	0.56	0.64	0.67	0.60	0.63	0.74	0.79	0.45	0.74
CP Percent of Total Shares	99.46	99.44	99.36	99.33	99.40	99.37	99.26	99.21	99.55	99.26

Table 17. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Western Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	99.46	99.44	99.46	99.43	99.39	99.36	99.36	99.33	99.94	99.90
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	0.54	0.56	0.54	0.57	0.61	0.64	0.64	0.67	0.06	0.10
Alaskans Endorsed	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	17	17
Alaskans Not Endorsed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Others Endorsed	70	70	70	70	66	66	66	66	56	56
Others Not Endorsed	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	4	4
Endorsed Total	92	92	92	92	88	88	88	88	73	73
Not Endorsed Total	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	5	5
All Vessels with Landings	103	103	103	103	99	99	99	99	78	78

Table 18. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	4	54	47	20	20	51	31	44	41
Alaskans	0	0	12	10	7	7	14	7	8	9
Others	0	4	42	37	13	13	37	24	36	32
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	99	49	56	83	83	52	72	59	62
Alaskans	0	23	11	13	16	16	9	16	15	14
Others	0	73	38	43	64	64	43	55	42	46
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	99	0	57	53	23	20	54	39	44	42
Alaskans	23	0	14	12	8	7	14	11	8	9
Others	76	0	43	41	15	13	40	28	36	33
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	4	0	46	50	80	83	49	64	59	61
Alaskans	0	0	9	11	15	16	9	12	15	14
Others	4	0	37	39	62	64	40	51	42	45
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	49	46	0	3	48	43	20	19	50	41
Alaskans	11	9	0	0	11	9	7	6	9	8
Others	38	37	0	3	37	34	13	13	41	33
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	54	57	0	100	55	60	83	84	53	62
Alaskans	12	14	0	23	12	14	16	17	14	15
Others	39	40	0	74	40	43	64	64	37	45
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	56	50	100	0	49	49	23	20	61	41
Alaskans	13	11	23	0	11	12	8	7	10	8
Others	43	39	77	0	38	37	15	13	51	33
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	47	53	3	0	54	54	80	83	42	62
Alaskans	10	12	0	0	12	11	15	16	13	15
Others	34	38	3	0	39	40	62	64	27	45

Table 19. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	83	80	55	54	0	6	53	43	42	41
Alaskans	16	15	12	12	0	1	14	11	8	9
Others	67	65	43	42	0	5	39	32	34	32
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	16	19	44	45	0	93	46	56	57	58
Alaskans	7	8	11	11	0	22	9	12	15	14
Others	9	11	33	34	0	68	37	44	40	42
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	83	83	60	54	93	0	59	51	43	43
Alaskans	16	16	14	11	22	0	16	14	9	9
Others	67	67	46	43	71	0	43	37	34	34
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	16	16	39	45	6	0	40	48	56	56
Alaskans	7	7	9	12	1	0	7	9	14	14
Others	9	9	30	33	5	0	33	39	40	40
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	52	49	83	80	46	40	0	4	58	41
Alaskans	9	9	16	15	9	7	0	0	11	9
Others	43	40	67	65	37	33	0	4	47	32
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	47	50	16	19	53	59	0	95	41	58
Alaskans	14	14	7	8	14	16	0	23	12	14
Others	30	33	9	11	36	40	0	69	27	42
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	72	64	84	83	56	48	95	0	59	44
Alaskans	16	12	17	16	12	9	23	0	11	10
Others	56	52	67	67	44	39	72	0	48	34
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	27	35	15	16	43	51	4	0	40	55
Alaskans	7	11	6	7	11	14	0	0	12	13
Others	18	22	9	9	29	34	4	0	26	40
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	59	59	53	42	61	60	45	44	0	29
Alaskans	15	15	14	13	15	14	12	12	0	7
Others	44	44	39	29	46	46	33	32	0	22
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	19	19	25	36	17	18	33	34	0	49
Alaskans	3	3	4	5	3	4	6	6	0	11
Others	16	16	21	31	14	14	27	28	0	38
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	62	61	62	62	62	60	62	59	49	0
Alaskans	14	14	15	15	14	14	14	13	11	0
Others	48	47	47	47	48	46	48	46	38	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	16	17	16	16	16	18	16	19	29	0
Alaskans	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	5	7	0
Others	12	13	13	13	12	14	12	14	20	0

Table 20. Participation by Number of Years in the Western Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	35	35	35	35	38	38	38	38	36	36
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	29	29	29	29	26	26	26	26	21	21
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	11	11	11	11	15	15	15	15	9	9
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	16	16	16	16	11	11	11	11	12	12
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	7	7	7	7	9	9	9	9	4	4
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	5	5
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	4	4	4	4	1	1	1	1	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	28	28	28	28	29	29	29	29	32	32
Others with Landings in 2 Years	27	27	27	27	23	23	23	23	16	16
Others with Landings in 3 Years	7	7	7	7	10	10	10	10	5	5
Others with Landings in 4 Years	10	10	10	10	6	6	6	6	7	7
Others with Landings in 5 Years	1	1	1	1	5	5	5	5	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0

2.5 Western Gulf Pacific Cod Non-Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 21. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	58,404.97	55,280.49	1.13	1.28	45,978.17	42,498.42	1.14	1.32	35,975.66	1.25
Qualifiers	265	265	265	265	238	238	238	238	196	196
Total Alaskans	148	148	148	148	132	132	132	132	113	113
Total Others	117	117	117	117	106	106	106	106	83	83
Endorsed	167	167	167	167	154	154	154	154	127	127
Not Endorsed	98	98	98	98	84	84	84	84	69	69
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	53.19	52.89	53.54	53.37	50.78	50.10	51.80	51.12	56.14	56.86
Others Percent of Total Shares	46.81	47.11	46.46	46.63	49.22	49.90	48.20	48.88	43.86	43.14
Total Qualified CVs	216.00	216.00	216.00	216.00	190.00	190.00	190.00	190.00	165.00	165.00
Total Qualified CPs	49.00	49.00	49.00	49.00	48.00	48.00	48.00	48.00	31.00	31.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	43.66	45.14	42.10	43.32	40.24	42.12	39.67	41.42	50.56	50.40
CP Percent of Total Shares	56.34	54.86	57.90	56.68	59.76	57.88	60.33	58.58	49.44	49.60

Table 22. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	88.20	87.54	88.08	87.43	87.02	85.98	87.22	86.18	89.74	89.81
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	11.80	12.46	11.92	12.57	12.98	14.02	12.78	13.82	10.26	10.19
Alaskans Endorsed	100	100	100	100	93	93	93	93	77	77
Alaskans Not Endorsed	48	48	48	48	39	39	39	39	36	36
Others Endorsed	67	67	67	67	61	61	61	61	50	50
Others Not Endorsed	50	50	50	50	45	45	45	45	33	33
Endorsed Total	167	167	167	167	154	154	154	154	127	127
Not Endorsed Total	98	98	98	98	84	84	84	84	69	69
All Vessels with Landings	265	265	265	265	238	238	238	238	196	196

Table 23. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	12	106	101	75	74	97	78	105	101
Alaskans	0	10	61	59	48	50	56	49	58	53
Others	0	2	45	42	27	24	41	29	47	48
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	253	159	164	190	191	168	187	160	164
Alaskans	0	137	87	89	99	97	92	98	89	94
Others	0	113	71	74	88	91	75	86	69	68
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	253	0	187	106	77	75	98	96	105	102
Alaskans	138	0	96	61	51	48	57	55	56	54
Others	115	0	91	45	26	27	41	41	49	48
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	12	0	78	159	188	190	167	169	160	163
Alaskans	10	0	52	87	96	99	91	93	91	93
Others	2	0	25	71	89	88	75	75	67	68
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	159	78	0	13	89	83	74	72	105	102
Alaskans	87	52	0	11	61	57	49	48	58	55
Others	72	26	0	2	28	26	25	24	47	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	106	187	0	252	176	182	191	193	160	163
Alaskans	60	95	0	136	86	90	98	99	89	92
Others	44	90	0	113	87	89	90	91	69	69
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	164	159	252	0	98	82	79	75	108	103
Alaskans	89	87	137	0	66	57	50	50	59	55
Others	75	72	115	0	32	25	29	25	49	48
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	101	106	13	0	167	183	186	190	157	162
Alaskans	58	60	11	0	81	90	97	97	88	92
Others	41	44	2	0	83	90	86	90	67	68

Table 24. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	190	188	176	167	0	14	156	56	110	104
Alaskans	100	97	87	82	0	11	75	30	61	57
Others	90	91	89	85	0	3	81	26	49	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	48	50	62	71	0	224	82	182	128	134
Alaskans	32	35	45	50	0	120	57	102	70	74
Others	16	15	17	21	0	101	25	79	56	58
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	191	190	182	183	224	0	197	156	112	106
Alaskans	98	100	91	91	121	0	101	75	62	56
Others	93	90	91	92	103	0	96	81	50	50
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	47	48	56	55	14	0	41	82	126	132
Alaskans	34	32	41	41	11	0	31	57	69	76
Others	13	16	15	14	3	0	10	25	55	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	168	167	191	186	82	41	0	16	110	105
Alaskans	92	91	99	98	57	31	0	13	61	58
Others	76	76	92	88	25	10	0	3	49	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	70	71	47	52	156	197	0	222	128	133
Alaskans	39	40	33	34	74	100	0	118	70	73
Others	29	29	14	18	79	94	0	101	56	58
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	187	169	193	190	182	82	222	0	119	107
Alaskans	99	93	100	98	102	57	119	0	68	58
Others	88	76	93	92	80	25	103	0	51	49
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	51	69	45	48	56	156	16	0	119	131
Alaskans	33	38	32	34	29	74	13	0	63	73
Others	18	29	13	14	25	79	3	0	54	56
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	160	160	160	157	155	153	155	146	0	102
Alaskans	90	92	90	89	87	86	87	80	0	60
Others	70	68	70	68	68	67	68	66	0	42
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	36	36	36	39	41	43	41	50	0	94
Alaskans	23	21	23	24	26	27	26	33	0	53
Others	12	14	12	14	14	15	14	16	0	40
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	164	163	163	162	161	159	160	158	94	0
Alaskans	95	94	93	93	91	92	90	90	53	0
Others	69	69	70	69	70	67	70	68	41	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	32	33	33	34	35	37	36	38	102	0
Alaskans	18	19	20	20	22	20	23	23	59	0
Others	13	13	12	13	12	15	12	14	41	0

Table 25. Participation by Number of Years in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	129	129	129	129	120	120	120	120	103	103
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	62	62	62	62	59	59	59	59	42	42
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	23	23	23	23	22	22	22	22	28	28
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	18	18	18	18	11	11	11	11	23	23
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	9	9	9	9	13	13	13	13	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	12	12	12	12	13	13	13	13	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	12	12	12	12	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	68	68	68	68	60	60	60	60	50	50
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	25	25	25	25	27	27	27	27	22	22
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	21	21
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	14	14	14	14	10	10	10	10	20	20
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	7	7	7	7	12	12	12	12	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	12	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	10	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	61	61	61	61	60	60	60	60	53	53
Others with Landings in 2 Years	37	37	37	37	32	32	32	32	20	20
Others with Landings in 3 Years	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	7	7
Others with Landings in 4 Years	4	4	4	4	1	1	1	1	3	3
Others with Landings in 5 Years	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

2.6 Western Gulf Rockfish Non-Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 26. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	327.61	312.79	1.14	1.28	292.82	276.90	1.16	1.32	136.58	1.26
Qualifiers	118	118	118	118	113	113	113	113	78	78
Total Alaskans	54	54	54	54	52	52	52	52	38	38
Total Others	64	64	64	64	61	61	61	61	40	40
Endorsed	84	84	84	84	81	81	81	81	55	55
Not Endorsed	34	34	34	34	32	32	32	32	23	23
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	39.22	39.04	39.35	38.43	38.11	37.99	37.47	37.06	39.08	39.85
Others Percent of Total Shares	60.78	60.96	60.65	61.57	61.89	62.01	62.53	62.94	60.92	60.15
Total Qualified CVs	84.00	84.00	84.00	84.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	54.00	54.00
Total Qualified CPs	34.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	33.00	33.00	33.00	33.00	24.00	24.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	15.14	15.85	15.32	16.33	15.77	16.65	16.20	17.82	18.83	17.92
CP Percent of Total Shares	84.86	84.15	84.68	83.67	84.23	83.35	83.80	82.18	81.17	82.08

Table 27. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	88.93	88.40	89.71	89.04	88.75	88.13	89.66	88.63	89.04	89.53
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	11.07	11.60	10.29	10.96	11.25	11.87	10.34	11.37	10.96	10.47
Alaskans Endorsed	31	31	31	31	30	30	30	30	21	21
Alaskans Not Endorsed	23	23	23	23	22	22	22	22	17	17
Others Endorsed	53	53	53	53	51	51	51	51	34	34
Others Not Endorsed	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	6	6
Endorsed Total	84	84	84	84	81	81	81	81	55	55
Not Endorsed Total	34	34	34	34	32	32	32	32	23	23
All Vessels with Landings	118	118	118	118	113	113	113	113	78	78

Table 28. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	5	55	53	27	21	62	61	68	68
Alaskans	0	3	22	21	14	11	26	25	27	27
Others	0	2	33	32	13	10	36	36	41	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	113	63	65	91	97	56	57	50	50
Alaskans	0	49	32	32	38	41	27	28	27	27
Others	0	61	31	32	50	53	28	28	23	23
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	113	0	65	55	26	24	67	63	68	68
Alaskans	51	0	26	22	13	12	28	27	27	27
Others	62	0	39	33	13	12	39	36	41	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	5	0	53	63	92	94	51	55	50	50
Alaskans	3	0	28	32	39	40	25	26	27	27
Others	2	0	25	31	50	51	25	28	23	23
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	63	53	0	5	44	44	25	19	66	68
Alaskans	32	28	0	3	24	24	13	10	28	27
Others	31	25	0	2	20	20	12	9	38	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	55	65	0	113	74	74	93	99	52	50
Alaskans	20	24	0	49	28	28	39	42	26	27
Others	32	38	0	61	43	43	51	54	26	23
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	65	63	113	0	53	44	28	24	69	68
Alaskans	33	32	51	0	28	24	12	13	29	27
Others	32	31	62	0	25	20	16	11	40	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	53	55	5	0	65	74	90	94	49	50
Alaskans	20	20	3	0	24	28	40	39	25	27
Others	31	32	2	0	38	43	47	52	24	23

Table 29. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	91	92	74	65	0	5	56	54	68	68
Alaskans	40	41	30	26	0	3	22	22	27	27
Others	51	51	44	39	0	2	34	32	41	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	22	21	39	48	0	108	57	59	45	45
Alaskans	12	11	22	26	0	47	29	29	25	25
Others	10	10	17	22	0	58	27	29	20	20
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	97	94	74	74	108	0	59	55	68	68
Alaskans	43	42	30	30	49	0	24	22	27	27
Others	54	52	44	44	59	0	35	33	41	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	16	19	39	39	5	0	54	58	45	45
Alaskans	9	10	22	22	3	0	28	29	25	25
Others	7	9	17	17	2	0	26	28	20	20
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	56	51	93	90	57	54	0	5	72	68
Alaskans	28	26	41	42	30	28	0	3	30	27
Others	28	25	52	48	27	26	0	2	42	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	57	62	20	23	56	59	0	108	41	45
Alaskans	23	25	11	10	21	22	0	47	22	25
Others	32	35	9	13	33	34	0	58	19	20
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	57	55	99	94	59	58	108	0	76	69
Alaskans	29	27	44	41	30	30	49	0	32	28
Others	28	28	55	53	29	28	59	0	44	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	56	58	14	19	54	55	5	0	37	44
Alaskans	22	24	8	11	21	21	3	0	20	24
Others	32	32	6	8	31	32	2	0	17	20
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	50	50	52	49	50	50	46	42	0	43
Alaskans	27	27	26	25	27	27	24	22	0	20
Others	23	23	26	24	23	23	22	20	0	23
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	28	28	26	29	28	28	32	36	0	35
Alaskans	10	10	11	12	10	10	13	15	0	18
Others	16	16	13	15	16	16	17	19	0	17
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	49	35	0
Alaskans	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	26	18	0
Others	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	17	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	29	43	0
Alaskans	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	11	19	0
Others	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	22	0

Table 30. Participation by Number of Years in the Western Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	50	50	50	50	51	51	51	51	39	39
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	25	25	25	25	27	27	27	27	20	20
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	14	14	14	14	11	11	11	11	10	10
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	11	11	11	11	12	12	12	12	9	9
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	9	9	9	9	4	4	4	4	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	2	2	2	2	8	8	8	8	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	23	23	23	23	26	26	26	26	20	20
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	13	13	13	13	12	12	12	12	10	10
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	7	7	7	7	5	5	5	5	5	5
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	3
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	27	27	27	27	25	25	25	25	19	19
Others with Landings in 2 Years	12	12	12	12	15	15	15	15	10	10
Others with Landings in 3 Years	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	5	5
Others with Landings in 4 Years	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6
Others with Landings in 5 Years	7	7	7	7	4	4	4	4	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0

3 Central Gulf Catch History Tables

3.1 Central Gulf Pollock Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 31. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Central Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	342,861.07	324,207.61	1.11	1.23	303,224.98	282,566.92	1.13	1.27	222,218.85	1.15
Qualifiers	180	180	180	180	174	174	174	174	143	143
Total Alaskans	64	64	64	64	63	63	63	63	53	53
Total Others	116	116	116	116	111	111	111	111	90	90
Endorsed	147	147	147	147	145	145	145	145	124	124
Not Endorsed	33	33	33	33	29	29	29	29	19	19
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	37.55	37.00	37.79	37.09	37.93	37.31	38.38	37.70	35.24	35.24
Others Percent of Total Shares	62.45	63.00	62.21	62.91	62.07	62.69	61.62	62.30	64.76	64.76
Total Qualified CVs	152.00	152.00	152.00	152.00	147.00	147.00	147.00	147.00	126.00	126.00
Total Qualified CPs	28.00	28.00	28.00	28.00	27.00	27.00	27.00	27.00	17.00	17.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	97.55	97.41	97.81	97.63	97.74	97.58	98.12	97.90	96.89	96.85
CP Percent of Total Shares	2.45	2.59	2.19	2.37	2.26	2.42	1.88	2.10	3.11	3.15

Table 32. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Central Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	96.96	96.82	97.31	97.12	96.87	96.68	97.25	96.96	96.25	96.66
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	3.04	3.18	2.69	2.88	3.13	3.32	2.75	3.04	3.75	3.34
Alaskans Endorsed	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	48	48
Alaskans Not Endorsed	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	5
Others Endorsed	88	88	88	88	86	86	86	86	76	76
Others Not Endorsed	28	28	28	28	25	25	25	25	14	14
Endorsed Total	147	147	147	147	145	145	145	145	124	124
Not Endorsed Total	33	33	33	33	29	29	29	29	19	19
All Vessels with Landings	180	180	180	180	174	174	174	174	143	143

Table 33. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	35	93	77	48	54	92	77	97	102
Alaskans	0	16	38	31	16	20	34	29	40	42
Others	0	19	55	46	32	34	58	48	57	60
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	145	87	103	132	126	88	103	83	78
Alaskans	0	48	26	33	48	44	30	35	24	22
Others	0	94	59	67	81	79	55	65	58	56
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	145	0	93	89	45	49	90	93	105	102
Alaskans	48	0	34	35	11	17	32	34	46	43
Others	97	0	59	54	34	32	58	59	59	59
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	35	0	87	91	135	131	90	87	75	78
Alaskans	16	0	30	29	53	47	32	30	18	21
Others	19	0	55	60	79	81	55	54	57	57
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	87	87	0	30	92	89	46	52	98	92
Alaskans	26	30	0	15	29	30	12	20	38	37
Others	61	57	0	15	63	59	34	32	60	55
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	93	93	0	150	88	91	134	128	82	88
Alaskans	38	34	0	49	35	34	52	44	26	27
Others	54	58	0	98	52	56	79	81	55	61
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	103	91	150	0	92	89	50	46	98	91
Alaskans	33	29	49	0	29	28	14	14	39	38
Others	70	62	101	0	63	61	36	32	59	53
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	77	89	30	0	88	91	130	134	82	89
Alaskans	31	35	15	0	35	36	50	50	25	26
Others	46	53	15	0	52	54	77	81	56	63

Table 34. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	132	135	88	88	0	35	92	86	101	113
Alaskans	48	53	35	35	0	17	36	35	41	44
Others	84	82	53	53	0	18	56	51	60	69
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	42	39	86	86	0	139	82	88	73	61
Alaskans	15	10	28	28	0	46	27	28	22	19
Others	27	29	56	56	0	90	53	57	51	42
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	126	131	91	91	139	0	99	93	100	113
Alaskans	44	47	34	36	46	0	39	36	43	45
Others	82	84	57	55	93	0	60	57	57	68
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	48	43	83	83	35	0	75	81	74	61
Alaskans	19	16	29	27	17	0	24	27	20	18
Others	29	27	52	54	18	0	49	51	54	43
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	88	90	134	130	82	75	0	30	93	98
Alaskans	30	32	52	50	27	24	0	14	36	40
Others	58	58	82	80	55	51	0	16	57	58
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	86	84	40	44	92	99	0	144	81	76
Alaskans	33	31	11	13	36	39	0	49	27	23
Others	53	53	29	31	55	59	0	92	54	53
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	103	87	128	134	88	81	144	0	91	94
Alaskans	35	30	44	50	28	27	49	0	37	38
Others	68	57	84	84	60	54	95	0	54	56
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	71	87	46	40	86	93	30	0	83	80
Alaskans	28	33	19	13	35	36	14	0	26	25
Others	43	54	27	27	51	57	16	0	57	55
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	83	75	82	82	79	80	87	89	0	92
Alaskans	24	18	26	25	23	21	28	27	0	38
Others	59	57	56	57	56	59	59	62	0	54
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	60	68	61	61	64	63	56	54	0	51
Alaskans	29	35	27	28	30	32	25	26	0	15
Others	31	32	34	33	33	30	30	27	0	36
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	78	78	88	89	67	67	82	86	51	0
Alaskans	22	21	27	26	20	19	24	26	15	0
Others	56	57	61	63	47	48	58	60	36	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	65	65	55	54	76	76	61	57	92	0
Alaskans	31	32	26	27	33	34	29	27	38	0
Others	33	32	28	26	42	41	31	29	53	0

Table 35. Participation by Number of Years in the Central Gulf Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	52	52	52	52	47	47	47	47	37	37
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	25	25	25	25	28	28	28	28	33	33
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	14	14	14	14	24	24	24	24	18	18
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	22	22	22	22	19	19	19	19	55	55
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	19	19	19	19	20	20	20	20	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	12	12	12	12	36	36	36	36	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	36	36	36	36	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	10	10
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	14	14
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	6	6	6	6	10	10	10	10	6	6
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	10	10	10	10	8	8	8	8	23	23
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	3	3	3	3	18	18	18	18	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	18	18	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	40	40	40	40	35	35	35	35	27	27
Others with Landings in 2 Years	17	17	17	17	20	20	20	20	19	19
Others with Landings in 3 Years	8	8	8	8	14	14	14	14	12	12
Others with Landings in 4 Years	12	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	32	32
Others with Landings in 5 Years	12	12	12	12	13	13	13	13	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	9	9	9	9	18	18	18	18	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	18	18	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0

3.2 Central Gulf Pacific Cod Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 36. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Central Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	142,597.35	135,637.98	1.12	1.25	125,005.63	116,943.37	1.13	1.30	61,857.88	1.16
Qualifiers	226	226	226	226	223	223	223	223	173	173
Total Alaskans	83	83	83	83	82	82	82	82	66	66
Total Others	143	143	143	143	141	141	141	141	107	107
Endorsed	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	146	146
Not Endorsed	45	45	45	45	42	42	42	42	27	27
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	35.81	35.60	35.66	35.38	36.32	36.08	36.13	36.06	34.33	34.37
Others Percent of Total Shares	64.19	64.40	64.34	64.62	63.68	63.92	63.87	63.94	65.67	65.63
Total Qualified CVs	188.00	188.00	188.00	188.00	185.00	185.00	185.00	185.00	149.00	149.00
Total Qualified CPs	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	38.00	24.00	24.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	87.37	86.86	86.58	85.75	88.27	87.63	87.50	86.57	82.39	82.80
CP Percent of Total Shares	12.63	13.14	13.42	14.25	11.73	12.37	12.50	13.43	17.61	17.20

Table 37. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Central Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	94.65	94.38	95.26	94.93	94.09	93.68	94.63	94.16	95.61	96.34
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	5.35	5.62	4.74	5.07	5.91	6.32	5.37	5.84	4.39	3.66
Alaskans Endorsed	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	61	61
Alaskans Not Endorsed	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	5	5
Others Endorsed	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	85	85
Others Not Endorsed	38	38	38	38	36	36	36	36	22	22
Endorsed Total	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	181	146	146
Not Endorsed Total	45	45	45	45	42	42	42	42	27	27
All Vessels with Landings	226	226	226	226	223	223	223	223	173	173

Table 38. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	37	169	167	36	49	115	38	144	148
Alaskans	0	18	63	64	13	20	45	13	57	60
Others	0	19	106	103	23	29	70	25	87	88
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	189	57	59	190	177	111	188	82	78
Alaskans	0	65	20	19	70	63	38	70	26	23
Others	0	121	36	39	117	111	70	115	53	52
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	189	0	165	171	32	40	144	59	145	148
Alaskans	65	0	62	64	11	14	59	23	58	60
Others	124	0	103	107	21	26	85	36	87	88
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	37	0	61	55	194	186	82	167	81	78
Alaskans	18	0	21	19	72	69	24	60	25	23
Others	19	0	39	35	119	114	56	104	53	52
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	57	61	0	31	48	54	36	44	142	149
Alaskans	20	21	0	15	15	19	14	15	57	61
Others	37	40	0	16	33	35	22	29	85	88
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	169	165	0	195	178	172	190	182	84	77
Alaskans	63	62	0	68	68	64	69	68	26	22
Others	104	101	0	124	107	105	118	111	55	52
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	59	55	195	0	48	49	33	36	140	146
Alaskans	19	19	68	0	13	18	13	12	58	59
Others	40	36	127	0	35	31	20	24	82	87
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	167	171	31	0	178	177	193	190	86	80
Alaskans	64	64	15	0	70	65	70	71	25	24
Others	101	105	16	0	106	109	120	116	58	53

Table 39. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	190	194	178	178	0	40	168	150	148	147
Alaskans	70	72	68	70	0	19	64	62	61	60
Others	120	122	110	108	0	21	104	88	87	87
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	33	29	45	45	0	183	55	73	75	76
Alaskans	12	10	14	12	0	63	18	20	21	22
Others	21	19	31	32	0	117	36	51	51	52
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	177	186	172	177	183	0	163	171	143	147
Alaskans	63	69	64	65	63	0	61	64	59	60
Others	114	117	108	112	120	0	102	107	84	87
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	46	37	51	46	40	0	60	52	80	76
Alaskans	19	13	18	17	19	0	21	18	23	22
Others	27	24	33	29	21	0	38	33	54	52
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	111	82	190	193	55	60	0	39	145	146
Alaskans	38	24	69	70	18	21	0	17	59	60
Others	73	58	121	123	37	39	0	22	86	86
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	112	141	33	30	168	163	0	184	78	77
Alaskans	44	58	13	12	64	61	0	65	23	22
Others	68	82	20	18	102	100	0	116	52	52
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	188	167	182	190	73	52	184	0	146	142
Alaskans	70	60	68	71	20	18	65	0	60	58
Others	118	107	114	119	53	34	119	0	86	84
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	35	56	41	33	150	171	39	0	77	81
Alaskans	12	22	14	11	62	64	17	0	22	24
Others	23	34	27	22	87	105	22	0	52	55
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	82	81	84	86	78	83	81	80	0	124
Alaskans	26	25	26	25	22	24	24	23	0	50
Others	56	56	58	61	56	59	57	57	0	74
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	91	92	89	87	95	90	92	93	0	49
Alaskans	40	41	40	41	44	42	42	43	0	16
Others	51	51	49	46	51	48	50	50	0	33
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	78	78	77	80	79	79	80	84	49	0
Alaskans	23	23	22	24	23	23	23	25	16	0
Others	55	55	55	56	56	56	57	59	33	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	95	95	96	93	94	94	93	89	124	0
Alaskans	43	43	44	42	43	43	43	41	50	0
Others	52	52	52	51	50	50	50	47	71	0

Table 40. Participation by Number of Years in the Central Gulf Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	54	54	54	54	51	51	51	51	62	62
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	34	34	34	34	36	36	36	36	32	32
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	21	21	21	21	26	26	26	26	21	21
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	28	28	28	28	33	33	33	33	58	58
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	25	25	25	25	31	31	31	31	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	21	21	21	21	46	46	46	46	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	43	43	43	43	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	14	14	14	14	13	13	13	13	20	20
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	13	13
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	6	6	6	6	10	10
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	13	13	13	13	14	14	14	14	23	23
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	12	12	12	12	19	19	19	19	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	12	12	12	12	20	20	20	20	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	18	18	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	40	40	40	40	38	38	38	38	42	42
Others with Landings in 2 Years	24	24	24	24	26	26	26	26	19	19
Others with Landings in 3 Years	17	17	17	17	20	20	20	20	11	11
Others with Landings in 4 Years	15	15	15	15	19	19	19	19	35	35
Others with Landings in 5 Years	13	13	13	13	12	12	12	12	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	9	9	9	9	26	26	26	26	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	25	25	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	0

3.3 Central Gulf Flatfish Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 41. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Central Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	67,170.39	63,506.72	1.13	1.27	57,027.55	53,061.15	1.15	1.31	30,311.33	1.16
Qualifiers	168	168	168	168	164	164	164	164	133	133
Total Alaskans	62	62	62	62	61	61	61	61	52	52
Total Others	106	106	106	106	103	103	103	103	81	81
Endorsed	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	116	116
Not Endorsed	26	26	26	26	22	22	22	22	17	17
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	41.66	41.80	41.38	41.18	42.21	42.52	41.62	42.09	41.07	40.83
Others Percent of Total Shares	58.34	58.20	58.62	58.82	57.79	57.48	58.38	57.91	58.93	59.17
Total Qualified CVs	133.00	133.00	133.00	133.00	129.00	129.00	129.00	129.00	114.00	114.00
Total Qualified CPs	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	19.00	19.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	63.74	63.79	63.03	62.62	62.29	62.25	61.28	61.06	68.81	67.58
CP Percent of Total Shares	36.26	36.21	36.97	37.38	37.71	37.75	38.72	38.94	31.19	32.42

Table 42. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Central Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	95.61	95.36	95.76	95.45	95.22	94.86	95.37	94.93	98.19	97.84
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	4.39	4.64	4.24	4.55	4.78	5.14	4.63	5.07	1.81	2.16
Alaskans Endorsed	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	48	48
Alaskans Not Endorsed	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4
Others Endorsed	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	68	68
Others Not Endorsed	22	22	22	22	19	19	19	19	13	13
Endorsed Total	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	116	116
Not Endorsed Total	26	26	26	26	22	22	22	22	17	17
All Vessels with Landings	168	168	168	168	164	164	164	164	133	133

Table 43. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	21	71	59	50	53	66	60	82	80
Alaskans	0	9	28	25	19	20	24	23	33	34
Others	0	12	43	34	31	33	42	37	49	46
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	147	97	109	118	115	102	108	86	88
Alaskans	0	53	34	37	43	42	38	39	29	28
Others	0	91	61	70	73	71	63	68	55	58
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	147	0	87	72	52	48	78	65	84	82
Alaskans	53	0	34	31	20	17	30	23	35	35
Others	94	0	53	41	32	31	48	42	49	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	21	0	81	96	116	120	90	103	84	86
Alaskans	9	0	28	31	42	45	32	39	27	27
Others	12	0	52	63	72	73	57	63	55	57
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	97	81	0	22	86	72	50	48	89	82
Alaskans	34	28	0	10	29	30	19	19	36	33
Others	63	53	0	12	57	42	31	29	53	49
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	71	87	0	146	82	96	118	120	79	86
Alaskans	28	34	0	52	33	32	43	43	26	29
Others	42	51	0	91	48	62	73	75	51	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	109	96	146	0	95	87	51	50	89	83
Alaskans	37	31	52	0	34	29	20	18	36	33
Others	72	65	94	0	61	58	31	32	53	50
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	59	72	22	0	73	81	117	118	79	85
Alaskans	25	31	10	0	28	33	42	44	26	29
Others	33	40	12	0	44	47	73	72	51	54

Table 44. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	118	116	82	73	0	22	73	58	86	83
Alaskans	43	42	33	28	0	9	30	22	35	36
Others	75	74	49	45	0	13	43	36	51	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	46	48	82	91	0	142	91	106	78	81
Alaskans	18	19	28	33	0	52	31	39	26	25
Others	28	29	53	57	0	88	59	66	51	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	115	120	96	81	142	0	82	73	87	83
Alaskans	42	45	32	33	52	0	33	31	35	36
Others	73	75	64	48	90	0	49	42	52	47
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	49	44	68	83	22	0	82	91	77	81
Alaskans	19	16	29	28	9	0	28	30	26	25
Others	30	28	39	54	13	0	53	60	50	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	102	90	118	117	91	82	0	19	98	84
Alaskans	38	32	43	42	31	28	0	9	40	35
Others	64	58	75	75	60	54	0	10	58	49
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	62	74	46	47	73	82	0	145	66	80
Alaskans	23	29	18	19	30	33	0	52	21	26
Others	38	44	28	28	42	48	0	91	44	53
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	108	103	120	118	106	91	145	0	97	84
Alaskans	39	39	43	44	39	30	52	0	40	34
Others	69	64	77	74	67	61	93	0	57	50
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	56	61	44	46	58	73	19	0	67	80
Alaskans	22	22	18	17	22	31	9	0	21	27
Others	33	38	26	29	35	41	10	0	45	52
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	86	84	79	79	82	81	70	71	0	50
Alaskans	29	27	26	26	27	27	22	22	0	19
Others	57	57	53	53	55	54	48	49	0	31
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	47	49	54	54	51	52	63	62	0	83
Alaskans	23	25	26	26	25	25	30	30	0	33
Others	24	24	28	28	26	27	33	32	0	49
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	88	86	86	85	85	85	84	84	83	0
Alaskans	28	27	29	29	26	26	27	28	33	0
Others	60	59	57	56	59	59	57	56	50	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	45	47	47	48	48	48	49	49	50	0
Alaskans	24	25	23	23	26	26	25	24	19	0
Others	21	22	24	25	22	22	24	25	30	0

Table 45. Participation by Number of Years in the Central Gulf Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	39	39	39	39	37	37	37	37	35	35
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	23	23	23	23	29	29	29	29	28	28
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	23	23	23	23	26	26	26	26	19	19
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	24	24	24	24	23	23	23	23	51	51
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	12	12	12	12	20	20	20	20	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	19	19	19	19	29	29	29	29	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	28	28	28	28	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	12	12
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	11	11
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	6	6	6	6	9	9	9	9	7	7
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	22	22
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	4	4	4	4	10	10	10	10	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	11	11	11	11	13	13	13	13	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	12	12	12	12	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	29	29	29	29	28	28	28	28	23	23
Others with Landings in 2 Years	16	16	16	16	21	21	21	21	17	17
Others with Landings in 3 Years	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	12	12
Others with Landings in 4 Years	12	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	29	29
Others with Landings in 5 Years	8	8	8	8	10	10	10	10	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	8	8	8	8	16	16	16	16	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	16	16	16	16	0	0	0	0	0	0

3.4 Central Gulf Rockfish Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 46. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Central Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	83,512.35	81,002.02	1.16	1.35	69,735.73	66,687.71	1.19	1.42	50,883.92	1.22
Qualifiers	146	146	146	146	145	145	145	145	116	116
Total Alaskans	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	38	38
Total Others	97	97	97	97	96	96	96	96	78	78
Endorsed	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	105	105
Not Endorsed	18	18	18	18	17	17	17	17	11	11
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	35.32	34.52	33.96	33.13	34.90	33.92	33.37	32.22	39.53	39.12
Others Percent of Total Shares	64.68	65.48	66.04	66.87	65.10	66.08	66.63	67.78	60.47	60.88
Total Qualified CVs	112.00	112.00	112.00	112.00	111.00	111.00	111.00	111.00	96.00	96.00
Total Qualified CPs	34.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	20.00	20.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	39.05	38.56	37.25	36.50	37.75	37.13	35.84	34.78	44.79	44.83
CP Percent of Total Shares	60.95	61.44	62.75	63.50	62.25	62.87	64.16	65.22	55.21	55.17

Table 47. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Central Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	90.44	90.15	90.06	89.74	88.80	88.29	88.60	88.01	91.05	90.97
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	9.56	9.85	9.94	10.26	11.20	11.71	11.40	11.99	8.95	9.03
Alaskans Endorsed	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	36	36
Alaskans Not Endorsed	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Others Endorsed	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	69	69
Others Not Endorsed	16	16	16	16	15	15	15	15	9	9
Endorsed Total	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	105	105
Not Endorsed Total	18	18	18	18	17	17	17	17	11	11
All Vessels with Landings	146	146	146	146	145	145	145	145	116	116

Table 48. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	15	89	83	41	46	65	61	62	62
Alaskans	0	9	28	27	13	17	19	22	21	21
Others	0	6	61	56	28	29	46	39	41	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	131	57	63	105	100	81	85	84	84
Alaskans	0	40	21	22	36	32	30	27	28	28
Others	0	88	35	40	66	65	49	56	54	54
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	131	0	81	87	37	41	60	62	61	59
Alaskans	40	0	25	27	11	13	17	21	21	19
Others	91	0	56	60	26	28	43	41	40	40
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	15	0	65	59	109	105	86	84	85	87
Alaskans	9	0	24	22	38	36	32	28	28	30
Others	6	0	40	36	68	66	52	54	55	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	57	65	0	15	70	69	42	47	60	59
Alaskans	21	24	0	9	21	21	14	18	21	20
Others	36	41	0	6	49	48	28	29	39	39
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	89	81	0	131	76	77	104	99	86	87
Alaskans	28	25	0	40	28	28	35	31	28	29
Others	59	54	0	88	46	47	66	65	56	56
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	63	59	131	0	70	65	38	44	60	60
Alaskans	22	22	40	0	20	19	12	16	21	20
Others	41	37	91	0	50	46	26	28	39	40
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	83	87	15	0	76	81	108	102	86	86
Alaskans	27	27	9	0	29	30	37	33	28	29
Others	54	58	6	0	45	49	68	66	56	55

Table 49. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	105	109	76	76	0	17	81	75	65	65
Alaskans	36	38	28	29	0	10	28	24	26	26
Others	69	71	48	47	0	7	53	51	39	39
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	40	36	69	69	0	128	64	70	80	80
Alaskans	13	11	21	20	0	39	21	25	23	23
Others	27	25	47	48	0	86	42	44	55	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	100	105	77	81	128	0	79	80	58	58
Alaskans	32	36	28	30	39	0	25	27	21	21
Others	68	69	49	51	89	0	54	53	37	37
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	45	40	68	64	17	0	66	65	87	87
Alaskans	17	13	21	19	10	0	24	22	28	28
Others	28	27	46	44	7	0	41	42	57	57
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	81	86	104	108	64	66	0	16	62	61
Alaskans	30	32	35	37	21	24	0	9	24	24
Others	51	54	69	71	43	42	0	7	38	37
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	64	59	41	37	81	79	0	129	83	84
Alaskans	19	17	14	12	28	25	0	40	25	25
Others	44	41	27	25	51	52	0	86	56	57
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	85	84	99	102	70	65	129	0	58	58
Alaskans	27	28	31	33	25	22	40	0	21	21
Others	58	56	68	69	45	43	89	0	37	37
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	60	61	46	43	75	80	16	0	87	87
Alaskans	22	21	18	16	24	27	9	0	28	28
Others	37	39	28	27	49	51	7	0	57	57
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	84	85	86	86	81	88	84	88	0	57
Alaskans	28	28	28	28	23	28	25	28	0	19
Others	56	57	58	58	58	60	59	60	0	38
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	32	31	30	30	35	28	32	28	0	59
Alaskans	10	10	10	10	15	10	13	10	0	19
Others	22	21	20	20	20	18	19	18	0	39
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	84	87	87	86	81	88	85	88	59	0
Alaskans	28	30	29	29	23	28	25	28	19	0
Others	56	57	58	57	58	60	60	60	40	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	32	29	29	30	35	28	31	28	57	0
Alaskans	10	8	9	9	15	10	13	10	19	0
Others	22	21	20	21	20	18	18	18	37	0

Table 50. Participation by Number of Years in the Central Gulf Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	42	42	42	42	44	44	44	44	38	38
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	19	19	19	19	27	27	27	27	21	21
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	21	21	21	21	24	24	24	24	19	19
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	20	20	20	20	12	12	12	12	38	38
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	8	8	8	8	17	17	17	17	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	16	16	16	16	21	21	21	21	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	20	20	20	20	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	12	12	12	12	14	14	14	14	8	8
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	6
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	3	3	3	3	8	8	8	8	8	8
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	8	8	8	8	4	4	4	4	16	16
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	3	3	3	3	7	7	7	7	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	6	6	6	6	11	11	11	11	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	11	11	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Others with Landings in 2 Years	13	13	13	13	22	22	22	22	15	15
Others with Landings in 3 Years	18	18	18	18	16	16	16	16	11	11
Others with Landings in 4 Years	12	12	12	12	8	8	8	8	22	22
Others with Landings in 5 Years	5	5	5	5	10	10	10	10	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0

3.5 Central Gulf Pacific Cod Non-Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 51. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	112,956.15	107,383.65	1.13	1.29	99,709.82	92,899.09	1.15	1.34	62,329.94	1.22
Qualifiers	604	604	604	604	575	575	575	575	437	437
Total Alaskans	505	505	505	505	480	480	480	480	366	366
Total Others	99	99	99	99	95	95	95	95	71	71
Endorsed	453	453	453	453	437	437	437	437	334	334
Not Endorsed	151	151	151	151	138	138	138	138	103	103
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	86.74	86.56	87.15	87.00	86.90	86.57	87.54	87.24	83.63	84.10
Others Percent of Total Shares	13.26	13.44	12.85	13.00	13.10	13.43	12.46	12.76	16.37	15.90
Total Qualified CVs	546.00	546.00	546.00	546.00	522.00	522.00	522.00	522.00	388.00	388.00
Total Qualified CPs	58.00	58.00	58.00	58.00	53.00	53.00	53.00	53.00	49.00	49.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	93.35	93.01	93.93	93.60	93.08	92.60	93.70	93.25	90.47	91.41
CP Percent of Total Shares	6.65	6.99	6.07	6.40	6.92	7.40	6.30	6.75	9.53	8.59

Table 52. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	91.80	91.38	92.27	91.85	91.45	90.84	91.92	91.32	88.57	89.20
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	8.20	8.62	7.73	8.15	8.55	9.16	8.08	8.68	11.43	10.80
Alaskans Endorsed	377	377	377	377	365	365	365	365	280	280
Alaskans Not Endorsed	128	128	128	128	115	115	115	115	86	86
Others Endorsed	76	76	76	76	72	72	72	72	54	54
Others Not Endorsed	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	17	17
Endorsed Total	453	453	453	453	437	437	437	437	334	334
Not Endorsed Total	151	151	151	151	138	138	138	138	103	103
All Vessels with Landings	604	604	604	604	575	575	575	575	437	437

Table 53. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	70	294	266	158	163	203	194	309	300
Alaskans	0	66	237	210	137	142	165	161	268	261
Others	0	4	57	56	21	21	38	33	41	39
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	534	310	338	446	441	401	410	295	304
Alaskans	0	437	267	294	366	361	338	342	237	244
Others	0	94	42	43	77	77	61	66	57	59
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	534	0	338	294	143	162	197	200	295	300
Alaskans	439	0	275	236	123	140	160	164	256	261
Others	95	0	63	58	20	22	37	36	39	39
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	70	0	266	310	461	442	407	404	309	304
Alaskans	66	0	229	268	380	363	343	339	249	244
Others	4	0	36	41	78	76	62	63	59	59
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	310	266	0	69	160	167	156	162	306	297
Alaskans	268	230	0	65	139	146	135	140	266	259
Others	42	36	0	4	21	21	21	22	40	38
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	294	338	0	535	444	437	448	442	298	307
Alaskans	236	274	0	438	364	357	368	363	239	246
Others	56	62	0	94	77	77	77	76	58	60
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	338	310	535	0	201	163	149	154	301	297
Alaskans	295	269	440	0	173	142	128	133	262	257
Others	43	41	95	0	28	21	21	21	39	40
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	266	294	69	0	403	441	455	450	303	307
Alaskans	209	235	65	0	331	361	375	370	243	248
Others	55	57	4	0	70	77	77	77	59	58

Table 54. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	446	461	444	403	0	82	296	141	302	300
Alaskans	368	382	366	332	0	78	231	116	263	260
Others	78	79	78	71	0	4	65	25	39	40
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	129	114	131	172	0	493	279	434	273	275
Alaskans	112	98	114	147	0	400	248	362	217	220
Others	17	16	17	24	0	90	30	70	55	54
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	441	442	437	441	493	0	349	300	296	306
Alaskans	363	365	359	363	402	0	280	234	256	265
Others	78	77	78	78	91	0	69	66	40	41
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	134	133	138	134	82	0	226	275	279	269
Alaskans	117	115	121	117	78	0	199	245	224	215
Others	17	18	17	17	4	0	26	29	54	53
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	401	407	448	455	279	226	0	76	305	300
Alaskans	340	345	370	377	249	200	0	72	265	261
Others	61	62	78	78	30	26	0	4	40	39
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	174	168	127	120	296	349	0	499	270	275
Alaskans	140	135	110	103	230	279	0	406	215	219
Others	33	32	17	17	64	68	0	90	54	55
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	410	404	442	450	434	275	499	0	299	304
Alaskans	344	341	365	372	364	246	408	0	260	264
Others	66	63	77	78	70	29	91	0	39	40
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	165	171	133	125	141	300	76	0	276	271
Alaskans	136	139	115	108	116	233	72	0	220	216
Others	28	31	18	17	24	65	4	0	55	54
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	295	309	298	303	302	308	299	305	0	218
Alaskans	237	249	239	243	242	249	240	245	0	177
Others	58	60	59	60	60	59	59	60	0	41
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	142	128	139	134	135	129	138	132	0	219
Alaskans	129	117	127	123	124	117	126	121	0	189
Others	13	11	12	11	11	12	12	11	0	30
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	304	304	307	307	304	298	304	300	219	0
Alaskans	244	244	246	248	245	240	244	241	189	0
Others	60	60	61	59	59	58	60	59	30	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	133	133	130	130	133	139	133	137	218	0
Alaskans	122	122	120	118	121	126	122	125	177	0
Others	11	11	10	12	12	13	11	12	40	0

Table 55. Participation by Number of Years in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	219	219	219	219	221	221	221	221	162	162
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	133	133	133	133	126	126	126	126	118	118
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	67	67	67	67	71	71	71	71	61	61
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	47	47	47	47	44	44	44	44	96	96
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	48	48	48	48	45	45	45	45	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	30	30	30	30	68	68	68	68	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	60	60	60	60	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	166	166	166	166	164	164	164	164	126	126
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	109	109	109	109	105	105	105	105	95	95
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	57	57	57	57	62	62	62	62	54	54
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	91	91
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	46	46	46	46	44	44	44	44	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	30	30	30	30	64	64	64	64	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	56	56	56	56	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	53	53	53	53	57	57	57	57	36	36
Others with Landings in 2 Years	24	24	24	24	21	21	21	21	23	23
Others with Landings in 3 Years	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	7	7
Others with Landings in 4 Years	6	6	6	6	3	3	3	3	5	5
Others with Landings in 5 Years	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0

3.6 Central Gulf Rockfish Non-Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 56. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	453.83	442.61	1.16	1.35	380.36	365.97	1.18	1.42	248.41	1.27
Qualifiers	406	406	406	406	377	377	377	377	280	280
Total Alaskans	277	277	277	277	252	252	252	252	186	186
Total Others	129	129	129	129	125	125	125	125	94	94
Endorsed	349	349	349	349	324	324	324	324	244	244
Not Endorsed	57	57	57	57	53	53	53	53	36	36
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	58.50	58.76	58.02	58.23	58.20	58.76	57.64	58.19	55.22	54.93
Others Percent of Total Shares	41.50	41.24	41.98	41.77	41.80	41.24	42.36	41.81	44.78	45.07
Total Qualified CVs	371.00	371.00	371.00	371.00	343.00	343.00	343.00	343.00	248.00	248.00
Total Qualified CPs	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	34.00	32.00	32.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	66.45	67.19	66.39	67.11	65.61	66.57	65.68	66.74	64.24	64.05
CP Percent of Total Shares	33.55	32.81	33.61	32.89	34.39	33.43	34.32	33.26	35.76	35.95

Table 57. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	86.20	85.93	86.60	86.34	86.80	86.38	87.20	86.77	86.73	86.96
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	13.80	14.07	13.40	13.66	13.20	13.62	12.80	13.23	13.27	13.04
Alaskans Endorsed	235	235	235	235	214	214	214	214	158	158
Alaskans Not Endorsed	42	42	42	42	38	38	38	38	28	28
Others Endorsed	114	114	114	114	110	110	110	110	86	86
Others Not Endorsed	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	8	8
Endorsed Total	349	349	349	349	324	324	324	324	244	244
Not Endorsed Total	57	57	57	57	53	53	53	53	36	36
All Vessels with Landings	406	406	406	406	377	377	377	377	280	280

Table 58. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	24	181	163	115	115	111	106	195	194
Alaskans	0	10	136	122	80	78	77	72	130	129
Others	0	14	45	41	35	37	34	34	65	65
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	382	225	243	291	291	295	300	211	212
Alaskans	0	265	140	154	195	197	198	203	147	148
Others	0	114	83	87	93	91	94	94	63	63
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	382	0	206	181	115	113	115	107	199	196
Alaskans	267	0	154	136	79	79	80	75	134	131
Others	115	0	52	45	36	34	35	32	65	65
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	24	0	200	225	291	293	291	299	207	210
Alaskans	10	0	122	140	196	196	195	200	143	146
Others	14	0	76	83	92	94	93	96	63	63
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	225	200	0	24	118	118	115	109	199	196
Alaskans	141	123	0	10	84	80	80	74	133	131
Others	84	77	0	14	34	38	35	35	66	65
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	181	206	0	382	288	288	291	297	207	210
Alaskans	135	153	0	265	191	195	195	201	144	146
Others	45	52	0	114	94	90	93	93	62	63
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	243	225	382	0	118	113	114	111	198	195
Alaskans	155	141	267	0	84	79	79	77	132	131
Others	88	84	115	0	34	34	35	34	66	64
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	163	181	24	0	288	293	292	295	208	211
Alaskans	121	135	10	0	191	196	196	198	145	146
Others	41	45	14	0	94	94	93	94	62	64

Table 59. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	291	291	288	288	0	31	134	120	209	205
Alaskans	197	198	193	193	0	11	102	83	141	141
Others	94	93	95	95	0	20	32	37	68	64
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	86	86	89	89	0	346	243	257	168	172
Alaskans	55	54	59	59	0	239	149	168	111	111
Others	31	32	30	30	0	104	92	87	56	60
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	291	293	288	293	346	0	192	133	211	209
Alaskans	199	198	197	198	241	0	141	100	142	142
Others	92	95	91	95	105	0	51	33	69	67
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	86	84	89	84	31	0	185	244	166	168
Alaskans	53	54	55	54	11	0	111	151	110	110
Others	33	30	34	30	20	0	73	91	55	57
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	295	291	291	292	243	185	0	31	210	205
Alaskans	200	197	197	198	150	111	0	12	139	137
Others	95	94	94	94	93	74	0	19	71	68
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	82	86	86	85	134	192	0	346	167	172
Alaskans	52	55	55	54	101	139	0	238	113	115
Others	30	31	31	31	32	51	0	105	53	56
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	300	299	297	295	257	244	346	0	207	208
Alaskans	205	202	203	200	169	152	240	0	138	139
Others	95	97	94	95	88	92	106	0	69	69
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	77	78	80	82	120	133	31	0	170	169
Alaskans	47	50	49	52	82	99	12	0	114	113
Others	30	28	31	30	37	33	19	0	55	55
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	211	207	207	208	197	195	196	199	0	141
Alaskans	147	143	144	145	136	135	138	139	0	95
Others	64	64	63	63	61	60	58	60	0	46
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	69	73	73	72	83	85	84	81	0	139
Alaskans	39	43	42	41	50	51	48	47	0	91
Others	30	30	31	31	33	34	36	34	0	47
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	212	210	210	211	201	197	201	198	139	0
Alaskans	148	146	146	146	136	135	140	138	91	0
Others	64	64	64	65	65	62	61	60	48	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	68	70	70	69	79	83	79	82	141	0
Alaskans	38	40	40	40	50	51	46	48	95	0
Others	30	30	30	29	29	32	33	34	46	0

Table 60. Participation by Number of Years in the Central Gulf Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	161	161	161	161	160	160	160	160	122	122
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	84	84	84	84	70	70	70	70	55	55
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	41	41	41	41	52	52	52	52	49	49
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	39	39	39	39	34	34	34	34	54	54
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	31	31	31	31	33	33	33	33	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	24	24	24	24	28	28	28	28	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	26	26	26	26	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	120	120	120	120	119	119	119	119	89	89
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	67	67	67	67	53	53	53	53	41	41
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	27	27	27	27	32	32	32	32	30	30
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	24	24	24	24	23	23	23	23	26	26
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	19	19	19	19	16	16	16	16	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	12	12	12	12	9	9	9	9	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	33	33
Others with Landings in 2 Years	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	14	14
Others with Landings in 3 Years	14	14	14	14	20	20	20	20	19	19
Others with Landings in 4 Years	15	15	15	15	11	11	11	11	28	28
Others with Landings in 5 Years	12	12	12	12	17	17	17	17	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	12	12	12	12	19	19	19	19	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	18	18	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0

4 West Yakutat Catch History Tables

4.1 West Yakutat Pollock Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 61. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the West Yakutat Trawl Pollock Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	18,673.98	18,673.98	1.17	1.40	14,898.69	14,898.69	1.20	1.50	13,619.70	1.33
Qualifiers	49	49	49	49	39	39	39	39	30	30
Total Alaskans	11	11	11	11	9	9	9	9	7	7
Total Others	38	38	38	38	30	30	30	30	23	23
Endorsed	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4
Not Endorsed	45	45	45	45	36	36	36	36	26	26
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	3.17	3.17	2.53	2.53	0.84	0.84	0.90	0.90	3.84	3.79
Others Percent of Total Shares	96.83	96.83	97.47	97.47	99.16	99.16	99.10	99.10	96.16	96.21
Total Qualified CVs	44.00	44.00	44.00	44.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	26.00	26.00
Total Qualified CPs	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	97.48	97.48	98.26	98.26	99.39	99.39	99.64	99.64	97.17	97.46
CP Percent of Total Shares	2.52	2.52	1.74	1.74	0.61	0.61	0.36	0.36	2.83	2.54

Table 62. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the West Yakutat Trawl Pollock Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	10.37	10.37	8.48	8.48	10.44	10.44	8.22	8.22	14.22	14.85
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	89.63	89.63	91.52	91.52	89.56	89.56	91.78	91.78	85.78	85.15
Alaskans Endorsed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans Not Endorsed	11	11	11	11	9	9	9	9	7	7
Others Endorsed	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4
Others Not Endorsed	34	34	34	34	27	27	27	27	19	19
Endorsed Total	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4
Not Endorsed Total	45	45	45	45	36	36	36	36	26	26
All Vessels with Landings	49	49	49	49	39	39	39	39	30	30

Table 63. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	25	25	15	15	26	26	22	26
Alaskans	0	0	6	6	3	3	6	6	4	6
Others	0	0	19	19	12	12	20	20	18	20
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	24	24	34	34	23	23	27	23
Alaskans	0	0	5	5	8	8	5	5	7	5
Others	0	0	16	16	23	23	15	15	19	17
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	25	25	15	15	26	26	22	26
Alaskans	0	0	6	6	3	3	6	6	4	6
Others	0	0	19	19	12	12	20	20	18	20
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	24	24	34	34	23	23	27	23
Alaskans	0	0	5	5	8	8	5	5	7	5
Others	0	0	16	16	23	23	15	15	19	17
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	24	24	0	41	36	36	14	14	25	21
Alaskans	5	5	0	10	8	8	3	3	6	4
Others	19	19	0	31	28	28	11	11	19	17
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	25	25	0	0	13	13	35	35	24	28
Alaskans	6	6	0	0	3	3	8	8	5	7
Others	19	19	0	0	10	10	24	24	19	20
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	24	24	0	0	36	36	14	14	25	21
Alaskans	5	5	0	0	8	8	3	3	6	4
Others	19	19	0	0	28	28	11	11	19	17
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	25	25	41	0	13	13	35	35	24	28
Alaskans	6	6	10	0	3	3	8	8	5	7
Others	19	19	28	0	10	10	24	24	19	20

Table 64. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	34	34	13	13	0	0	15	15	21	26
Alaskans	8	8	3	3	0	0	4	4	4	6
Others	26	26	10	10	0	0	11	11	17	20
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	5	5	26	26	0	0	24	24	18	13
Alaskans	1	1	6	6	0	0	5	5	5	3
Others	4	4	17	17	0	0	16	16	12	9
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	34	34	13	13	0	0	15	15	21	26
Alaskans	8	8	3	3	0	0	4	4	4	6
Others	26	26	10	10	0	0	11	11	17	20
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	5	5	26	26	0	0	24	24	18	13
Alaskans	1	1	6	6	0	0	5	5	5	3
Others	4	4	17	17	0	0	16	16	12	9
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	23	23	35	35	24	24	0	0	25	21
Alaskans	5	5	8	8	5	5	0	0	6	4
Others	18	18	27	27	19	19	0	0	19	17
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	16	16	4	4	15	15	0	38	14	18
Alaskans	4	4	1	1	4	4	0	9	3	5
Others	12	12	3	3	11	11	0	26	11	12
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	23	23	35	35	24	24	38	0	25	21
Alaskans	5	5	8	8	5	5	9	0	6	4
Others	18	18	27	27	19	19	29	0	19	17
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	16	16	4	4	15	15	0	0	14	18
Alaskans	4	4	1	1	4	4	0	0	3	5
Others	12	12	3	3	11	11	0	0	11	12
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	27	27	24	24	28	28	24	24	0	19
Alaskans	7	7	5	5	7	7	5	5	0	5
Others	20	20	19	19	21	21	19	19	0	14
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	3	3	6	6	2	2	6	6	0	11
Alaskans	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	2
Others	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	0	8
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	23	23	28	28	23	23	28	28	11	0
Alaskans	5	5	7	7	5	5	7	7	2	0
Others	18	18	21	21	18	18	21	21	9	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	7	7	2	2	7	7	2	2	19	0
Alaskans	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	5	0
Others	5	5	2	2	5	5	2	2	14	0

Table 65. Participation by Number of Years in the West Yakutat Trawl Pollock Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	36	36	36	36	28	28	28	28	22	22
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	5
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	6	6
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	27	27	27	27	20	20	20	20	16	16
Others with Landings in 2 Years	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	4
Others with Landings in 3 Years	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	3
Others with Landings in 4 Years	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4.2 West Yakutat Pacific Cod Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 66. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the West Yakutat Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	299.79	299.79	1.17	1.40	299.00	299.00	1.20	1.50	125.27	1.33
Qualifiers	38	38	38	38	36	36	36	36	23	23
Total Alaskans	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	7	7
Total Others	23	23	23	23	21	21	21	21	16	16
Endorsed	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3
Not Endorsed	35	35	35	35	34	34	34	34	20	20
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	58.92	58.92	41.57	41.57	59.01	59.01	44.21	44.21	41.21	42.28
Others Percent of Total Shares	41.08	41.08	58.43	58.43	40.99	40.99	55.79	55.79	58.79	57.72
Total Qualified CVs	28.00	28.00	28.00	28.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	26.00	17.00	17.00
Total Qualified CPs	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	6.00	6.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	71.25	71.25	68.95	68.95	71.17	71.17	63.78	63.78	51.07	65.61
CP Percent of Total Shares	28.75	28.75	31.05	31.05	28.83	28.83	36.22	36.22	48.93	34.39

Table 67. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the West Yakutat Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	12.57	12.57	14.89	14.89	12.47	12.47	8.89	8.89	30.08	26.06
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	87.43	87.43	85.11	85.11	87.53	87.53	91.11	91.11	69.92	73.94
Alaskans Endorsed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans Not Endorsed	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	7	7
Others Endorsed	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3
Others Not Endorsed	20	20	20	20	19	19	19	19	13	13
Endorsed Total	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3
Not Endorsed Total	35	35	35	35	34	34	34	34	20	20
All Vessels with Landings	38	38	38	38	36	36	36	36	23	23

Table 68. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	18	18	4	4	20	20	18	18
Alaskans	0	0	6	6	1	1	6	6	8	8
Others	0	0	12	12	3	3	14	14	10	10
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	20	20	34	34	18	18	20	20
Alaskans	0	0	8	8	12	12	8	8	6	6
Others	0	0	11	11	19	19	9	9	12	12
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	18	18	4	4	20	20	18	18
Alaskans	0	0	6	6	1	1	6	6	8	8
Others	0	0	12	12	3	3	14	14	10	10
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	20	20	34	34	18	18	20	20
Alaskans	0	0	8	8	12	12	8	8	6	6
Others	0	0	11	11	19	19	9	9	12	12
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	20	20	0	3	20	20	4	4	22	17
Alaskans	9	9	0	1	9	9	1	1	8	8
Others	11	11	0	2	11	11	3	3	14	9
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	18	18	0	4	18	18	34	34	16	21
Alaskans	5	5	0	0	5	5	12	12	6	6
Others	11	11	0	4	11	11	19	19	8	13
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	20	20	4	0	20	20	4	4	22	17
Alaskans	9	9	0	0	9	9	1	1	8	8
Others	11	11	4	0	11	11	3	3	14	9
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	18	18	3	0	18	18	34	34	16	21
Alaskans	5	5	0	0	5	5	12	12	6	6
Others	11	11	2	0	11	11	19	19	8	13

Table 69. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	34	34	18	18	0	0	18	18	17	18
Alaskans	14	14	6	6	0	0	6	6	8	8
Others	20	20	12	12	0	0	12	12	9	10
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	2	2	18	18	0	0	18	18	19	18
Alaskans	1	1	8	8	0	0	8	8	6	6
Others	1	1	9	9	0	0	9	9	11	10
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	34	34	18	18	0	0	18	18	17	18
Alaskans	14	14	6	6	0	0	6	6	8	8
Others	20	20	12	12	0	0	12	12	9	10
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	2	2	18	18	0	0	18	18	19	18
Alaskans	1	1	8	8	0	0	8	8	6	6
Others	1	1	9	9	0	0	9	9	11	10
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	18	18	34	34	18	18	0	36	22	19
Alaskans	9	9	14	14	9	9	0	15	10	8
Others	9	9	20	20	9	9	0	21	12	11
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	18	18	2	2	18	18	0	0	14	17
Alaskans	5	5	1	1	5	5	0	0	4	6
Others	11	11	1	1	11	11	0	0	8	9
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	18	18	34	34	18	18	0	0	22	19
Alaskans	9	9	14	14	9	9	0	0	10	8
Others	9	9	20	20	9	9	0	0	12	11
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	18	18	2	2	18	18	36	0	14	17
Alaskans	5	5	1	1	5	5	13	0	4	6
Others	11	11	1	1	11	11	20	0	8	9
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	20	20	16	16	21	21	16	16	0	14
Alaskans	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	0	4
Others	13	13	9	9	14	14	11	11	0	10
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	3	3	7	7	2	2	7	7	0	9
Alaskans	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	3
Others	3	3	7	7	2	2	5	5	0	6
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	20	20	21	21	20	20	19	19	9	0
Alaskans	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	3	0
Others	13	13	14	14	13	13	12	12	6	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	3	3	2	2	3	3	4	4	14	0
Alaskans	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Others	3	3	2	2	3	3	4	4	9	0

Table 70. Participation by Number of Years in the West Yakutat Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	26	26	26	26	25	25	25	25	19	19
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	2	2
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	5	5
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	13	13	13	13	12	12	12	12	14	14
Others with Landings in 2 Years	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	1	1
Others with Landings in 3 Years	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
Others with Landings in 4 Years	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Others with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4.3 West Yakutat Flatfish Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 71. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the West Yakutat Trawl Flatfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	2,929.24	2,929.24	1.17	1.40	2,797.76	2,797.76	1.20	1.50	1,069.58	1.33
Qualifiers	45	45	45	45	43	43	43	43	26	26
Total Alaskans	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	8	8
Total Others	29	29	29	29	27	27	27	27	18	18
Endorsed	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3
Not Endorsed	42	42	42	42	41	41	41	41	23	23
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	28.12	28.12	45.42	45.42	24.83	24.83	36.63	36.63	68.71	74.30
Others Percent of Total Shares	71.88	71.88	54.58	54.58	75.17	75.17	63.37	63.37	31.29	25.70
Total Qualified CVs	31.00	31.00	31.00	31.00	29.00	29.00	29.00	29.00	21.00	21.00
Total Qualified CPs	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	5.00	5.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	45.78	45.78	60.30	60.30	43.23	43.23	53.68	53.68	85.81	87.68
CP Percent of Total Shares	54.22	54.22	39.70	39.70	56.77	56.77	46.32	46.32	14.19	12.32

Table 72. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the West Yakutat Trawl Flatfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	1.24	1.24	1.11	1.11	1.22	1.22	1.00	1.00	3.40	1.93
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	98.76	98.76	98.89	98.89	98.78	98.78	99.00	99.00	96.60	98.07
Alaskans Endorsed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans Not Endorsed	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	8	8
Others Endorsed	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3
Others Not Endorsed	26	26	26	26	25	25	25	25	15	15
Endorsed Total	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3
Not Endorsed Total	42	42	42	42	41	41	41	41	23	23
All Vessels with Landings	45	45	45	45	43	43	43	43	26	26

Table 73. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	22	22	4	4	18	18	26	26
Alaskans	0	0	6	6	2	2	6	6	8	8
Others	0	0	16	16	2	2	12	12	18	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	23	23	41	41	27	27	19	19
Alaskans	0	0	10	10	13	13	10	10	8	8
Others	0	0	13	13	25	25	16	16	10	10
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	22	22	4	4	18	18	26	26
Alaskans	0	0	6	6	2	2	6	6	8	8
Others	0	0	16	16	2	2	12	12	18	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	23	23	41	41	27	27	19	19
Alaskans	0	0	10	10	13	13	10	10	8	8
Others	0	0	13	13	25	25	16	16	10	10
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	23	23	0	0	20	20	4	4	32	25
Alaskans	10	10	0	0	10	10	2	2	11	8
Others	13	13	0	0	10	10	2	2	21	17
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	22	22	0	45	25	25	41	41	13	20
Alaskans	5	5	0	15	5	5	13	13	5	8
Others	14	14	0	27	17	17	25	25	7	11
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	23	23	45	0	20	20	4	4	32	25
Alaskans	10	10	16	0	10	10	2	2	11	8
Others	13	13	29	0	10	10	2	2	21	17
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	22	22	0	0	25	25	41	41	13	20
Alaskans	5	5	0	0	5	5	13	13	5	8
Others	14	14	0	0	17	17	25	25	7	11

Table 74. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	41	41	25	25	0	0	15	15	26	26
Alaskans	14	14	6	6	0	0	5	5	8	8
Others	27	27	19	19	0	0	10	10	18	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	2	2	18	18	0	0	28	28	17	17
Alaskans	2	2	10	10	0	0	11	11	8	8
Others	0	0	8	8	0	0	16	16	8	8
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	41	41	25	25	0	0	15	15	26	26
Alaskans	14	14	6	6	0	0	5	5	8	8
Others	27	27	19	19	0	0	10	10	18	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	2	2	18	18	0	0	28	28	17	17
Alaskans	2	2	10	10	0	0	11	11	8	8
Others	0	0	8	8	0	0	16	16	8	8
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	27	27	41	41	28	28	0	38	29	26
Alaskans	10	10	14	14	11	11	0	15	10	8
Others	17	17	27	27	17	17	0	23	19	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	16	16	2	2	15	15	0	0	14	17
Alaskans	5	5	2	2	4	4	0	0	6	8
Others	9	9	0	0	9	9	0	0	7	8
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	27	27	41	41	28	28	0	0	29	26
Alaskans	10	10	14	14	11	11	0	0	10	8
Others	17	17	27	27	17	17	0	0	19	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	16	16	2	2	15	15	38	0	14	17
Alaskans	5	5	2	2	4	4	14	0	6	8
Others	9	9	0	0	9	9	22	0	7	8
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	19	19	13	13	19	19	16	16	0	16
Alaskans	8	8	5	5	8	8	6	6	0	4
Others	11	11	8	8	11	11	10	10	0	12
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	7	7	13	13	7	7	10	10	0	10
Alaskans	0	0	3	3	0	0	2	2	0	4
Others	6	6	9	9	6	6	7	7	0	6
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	19	19	20	20	19	19	19	19	10	0
Alaskans	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	4	0
Others	11	11	12	12	11	11	11	11	6	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	7	7	6	6	7	7	7	7	16	0
Alaskans	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
Others	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	6	10	0

Table 75. Participation by Number of Years in the West Yakutat Trawl Flatfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	26	26	26	26	25	25	25	25	21	21
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	12	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	2	2
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	3	3
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	10	10	10	10	11	11	11	11	6	6
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	16	16	16	16	14	14	14	14	15	15
Others with Landings in 2 Years	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	2	2
Others with Landings in 3 Years	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1
Others with Landings in 4 Years	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0
Others with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4.4 West Yakutat Rockfish Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 76. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the West Yakutat Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	11,273.45	10,487.57	1.11	1.27	10,112.44	9,326.56	1.13	1.34	4,254.13	1.13
Qualifiers	57	57	57	57	46	46	46	46	36	36
Total Alaskans	17	17	17	17	13	13	13	13	11	11
Total Others	40	40	40	40	33	33	33	33	25	25
Endorsed	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4
Not Endorsed	51	51	51	51	41	41	41	41	32	32
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	4.19	4.50	5.02	5.27	4.53	4.92	5.69	6.04	9.91	9.24
Others Percent of Total Shares	95.81	95.50	94.98	94.73	95.47	95.08	94.31	93.96	90.09	90.76
Total Qualified CVs	39.00	39.00	39.00	39.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	30.00
Total Qualified CPs	18.00	18.00	18.00	18.00	16.00	16.00	16.00	16.00	6.00	6.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	3.97	4.27	4.50	4.73	4.05	4.40	4.72	5.01	6.08	5.62
CP Percent of Total Shares	96.03	95.73	95.50	95.27	95.95	95.60	95.28	94.99	93.92	94.38

Table 77. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the West Yakutat Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	7.12	7.66	5.79	6.09	7.88	8.55	6.72	7.13	0.84	0.77
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	92.88	92.34	94.21	93.91	92.12	91.45	93.28	92.87	99.16	99.23
Alaskans Endorsed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans Not Endorsed	17	17	17	17	13	13	13	13	11	11
Others Endorsed	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4
Others Not Endorsed	34	34	34	34	28	28	28	28	21	21
Endorsed Total	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4
Not Endorsed Total	51	51	51	51	41	41	41	41	32	32
All Vessels with Landings	57	57	57	57	46	46	46	46	36	36

Table 78. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	1	20	20	14	14	33	33	25	25
Alaskans	0	0	5	5	5	5	10	10	6	6
Others	0	1	15	15	9	9	23	23	19	19
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	56	37	37	43	43	24	24	32	32
Alaskans	0	17	12	12	12	12	7	7	11	11
Others	0	36	23	23	28	28	15	15	19	19
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	56	0	25	23	16	14	33	33	25	25
Alaskans	17	0	6	6	6	5	10	10	6	6
Others	39	0	19	17	10	9	23	23	19	19
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	1	0	32	34	41	43	24	24	32	32
Alaskans	0	0	11	11	11	12	7	7	11	11
Others	1	0	19	21	27	28	15	15	19	19
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	37	32	0	1	31	19	14	14	25	25
Alaskans	12	11	0	0	11	8	5	5	6	6
Others	25	21	0	1	20	11	9	9	19	19
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	20	25	0	56	26	38	43	43	32	32
Alaskans	5	6	0	17	6	9	12	12	11	11
Others	14	18	0	36	19	26	28	28	19	19
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	37	34	56	0	32	29	15	14	25	25
Alaskans	12	11	17	0	11	11	6	5	6	6
Others	25	23	39	0	21	18	9	9	19	19
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	20	23	1	0	25	28	42	43	32	32
Alaskans	5	6	0	0	6	6	11	12	11	11
Others	14	16	1	0	18	20	28	28	19	19

Table 79. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	43	41	26	25	0	1	21	21	25	25
Alaskans	12	11	6	6	0	0	6	6	6	6
Others	31	30	20	19	0	1	15	15	19	19
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	3	5	20	21	0	45	25	25	21	21
Alaskans	1	2	7	7	0	13	7	7	7	7
Others	2	3	11	12	0	29	16	16	12	12
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	43	43	38	28	45	0	25	21	25	25
Alaskans	12	12	9	6	13	0	7	6	6	6
Others	31	31	29	22	32	0	18	15	19	19
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	3	3	8	18	1	0	21	25	21	21
Alaskans	1	1	4	7	0	0	6	7	7	7
Others	2	2	4	10	1	0	13	16	12	12
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	24	24	43	42	25	21	0	1	25	25
Alaskans	7	7	12	11	7	6	0	0	6	6
Others	17	17	31	31	18	15	0	1	19	19
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	22	22	3	4	21	25	0	45	21	21
Alaskans	6	6	1	2	6	7	0	13	7	7
Others	15	15	2	2	14	17	0	29	12	12
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	24	24	43	43	25	25	45	0	25	26
Alaskans	7	7	12	12	7	7	13	0	6	6
Others	17	17	31	31	18	18	32	0	19	20
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	22	22	3	3	21	21	1	0	21	20
Alaskans	6	6	1	1	6	6	0	0	7	7
Others	15	15	2	2	14	14	1	0	12	11
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	0	19
Alaskans	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	0	5
Others	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	0	14
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	0	17
Alaskans	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Others	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	0	11
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	31	17	0
Alaskans	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	6	0
Others	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	20	11	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	19	0
Alaskans	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
Others	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	12	0

Table 80. Participation by Number of Years in the West Yakutat Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	36	36	36	36	28	28	28	28	27	27
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	13	13	13	13	10	10	10	10	5	5
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	3	3	3	3	6	6	6	6	3	3
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	4	4	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	1
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	13	13	13	13	10	10	10	10	9	9
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	23	23	23	23	18	18	18	18	18	18
Others with Landings in 2 Years	11	11	11	11	9	9	9	9	5	5
Others with Landings in 3 Years	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	1	1
Others with Landings in 4 Years	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1
Others with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

4.5 West Yakutat Pacific Cod Non-Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 81. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	191.85	191.85	1.17	1.40	119.79	119.79	1.20	1.50	82.46	1.33
Qualifiers	88	88	88	88	74	74	74	74	43	43
Total Alaskans	57	57	57	57	48	48	48	48	25	25
Total Others	31	31	31	31	26	26	26	26	18	18
Endorsed	33	33	33	33	30	30	30	30	15	15
Not Endorsed	55	55	55	55	44	44	44	44	28	28
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	94.34	94.34	82.35	82.35	93.57	93.57	80.14	80.14	92.00	72.13
Others Percent of Total Shares	5.66	5.66	17.65	17.65	6.43	6.43	19.86	19.86	8.00	27.87
Total Qualified CVs	79.00	79.00	79.00	79.00	66.00	66.00	66.00	66.00	40.00	40.00
Total Qualified CPs	9.00	9.00	9.00	9.00	8.00	8.00	8.00	8.00	3.00	3.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	98.46	98.46	94.07	94.07	97.90	97.90	93.19	93.19	97.90	90.44
CP Percent of Total Shares	1.54	1.54	5.93	5.93	2.10	2.10	6.81	6.81	2.10	9.56

Table 82. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	3.17	3.17	3.99	3.99	2.06	2.06	3.82	3.82	4.90	4.60
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	96.83	96.83	96.01	96.01	97.94	97.94	96.18	96.18	95.10	95.40
Alaskans Endorsed	25	25	25	25	23	23	23	23	11	11
Alaskans Not Endorsed	32	32	32	32	25	25	25	25	14	14
Others Endorsed	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	4	4
Others Not Endorsed	23	23	23	23	19	19	19	19	14	14
Endorsed Total	33	33	33	33	30	30	30	30	15	15
Not Endorsed Total	55	55	55	55	44	44	44	44	28	28
All Vessels with Landings	88	88	88	88	74	74	74	74	43	43

Table 83. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	36	36	15	15	35	35	48	62
Alaskans	0	0	26	26	10	10	25	25	35	44
Others	0	0	10	10	5	5	10	10	13	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	0	52	52	73	73	53	53	40	26
Alaskans	0	0	31	31	45	45	32	32	21	13
Others	0	0	21	21	26	26	21	21	18	13
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	36	36	15	15	35	35	48	62
Alaskans	0	0	26	26	10	10	25	25	35	44
Others	0	0	10	10	5	5	10	10	13	18
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	0	0	52	52	73	73	53	53	40	26
Alaskans	0	0	31	31	45	45	32	32	21	13
Others	0	0	21	21	26	26	21	21	18	13
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	52	52	0	0	48	48	15	15	73	47
Alaskans	31	31	0	0	27	27	10	10	47	34
Others	21	21	0	0	21	21	5	5	26	13
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	36	36	0	88	40	40	73	73	15	41
Alaskans	23	23	0	54	28	28	45	45	9	22
Others	10	10	0	31	10	10	26	26	5	18
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	52	52	88	0	48	48	15	15	73	47
Alaskans	31	31	57	0	27	27	10	10	47	34
Others	21	21	31	0	21	21	5	5	26	13
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	36	36	0	0	40	40	73	73	15	41
Alaskans	23	23	0	0	28	28	45	45	9	22
Others	10	10	0	0	10	10	26	26	5	18

Table 84. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	73	73	40	40	0	0	41	41	49	47
Alaskans	47	47	30	30	0	0	31	31	36	34
Others	26	26	10	10	0	0	10	10	13	13
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	1	1	34	34	0	0	33	33	25	27
Alaskans	1	1	18	18	0	0	17	17	12	14
Others	0	0	16	16	0	0	16	16	13	13
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	73	73	40	40	0	0	41	41	49	47
Alaskans	47	47	30	30	0	0	31	31	36	34
Others	26	26	10	10	0	0	10	10	13	13
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	1	1	34	34	0	0	33	33	25	27
Alaskans	1	1	18	18	0	0	17	17	12	14
Others	0	0	16	16	0	0	16	16	13	13
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	53	53	73	73	33	33	0	74	73	47
Alaskans	32	32	47	47	17	17	0	48	47	34
Others	21	21	26	26	16	16	0	26	26	13
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	21	21	1	1	41	41	0	0	1	27
Alaskans	14	14	1	1	29	29	0	0	1	14
Others	5	5	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	13
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	53	53	73	73	33	33	0	0	73	47
Alaskans	32	32	47	47	17	17	0	0	47	34
Others	21	21	26	26	16	16	0	0	26	13
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	21	21	1	1	41	41	74	0	1	27
Alaskans	14	14	1	1	29	29	46	0	1	14
Others	5	5	0	0	10	10	26	0	0	13
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	40	40	15	15	39	39	15	15	0	17
Alaskans	22	22	10	10	21	21	10	10	0	12
Others	18	18	5	5	18	18	5	5	0	5
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	3	3	28	28	4	4	28	28	0	26
Alaskans	3	3	15	15	4	4	15	15	0	13
Others	0	0	13	13	0	0	13	13	0	13
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	26	26	41	41	41	41	41	41	26	0
Alaskans	13	13	23	23	23	23	23	23	13	0
Others	13	13	18	18	18	18	18	18	13	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	17	17	2	2	2	2	2	2	17	0
Alaskans	11	11	2	2	2	2	2	2	11	0
Others	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0

Table 85. Participation by Number of Years in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Pacific Cod Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	68	68	68	68	57	57	57	57	37	37
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	15	15	15	15	13	13	13	13	6	6
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	41	41	41	41	35	35	35	35	22	22
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	12	12	12	12	10	10	10	10	3	3
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	27	27	27	27	22	22	22	22	15	15
Others with Landings in 2 Years	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Others with Landings in 3 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 4 Years	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Others with Landings in 5 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4.6 West Yakutat Rockfish Non-Trawl Catch History Allocation Tables

Table 86. Summary Table of Catch History Options for the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Denominator	423.20	414.78	1.16	1.35	385.13	371.16	1.18	1.43	199.27	1.27
Qualifiers	283	283	283	283	266	266	266	266	189	189
Total Alaskans	162	162	162	162	148	148	148	148	109	109
Total Others	121	121	121	121	118	118	118	118	80	80
Endorsed	135	135	135	135	128	128	128	128	97	97
Not Endorsed	148	148	148	148	138	138	138	138	92	92
Alaskan Percent of Total Shares	52.67	52.36	53.04	52.64	51.07	50.45	50.38	49.77	52.94	54.05
Others Percent of Total Shares	47.33	47.64	46.96	47.36	48.93	49.55	49.62	50.23	47.06	45.95
Total Qualified CVs	259.00	259.00	259.00	259.00	243.00	243.00	243.00	243.00	173.00	173.00
Total Qualified CPs	24.00	24.00	24.00	24.00	23.00	23.00	23.00	23.00	16.00	16.00
CV Percent of Total Shares	52.78	52.75	56.04	56.26	49.73	50.12	51.11	51.55	53.33	57.23
CP Percent of Total Shares	47.22	47.25	43.96	43.74	50.27	49.88	48.89	48.45	46.67	42.77

Table 87. Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Participants in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery by Allocation Method Options

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	31.97	32.09	32.73	33.06	30.20	30.73	29.66	30.20	30.18	32.19
Not Endorsed Percent of Total Shares	68.03	67.91	67.27	66.94	69.80	69.27	70.34	69.80	69.82	67.81
Alaskans Endorsed	91	91	91	91	86	86	86	86	66	66
Alaskans Not Endorsed	71	71	71	71	62	62	62	62	43	43
Others Endorsed	44	44	44	44	42	42	42	42	31	31
Others Not Endorsed	77	77	77	77	76	76	76	76	49	49
Endorsed Total	135	135	135	135	128	128	128	128	97	97
Not Endorsed Total	148	148	148	148	138	138	138	138	92	92
All Vessels with Landings	283	283	283	283	266	266	266	266	189	189

Table 88. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1#s	0	29	135	133	90	85	162	140	149	148
Alaskans	0	10	72	71	55	52	95	81	73	73
Others	0	19	63	62	35	33	67	59	76	75
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1#s	0	254	148	150	193	198	121	143	134	135
Alaskans	0	150	89	90	106	109	66	80	88	88
Others	0	101	58	59	85	87	54	62	45	46
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2#s	254	0	149	137	87	84	165	163	148	145
Alaskans	152	0	81	72	54	52	98	95	73	72
Others	102	0	68	65	33	32	67	68	75	73
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2#s	29	0	134	146	196	199	118	120	135	138
Alaskans	10	0	80	89	107	109	63	66	88	89
Others	19	0	53	56	87	88	54	53	46	48
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d1%s	148	134	0	26	118	100	87	84	157	149
Alaskans	90	81	0	10	71	61	53	51	78	74
Others	58	53	0	16	47	39	34	33	79	75
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d1%s	135	149	0	257	165	183	196	199	126	134
Alaskans	71	80	0	150	90	100	108	110	83	87
Others	62	67	0	104	73	81	86	87	42	46
Vessels Better off than with 95-01d2%s	150	146	257	0	121	102	87	84	156	148
Alaskans	91	90	152	0	76	63	55	51	79	74
Others	59	56	105	0	45	39	32	33	77	74
Vessels Worse off than with 95-01d2%s	133	137	26	0	162	181	196	199	127	135
Alaskans	70	71	10	0	85	98	106	110	82	87
Others	61	64	16	0	75	81	88	87	44	47

Table 89. Numbers of Vessels Better or Worse Off in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option (continued)

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1#s	193	196	165	162	0	28	128	126	149	148
Alaskans	107	108	91	86	0	10	67	66	73	73
Others	86	88	74	76	0	18	61	60	76	75
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1#s	73	70	101	104	0	238	138	140	117	118
Alaskans	40	39	56	61	0	137	81	82	74	74
Others	32	30	44	42	0	99	57	58	42	43
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2#s	198	199	183	181	238	0	143	128	148	147
Alaskans	110	110	101	99	138	0	77	68	74	74
Others	88	89	82	82	100	0	66	60	74	73
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2#s	68	67	83	85	28	0	123	138	118	119
Alaskans	37	37	46	48	9	0	70	80	73	73
Others	30	29	36	36	18	0	52	58	44	45
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d1%s	121	118	196	196	138	123	0	27	153	150
Alaskans	67	64	109	107	81	71	0	10	75	75
Others	54	54	87	89	57	52	0	17	78	75
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d1%s	145	148	70	70	128	143	0	239	113	116
Alaskans	80	83	38	40	65	76	0	137	72	72
Others	63	63	31	29	60	65	0	100	40	43
Vessels Better off than with 95-00d2%s	143	120	199	199	140	138	239	0	151	148
Alaskans	81	67	111	111	82	80	138	0	76	76
Others	62	53	88	88	58	58	101	0	75	72
Vessels Worse off than with 95-00d2%s	123	146	67	67	126	128	27	0	115	118
Alaskans	66	80	36	36	64	66	9	0	71	71
Others	55	64	30	30	59	59	17	0	43	46
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1#s	134	135	126	127	134	135	130	132	0	84
Alaskans	89	89	84	83	89	88	87	86	0	49
Others	45	46	42	44	45	47	43	46	0	35
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1#s	55	54	63	62	55	54	59	57	0	105
Alaskans	19	19	24	25	19	20	21	22	0	58
Others	35	34	38	36	35	33	37	34	0	45
Vessels Better off than with 98-00d1%s	135	138	134	135	135	136	133	135	105	0
Alaskans	89	90	88	88	89	88	87	86	60	0
Others	46	48	46	47	46	48	46	49	45	0
Vessels Worse off than with 98-00d1%s	54	51	55	54	54	53	56	54	84	0
Alaskans	19	18	20	20	19	20	21	22	49	0
Others	34	32	34	33	34	32	34	31	35	0

Table 90. Participation by Number of Years in the West Yakutat Non-Trawl Rockfish Fishery, by Allocation Method Option

Item	95-01d1#s	95-01d2#s	95-01d1%s	95-01d2%s	95-00d1#s	95-00d2#s	95-00d1%s	95-00d2%s	98-01d1#s	98-01d1%s
Vessels with Landings in 1 Year	108	108	108	108	102	102	102	102	74	74
Vessels with Landings in 2 Years	46	46	46	46	51	51	51	51	34	34
Vessels with Landings in 3 Years	40	40	40	40	39	39	39	39	37	37
Vessels with Landings in 4 Years	27	27	27	27	29	29	29	29	44	44
Vessels with Landings in 5 Years	23	23	23	23	22	22	22	22	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 6 Years	19	19	19	19	23	23	23	23	0	0
Vessels with Landings in 7 Years	20	20	20	20	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 1 Year	72	72	72	72	65	65	65	65	48	48
Alaskans with Landings in 2 Years	25	25	25	25	29	29	29	29	20	20
Alaskans with Landings in 3 Years	24	24	24	24	22	22	22	22	21	21
Alaskans with Landings in 4 Years	14	14	14	14	15	15	15	15	20	20
Alaskans with Landings in 5 Years	13	13	13	13	9	9	9	9	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 6 Years	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	0	0
Alaskans with Landings in 7 Years	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others with Landings in 1 Year	36	36	36	36	37	37	37	37	26	26
Others with Landings in 2 Years	21	21	21	21	22	22	22	22	14	14
Others with Landings in 3 Years	16	16	16	16	17	17	17	17	16	16
Others with Landings in 4 Years	13	13	13	13	14	14	14	14	24	24
Others with Landings in 5 Years	10	10	10	10	13	13	13	13	0	0
Others with Landings in 6 Years	12	12	12	12	15	15	15	15	0	0
Others with Landings in 7 Years	13	13	13	13	0	0	0	0	0	0

Part 4: Status of Gulf of Alaska Fisheries

General Trends in Fisheries

The Gulf of Alaska supports numerous fisheries prosecuted by a highly diverse group of individuals, vessels, and gear. While it is difficult to summarize such a diverse group, generally, fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska share several characteristics: (1) the presence of large numbers of fishery dependent communities that rely on a variety of nearshore resources; (2) a limited presence of catcher/processors or larger catcher vessels (> 125' LOA); (3) a high incidence of multi-species or "combination" fishermen prosecuting federal fisheries in both federal and state waters (the so-called parallel fisheries) as well as State-managed fisheries; and (4) integration of commercial and subsistence fishing. The Gulf of Alaska processing sector is addressed in Part III of this paper.

Prior to the 1980's, most of the groundfish harvests in the Gulf of Alaska came from foreign fleets operating in the EEZ. In the early and mid-1980's joint ventures (JV's)between foreign and domestic vessels harvested an increasingly larger percentage of the resource. By the early 1990's, domestic groundfish vessels had replaced the JV fleet. By the early 1990's, domestic groundfish harvests increased dramatically. Between 1991-1998, groundfish accounted for roughly 85% of the volume and 45% of the ex-vessel value of fishery resources in Alaska **(Table 4.1)**. Most of the volume and value of the groundfish resource came from the Bering Sea pollock fishery **(Figures 4.1 and 4.2)**.

Unlike the Bering Sea, non-groundfish species represent a considerable percentage of the overall harvest and value of fishery resources in the Gulf of Alaska **(Figure 4.1).** State managed salmon fisheries, Pacific cod, herring fisheries, and the federally managed non-groundfish halibut fishery historically provide a substantial portion of the revenue to fishermen and communities that also participate in the groundfish fishery **(Table 4.2)**.

Unlike the Bering Sea, non-groundfish species represent a considerable percentage of the overall harvest and value of fishery resources in the Gulf of Alaska. State managed salmon fisheries, Pacific cod, herring fisheries, and the federally managed non-groundfish halibut fishery historically provide a substantial portion of the revenue to fishermen and communities that also participate in the groundfish fishery in the Gulf of Alaska **(Table 4.3).** A more detailed description of the harvests of non-groundfish species in the Gulf of Alaska by residents of various regions is provided in *Sector and Regional Profiles of the North Pacific Groundfish Fisheries – 2001*, prepared by Northern Economics. Specifically refer to Figures 3.1-5, 3.2-5, 3.3-5, 3.4-5, 3.5-2, 3.6-2.

Sablefish provides a considerable amount of the total exvessel value from groundfish in the Gulf of Alaska **(Table 4.4)**. Most of the sablefish harvests in the GOA are managed under the IFQ Program. After sablefish, Pacific cod, pollock, flatfish, and rockfish respectively provide most of the remaining value to fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska **(Figure 4.2).**

Much of the groundfish in the Gulf of Alaska are harvested by catcher vessels in the inshore fleet. In 1992, the Council approved and NMFS implemented Amendment 23 to the GOA FMP which limits the participation of the offshore fleet to 10% of the Pacific cod TAC. Currently, there is not an allocation to an offshore pollock quota. Even though little Pacific cod and no pollock are allocated to an offshore catcher processor vessels sector, some catcher/processor vessels are active in the Gulf. Vessels that are less than 125' LOA and that process less than 126 mt/week of pollock and Pacific cod in the aggregate are not defined as offshore vessels in the Gulf. These vessels can harvest and process fish off of the inshore allocation for Pacific cod. Vessels that target cod but incidentally harvest pollock, up to 20% of the landings on-board a vessel during a trip, can retain and process pollock on board.

There is not an inshore/offshore allocation for other species in the Gulf and smaller catcher/processors are active in some of those fisheries. Federally managed rockfish and flatfish fisheries have traditionally been prosecuted by smaller trawl catcher/processors--the "head and gut" boat fleet. The head and gut incidentally harvest a considerable portion of the trawl allocation of sablefish during these fisheries. Longline catcher processors are also active in the Gulf of Alaska targeting Pacific cod either as an inshore vessel or off of the offshore allocation. Some of these vessels also fish halibut and sablefish IFQ in the Gulf of Alaska. Pot catcher/processors vessels have been less active in the Gulf, principally targeting Pacific cod in either the inshore or offshore sector.

Generally, there has been an increasing level of participation by smaller vessels, particularly trawl and fixed gear catcher vessels less than 60' LOA, over the past ten years in the federally managed groundfish fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska. Most of this new participation has been in the Pacific cod fishery, and to a lesser extent the pollock fishery. Participation in the Pacific cod and pollock fisheries by vessel class is described under the heading for each fishery.

The State-managed Pacific cod fisheries are an increasingly important source of revenue to fixed gear catcher vessels less than 60' LOA fishing in the Western and Central Gulf of Alaska **(Table 4.5, 4.6)**. The State of Alaska determines the guideline harvest levels (GHLs) for these fisheries based on a percentage of the federal TAC in the Western and Central Gulf. This quota is effectively reallocated from the federally managed fisheries to the State water Pacific cod fisheries. The State managed cod fisheries were implemented in 1997 in the Gulf of Alaska, and are generally limited to vessels under 60' except in Cook Inlet and Prince William sound, and to vessels using pot and jig gear. It has provided additional harvest opportunities to small vessels. Many of the recent small boat participants have begun to rely on both the State, and to a lesser extent, federal groundfish fisheries to supplement revenue from salmon, and herring fisheries that have shown a general trend of decreasing harvests in some regions.

Perhaps more importantly, many salmon fisheries have greatly decreased in value over the past ten years due to unfavorable market conditions as well as other factors **(Figure 4.2)**. Lower exvessel value has increased the reliance of some vessel sectors from primarily state managed resources to federally managed groundfish fisheries. This is a general trend and not necessarily applicable to all gear types, vessel sizes, or regions.

The following sections further describe the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries in the various management regions under two categories: by fishery, by vessel class by area; and by residence of vessel owners participating in the fishery. Finally, this section provides an overview of the fishery dependent communities in the region and the role of groundfish fisheries in those communities.

Data used in this Analysis

This discussion paper uses the data derived from information already available in various tables in Appendix I of the Draft Programmatic SEIS (PSEIS), the annual SAFE documents, and landings data. Most data in the PSEIS are limited to data prior to 1998. This discussion paper includes data that have been updated by Northern Economics. This revised data set provides harvest and value data for 1999 and 2000, modifies the AFA vessel categories, filters the existing data to account for bycatch in the halibut IFQ fishery, and provides increased detail on harvests of species by vessel category within a FMP Area.

The data in this discussion paper shows the amount and wholesale value of Pacific cod, pollock, sablefish, the ARO complex (Atka Mackerel, Rockfish, and Other), and the Flatfish complex by vessel group by FMP area from 1992-2000 (e.g., harvest and wholesale value of Pacific cod by fixed gear catcher vessels 32' and under LOA in the Central Gulf). The tables have been sorted to remove harvests by vessels sectors to preserve confidentiality.

The economic and harvest data presented in the SAFE documents do not necessarily match the vessel sector descriptions provided in the updated data from Northern Economics. This may create some inconsistencies when comparing data between these sources. Economic assumptions used in the PSEIS, the updated data from Northern Economics, and the SAFE documents may differ and result in different conclusions. However, these data do appear to agree on general trends in harvest and exvessel value between various groups of vessels operating within Gulf groundfish fisheries.

It may be helpful for future analyses to use the same vessel sector groupings as the updated data from Northern Economics to maintain consistency with that analysis and to allow any future analyses to"tier" off of that document for purposes of complying with NEPA--if a rationalization program is developed. However, other vessel groupings based on residency of vessel owner, historic participation by vessel size, dependence on groundfish as a percentage of total exvessel revenue, or other factors could also be used. **Future analyses of vessel sector harvests will benefit from clear direction from the Council on what groups and areas should be analyzed.**

Due to time constraints, and uncertainty over the approach the Council wishes to take, the analysis does not provide a more detailed breakdown of species processed, by processor, by regulatory area. Setting up a database similar to the one for the vessel classes requires considerable effort. **It would be helpful for the Council to indicate if it wishes to conduct an analysis of processing similar to the breakdown provided for the vessel sectors.**

Vessel Sectors

The Vessel sectors used in this discussion paper are based on the revised vessel classes provided by Northern Economics. Classes are defined based on a combination of vessel/plant characteristics and fishing patterns. Table 1 provides descriptions of the 9 CV classes, while Table 2 provides descriptions of the 5 CP classes.

Table 1. Catcher Vessel Classes

Class	Acronym	Description
Bering Sea Pollock Trawl Catcher Vessels Greater than or Equal to 125 Feet in Length	TCV BSP ≥ 125	Includes all vessels for which trawl catch accounts for more than 15% of total catch value, value of Bering Sea pollock catch is greater than value of catch of all other species combined, vessel length is greater than or equal to 125 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $5000. All of these vessels fishing after 1998 are AFA-eligible.
Bering Sea Pollock Trawl Catcher Vessels 60 to 124 Feet in Length	TCV BSP 60-124	Includes all vessels for which trawl catch accounts for more than 15% of total catch value, value of Bering Sea pollock catch is greater than value of catch of all other species combined, vessel length is 60 ft. to 124 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $5000. All of these vessels fishing after 1998 are AFA-eligible.
Diversified AFA-Eligible Trawl Catcher Vessels	TCV Div. AFA	Includes all vessels that are AFA-eligible for which trawl catch accounts for more than 15% of total catch value, value of Bering Sea pollock catch is less than value of catch of all other species combined, vessel length is greater than or equal to 60 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $5000.
Non-AFA Trawl Catcher Vessels	TCV Non-AFA	Includes all vessels that are not AFA-eligible for which trawl catch accounts for more than 15% of total catch value, value of Bering Sea pollock catch is less than value of catch of all other species combined, vessel length is greater than or equal to 60 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $5000.
Trawl Catcher Vessels Less than 60 Feet in Length	TCV < 60	Includes all vessels for which trawl catch accounts for more than 15% of total catch value, vessel length is less than 60 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $2500.
Pot Catcher Vessels	PCV	Includes all vessels that are not trawl CVs for which value of pot catch is greater than15% of total catch value, vessel length is greater than or equal to 60 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $5000.
Longline Catcher Vessels	LCV	Includes all vessels that are not trawl CVs or pot CVs for which vessel length is greater than or equal to 60 ft. and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $2000, excluding halibut and state water sablefish.
Fixed Gear Catcher Vessels 33 Feet to 59 Feet in Length	FGCV 33-59	Includes all vessels that are not trawl CVs for which vessel length is 33 to 59 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $2000.
Fixed Gear Catcher Vessels Less Than or Equal to 32 Feet in Length	FGCV ≤ 32	Includes all vessels that are not trawl CVs for which vessel length is less than or equal to 32 ft., and total value of groundfish catch is greater than $1000.

Table 2. Catcher Processor Classes

Acronym	Description
ST-CP	**Surimi Trawl Catcher Processor.** These factory trawlers have the necessary processing equipment to produce surimi from pollock and other groundfish. They are generally the largest of all Cps.
FT-CP	**Fillet Trawl Catcher Processor.** These trawl vessels have the processing equipment to produce fillets from pollock, Pacific cod, and other groundfish. They are generally smaller than ST-CP vessels.
HT-CP	**Head And Gut Trawl Catcher Processor.** These factory trawlers do not process more than incidental amount of fillets. Generally, they are limited to headed and gutted products or kirimi. In general, they do not focus their efforts on pollock, opting instead for flatfish, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel. HT-CP vessels are the smallest of the trawl Cps.
P-CP	**Pot Catcher Processor.** These vessels have been used primarily in the crab fisheries of the North Pacific, but increasingly are participating in the Pacific cod fisheries. They generally use pot gear, but may also use longline gear. They produce whole or headed and gutted groundfish products, some of which may be frozen in brine rather than blast frozen.
L-CP	**Longline Catcher Processor**. These vessels, also known as freezer longliners, do not trawl or use pot gear but use longline gear with a focus on Pacific cod. Most L-CP vessels are limited to headed and gutted products, and in general are smaller than HT-CP vessels.

The data used by Northern Economics are derived from ADF&G Fish-tickets for CVs and NMFS Blend Data for CPs and include retained harvests in both directed and bycatch fisheries. Bycatch of groundfish from the halibut fishery and State of Alaska limited entry sablefish fisheries are excluded from this database. Also excluded are directed State managed fisheries for Lingcod. Other fisheries such as the Prince William Sound (PWS) pollock fishery, the state water Pacific cod fisheries, and state managed rockfish fisheries are included. Other than the state managed Pacific cod fishery and the PWS pollock fishery in the Eastern Gulf, the total retained harvests from these state managed fisheries are typically small in comparison to the federal TAC. Additional analyses in the future can extract the state managed Pacific cod and PWS from the data base.

Vessels are included in only one category during any given year. As an example, if a TCV < 60 vessel trawls in the federal PCOD fishery and then switches to pot gear in the state water fishery it will be classified as TCV < 60. In other words vessels that use more than one gear are classified in the highest ranking class for which they qualify. An exemption to this categorization is that there may be one or two vessels that are classified both as H&G CPs and as AFA TCVs in a given year. Currently, the database has not been sorted to account for these factors.

Groundfish Fishery Overview

Sablefish

Within the Gulf, the sablefish fishery is the most valuable fishery in terms of exvessel revenue **(Figure 4.2)**. Roughly half of the exvessel value of federal groundfish harvests in the Gulf of Alaska comes from sablefish. Much of the value in the sablefish fishery comes from the IFQ managed portion of the fishery. The IFQ

fishery is allocated 80% of the TAC in the Central and Western Gulf, and 5% in the Eastern Gulf. In the Western and Central Gulf, 20% of the sablefish TAC is allocated to trawl fisheries as bycatch. Trawl vessels harvesting primarily harvesting rockfish, and some vessels harvesting deep water flatfish such as rex sole harvest most of the bycatch either as incidental harvest to other species or as a "top off" harvest in low value fisheries. In the Eastern Gulf, only 5% of the TAC is allocated as trawl bycatch which is almost exclusively taken in the West Yakutat region. Longline and trawl gear are the only two gear types that are allowed to retain sablefish.

Because sablefish is already rationalized under the IFQ Program and sablefish is taken as a bycatch species in trawl fisheries, sablefish harvests in the IFQ Program would not likely be directly affected by any possible rationalization programs in the GOA. Although vessels that harvest IFQ sablefish may be affected by potential future rationalization program for other species in the Gulf, it does not appear that IFQ Sablefish Program would be directly changed by future rationalization efforts.

The sablefish IFQ Program does not apply to harvests inside state waters. The state manages a number of sablefish fisheries throughout the state in Southeast Alaska, Prince William Sound, and Cook Inlet. There are also a number of vessels that harvest sablefish from state waters in the Aleutian Islands and Western Gulf. State managed sablefish fisheries outside of Southeast Alaska are typically small with limited exvessel value compared to federally managed fisheries.

Harvest and wholesale value by vessel class and by FMP Area are provided in **Tables 4.7 - 4.12.**

Pacific Cod

The Pacific cod fishery is the second most valuable fishery in the GOA in terms of exvessel value **(Figure 4.2)**. Roughly one fourth of the total exvessel value of federal groundfish harvests in the Gulf comes from Pacific cod. Total harvests from Pacific cod are the second highest of federally managed groundfish species in the Gulf of Alaska (**Table 4.4).** A wide diversity of vessels harvest Pacific cod throughout the Gulf although most of the harvest comes from trawl and pot catcher vessel.

To some extent, a portion of the GOA Pacific cod fishery has been allocated to a rationalized fishery through the sideboard harvest limitations established for non-exempt AFA catcher vessels. Based on the recently revised 2002 calculation of sideboard limits, roughly 9% of the total Gulf federal TAC for Pacific cod is allocated to AFA sideboard vessels (**Table 4.13**). While the percentage of TAC allocated to AFA sideboarded vessels can vary depending on the future allocation of TAC within management regions the Gulf, this figure gives some indication as to the overall allocation of the Gulf Pacific cod TAC to these vessels.

The state water Pacific cod fishery in the South Alaska Peninsula, Chignik, Kodiak, Cook Inlet, and Prince William Sound regions are based on the Federal TAC. These fisheries were established in 1996 and implemented in 1997. Currently, the State water Pacific cod fisheries are allocated a percentage of the total TAC "off the top", the remaining allocation goes to the federal TAC. Roughly 25% of the Western, Central, and Eastern Gulf TAC for Pacific cod is allocated to the state managed fishery. The harvest and exvessel value for the state water fisheries is provided in **Tables 4.5, and 4.6**. These fisheries are limited to pot and jig vessels less than or equal to 58' LOA in Chignik and Kodiak. Pot vessels greater than 58' LOA are allocated 50% of the pot quota in the Kodiak fishery. There is no vessel size limit in the Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound state managed fisheries. While harvest statistics are not available, a number of trawl and fixed gear catcher vessels less than 60' LOA now participate in both federally and state managed fisheries.

Additionally, a considerable portion of the TAC for the federal Pacific cod fishery is harvested within State waters during the parallel fishery. The State opens state waters to allow vessels to fish for the federal TAC. Vessels fishing inside state waters must meet additional regulations that the state may have in place such as additional restrictions on the use of non-pelagic trawl gear inside most state waters. Estimates on the amount of federal TAC coming from the parallel fishery in the Western and Central Gulf is provided in **Table 4.14**.

Harvest and wholesale value by vessel class and by FMP Area are provided in **Tables 4.15 -4.20)**

Pollock

The pollock fishery is the third most valuable fishery in the GOA in terms of exvessel value **(Figure 4.2)**. Roughly thirteen percent of the total exvessel value of GOA groundfish comes from pollock. Pollock is harvested by inshore catcher trawl vessels.

As with Pacific cod, a portion of the pollock fishery has been rationalized through the allocation of sideboard harvest limitations established for non-exempt AFA catcher vessels. Based on the recently revised 2002 calculation of sideboard limits, roughly 33% of the total Gulf federal TAC for pollock is allocated to AFA sideboard vessels (**Table 4.13**). While the percentage of TAC allocated to AFA sideboarded vessels can vary depending on the future allocation of TAC within management regions the Gulf, this figure gives some indication as to the overall allocation of the Gulf pollock TAC to these vessels. **Table 4.13** provides additional information on the distribution of pollock to AFA sideboarded vessels.

Beginning in 1995, the state established a pollock fishery in Prince William Sound. The total harvests in this fishery averaged roughly 2,000 mt. from 1995-1999**.** The state establishes a GHL for the Prince William Sound fishery. Because the Prince William Sound stock is considered part of the Gulf pollock stock, the GHL is deducted from the entire GOA pollock TAC. The remaining TAC is allocated to the federally managed pollock fisheries in the Gulf.

As with the Pacific cod fishery, much of the federal TAC of pollock comes from state waters during the parallel fishery. **Table 4.21** shows the harvest of pollock from state waters in the Gulf of Alaska. Although the State of Alaska does not have a directed state managed fishery inside state waters outside of Prince William Sound, it does open state waters for harvest of the federal TAC. This constitutes a parallel fishery.

Harvest and wholesale value by vessel class and by FMP Area are provided in **Tables 4.22- 4.27.**

Rockfish

As a group, rockfish fisheries are the fourth most valuable fishery in the GOA in terms of exvessel value **(Figure 4.2)**. Roughly five percent of the total exvessel value of GOA groundfish comes from rockfish. Rockfish are harvested by a wide range of vessels, but many of these vessels account for only a small percentage of the overall harvests. Catcher/processor head and gut trawl vessels and larger non-AFA trawl vessels have typically taken the largest percentage of rockfish resources in the Central and Western Gulf. Hook and Line vessels fishing in the Eastern Gulf do take a small percentage of the rockfish harvests.

Typically, the TAC in the rockfish and flatfish fisheries is not reached due to bycatch limitations. The closure dates of flatfish and rockfish fisheries are highly dependent on bycatch of non-target species. Halibut bycatch is the key bycatch concern in the flatfish fisheries. Halibut is managed as a prohibited species and

fisheries and gear types within fisheries are allocated a prohibited species cap (PSC). All halibut must be discarded and fisheries reaching that cap are closed. In many cases, these fisheries, especially flatfish fisheries, are closed prior to attaining the TAC because they have reached their halibut PSC. In the rockfish fisheries, halibut is also a bycatch concern although generally to a lesser degree. Within the Gulf, a small allocation of sablefish is made to the trawl fleet. This allocation which is almost exclusively taken as bycatch in rockfish and flatfish fisheries supplements the income of vessels in the rockfish directed fishery.

The state manages rockfish in Southeast Outside. The state also manages Blue and Black rockfish in the Western and Central Gulf as well. These harvests are traditionally fairly limited and the jig fleet target these stocks during the State water Pacific cod fishery.

Harvest and wholesale value by vessel class and by FMP Area are provided in **Tables 4.28-Table 4.33.**

Flatfish

As a group, flatfish fisheries are the fifth most valuable fishery in the GOA in terms of exvessel value **(Figure 4.22)**. Roughly 4% percent of the total exvessel value of GOA groundfish comes from flatfish. Flatfish are harvested almost exclusively by catcher/processor head and gut trawl vessels and larger non-AFA trawl vessels. As with the rockfish fishery, the TAC in many flatfish fisheries is limited by PSC and bycatch.

Harvest and wholesale value by vessel class and by FMP Area are provided in **Tables 434-4.39.**

Seasonal Harvest Patterns

The PSEIS describes the seasonal harvest pattern of various vessel classes in Appendix I. This section expands on that description and provides more detail on harvest patterns within FMP management areas. These patterns are generalizations based on recent harvest trends and may not be reflective of individual vessels. The exact timing of fishing effort can vary from year to year depending on stock abundance, market conditions, and regulatory changes, such as measures introduced under the Steller Sea Lion Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives (RPA's) can change these patterns as well.

Western Gulf of Alaska

The federal fixed gear Pacific cod and rockfish fishery begins on January 1st. Generally, most of this effort is from the catcher/processor longline vessels under 125' LOA that are fishing off of the onshore allocation. Some of these vessels will fish Pacific cod in the Bering Sea after some effort in the Western Gulf. Pot vessels greater than 60' participate in the early portion of the fixed gear Pacific cod season, but this effort tends to be fairly limited. These vessels tend to participate in both the Western Gulf and the Bering Sea Pacific crab fishery which begins later in January. Typically, there is limited participation in the early fixed gear cod fishery by the fixed gear catcher vessels under 60' LOA.

In 2001, the state opened a bairdi crab fishery in the Western Gulf (South Alaska Peninsula). Although the fishery had restrictive pot limits, more than 100 vessels participated in the fishery. Threshold biomass levels were not reached for an opening in 2002.

On January 20th, trawl fisheries for the pollock and pacific cod trawl open. Trawl vessels less than 60' length overall (LOA) typically target pollock, and increase their effort on the Pacific cod fishery after the end of the pollock opening, usually in late January or early February. Small trawl vessels, and to a lesser extent AFA qualified trawl vessels typically harvest much of the Pacific cod biomass. AFA-qualified vessels harvest a greater proportion of the pollock biomass. The pollock fishery typically lasts until late January or early February. The Pacific cod harvests for the small trawl fleet and the longline C/P fleet peak in February. By mid-march the quota for Pacific cod is reached.

By mid-march, the Pacific cod inshore quota has typically been taken. The small trawl, and AFA qualified trawl vessels will participate in the pollock B season opening in mid-March. Trawl and fixed gear vessels under 60' LOA refit their vessels to participate in the state water South Alaska Peninsula Pacific cod fishery which is allocated 25% of the federal TAC for the Western Gulf. The refitted small trawl fleet uses pot gear. Pot vessels are allocated 85% of this quota, and by mid to late April that quota has typically been taken. Some of the smaller fixed gear vessels use pots, but many vessels use jig gear. The jig fishery typically lasts through much of the summer. In March, the head and gut fleet begins targeting flatfish species such as rex sole. This fishery usually ends in March and restarts on July 1.

The Area M salmon fishery begins in June. This fishery takes place along the South Alaska Peninsula, and later in July along the North Alaska Peninsula. Trawl vessels under 60' refit their vessels again to participate in the fishery with seine gear. Most fixed gear Pacific cod vessels refit their vessels and participate with drift and set gillnet gear. The IFQ fisheries continue throughout the summer as does the state water jig fishery. There is a limited State water rockfish fishery that the small boat jig vessels typically target in June through August. A number of larger seine vessels also target the Dutch Harbor food and bait herring fishery in June.

In July, a rockfish and flatfish trawl fishery opens. This fishery is almost exclusively targeted by the head and gut catcher/processor fleet. The rockfish fishery typically ends in July and flatfish harvests continue through October. Arrowtooth flounder harvests by the head and gut trawl fleet peak in May. In August, the pollock C season begins, and some seine vessels may refit their vessels for the fishery. There is typically more limited participation in the C season fishery by small trawl vessels and AFA-trawl vessels.

By September, the salmon season is largely finished. The remaining Pacific cod quota is released in September, and if halibut bycatch limits have not be reached, the trawl fishery will target the remaining Pacific cod. Some pot catcher vessels returning from the Bering Sea crab fishery and smaller local fixed gear catcher vessels will fish the remaining cod quota. This fishery can last through November depending on catch rates and quota. The trawl fishery for Pacific cod is typically shortened due to halibut bycatch. The final pollock D season is opened on October 1, and the small trawl fleet and some larger AFA-qualified vessels participate in the fishery. The longline catcher/processor fleet does not typically participate in the fall Pacific cod fishery. Non-sablefish longline fisheries are typically closed due to halibut mortality. By October, IFQ fishing is largely completed in the Western Gulf. In some years, jig and pot cod harvests may continue through November, but these harvests are limited.

Central Gulf of Alaska

Because the Central Gulf comprises a much wider area, there is greater variability in the seasonal patterns of fishing than observed in the Western Gulf of Alaska. The Central Gulf is split into two regulatory Areas, 620 and 630. Fleet behavior differs somewhat between these two regions. Generally, there is greater participation by smaller fixed gear vessels in Area 630 near Cook Inlet and Kodiak. Area 620 extends from the Western portion of Kodiak and borders the Western Gulf. some vessels which participate in the Western Gulf also participate in Area 620. Area 630 encompasses much of Kodiak,

Area 620

The federal fixed gear Pacific cod and rockfish fishery begins on January 1st. In Area 620, there is limited C/P longline, and longline harvest of cod. Generally, most of the effort in the Area 620 fixed gear Pacific cod fishery comes from pot catcher vessels. These vessels are typically active through March Some of these vessels will fish Pacific cod in Area 630 and the Western Gulf.

On January 20th, the trawl fisheries for the pollock and pacific cod trawl fisheries open. A combination of small trawl, non-AFA trawlers and AFA-qualified trawlers participate in the pollock fishery. There is typically greater participation by larger non-AFA qualified trawl vessels than other vessel classes. The pollock fishery typically lasts until late January or early February. In recent years the allocation to the Area 620 pollock A season has been much lower than previous years resulting in lower harvests and short seasons. Typically, trawl vessels will target Pacific cod first, then pollock since pollock tends to mature later than in Area 620 than in the Western Gulf. The Pacific cod harvests for the trawl fleet and the Pot catcher vessel fleet tends to peak in February. A rex sole flatfish trawl fishery almost exclusively harvested by head and gut catcher/processors opens in late January but there is little fishing effort until February and March.

The longline C/P sector is less active in Area 620 than the Western Gulf, and this fleet typically begins fishing in Area 620 for IFQ sablefish and halibut on the March 15. There is a limited but steady harvest of Pacific cod by the longline catcher fleet from January through March 15 when many of these vessels switch to IFQ fisheries. Head and Gut C/P trawl fisheries for rex sole begin in February with limited effort and increase harvests over the coming months peaking in May.

By late March or early February, the Pacific cod inshore quota has been taken. The pot catcher/processor fleet may target the remaining offshore cod quota in April and May. Some of the small trawl, non-AFA trawl vessels, and AFA qualified trawl vessels will participate in the pollock opening in mid-March. Much of the Pollock B season quota is taken out of Shelikof Strait in Area 620 because there has been a high percentage of roe during this time period. Once the pollock B season closes trawl vessels will switch to the flatfish trawl fisheries targeting the shallow water flatfish. Remaining vessels will move to the Bering sea if they are AFA-qualified vessels, or to Oregon to participate in the Pacific Hake fishery. Other trawl vessels will refit their vessels and begin fishing IFQ halibut and sablefish.

Some of the fixed gear vessels under 60' LOA participate in the state water Pacific cod fishery in Chignik which is allocated 7.0 % of the federal TAC for the Central Gulf (Areas 620 and 630 combined). Typically, participation is limited to Chignik and Kodiak salmon seine vessels that refit their vessels with pot gear. Very few small trawl vessels refit gear to fish in the Chignik state water cod fishery. The state water quota is not typically taken, and Pacific cod fisheries within state waters in Area 620 are managed under state regulations for the remainder of the year. There is a limited state managed blue and black rockfish fishery targeted by jig vessels. This fishery starts in March and typically lasts until early summer. In March, the head and gut fleet begins to target flatwater species such as rex sole. This fishery typically ends in March and restarts in July.

The Chignik and Kodiak salmon fishery opens in July. Most of the effort in the Kodiak salmon fishery occurs in Area 630. The few seine vessels that had been participating in the state managed cod fishery refit their vessels to participate in this fishery. The IFQ fisheries continue throughout the summer as does the state water cod jig fishery.

In July, the Central Gulf rockfish fishery opens and vessels begin targeting Pacific Ocean Perch, northern rockfish, and pelagic shelf rockfish with sablefish bycatch. Typically, this fishery lasts for three weeks. This fishery is targeted largely by the catcher/processor head and gut fleet and larger non-AFA trawl vessels. After the rockfish trawl fishery, a limited shallow water flatfish fishery opens. This fishery typically ends in August. In August, the pollock C season begins, and typically the remaining trawl fleet of non-AFA, AFA, and a limited number of small trawl vessels participate in this fishery.

By September, the salmon season is largely finished. The B season Pacific cod quota is released in September, and if halibut bycatch limits have not be reached, the trawl fishery will target the remaining Pacific cod. Some pot catcher vessels will also fish the remaining cod quota. The state may relax gear, vessel size, and registration restrictions in late October to allow the harvest of Pacific cod in state waters. The state managed cod fishery can last through November depending on catch rates and quota. Smaller head and gut catcher/processor trawlers target shallow water flatfish in fall. The final pollock season is opened on October 1, and the small trawl fleet, non-AFA trawl vessels, and some larger AFA-qualified vessels may participate in the fishery. The longline fleet does not typically participate in the fall Pacific cod fishery. By October, IFQ fishing is largely completed in the Area 620. In some years, pot cod harvests may continue through December, but these harvests are limited.

Area 630

The federal fixed gear Pacific cod and rockfish fishery begins on January 1st. In Area 630, there is limited C/P longline harvest of cod. However, there is an active longline fleet comprised mostly of fixed gear vessels under 32' typically home ported out of Homer, and pot catcher vessels greater than 60' from Kodiak that actively target cod. Harvests peak in February for both gear groups. Generally, most of the early effort in the Area 630 fixed gear Pacific cod fishery comes from longline catcher vessels. These vessels are typically active through March. Jig vessels have a limited harvest of cod during this early January portion of the fishery.

In the past two years, the state has opened a bairdi crab fishery in the Kodiak region. Although the fishery has restrictive pot limits, more than 125 vessels have participated in the fishery. This fishery opens on January 15th, and vessels participating in this fishery cannot operate pot gear 14 days prior to the opening of the fishery. This regulation limits pot cod effort in Area 630 prior to the bairdi fishery. The guideline harvest level for the bairdi fishery has been 500,000 pounds in the last two years and most vessels participating in this fishery have not covered costs.

On January 20th, the trawl fisheries for the pollock and pacific cod trawl fisheries open. A combination of mostly non-AFA trawlers and AFA-qualified trawlers participate in the pollock fishery. There is greater participation by larger non-AFA qualified trawl vessels than other vessel classes. A limited small trawl fleet operates in Area 630. The pollock fishery lasts until late January or early February. The Pacific cod harvests for the trawl fleet and the Pot catcher vessel fleet peak in late February. A short shallow water flatfish taken by the shoreside trawl fleet begins in January. A flathead sole fishery targeted by the shoreside trawl fleet opens in February. Smaller fixed gear vessels begins targeting a limited state managed rockfish fishery with jig gear in February. Harvests in that fishery peak in February and March then continue at lower harvest rates through the summer.

Longline C/P vessels are less active in Area 630 than the Western Gulf, and this fleet typically does not begin fishing in Area 630 once the IFQ sablefish and halibut fisheries open on March 15. The longline catcher fleet targets cod until March 15 when many of these vessels switch to IFQ fisheries and cod harvests drop dramatically. This fleet harvests a small but steady amount of bycatch incidental to the IFQ fisheries.

Catcher/processor trawl fisheries for rex sole begin in February with increasing harvests over the coming months peaking in April and May. The shoreside trawl fleet begins fishing deep water flatfish in March and the fishery typically continues through May.

By early March, the Pacific cod inshore quota has typically been taken. The small trawl, non-AFA trawl vessels, and AFA qualified trawl vessels will participate in the pollock opening in mid-March. Jig and pot gear vessels participate in the state water Pacific cod fishery in Kodiak and Cook inlet which are allocated 12.5 % and 2.25 % respectively of the federal TAC for the Central Gulf (Areas 620 and 630 combined). Typically, most of the pot harvests are by vessels larger than 60' and by some seine vessels under 60' that refit their vessels. The Kodiak and Cook Inlet state water quota is not typically taken. The pot fleet is limited to 50% of the total GHL in Kodiak. Pot vessels greater than 60' can harvests 50% of the pot quota, or 25% of the total Kodiak state water Pacific cod GHL. Jig effort is limited in Kodiak, and sporadic after the start of the summer salmon season.

The Cook Inlet GHL is split between pot (50%) and jog gear (50%). The pot allocation is typically taken and the jig allocation is not. Since the jig quota is not taken, the state manages Pacific cod fisheries within state waters in Kodiak and Cook Inlet are managed under state gear and vessel size regulations for the remainder of the year. Some of the local salmon drift and set gillnet vessels target cod in mid-April until mid-June. There is a very limited state managed blue and black rockfish fishery targeted by jig vessels in the Kodiak region. This fishery starts in March and typically lasts until early summer. In March, the head and gut fleet catcher/processor fleet begins to target flatwater species such as rex sole.

The Kodiak and Cook Inlet salmon fisheries open in July. Most of the effort in the Kodiak salmon fishery occurs in Area 630. The few seine vessels that had been participating in the state managed cod fishery refit their vessels to participate in this fishery. Many of the small jig boats begin fishing salmon in Cook Inlet, Kodiak, Area M, and other salmon fisheries in the state. The IFQ fisheries continue throughout the summer as does the state water cod jig fishery. Many of the larger non-AFA trawl vessels also own IFQ and fish it between trawl closures. Some trawl vessels have tender contracts during the salmon season.

In July, the Central Gulf rockfish fishery opens and vessels begin targeting Pacific Ocean Perch, northern rockfish, and pelagic shelf rockfish. Typically, this fishery lasts for three weeks. This fishery is targeted largely by the catcher/processor head and gut fleet and a few larger non-AFA trawl vessels. After the rockfish trawl fishery, a limited shallow water flatfish fishery opens and trawl vessels will target flatfish. This fishery typically ends in August. In August, the pollock C season begins, and typically the remaining trawl fleet of non-AFA, and AFA qualified trawl vessels participate in this fishery. The state also manages a small sablefish fishery in Cook Inlet. Typically this fishery opens in July and is reached within a couple of weeks. This fishery is limited to fixed gear.

By September, the salmon season is largely finished. The remaining Pacific cod B season begins in September. If halibut bycatch mortality limits have not be reached, the trawl fishery will target the remaining Pacific cod. Some pot catcher vessels will also fish the remaining cod quota. The state may relax gear, vessel size, and registration restrictions in late October to allow the harvest of Pacific cod in state waters. The cod fishery can last through November depending on catch rates and quota. There is a limited catcher/processor trawl fishery on shallow water flatfish in September, and for the remaining offshore Pacific cod quota in October. The final pollock season is opened on October 1, and the small trawl fleet, non-AFA trawl vessels, and some larger AFA-qualified vessels may participate in the fishery. The longline fleet does not typically participate in the fall Pacific cod fishery. By October, IFQ fishing is largely completed in the Area 620. In some years, pot cod harvests may continue through December, but these harvests are limited.

Eastern Gulf – Area 640

Sablefish comprises most of the groundfish harvested in the Eastern Gulf. Prior to the opening of the IFQ fisheries in March there is a small jig cod fishery within Prince William Sound. In March, the West Yakutat pollock fishery opens and a small number of larger non-AFA trawl vessels target this aggregation of fish. The pollock fishery does not typically have any effort prior to March since the fish have not aggregated. The state managed Prince William Sound pollock fishery takes place in March and a limited number of vessels participate in that fishery.

After the West Yakutat pollock fishery, there is a limited Deepwater flatfish fishery in which some of the pollock trawl vessels participate. This fishery is typically closed by early May. A very limited longline rockfish fishery continues in Prince William Sound as an incidental harvest to halibut and sablefish IFQ fisheries.

The state also operates several groundfish fisheries in the Eastern Gulf. In Prince William Sound, there is a state water Pacific cod fishery that is allocated 25% of the federal TAC for the Eastern Gulf. Historically, less than half of the cod GHL is taken. The state water Pacific cod fishery is limited to fixed gear vessels but do not have vessel size restrictions common in the Western and Central Gulf of Alaska. The state also manages small sablefish, lingcod, and rockfish fisheries in Prince William sound. Typically the sablefish quotas are reached.

Figure 4.1a. Volume of Domestic Processing of Groundfish and Non-Groundfish Species from Alaska Waters, 1975–2000



Figure 4.1b. Value of Domestic Processing of Groundfish and Non-Groundfish Species from Alaska Waters, 1975–2000



Sources: Commercial Operator Annual Reports 1975-1984 supplied by ADFG, June 2000; Commercial Operator Annual Report Summaries 1985-1998 supplied by NPFMC, July 2000; and Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC)/ADFG Fish Ticket Data provided by NPFMC, June 2000 and updated in June 2001. Figures from Northern Economics Sector and Regional Profiles of the North Pacific Groundfish Fisheries -- 2001.

Figure 4.2 Percentage of Groundfish Exvessel Value by Species in the Gulf of Alaska (Average 1996-2000)

Average Exvessel Value 96-00: $ 131.3 Million



Table 4.1. Summary of Domestic Groundfish Fishing and Processing, 1992–2000

Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Groundfish Vessels and Processors									
No. of Catcher Vessels [a]	1,658	1,339	1,437	1,334	1,278	1,332	1,177	1,223	1,261
No. of Catcher Processors	136	120	116	118	112	106	98	88	90
No. of Inshore Processors and Motherships [b]	77	69	73	77	67	64	62	61	69
All Vessels & Processors	1,871	1,528	1,626	1,529	1,457	1,502	1,337	1,372	1,420
Total Ex-Vessel Value in Major Alaska Fisheries ($Millions and Percent of Total)									
Groundfish	266.2	172.9	197.6	261.3	232.4	334.7	181.0	247.4	308.3
Non-Groundfish [c]	180.5	134.0	166.1	193.1	154.8	170.6	139.4	250.7	107.5
Groundfish (Percent of Total)	59.6	56.3	54.3	57.5	60.0	66.2	56.5	49.7	74.1
Total Groundfish Tons and Species Groups as a Percent of Total Groundfish									
Groundfish Tons (1,000) [d]	2,275	2,139	2,178	2,140	2,048	2,057	1,864	1,654	1,823
ARSO (Percent of GFSH)	9.7	11.0	9.8	10.2	11.6	10.5	9.1	11.1	10.5
FLAT (Percent of GFSH)	10.4	8.9	10.5	9.8	11.2	13.5	10.2	8.8	9.8
PCOD (Percent of GFSH)	12.5	10.4	11.0	14.6	15.0	15.9	13.8	14.6	13.4
PLCK (Percent of GFSH)	67.3	69.7	68.6	65.4	62.1	60.2	67.0	65.5	66.3
Reported tons from FMP Subareas as a Percent of Total Groundfish									
BSAI (Percent of Groundfish)	85.5	84.6	85.9	87.4	87.7	85.1	82.3	83.0	86.0
GOA (Percent of Groundfish)	14.5	15.4	14.1	12.6	12.3	14.9	17.7	17.0	14.0
Total Production, Product Utilization Rate, Product Value, and Value per MT of Round Weight									
Product Tons (1,000)	565.7	544.9	569.8	594.6	598.1	598.5	550.7	533.2	593.8
Utilization Rate (Percent)	25.1	25.5	26.2	27.9	29.3	29.2	29.6	32.3	32.9
Product Value ($Millions)	1,411.3	990.3	1,124.1	1,381.4	1,224.0	1,194.7	1,048.6	1,210.9	1,371.6
Value per Round Ton ($)	620.2	463.0	516.2	645.5	597.6	580.7	562.5	732.0	752.3
Total Employment by Region (Catcher Vessel Positions Plus Processor FTEs) [e]									
Alaska [f]	4,483	3,953	4,302	4,814	4,686	4,833	4,527	4,817	5,369
WAIW [g]	5,520	5,430	5,076	6,109	6,706	5,508	5,569	4,473	4,638
Total [h]	10,404	9,682	9,680	11,205	11,651	10,640	10,371	9,664	10,379
Total Payments to Labor by Region ($Millions)									
Alaska [f]	194.8	143.1	174.3	207.8	183.3	191.1	159.3	200.6	225.7
WAIW [g]	428.9	293.1	326.1	412.1	368.6	387.8	308.0	347.4	410.1
Total [h]	652.2	494.0	547.4	646.8	585.3	573.0	517.1	578.5	645.3

Sources: CFEC/ADF&G Fish Tickets, NMFS Observer Data, NMFS Blend Data and NMFS Weekly Production Report Data, June 2001. Figures from Northern Economics Sector and Regional Profiles of the North Pacific Groundfish Fisheries -- 2001.

[a] The count of catcher vessels excludes vessels that made only incidental landings or could not be classified. Since 1992, there have been an average of 408 such vessels. The annual deliveries of these vessels have averaged less than 70 tons and generated an average of only $87,000 in ex-vessel revenues.

[b] The count of processors does not include facilities that acted as buying stations or inshore processors that were not identified with a specific port. There were an average of 53 excluded facilities, which accounted for an average of 0.3 percent of total groundfish processing since 1992.

[c] Includes all deliveries of salmon, crab, halibut, and other non-groundfish species to groundfish processors.

[d] Includes all groundfish reported by processors including discards.

[e] Includes skippers, fishing crew, processing crew, managers, and home office support staff. Total employment estimates combine FTEs from all processors with position counts from catcher vessels.

[f] Includes coastal boroughs and census areas from the Aleutians southward and eastward through Southeast Alaska.

[g] Includes coastal counties in Washington that border on Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

[h] Totals include all areas of the U.S. not included in Alaska and WAIW.

Table 4.2. Ex-vessel value of the catch in the domestic commercial fisheries off Alaska by species group, 1984-2000 ($ millions)

Year	Shellfish	Salmon	Herring		Halibut		Groundfish	Total
1984	103.4	343.0	20.4		19.6		27.9	514.3
1985	106.9	389.6	36.9		37.5		43.4	614.3
1986	183.0	404.1	38.4		70.1		66.6	762.2
1987	215.2	473.0	41.7		76.3	137.1		943.3
1988	235.6	744.9	56.0		66.1	242.2	1,344.8	
1989	279.2	506.7	18.7		84.4	338.3	1,227.3	
1990	355.1	546.7	24.0		86.9	449.5	1,462.2	
1991	301.1	300.1	28.6		91.6	467.0	1,188.4	
1992	335.1	544.5	27.0		48.0	659.6	1,614.2	
1993	328.5	391.1	14.1		53.6	425.5	1,212.8	
1994	321.2	424.4	21.6		84.7	465.0	1,316.9	
1995	282.9	495.9	39.1		59.5	593.8	1,471.2	
1996	175.2	346.5	44.8		74.2	537.9	1,178.6	
1997	172.1	247.8	15.9	106.5		592.5	1,134.8	
1998	218.7	242.7	10.8		94.1	412.4		978.7
1999	271.2	345.7	14.2	116.9		471.8	1,219.8	
2000	142.6	246.6	9.6		134.8	564.9		1,098.5

Note: The value added by at-sea processing is not included in these estimates of ex-vessel value.

Source: Blend estimates, PacFIN prices, ADFG fishtickets, annual processor report, weekly processor reports.
National Marine Fisheries Service, P.O. Box 15700, Seattle, WA 98115-0070.
Table from 2001 Economic SAFE, NMFS (Table 2).

Table 4.3. Retained Harvests by FMP Area and Species of Regional Catcher Vessels, 2000

Region of CV Owner	FMP Area										Total
	Aleutian Islands		Bering Sea		Western Gulf		Central Gulf		Eastern Gulf		
	Pacific cod	Pollock	Pacific cod	Pollock	Pacific cod	Pollock	Pacific cod	Pollock	Pacific cod	Pollock	
Volume (Thousands of Tons)											
APAI	0.22	0.00	0.44	1.49	8.19	5.38	2.46	1.85	0.02	0.13	20.20
AKKO	1.87	0.00	6.30	11.95	3.41	3.02	10.34	13.45	0.10	0.68	51.12
AKSC	0.57	0.00	2.10	0.57	1.27	0.33	5.87	1.83	0.07	0.09	12.70
AKSE	0.08	0.00	0.11	0.06	0.41	0.17	0.95	0.02	0.02	0.00	1.79
WAIW	5.34	0.00	24.32	536.78	5.48	4.42	8.26	14.01	0.04	0.47	599.11
ORCO	1.53	0.00	5.52	44.18	0.62	2.34	2.51	11.10	0.01	0.29	68.10
Value ($Millions)											
APAI	0.15	0.00	0.28	0.37	5.33	1.34	1.84	0.45	0.02	0.03	9.80
KO	1.20	0.00	4.05	2.84	2.21	0.74	8.00	3.24	0.08	0.17	22.55
AKSC	0.36	0.00	1.39	0.14	0.84	0.08	4.91	0.46	0.06	0.02	8.26
AKSE	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.26	0.04	0.78	0.00	0.01	0.00	1.22
WAIW	3.47	0.00	15.15	132.22	3.63	1.11	6.44	3.45	0.03	0.12	165.62
ORCO	1.07	0.00	3.78	11.28	0.43	0.62	1.85	2.90	0.01	0.08	22.00

Source: Spreadsheet from Northern Economics based on ADF&G Fish Tickets and NMFS Observer Data, June 2001

Table 4.4. Ex-vessel value of the groundfish catch off Alaska by area, catcher category, gear, and species, 1996-2000, ($ millions).

	Gulf of Alaska			Bering Sea and Aleutian			All Alaska		
	Catcher vessels	Catcher/ processors	Total	Catcher vessels	Catcher/ processors	Total	Catcher vessels	Catcher/ processors	Total
All gear									
All species									
1996	105.6	22.2	127.8	122.6	286.7	409.3	228.2	308.8	537.0
1997	119.4	24.7	144.1	135.2	311.5	446.7	254.6	336.2	590.9
1998	89.5	17.6	107.1	92.6	211.8	304.5	182.1	229.5	411.6
1999	104.5	26.6	131.1	126.9	213.2	340.1	231.3	239.8	471.1
2000	125.9	25.8	151.6	182.2	230.2	412.4	308.1	255.9	564.0
Hook and line									
All species									
1996	65.9	9.8	75.7	3.3	71.5	74.8	69.2	81.3	150.5
1997	74.5	14.4	88.9	3.6	103.1	106.7	78.2	117.4	195.6
1998	48.6	9.4	58.0	3.0	70.0	73.0	51.6	79.4	131.0
1999	52.5	13.5	66.0	2.5	72.5	74.9	54.9	86.0	140.9
2000	69.4	15.5	84.9	3.6	76.9	80.5	73.1	92.4	165.4
Sablefish									
1996	61.4	6.5	68.0	2.8	2.6	5.4	64.2	9.1	73.4
1997	68.8	11.8	80.6	3.3	4.2	7.6	72.1	16.1	88.2
1998	42.1	7.4	49.5	1.7	1.9	3.7	43.8	9.4	53.2
1999	41.6	9.3	50.9	2.1	3.4	5.5	43.6	12.7	56.4
2000	59.1	10.8	69.9	3.0	4.6	7.6	62.1	15.4	77.5
Pacific cod									
1996	2.3	2.9	5.2	.2	65.4	65.7	2.5	68.3	70.8
1997	3.7	2.2	5.9	-	89.1	89.1	3.7	91.3	95.1
1998	4.3	1.6	5.9	1.2	61.4	62.6	5.5	63.0	68.5
1999	7.6	3.9	11.5	.2	62.8	62.9	7.8	66.7	74.5
2000	5.9	4.4	10.3	.5	66.6	67.1	6.4	71.1	77.5
Flatfish									
1996	.0	.0	.0	.2	2.1	2.2	.2	2.1	2.3
1997	.0	.0	.0	.2	9.0	9.2	.3	9.0	9.3
1998	.0	.0	.0	-	5.7	5.7	.0	5.7	5.7
1999	.0	.0	.0	.1	4.1	4.2	.1	4.1	4.2
2000	.5	.0	.5	.1	4.5	4.5	.5	4.5	5.0
Rockfish									
1996	2.1	.3	2.4	.1	.4	.5	2.2	.7	2.9
1997	2.0	.3	2.3	.1	.5	.6	2.1	.8	2.9
1998	1.9	.4	2.3	.1	.6	.6	2.0	.9	2.9
1999	1.8	.2	2.0	.1	.3	.4	1.9	.5	2.4
2000	2.2	.2	2.5	.1	.5	.6	2.3	.7	3.0
Pot									
Pacific cod									
1996	4.7	-	4.7	8.7	3.3	12.0	13.4	3.3	16.7
1997	5.5	-	5.5	3.8	2.2	6.0	9.3	2.2	11.5
1998	6.6	.0	6.6	2.6	1.6	4.2	9.2	1.6	10.8
1999	11.6	2.9	14.6	7.7	2.7	10.4	19.3	5.6	25.0
2000	14.9	.9	15.8	10.4	1.8	12.3	25.3	2.7	28.0

Table 19. Continued.

	Gulf of Alaska			Bering Sea and Aleutian			All Alaska		
	Catcher vessels	Catcher/ processors	Total	Catcher vessels	Catcher/ processors	Total	Catcher vessels	Catcher/ processors	Total
Trawl									
All species									
1996	34.9	12.4	47.4	110.7	211.8	322.4	145.6	224.2	369.8
1997	39.3	10.3	49.6	127.8	206.3	334.0	167.0	216.6	383.6
1998	34.2	8.2	42.4	87.0	140.2	227.3	121.3	148.4	269.7
1999	40.3	10.2	50.4	116.7	137.9	254.7	157.0	148.1	305.1
2000	41.5	9.4	50.9	168.2	151.4	319.6	209.7	160.8	370.5
Pollock									
1996	11.7	.1	11.8	93.2	121.4	214.6	104.9	121.5	226.5
1997	17.5	.2	17.7	104.6	119.6	224.2	122.1	119.8	241.9
1998	17.9	.0	17.9	75.6	86.7	162.3	93.5	86.8	180.2
1999	18.9	.0	19.0	101.8	80.5	182.3	120.7	80.5	201.3
2000	19.1	.0	19.2	146.4	88.2	234.6	165.6	88.2	253.8
Sablefish									
1996	3.7	3.2	7.0	.0	.3	.3	3.8	3.5	7.3
1997	1.8	3.9	5.7	.0	.1	.1	1.8	4.1	5.9
1998	1.1	2.2	3.3	.0	.2	.2	1.1	2.5	3.5
1999	3.0	2.6	5.6	.0	.5	.5	3.0	3.1	6.1
2000	1.2	3.0	4.1	.0	.6	.6	1.2	3.5	4.7
Pacific cod									
1996	14.1	1.4	15.5	15.5	13.0	28.4	29.6	14.4	44.0
1997	14.7	.4	15.2	18.6	15.5	34.1	33.3	15.9	49.2
1998	12.0	2.1	14.1	10.9	15.0	25.9	22.9	17.1	40.0
1999	15.9	1.5	17.5	14.2	18.3	32.5	30.1	19.8	49.9
2000	16.8	1.6	18.4	20.7	18.3	39.1	37.5	19.9	57.4
Flatfish									
1996	4.0	4.1	8.1	1.9	44.3	46.2	5.9	48.5	54.4
1997	3.8	2.1	6.0	4.4	51.2	55.6	8.3	53.3	61.6
1998	2.2	1.4	3.6	.5	28.6	29.1	2.7	30.0	32.6
1999	.8	1.6	2.4	.7	25.3	26.0	1.5	26.9	28.4
2000	2.4	2.2	4.6	1.0	32.4	33.4	3.4	34.6	38.0
Rockfish									
1996	1.2	3.1	4.3	.0	4.7	4.8	1.3	7.8	9.1
1997	1.2	3.6	4.8	.1	3.8	3.9	1.3	7.4	8.7
1998	1.1	2.4	3.5	.1	1.8	1.9	1.2	4.2	5.4
1999	1.6	4.3	5.9	.0	2.9	2.9	1.6	7.2	8.8
2000	2.0	2.6	4.5	.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	5.0	7.0
Atka mackerel									
1996	.0	.4	.4	.0	27.7	27.7	.0	28.2	28.2
1997	.0	.1	.1	.0	16.0	16.0	.0	16.1	16.1
1998	.0	.1	.1	.0	7.8	7.8	.0	7.9	7.9
1999	.0	.0	.1	.0	10.2	10.2	.0	10.2	10.3
2000	.0	.0	.0	.0	9.5	9.5	.0	9.5	9.5

Note: These estimates include only catch counted against Federal TACS. Ex-vessel value is calculated using prices on table 18. Please refer to Table 18 for a description of the price derivation. All groundfish includes additional species categories.

Source: Blend estimates, ADFG commercial operators annual reports. National Marine Fisheries Service, P.O. Box 15700, Seattle, WA 98115-0070. This Table is Table 19 in the 2001 Economic SAFE, NMFS.

Table 4.5 Harvest in the State Water Pacific Cod Fishery (in metric tons)

Source: Jackson, D. and Ruccio, M. 2001. Annual Management Report for the Kodiak, Chignik, and South Alaska Peninsula Area Groundfish Fisheries, 2000. RIR No. 4K01-44

Source: Trowbridge, C.E., Bechtol, W.R., Lambdin, M.A., and W. Dunne. 2001. Cook Inlet Area Groundfish Report to the Alaska Board of Fisheries 2001. RIR no. 2A01-18

Source: Berceli, R., C. Trowbridge, M. Lambdin, and W. Bechtol. 1999. Review of Groundfish Fisheries in the Prince William Sound Management Area: Report to the Alaska Board of Fisheries. RIR No. 2A99-00

Year	SAP	GHL	% of GHL Taken	Kodiak	GHL	% of GHL Taken	Chignik	GHL	% of GHL Taken	Cook Inlet	GHL	% of GHL Taken	PWS	GHL	% of GHL Taken
1997	4,248	4,261	100%	3,445	3,853	89%	518	2,675	19%	380	952	40%	91	399	23%
1998	3,916	4,080	96%	3,753	3,672	102%	2,543	2,584	98%	330	1,088	30%	190	390	45%
1999	5,385	5,893	91%	4,887	5,304	92%	2,926	3,717	79%	688	1,088	63%	149	422	35%
2000	6,860	6,845	100%	3,914	5,440	72%	805	3,037	27%	521	1,179	44%	N/A		N/A

12.5% of CG TAC

7.0% of CG TAC

2.25% of CG TAC

25% of WG TAC

21.75% of CG TAC

25% of EG TAC

% of Total Pacific cod TAC allocated to state fishery

Table 4.6 Exvessel Value in the State Water Pacific Cod Fishery (Dollars)

Year	SAP	Kodiak	Chignik	Cook Inlet	PWS
1997	1,686,690	1,748,131	205,787	226,526	N/A
1998	1,468,761	1,904,232	1,121,900	174,547	N/A
1999	3,088,830	3,989,272	1,419,927	561,626	N/A
2000	4,388,769	3,713,139	532,734	471,413	N/A

Table 4.7: Harvest of Sablefish in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class

						Tons-Retained (Thousands)						**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	SABL										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	SABL										
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	SABL			0.01					0.01		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	SABL			0.04	0.01	0.02	0.06		0.02		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	SABL	0.09		0.24	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.11	**0.11**
	06-PCV	EG	SABL	0.14			0.11	0.06	0.03			0.08	
	07-LCV	EG	SABL	1.22	1.02	1.69	2.82	2.30	2.02	1.67	1.54	1.63	**2.00**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	SABL	6.69	7.80	8.95	5.63	4.52	3.94	3.59	3.26	3.62	**4.09**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	SABL	0.08	0.20	0.09	0.03	0.07			0.01	0.02	
	102-FT-CP	EG	SABL		0.31								
	103-HT-CP	EG	SABL	0.33		0.20	0.19	0.23			0.13		
	104-P-CP	EG	SABL										
	105-L-CP	EG	SABL	0.59	0.71	0.58	0.50	0.35	0.30	0.31	0.23	0.23	**0.32**
	Total Harvest			9.16	10.30	11.88	9.46	7.73	6.60	5.82	5.31	5.77	**6.78**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	SABL										
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	SABL										
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	SABL			0.13%					0.20%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	SABL			0.35%	0.11%	0.23%	0.93%		0.44%		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	SABL	1.00%		2.05%	1.34%	1.43%	1.67%	2.19%	1.85%	1.84%	**1.67%**
	06-PCV	EG	SABL	1.54%			1.19%	0.77%	0.47%			1.47%	
	07-LCV	EG	SABL	13.34%	9.86%	14.19%	29.87%	29.76%	30.55%	28.77%	28.97%	28.34%	**29.47%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	SABL	72.96%	75.70%	75.30%	59.58%	58.52%	59.73%	61.73%	61.32%	62.76%	**60.39%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	SABL	0.89%	1.90%	0.73%	0.35%	0.92%			0.11%	0.43%	
	102-FT-CP	EG	SABL		3.00%								
	103-HT-CP	EG	SABL	3.62%		1.72%	1.99%	2.93%			2.39%		
	104-P-CP	EG	SABL										
	105-L-CP	EG	SABL	6.42%	6.89%	4.87%	5.29%	4.54%	4.57%	5.33%	4.38%	3.94%	**4.73%**

Table 4.8: Wholesale Value of Sablefish in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã1 2	EG	SABL										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	SABL										
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	SABL			0.05					0.03		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	SABL	0.05		0.12	0.04	0.08	0.26		0.07		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	SABL	0.25		0.77	0.54	0.51	0.58	0.45	0.41	0.56	**0.51**
	06-PCV	EG	SABL	0.37			0.51	0.27	0.16			0.44	
	07-LCV	EG	SABL	3.23	2.39	5.57	11.74	10.62	10.59	6.07	6.39	8.59	**9.00**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	SABL	17.95	18.46	30.08	24.27	21.35	20.81	12.61	13.74	18.85	**18.61**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â3	EG	SABL	0.22	0.47	0.30	0.15	0.33			0.02	0.12	**0.15**
	102-FT-CP	EG	SABL	0.01	1.01	0.18	0.11	0.22			0.00	0.00	**0.08**
	103-HT-CP	EG	SABL	1.29		0.79	0.78	1.00			0.62		
	104-P-CP	EG	SABL										
	105-L-CP	EG	SABL	2.16	2.34	1.97	2.25	1.82	1.63	1.18	1.05	1.10	**1.50**
	Total Value			25.51	25.37	40.02	40.41	36.30	34.71	20.71	22.40	29.90	**30.74**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã1 2	EG	SABL										
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	SABL										
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	SABL			0.11%					0.15%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	SABL	0.19%		0.31%	0.11%	0.22%	0.76%		0.31%		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	SABL	0.98%		1.93%	1.34%	1.40%	1.67%	2.18%	1.83%	1.86%	**1.65%**
	06-PCV	EG	SABL	1.43%			1.25%	0.75%	0.46%			1.48%	
	07-LCV	EG	SABL	12.67%	9.44%	13.91%	29.06%	29.27%	30.50%	29.33%	28.52%	28.71%	**29.28%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	SABL	70.33%	72.78%	75.17%	60.07%	58.83%	59.96%	60.87%	61.31%	63.05%	**60.53%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â3	EG	SABL	0.87%	1.86%	0.75%	0.37%	0.90%			0.11%	0.40%	**0.50%**
	102-FT-CP	EG	SABL	0.02%	3.98%	0.46%	0.27%	0.59%			0.00%	0.00%	**0.26%**
	103-HT-CP	EG	SABL	5.05%		1.97%	1.92%	2.74%			2.75%		
	104-P-CP	EG	SABL										
	105-L-CP	EG	SABL	8.46%	9.23%	4.92%	5.56%	5.03%	4.68%	5.71%	4.67%	3.67%	**4.89%**

Table 4.9: Harvest of Sablefish in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	SABL										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	SABL		0.04	0.01	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.06		0.04	
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	SABL	0.34	0.27	0.36	0.14	0.16	0.23	0.19	0.22	0.20	**0.19**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	SABL	0.25	0.19	0.32	0.12	0.25	0.22	0.19	0.19	0.32	**0.22**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	SABL	0.14	0.43	0.35	0.21	0.21	0.18	0.21	0.15	0.11	**0.18**
	06-PCV	CG	SABL	0.30	0.40	0.18	0.26	0.24	0.14	0.18	0.12	0.17	**0.18**
	07-LCV	CG	SABL	1.92	1.73	1.21	2.35	2.11	2.04	1.95	1.63	1.57	**1.94**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	SABL	4.64	4.72	2.95	2.58	2.13	2.00	1.97	1.87	1.99	**2.09**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	SABL	0.19	0.30	0.26	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	**0.02**
	101-ST-CP	CG	SABL										
	102-FT-CP	CG	SABL	0.34	0.38			0.12					
	103-HT-CP	CG	SABL	1.01	0.83	0.95	0.77	0.46	0.40	0.39	0.30	0.39	**0.45**
	105-L-CP	CG	SABL	0.72	1.81	1.77	0.85	0.62	0.67	0.63	0.64	0.58	**0.66**
	Total Harvest			9.84	11.09	8.50	7.49	6.55	6.06	5.89	5.15	5.39	**6.09**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	SABL										
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	SABL		0.32%	0.09%	0.69%	3.30%	1.04%	1.05%		0.73%	
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	SABL	3.43%	2.47%	4.23%	1.85%	2.40%	3.82%	3.24%	4.22%	3.72%	**3.11%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	SABL	2.58%	1.72%	3.78%	1.55%	3.84%	3.66%	3.24%	3.75%	5.97%	**3.55%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	SABL	1.42%	3.83%	4.18%	2.76%	3.20%	2.99%	3.51%	2.88%	2.13%	**2.92%**
	06-PCV	CG	SABL	3.04%	3.57%	2.15%	3.41%	3.65%	2.38%	3.03%	2.32%	3.17%	**3.03%**
	07-LCV	CG	SABL	19.48%	15.58%	14.22%	31.36%	32.17%	33.76%	33.13%	31.72%	29.06%	**31.90%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	SABL	47.09%	42.56%	34.76%	34.46%	32.49%	32.97%	33.40%	36.29%	36.86%	**34.30%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	SABL	1.94%	2.74%	3.10%	0.43%	0.66%	0.20%	0.11%	0.16%	0.40%	**0.34%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	SABL										
	102-FT-CP	CG	SABL	3.50%	3.44%			1.84%					
	103-HT-CP	CG	SABL	10.22%	7.47%	11.13%	10.26%	6.98%	6.62%	6.68%	5.90%	7.17%	**7.42%**
	105-L-CP	CG	SABL	7.30%	16.30%	20.83%	11.37%	9.47%	11.00%	10.70%	12.37%	10.79%	**10.91%**

Table 4.10: Wholesale Value of Sablefish in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	SABL										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	SABL		0.06	0.02	0.22	0.83	0.25	0.16		0.13	**0.32**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	SABL	0.78	0.47	1.10	0.59	0.61	0.92	0.46	0.68	0.64	**0.65**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	SABL	0.59	0.33	0.98	0.48	0.98	0.90	0.47	0.65	1.11	**0.77**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	SABL	0.36	0.97	1.19	0.81	0.92	0.93	0.76	0.61	0.60	**0.77**
	06-PCV	CG	SABL	0.80	0.90	0.56	1.12	1.08	0.75	0.64	0.52	0.88	**0.83**
	07-LCV	CG	SABL	5.09	4.03	3.57	9.87	9.44	10.64	7.14	6.77	8.10	**8.66**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	SABL	12.14	10.87	8.86	11.22	9.61	10.40	7.16	7.84	10.35	**9.43**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	SABL	0.49	0.70	0.77	0.15	0.19	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.11	**0.10**
	101-ST-CP	CG	SABL										
	102-FT-CP	CG	SABL	0.92	1.24			0.60	0.40				
	103-HT-CP	CG	SABL	3.91	2.59	3.65	3.16	2.02	2.06	1.33	1.48	1.56	**1.93**
	105-L-CP	CG	SABL	2.64	5.97	6.02	3.82	3.23	3.59	2.40	2.86	2.81	**3.12**
	Total Value			27.72	28.13	27.84	32.14	29.51	30.90	21.08	21.51	26.29	**26.91**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	SABL										
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	SABL		0.20%	0.08%	0.68%	2.81%	0.81%	0.75%		0.49%	**1.18%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	SABL	2.80%	1.66%	3.96%	1.83%	2.05%	2.97%	2.18%	3.16%	2.43%	**2.41%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	SABL	2.12%	1.17%	3.52%	1.50%	3.33%	2.90%	2.24%	3.03%	4.22%	**2.85%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	SABL	1.30%	3.44%	4.27%	2.53%	3.11%	3.02%	3.60%	2.84%	2.28%	**2.87%**
	06-PCV	CG	SABL	2.90%	3.19%	2.02%	3.47%	3.65%	2.42%	3.06%	2.43%	3.36%	**3.09%**
	07-LCV	CG	SABL	18.37%	14.34%	12.83%	30.71%	32.01%	34.43%	33.88%	31.47%	30.81%	**32.19%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	SABL	43.81%	38.65%	31.81%	34.90%	32.55%	33.67%	33.94%	36.42%	39.37%	**35.04%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	SABL	1.76%	2.48%	2.77%	0.46%	0.66%	0.20%	0.11%	0.16%	0.43%	**0.35%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	SABL										
	102-FT-CP	CG	SABL	3.31%	4.42%			2.04%	1.30%				
	103-HT-CP	CG	SABL	14.11%	9.23%	13.10%	9.84%	6.85%	6.67%	6.30%	6.86%	5.93%	**7.19%**
	105-L-CP	CG	SABL	9.51%	21.21%	21.63%	11.90%	10.93%	11.61%	11.40%	13.32%	10.68%	**11.59%**

Table 4.11: Harvest of Sablefish in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	SABL										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	SABL										
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	SABL										
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	SABL										
	05-TCV < 60	WG	SABL	0.03				0.02	0.03				
	06-PCV	WG	SABL					0.04					
	07-LCV	WG	SABL	0.78	0.14	0.09	0.74	0.77	0.66	0.56	0.49	0.38	**0.60**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	SABL	0.63	0.01	0.02	0.33	0.24	0.26	0.33	0.39	0.46	**0.34**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	SABL	0.04									
	102-FT-CP	WG	SABL	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
	103-HT-CP	WG	SABL	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.13	**0.05**
	105-L-CP	WG	SABL	0.68	0.49	0.24	0.71	0.56	0.52	0.51	0.59	0.56	**0.58**
	Total Harvest			2.20	0.75	0.47	1.89	1.65	1.52	1.44	1.56	1.54	**1.60**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	SABL										
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	SABL										
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	SABL										
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	SABL										
	05-TCV < 60	WG	SABL	1.25%				1.20%	1.65%				
	06-PCV	WG	SABL					2.64%					
	07-LCV	WG	SABL	35.50%	18.90%	18.02%	39.25%	46.68%	43.07%	38.82%	31.50%	24.91%	**37.37%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	SABL	28.66%	1.23%	3.94%	17.60%	14.42%	16.89%	23.10%	25.17%	30.03%	**21.20%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	SABL	1.68%									
	102-FT-CP	WG	SABL	0.07%	0.00%	0.00%	0.09%	0.00%	0.21%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	SABL	0.50%	6.28%	21.15%	3.39%	1.12%	1.23%	1.77%	4.62%	8.26%	**3.40%**
	105-L-CP	WG	SABL	30.74%	65.85%	50.11%	37.75%	33.95%	34.27%	35.51%	37.75%	36.18%	**35.90%**

Table 4.12: Wholesale Value of Sablefish in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	SABL										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	SABL										
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	SABL										
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	SABL										
	05-TCV < 60	WG	SABL	0.07				0.10	0.13				
	06-PCV	WG	SABL										
	07-LCV	WG	SABL	2.17	0.35	0.38	3.24	3.42	3.38	1.87	1.99	1.90	**2.63**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	SABL	1.71	0.02	0.09	1.53	1.04	1.33	1.12	1.60	2.27	**1.48**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	SABL	0.10									
	102-FT-CP	WG	SABL	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01				
	103-HT-CP	WG	SABL	0.04	0.15	0.39	0.26	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.35	0.51	**0.23**
	105-L-CP	WG	SABL	2.49	1.63	0.81	3.21	2.91	2.81	1.96	2.65	2.69	**2.70**
	Total Value			6.67	2.28	1.75	8.42	7.75	7.94	5.07	6.65	7.42	**7.21**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	SABL										
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	SABL										
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	SABL										
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	SABL										
	05-TCV < 60	WG	SABL	1.05%				1.30%	1.58%				
	06-PCV	WG	SABL					0.00%					
	07-LCV	WG	SABL	32.52%	15.38%	21.79%	38.45%	44.17%	42.51%	36.87%	29.97%	25.63%	**36.27%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	SABL	25.60%	0.93%	5.28%	18.22%	13.42%	16.70%	22.08%	24.03%	30.54%	**20.83%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	SABL	1.45%									
	102-FT-CP	WG	SABL	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.11%	0.00%	0.17%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	SABL	0.64%	6.48%	21.98%	3.13%	1.05%	1.21%	1.70%	5.27%	6.92%	**3.21%**
	105-L-CP	WG	SABL	37.29%	71.57%	45.93%	38.09%	37.59%	35.37%	38.55%	39.84%	36.25%	**37.61%**

Table 4.13 NON-Exempt AFA Sideboard Catcher Vessel Groundfish Harvest Limitations Based on 2002 TAC Allocation
Based on Table 19 in Harvest Specification Tables (2002 Final Rule)

		Pollock	2002 AFA Tac	Pacific cod Inshore	2002 AFA TAC	Pacific cod Offshore	2002 AFA TAC
WG		61.12%	10836	14.23%	2158	10.26%	173
CG	620	14.27%	3288				
	630	24.38%	2402				
Total				7.22%	1610	7.21%	179
EG	640	34.99%	408				
	650	34.99%	2260				
Total				0.79%	18	0.78%	2
Total AFA TAC			19194		3768		352
Total Gulf TAC			58250			44230	
% Total Gulf TAC to AFA sideboard			32.95%			9.31%	

Table 4.14 Harvest in the Central and Western Gulf Parallel Pacific Cod Fishery (metric tons) · -- State Managed Pacific Cod Harvests not Included

Central Gulf

Year	Parallel Fishery	Fishery Harvests	Parallel Fishery
1992	7,389	40,752	18%
1993	5,213	32,684	16%
1994	5,848	28,785	20%
1995	9,837	44,016	22%
1996	7,661	41,568	18%
1997	6,762	46,646	14%
1998	4,390	43,835	10%
1999	6,367	46,691	14%
2000	4,551	35,539	13%

Western Gulf

Year	Parallel Fishery	Fishery Harvests	Parallel Fishery
1992	5,984	33,409	18%
1993	861	18,042	5%
1994	3,354	14,687	23%
1995	4,080	19,175	21%
1996	5,848	20,943	28%
1997	4,274	27,108	16%
1998	4,016	24,887	16%
1999	4,134	26,337	16%
2000	5,560	27,516	20%

Source: Jackson, D. and Ruccio, M. 2001. Annual Management Report for the Kodiak, Chignik, and South Alaska Peninsula Area Groundfish Fisheries, 2000. RIR No. 4K01-44.

Table 4.15: Harvest of Pacific Cod in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PCOD										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PCOD				0.00		0.00				
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PCOD								0.02		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PCOD			0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02		0.00	0.06	
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PCOD										
	06-PCV	EG	PCOD		0.44								
	07-LCV	EG	PCOD	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	**0.01**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PCOD	0.41	0.53	0.30	0.12	0.26	0.32	0.23	0.27	0.20	**0.23**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PCOD	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03			
	102-FT-CP	EG	PCOD		0.00								
	103-HT-CP	EG	PCOD	0.03		0.00	0.01	0.00			0.04		
	104-P-CP	EG	PCOD										
	105-L-CP	EG	PCOD	0.26	0.00	0.01	0.00						
	Total Harvest			0.79	1.06	0.71	0.27	0.35	0.42	0.38	0.37	0.30	**0.35**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PCOD										
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PCOD				0.00%		0.16%				
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PCOD								4.77%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PCOD			1.10%	1.45%	4.50%	4.13%		0.73%	20.61%	
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PCOD										
	06-PCV	EG	PCOD		41.88%								
	07-LCV	EG	PCOD	1.20%	2.79%	2.68%	7.01%	2.81%	0.43%	1.26%	6.35%	9.10%	**4.12%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PCOD	52.48%	49.91%	42.46%	43.12%	75.57%	76.97%	61.50%	72.31%	66.57%	**67.22%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PCOD	2.20%	3.52%	2.52%	2.23%	3.44%	4.91%	8.63%			
	102-FT-CP	EG	PCOD		0.44%								
	103-HT-CP	EG	PCOD	3.60%		0.10%	2.29%	0.65%			12.06%		
	104-P-CP	EG	PCOD										
	105-L-CP	EG	PCOD	33.21%	0.27%	1.64%	0.11%						

Table 4.16: Wholesale Value of Pacific Cod in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PCOD										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PCOD				0.00		0.00				
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PCOD								0.01		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PCOD			0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.03	**0.01**
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PCOD										
	06-PCV	EG	PCOD		0.21								
	07-LCV	EG	PCOD	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	**0.01**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PCOD	0.35	0.42	0.14	0.08	0.27	0.29	0.19	0.19	0.18	**0.20**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PCOD	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02			
	102-FT-CP	EG	PCOD		0.00								
	103-HT-CP	EG	PCOD	0.02		0.00	0.00	0.00			0.06		
	104-P-CP	EG	PCOD										
	105-L-CP	EG	PCOD	0.21	0.00	0.01	0.00						
	Total Value			0.63	0.70	0.31	0.15	0.33	0.34	0.26	0.28	0.25	**0.27**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PCOD										
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PCOD						0.08%				
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PCOD								3.97%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PCOD			0.69%	1.08%	1.97%	2.49%		0.50%	13.24%	**3.79%**
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PCOD										**0.00%**
	06-PCV	EG	PCOD		30.35%								
	07-LCV	EG	PCOD	0.80%	2.03%	2.58%	6.50%	2.28%	0.26%	0.77%	4.98%	8.39%	**3.43%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PCOD	55.07%	60.61%	46.33%	53.78%	80.85%	84.58%	71.59%	67.20%	74.03%	**74.14%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PCOD	2.50%	5.59%	5.96%	3.46%	5.31%	5.72%	9.47%			
	102-FT-CP	EG	PCOD		0.48%								
	103-HT-CP	EG	PCOD	3.69%		0.16%	2.25%	0.49%			19.83%		
	104-P-CP	EG	PCOD										
	105-L-CP	EG	PCOD	32.99%	0.30%	3.00%	0.13%						

Table 4.17: Harvest of Pacific Cod in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

						Tons-Retained (Thousands)						**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PCOD		0.49		1.12	1.12	0.24	0.36	0.11		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PCOD	1.25	0.02	0.68	1.20	1.94	1.48	1.86	0.12	0.12	**1.12**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PCOD	7.64	8.71	5.42	6.25	3.50	7.85	5.99	8.47	3.84	**5.98**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PCOD	6.49	6.71	5.50	9.38	8.56	10.70	8.47	9.83	6.10	**8.84**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PCOD	5.95	5.22	6.15	5.89	7.77	6.02	4.95	2.41	1.13	**4.70**
	06-PCV	CG	PCOD	5.14	3.84	3.25	6.06	4.91	4.46	6.14	7.87	8.78	**6.37**
	07-LCV	CG	PCOD	0.92	0.26	0.47	0.88	0.50	0.22	0.45	0.46	0.78	**0.55**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PCOD	8.73	6.32	6.23	10.69	8.87	13.64	12.60	17.00	13.33	**12.69**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PCOD	0.42	0.28	0.13	0.23	0.35	0.85	0.81	0.66	0.79	**0.61**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PCOD										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PCOD	0.28	0.06		0.47	2.26		0.82			
	103-HT-CP	CG	PCOD	1.23	0.82	0.65	1.60	0.44	0.75	3.98	1.60	1.39	**1.62**
	104-P-CP	CG	PCOD								2.67		
	105-L-CP	CG	PCOD	2.09	0.21	0.36	0.13	0.71	0.06	0.18	0.58	0.36	**0.34**
	Total Harvest			40.34	32.96	28.85	43.90	41.26	46.31	46.59	51.78	37.37	**44.53**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PCOD		1.48%		2.55%	2.70%	0.52%	0.77%	0.22%		
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PCOD	3.10%	0.05%	2.35%	2.72%	4.69%	3.19%	3.99%	0.24%	0.32%	**2.51%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PCOD	18.95%	26.42%	18.80%	14.24%	8.47%	16.95%	12.85%	16.36%	10.27%	**13.43%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PCOD	16.09%	20.37%	19.06%	21.36%	20.75%	23.10%	18.17%	18.98%	16.31%	**19.85%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PCOD	14.74%	15.85%	21.32%	13.42%	18.82%	13.01%	10.63%	4.66%	3.01%	**10.54%**
	06-PCV	CG	PCOD	12.75%	11.66%	11.26%	13.81%	11.91%	9.64%	13.18%	15.20%	23.50%	**14.31%**
	07-LCV	CG	PCOD	2.28%	0.80%	1.62%	2.01%	1.20%	0.48%	0.97%	0.88%	2.09%	**1.23%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PCOD	21.65%	19.18%	21.59%	24.35%	21.50%	29.47%	27.04%	32.84%	35.66%	**28.49%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PCOD	1.04%	0.85%	0.46%	0.52%	0.84%	1.83%	1.75%	1.27%	2.12%	**1.38%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PCOD										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PCOD	0.69%	0.19%		1.07%	5.48%		1.75%			
	103-HT-CP	CG	PCOD	3.05%	2.48%	2.26%	3.65%	1.06%	1.62%	8.53%	3.08%	3.71%	**3.65%**
	104-P-CP	CG	PCOD								5.16%		
	105-L-CP	CG	PCOD	5.17%	0.62%	1.26%	0.30%	1.72%	0.13%	0.38%	1.11%	0.96%	**0.75%**

Table 4.18: Wholesale Value of Pacific Cod in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PCOD		0.17		0.43	0.36	0.08	0.12	0.07		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PCOD	0.54	0.01	0.21	0.52	0.70	0.60	0.62	0.06	0.05	**0.43**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PCOD	3.49	3.11	1.83	2.81	1.40	3.59	2.16	5.29	2.54	**2.97**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PCOD	2.80	2.38	1.66	4.07	3.49	4.75	3.04	6.13	3.91	**4.23**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PCOD	2.51	1.78	1.90	2.53	2.92	2.48	1.70	1.50	0.77	**1.98**
	06-PCV	CG	PCOD	2.75	1.84	1.40	3.12	2.42	2.30	2.84	5.41	7.39	**3.92**
	07-LCV	CG	PCOD	0.48	0.11	0.18	0.43	0.25	0.12	0.21	0.33	0.69	**0.34**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PCOD	4.59	2.97	2.53	5.33	4.53	7.12	5.85	11.90	11.33	**7.68**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PCOD	0.22	0.13	0.05	0.10	0.18	0.45	0.39	0.51	0.70	**0.39**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PCOD										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PCOD	0.23	0.04		0.30	1.16		0.56			
	103-HT-CP	CG	PCOD	1.01	0.59	0.45	0.90	0.32	0.42	3.45	1.99	1.75	**1.47**
	104-P-CP	CG	PCOD								3.38		
	105-L-CP	CG	PCOD	1.66	0.15	0.29	0.09	0.55	0.04	0.16	0.70	0.44	**0.33**
	Total Value			20.36	13.30	10.50	20.62	18.39	21.97	21.08	37.26	30.57	**24.98**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PCOD		1.30%		2.09%	1.96%	0.38%	0.56%	0.17%		
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PCOD	2.66%	0.05%	2.03%	2.50%	3.82%	2.73%	2.92%	0.17%	0.18%	**1.70%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PCOD	17.14%	23.36%	17.39%	13.61%	7.63%	16.36%	10.23%	14.19%	8.32%	**11.87%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PCOD	13.77%	17.91%	15.83%	19.74%	18.95%	21.64%	14.41%	16.45%	12.79%	**16.94%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PCOD	12.31%	13.40%	18.14%	12.25%	15.89%	11.27%	8.05%	4.03%	2.52%	**7.93%**
	06-PCV	CG	PCOD	13.49%	13.85%	13.34%	15.14%	13.16%	10.47%	13.49%	14.53%	24.18%	**15.67%**
	07-LCV	CG	PCOD	2.38%	0.86%	1.70%	2.07%	1.38%	0.54%	0.98%	0.88%	2.24%	**1.35%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PCOD	22.55%	22.34%	24.11%	25.87%	24.63%	32.39%	27.74%	31.94%	37.08%	**30.73%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PCOD	1.06%	0.98%	0.45%	0.48%	0.99%	2.07%	1.86%	1.37%	2.30%	**1.56%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PCOD										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PCOD	1.13%	0.33%		1.46%	6.32%		2.66%			
	103-HT-CP	CG	PCOD	4.97%	4.44%	4.27%	4.35%	1.75%	1.92%	16.36%	5.33%	5.72%	**5.89%**
	104-P-CP	CG	PCOD								9.06%		
	105-L-CP	CG	PCOD	8.14%	1.11%	2.73%	0.44%	2.97%	0.17%	0.75%	1.87%	1.43%	**1.31%**

Table 4.19: Harvest of Pacific Cod in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class

							Tons-Retained (Thousands)						**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PCOD	1.59	0.24	0.01	1.29	0.06	1.19	0.01	0.21		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PCOD	1.11	0.02	0.46	3.89	0.12	0.97	0.67	1.19		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PCOD	4.58	0.95	0.90	1.02	0.75	1.45	1.36	0.45	0.55	**0.93**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PCOD	4.22	2.66	1.31	1.46	2.41	2.18	1.97	2.40	1.72	**2.02**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PCOD	11.94	10.01	7.76	4.80	11.61	14.52	14.08	15.06	12.64	**12.12**
	06-PCV	WG	PCOD	0.30	0.45		0.92	1.55	1.58	1.08	0.92	3.16	**1.53**
	07-LCV	WG	PCOD	0.20		0.03	0.01	0.09	1.06				
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PCOD	0.66	0.14	0.58	0.63	0.81	2.80	2.97	2.44	2.43	**2.02**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	PCOD	0.02		0.02			0.03	0.02	0.06	0.10	
	101-ST-CP	WG	PCOD				0.00						
	102-FT-CP	WG	PCOD	0.28	0.04		0.07	0.39	0.05				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PCOD	2.03	0.22	0.16	0.52	0.33	0.24	0.27	0.62	0.75	**0.46**
	104-P-CP	WG	PCOD								1.33		
	105-L-CP	WG	PCOD	6.37	5.08	3.58	5.63	4.39	3.84	3.16	5.21	4.71	**4.49**
	Total Harvest			33.69	19.84	15.13	20.37	22.64	29.90	25.65	29.89	26.76	**25.87**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PCOD	4.73%	1.19%	0.07%	6.35%	0.26%	3.97%	0.05%	0.69%		
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PCOD	3.28%	0.11%	3.03%	19.12%	0.52%	3.24%	2.62%	4.00%		
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PCOD	13.60%	4.78%	5.92%	5.02%	3.30%	4.85%	5.29%	1.51%	2.04%	**3.67%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PCOD	12.54%	13.39%	8.66%	7.17%	10.64%	7.28%	7.70%	8.03%	6.42%	**7.87%**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PCOD	35.45%	50.45%	51.29%	23.58%	51.28%	48.57%	54.88%	50.38%	47.22%	**45.99%**
	06-PCV	WG	PCOD	0.90%	2.29%		4.54%	6.86%	5.27%	4.21%	3.07%	11.81%	**5.96%**
	07-LCV	WG	PCOD	0.59%		0.18%	0.03%	0.41%	3.53%				
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PCOD	1.97%	0.73%	3.86%	3.11%	3.59%	9.36%	11.60%	8.17%	9.09%	**7.49%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	PCOD	0.06%		0.15%			0.10%	0.10%	0.20%	0.38%	
	101-ST-CP	WG	PCOD				0.00%						
	102-FT-CP	WG	PCOD	0.84%	0.22%		0.34%	1.72%	0.18%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PCOD	6.03%	1.11%	1.05%	2.54%	1.47%	0.80%	1.06%	2.09%	2.81%	**1.79%**
	104-P-CP	WG	PCOD										
	105-L-CP	WG	PCOD	18.91%	25.60%	23.68%	27.65%	19.39%	12.84%	12.34%	17.44%	17.59%	**17.87%**

Table 4.20: Wholesale Value of Pacific Cod in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PCOD	0.42	0.09	0.00	0.40	0.02	0.45	0.00	0.11		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PCOD	0.48	0.01	0.14	1.41	0.04	0.35	0.22	0.57		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PCOD	1.63	0.33	0.28	0.36	0.24	0.55	0.47	0.22	0.34	**0.36**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PCOD	1.74	0.87	0.42	0.56	0.80	0.81	0.64	1.21	1.14	**0.86**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PCOD	4.79	3.26	2.38	1.85	3.81	5.33	4.59	7.67	8.37	**5.27**
	06-PCV	WG	PCOD	0.22	0.21	0.11		0.62	0.67	0.45	0.57	2.09	**0.88**
	07-LCV	WG	PCOD	0.09	0.00		0.00	0.04	0.97				
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PCOD	0.36	0.09	0.21	0.25	0.35	1.12	1.12	1.40	1.60	**0.97**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	PCOD	0.02	0.03		0.00			0.01	0.04	0.07	
	101-ST-CP	WG	PCOD	0.16				0.03					
	102-FT-CP	WG	PCOD	0.23	0.03	0.00		0.20	0.03				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PCOD	1.70	0.16	0.11	0.29	0.24	0.14	0.24	0.79	0.95	**0.44**
	104-P-CP	WG	PCOD								1.67		
	105-L-CP	WG	PCOD	5.21	3.69	2.83	3.91	3.38	2.31	2.91	6.36	5.82	**4.11**
	Total Value			17.11	8.77	6.51	9.54	9.77	12.75	10.69	20.62	20.98	**14.06**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PCOD	2.46%	0.97%	0.02%	4.16%	0.17%	3.50%	0.02%	0.52%		
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PCOD	2.78%	0.08%	2.20%	14.79%	0.38%	2.72%	2.09%	2.79%		
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PCOD	9.54%	3.72%	4.31%	3.81%	2.45%	4.34%	4.43%	1.08%	1.61%	**2.95%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PCOD	10.15%	9.96%	6.42%	5.91%	8.20%	6.35%	6.00%	5.89%	5.44%	**6.30%**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PCOD	27.99%	37.22%	36.57%	19.35%	38.97%	41.83%	42.94%	37.17%	39.91%	**36.69%**
	06-PCV	WG	PCOD	1.28%	2.36%			6.34%	5.29%	4.24%	2.78%	9.97%	**5.73%**
	07-LCV	WG	PCOD	0.52%			0.03%	0.37%	7.60%				
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PCOD	2.08%	1.05%	3.17%	2.63%	3.59%	8.79%	10.45%	6.81%	7.65%	**6.65%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	PCOD	0.10%			0.04%			0.08%	0.19%	0.31%	
	101-ST-CP	WG	PCOD										
	102-FT-CP	WG	PCOD	1.35%	0.35%	0.02%		2.05%	0.26%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PCOD	9.93%	1.83%	1.70%	3.05%	2.50%	1.08%	2.22%	3.82%	4.53%	**2.87%**
	104-P-CP	WG	PCOD								8.12%		
	105-L-CP	WG	PCOD	30.44%	42.13%	43.42%	40.96%	34.58%	18.15%	27.20%	30.83%	27.73%	**29.91%**

Table 4.21 Harvest in the Central and Western Gulf Parallel Pollock Fishery (mt)

	Central Gulf				Western Gulf		
Year	Parallel Fishery	Federal Fishery	% From Parallel	Year	Parallel Fishery	Federal Fishery	% From Parallel
1992	3,354	67,090	5%	1992	1,768	17,679	10%
1993	12,466	88,849	14%	1993	5,122	20,399	25%
1994	30,326	79,782	38%	1994	6,936	21,759	32%
1995	4,080	33,998	12%	1995	10,154	29,918	34%
1996	5,666	22,665	25%	1996	14,189	24,025	59%
1997	15,684	52,131	30%	1997	8,749	28,105	31%
1998	32,004	93,835	34%	1998	17,271	29,918	58%
1999	18,132	63,010	29%	1999	12,647	24,025	53%
2000	2,085	48,504	4%	2000	13,101	17,679	74%

Source: Jackson, D. and Ruccio, M. 2001. Annual Management Report for the Kodiak, Chignik, and South Alaska Peninsula Area Groundfish Fisheries, 2000. RIR No. 4K01-44

Table 4.22: Harvest of Pollock in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PLCK										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PLCK				0.05		1.13				
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PLCK			3.00							
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PLCK			0.00						1.73	
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PLCK										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PLCK	0.00		0.00						0.00	
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	EG	PLCK										
	103-HT-CP	EG	PLCK	0.01		0.00	0.00	0.00					
	104-P-CP	EG	PLCK										
	Total Value			0.16	0.72	7.59	0.37	0.51	4.19	6.24	1.71	1.92	**2.49**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PLCK										
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PLCK				13.43%		27.07%				
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PLCK			39.57%							
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PLCK			0.05%						89.97%	
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PLCK										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PLCK	0.62%		0.00%						0.09%	
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	EG	PLCK										
	103-HT-CP	EG	PLCK	9.30%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%					
	104-P-CP	EG	PLCK										

Table 4.23: Wholesale Value of Pollock in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PLCK										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PLCK				0.01		0.22				
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PLCK			0.51							
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PLCK			0.00						0.44	
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PLCK										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PLCK	0.00		0.00						0.00	
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	EG	PLCK										
	103-HT-CP	EG	PLCK	0.01		0.00	0.00	0.00					
	104-P-CP	EG	PLCK										
	Total Value			0.08	0.12	1.29	0.08	0.11	0.95	1.06	0.35	0.49	**0.51**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	PLCK										
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	PLCK				11.14%		23.68%				
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	PLCK			39.57%							
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	PLCK			0.05%						89.88%	
	05-TCV < 60	EG	PLCK										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	PLCK	0.59%		0.00%						0.27%	
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	EG	PLCK										
	103-HT-CP	EG	PLCK	12.27%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%					
	104-P-CP	EG	PLCK										

Table 4.24: Harvest of Pollock in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PLCK	1.94	3.77	3.21	1.54	0.13	0.64	1.44	2.14		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PLCK	7.08	6.35	8.20	9.26	1.41	3.29	7.63	3.57	2.50	**4.61**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PLCK	37.14	49.33	43.99	10.80	6.53	20.19	40.21	35.37	26.55	**23.27**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PLCK	12.99	16.31	16.91	11.96	12.94	20.02	33.96	25.18	19.37	**20.57**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PLCK	2.28	2.37	5.36	2.36	2.08	9.51	11.81	2.84	0.57	**4.86**
	06-PCV	CG	PLCK						0.00			0.04	
	07-LCV	CG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	**0.00**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PLCK	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	**0.04**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PLCK										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.17	0.00		0.04	0.04					
	103-HT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.07	0.12	**0.05**
	104-P-CP	CG	PLCK										
	105-L-CP	CG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00			
	Total Value			61.84	78.13	78.04	36.07	23.27	53.72	95.21	69.22	49.22	**54.45**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PLCK	3.13%	4.83%	4.12%	4.28%	0.56%	1.19%	1.51%	3.09%		
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PLCK	11.45%	8.13%	10.51%	25.68%	6.07%	6.12%	8.02%	5.16%	5.07%	**8.47%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PLCK	60.06%	63.13%	56.37%	29.93%	28.04%	37.59%	42.23%	51.09%	53.94%	**42.74%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PLCK	21.00%	20.87%	21.66%	33.15%	55.60%	37.28%	35.67%	36.38%	39.35%	**37.78%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PLCK	3.68%	3.03%	6.86%	6.55%	8.95%	17.70%	12.40%	4.11%	1.16%	**8.93%**
	06-PCV	CG	PLCK						0.00%			0.09%	
	07-LCV	CG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	0.02%	**0.01%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PLCK	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.08%	0.10%	0.06%	0.06%	0.11%	**0.07%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	**0.00%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PLCK										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.27%	0.00%		0.11%	0.19%					
	103-HT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.14%	0.02%	0.09%	0.10%	0.25%	**0.10%**
	104-P-CP	CG	PLCK										
	105-L-CP	CG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%			

Table 4.25: Wholesale Value of Pollock in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PLCK	0.41	0.57	0.49	0.31	0.02	0.15	0.20	0.47		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PLCK	1.73	0.88	1.35	2.03	0.29	0.76	1.12	0.72	0.61	**0.92**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PLCK	9.30	8.05	7.47	2.35	1.36	4.62	5.95	7.47	6.49	**4.71**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PLCK	3.32	2.66	2.87	2.65	2.72	4.63	5.15	5.28	4.72	**4.19**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PLCK	0.58	0.39	0.88	0.50	0.42	2.20	1.70	0.61	0.14	**0.93**
	06-PCV	CG	PLCK						0.00			0.04	
	07-LCV	CG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PLCK	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	**0.01**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PLCK										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03					
	103-HT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.05	**0.02**
	104-P-CP	CG	PLCK										
	105-L-CP	CG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00			
	Total Value			15.52	12.55	13.27	7.94	4.91	12.38	14.16	14.58	12.08	**11.01**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	PLCK	2.61%	4.52%	3.72%	3.91%	0.50%	1.22%	1.44%	3.22%		
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	PLCK	11.17%	7.04%	10.16%	25.61%	5.99%	6.11%	7.92%	4.92%	5.06%	**8.38%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	PLCK	59.94%	64.14%	56.28%	29.61%	27.71%	37.32%	42.04%	51.25%	53.73%	**42.77%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	PLCK	21.39%	21.20%	21.61%	33.40%	55.46%	37.42%	36.33%	36.20%	39.09%	**38.08%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	PLCK	3.72%	3.09%	6.60%	6.23%	8.53%	17.81%	12.00%	4.16%	1.16%	**8.42%**
	06-PCV	CG	PLCK						0.00%			0.31%	
	07-LCV	CG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	0.02%	**0.01%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	PLCK	0.06%	0.00%	0.01%	0.03%	0.08%	0.08%	0.06%	0.06%	0.22%	**0.09%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	**0.00%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	PLCK										
	102-FT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.46%	0.00%		0.19%	0.66%					
	103-HT-CP	CG	PLCK	0.60%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.41%	0.05%	0.17%	0.18%	0.40%	**0.19%**
	104-P-CP	CG	PLCK										
	105-L-CP	CG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%		0.00%			

Table 4.26: Harvest of Pollock in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PLCK	4.54	4.07	5.75	9.06	5.27	6.61	8.00	5.10		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PLCK	8.50	7.79	7.10	10.15	4.24	5.59	4.26	2.92		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PLCK	0.84	3.37		3.41	3.72	5.32	8.70	4.38	6.47	**5.33**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PLCK	0.40			1.31	2.53	1.10	1.65	1.93	2.30	**1.80**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PLCK	0.41	3.61	4.80	5.41	7.92	6.40	7.23	9.33	8.44	**7.46**
	06-PCV	WG	PLCK							0.00	0.00	0.00	
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	WG	PLCK	2.56			0.42						
	102-FT-CP	WG	PLCK	0.01	0.07		0.43	0.06	0.31				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PLCK	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.11	0.11	**0.05**
	105-L-CP	WG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	**0.00**
	Total Harvest			17.36	19.79	21.18	30.21	23.96	25.55	29.95	23.79	17.63	**25.18**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PLCK	26.14%	20.56%	27.13%	30.00%	21.99%	25.86%	26.71%	21.46%		
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PLCK	48.92%	39.37%	33.52%	33.58%	17.69%	21.89%	14.23%	12.27%		
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PLCK	4.85%	17.04%		11.30%	15.51%	20.81%	29.06%	18.42%	36.73%	**21.97%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PLCK	2.32%			4.33%	10.56%	4.29%	5.50%	8.13%	13.04%	**7.64%**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PLCK	2.39%	18.26%	22.66%	17.92%	33.07%	25.04%	24.15%	39.23%	47.87%	**31.21%**
	06-PCV	WG	PLCK							0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	WG	PLCK	14.77%			1.40%						
	102-FT-CP	WG	PLCK	0.07%	0.34%		1.44%	0.26%	1.20%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PLCK	0.54%	0.02%	0.01%	0.04%	0.00%	0.01%	0.14%	0.47%	0.61%	**0.21%**
	105-L-CP	WG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.02%	0.07%	**0.02%**

Table 4.27: Wholesale Value of Pollock in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PLCK	1.30	0.59	0.98	1.96	0.98	1.50	1.14	1.10		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PLCK	2.24	1.11	1.13	1.99	0.78	1.24	0.60	0.63		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PLCK	0.17	0.44		0.56	0.69	1.25	1.16	0.96	1.59	**1.04**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PLCK	0.08			0.24	0.47	0.26	0.22	0.42	0.58	**0.37**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PLCK	0.09	0.46	0.78	0.96	1.47	1.50	1.00	2.05	2.13	**1.52**
	06-PCV	WG	PLCK							0.00	0.00	0.00	
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	WG	PLCK	1.85			0.28						
	102-FT-CP	WG	PLCK	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.30	0.04	0.22				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PLCK	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.07	**0.02**
	105-L-CP	WG	PLCK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	Total Value			5.90	2.74	3.47	6.30	4.61	6.17	4.18	5.20	4.45	**5.15**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	PLCK	22.09%	21.59%	28.29%	31.06%	21.33%	24.38%	27.28%	21.18%		
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	PLCK	38.01%	40.55%	32.48%	31.60%	16.93%	20.16%	14.30%	12.02%		
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	PLCK	2.83%	16.11%		8.90%	14.99%	20.27%	27.87%	18.40%	35.83%	**21.04%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	PLCK	1.28%			3.85%	10.29%	4.19%	5.37%	8.10%	13.03%	**7.47%**
	05-TCV < 60	WG	PLCK	1.55%	16.86%	22.65%	15.33%	31.99%	24.38%	23.93%	39.39%	47.92%	**30.49%**
	06-PCV	WG	PLCK							0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	PLCK										
	101-ST-CP	WG	PLCK	31.33%			4.38%						
	102-FT-CP	WG	PLCK	0.20%	0.73%	1.17%	4.78%	0.79%	3.57%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	PLCK	2.73%	0.06%	0.08%	0.11%	0.00%	0.03%	0.33%	0.87%	1.48%	**0.47%**
	105-L-CP	WG	PLCK	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%	0.03%	0.09%	**0.03%**

Table 4.28: Harvest of ARO in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class (Atka Mackerel, Rockfish, Other)

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	ARO										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	ARO					0.13					
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	ARO			0.01			0.02		0.04		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	ARO			0.00	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.00	0.04		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	ARO				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	**0.00**
	06-PCV	EG	ARO	0.00					0.00				
	07-LCV	EG	ARO	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.04	**0.04**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	ARO	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.11	0.14	**0.12**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	ARO	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	102-FT-CP	EG	ARO	0.00	0.08								
	103-HT-CP	EG	ARO	2.53		0.57	1.45	1.83			0.56		
	104-P-CP	EG	ARO										
	105-L-CP	EG	ARO	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	**0.01**
	Total Harvests			2.67	0.28	0.73	1.80	2.51	1.40	0.86	0.80	0.79	**1.36**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	ARO										
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	ARO					5.11%					
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	ARO			0.95%			1.17%		4.85%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	ARO			0.28%	0.20%	0.44%	6.74%	0.15%	5.03%		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	ARO				0.04%	0.05%	0.09%	0.39%	0.70%	0.82%	**0.23%**
	06-PCV	EG	ARO	0.06%					0.03%				
	07-LCV	EG	ARO	0.63%	4.76%	4.46%	1.81%	1.46%	2.74%	5.94%	4.31%	5.27%	**2.88%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	ARO	3.46%	37.40%	12.08%	5.65%	4.28%	7.98%	18.99%	13.12%	17.47%	**8.91%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	ARO	0.24%	1.38%	0.32%	0.01%	0.15%	0.03%	0.01%	0.03%	0.05%	**0.06%**
	102-FT-CP	EG	ARO	0.00%	28.11%								
	103-HT-CP	EG	ARO	94.58%		77.91%	80.89%	72.96%			70.08%		
	104-P-CP	EG	ARO										
	105-L-CP	EG	ARO	0.98%	9.98%	3.49%	0.76%	0.46%	0.66%	1.01%	0.81%	1.28%	**0.73%**

Table 4.29: Wholesale Value of ARO in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class (Atka Mackerel, Rockfish, Other)

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	ARO										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	ARO					0.09					
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	ARO			0.00			0.01		0.01		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	ARO			0.00	0.00	0.01	0.22	0.00	0.03		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	ARO				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	**0.01**
	06-PCV	EG	ARO	0.00					0.00				
	07-LCV	EG	ARO	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.09	**0.07**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	ARO	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.29	0.22	0.29	**0.23**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	ARO	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	102-FT-CP	EG	ARO	0.00	0.16								
	103-HT-CP	EG	ARO	3.36		0.45	1.76	1.45			0.39		
	104-P-CP	EG	ARO										
	105-L-CP	EG	ARO	0.08	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.05	**0.04**
	Total Value			3.57	0.51	0.71	2.33	2.14	1.49	0.79	0.76	0.72	**1.37**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	ARO										
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	ARO					4.30%					
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	ARO			0.23%			0.52%		1.90%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	ARO			0.06%	0.09%	0.32%	15.08%	0.32%	3.95%		**0.00%**
	05-TCV < 60	EG	ARO				0.06%	0.12%	0.13%	0.69%	1.02%	1.95%	**0.40%**
	06-PCV	EG	ARO	0.06%					0.04%				
	07-LCV	EG	ARO	0.55%	2.98%	4.73%	2.76%	3.25%	4.50%	11.52%	9.14%	12.02%	**5.44%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	ARO	2.87%	23.96%	16.83%	8.47%	8.92%	13.39%	36.48%	28.46%	40.03%	**16.78%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	ARO	0.12%	0.91%	0.35%	0.02%	0.17%	0.02%	0.02%	0.07%	0.12%	**0.07%**
	102-FT-CP	EG	ARO	0.01%	31.65%								
	103-HT-CP	EG	ARO	94.20%		63.18%	75.73%	67.98%			51.59%		
	104-P-CP	EG	ARO										
	105-L-CP	EG	ARO	2.14%	24.23%	12.87%	3.04%	2.18%	1.95%	4.99%	3.70%	6.52%	**3.17%**

Table 4.30: Harvest of ARO in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class (Atka Mackerel, Rockfish, Other)

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	ARO								0.01		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	ARO		0.02	0.00	0.03	0.88	0.27	0.38	0.23	0.41	**0.37**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	ARO	0.13	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.81	1.80	1.57	1.34	2.00	**1.27**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	ARO	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.14	1.26	1.79	1.33	1.08	2.71	**1.39**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	ARO	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.19	0.16	0.07	0.11	0.02	**0.10**
	06-PCV	CG	ARO	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.01**
	07-LCV	CG	ARO	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04	**0.05**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	ARO	0.09	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.09	0.14	0.08	0.04	0.04	**0.08**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	ARO	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	101-ST-CP	CG	ARO										
	102-FT-CP	CG	ARO	0.06	0.22		0.23	0.75		1.61			
	103-HT-CP	CG	ARO	2.01	2.23	1.15	1.98	1.25	3.06	2.62	4.39	3.58	**2.81**
	104-P-CP	CG	ARO								0.00		
	105-L-CP	CG	ARO	0.04	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	**0.03**
	Total Harvests			2.49	2.80	1.45	2.76	5.34	7.71	7.75	7.25	8.83	**6.61**
% Harvests by Vessel Class	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	ARO								0.12%		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	ARO		0.74%	0.17%	0.99%	16.45%	3.56%	4.91%	3.13%	4.65%	**5.55%**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	ARO	5.38%	3.00%	4.69%	3.29%	15.16%	23.39%	20.26%	18.51%	22.60%	**19.20%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	ARO	3.12%	1.59%	4.74%	4.99%	23.64%	23.19%	17.17%	14.88%	30.73%	**20.96%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	ARO	0.10%	0.07%	0.37%	1.32%	3.53%	2.12%	0.95%	1.47%	0.24%	**1.49%**
	06-PCV	CG	ARO	0.67%	0.31%	0.04%	1.97%	0.07%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	**0.16%**
	07-LCV	CG	ARO	1.67%	1.64%	1.02%	3.12%	1.05%	0.59%	0.53%	0.46%	0.42%	**0.76%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	ARO	3.67%	1.78%	1.41%	3.17%	1.77%	1.86%	0.98%	0.55%	0.47%	**1.22%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	ARO	0.03%	0.10%	0.04%	0.02%	0.14%	0.09%	0.04%	0.03%	0.01%	**0.05%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	ARO										
	102-FT-CP	CG	ARO	2.57%	7.81%		8.17%	14.09%		20.83%			
	103-HT-CP	CG	ARO	80.61%	79.45%	78.74%	71.76%	23.49%	39.74%	33.82%	60.46%	40.52%	**42.59%**
	104-P-CP	CG	ARO								0.00%		
	105-L-CP	CG	ARO	1.73%	3.18%	5.74%	1.12%	0.60%	0.41%	0.49%	0.38%	0.33%	**0.48%**

Table 4.31: Wholesale Value of ARO in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class (Atka Mackerel, Rockfish, Other)

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)								**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	ARO								0.00		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	ARO		0.01	0.00	0.02	0.18	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.10	**0.08**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	ARO	0.13	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.13	0.33	0.27	0.28	0.46	**0.25**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	ARO	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.28	0.61	0.25	0.21	0.66	**0.34**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	ARO	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	**0.02**
	06-PCV	CG	ARO	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.01**
	07-LCV	CG	ARO	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.07	**0.07**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	ARO	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.06	**0.06**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	ARO	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	101-ST-CP	CG	ARO										
	102-FT-CP	CG	ARO	0.13	0.41		0.30	0.58		0.72			
	103-HT-CP	CG	ARO	2.53	2.63	1.36	2.62	1.54	2.70	1.56	2.52	2.08	**2.17**
	104-P-CP	CG	ARO								0.00		
	105-L-CP	CG	ARO	0.12	0.36	0.34	0.15	0.13	0.10	0.17	0.12	0.14	**0.13**
	Total Value			3.17	3.64	1.97	3.41	3.05	4.28	3.19	3.27	3.57	**3.46**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	ARO								0.01%		
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	ARO		0.18%	0.07%	0.52%	5.74%	1.37%	2.30%	1.17%	2.72%	**2.22%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	ARO	4.16%	1.54%	2.33%	1.54%	4.36%	7.73%	8.54%	8.50%	12.88%	**7.35%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	ARO	2.48%	0.92%	1.70%	2.04%	9.02%	14.30%	7.76%	6.41%	18.35%	**9.96%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	ARO	0.06%	0.06%	0.22%	0.39%	1.08%	0.84%	0.44%	0.58%	0.20%	**0.59%**
	06-PCV	CG	ARO	0.15%	0.32%	0.03%	0.92%	0.14%	0.05%	0.07%	0.04%	0.08%	**0.21%**
	07-LCV	CG	ARO	1.57%	1.84%	0.91%	2.44%	2.71%	1.53%	2.19%	1.59%	1.90%	**2.03%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	ARO	3.73%	1.86%	1.08%	2.35%	3.40%	1.18%	1.80%	1.12%	1.60%	**1.86%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	ARO	0.03%	0.10%	0.03%	0.03%	0.11%	0.04%	0.04%	0.01%	0.02%	**0.04%**
	101-ST-CP	CG	ARO										
	102-FT-CP	CG	ARO	4.15%	11.21%		8.64%	19.05%		22.58%			
	103-HT-CP	CG	ARO	79.89%	72.03%	69.23%	76.63%	50.29%	63.15%	48.84%	76.98%	58.32%	**62.63%**
	104-P-CP	CG	ARO								0.00%		
	105-L-CP	CG	ARO	3.75%	9.84%	17.08%	4.46%	4.10%	2.35%	5.43%	3.58%	3.95%	**3.90%**

Table 4.32: Harvest of ARO in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class (Atka Mackerel, Rockfish, Other)

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									Ave.
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	ARO	0.00		0.00	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.04		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	ARO	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	ARO							0.00	0.01	0.01	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	ARO						0.02		0.02		
	05-TCV < 60	WG	ARO					0.04	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.00	
	06-PCV	WG	ARO	0.00				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	07-LCV	WG	ARO	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	**0.03**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	ARO	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	**0.02**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	ARO							0.00	0.00	0.00	
	101-ST-CP	WG	ARO										
	102-FT-CP	WG	ARO	2.32	1.42			0.00	0.01				
	103-HT-CP	WG	ARO	11.73	3.23	2.38	1.48	2.08	1.93	0.96	1.96	1.24	**1.61**
	104-P-CP	WG	ARO								0.00		
	105-L-CP	WG	ARO	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.04	**0.05**
	Total Harvests			14.27	4.84	2.63	1.70	2.30	2.07	1.10	2.17	1.34	**1.78**
% Harvests by Vessel Class	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	ARO	0.01%		0.08%	3.89%	0.88%	0.07%	1.66%	1.84%		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	ARO	0.07%	0.94%	0.36%	2.02%	1.33%	0.14%	0.13%	0.61%		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	ARO							0.01%	0.58%	0.52%	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	ARO						1.06%		0.76%		
	05-TCV < 60	WG	ARO					1.54%	1.17%	1.05%	2.37%	0.03%	
	06-PCV	WG	ARO	0.00%				0.06%	0.08%	0.02%	0.01%	0.03%	
	07-LCV	WG	ARO	0.35%	0.08%	0.16%	1.72%	1.72%	1.19%	2.88%	0.62%	1.89%	**1.53%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	ARO	0.32%	0.01%	0.04%	1.02%	1.75%	0.36%	1.28%	1.05%	1.96%	**1.20%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	ARO							0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	
	101-ST-CP	WG	ARO	0.00%	0.00%			0.00%	0.00%				
	102-FT-CP	WG	ARO	16.24%	29.28%	0.00%	0.00%	0.05%	0.69%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	ARO	82.18%	66.79%	90.78%	87.47%	90.49%	93.19%	87.52%	90.30%	92.84%	**90.48%**
	104-P-CP	WG	ARO								0.11%		
	105-L-CP	WG	ARO	0.53%	0.67%	0.39%	3.07%	2.19%	2.05%	5.45%	1.74%	2.67%	**2.61%**

Table 4.33: Wholesale Value of ARO in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class (Atka Mackerel, Rockfish, Other)

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	ARO	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	ARO	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	ARO							0.00	0.00	0.00	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	ARO						0.05		0.00		
	05-TCV < 60	WG	ARO					0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	
	06-PCV	WG	ARO	0.00				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	07-LCV	WG	ARO	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.03	**0.05**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	ARO	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	**0.04**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	ARO							0.00	0.00	0.00	
	101-ST-CP	WG	ARO										
	102-FT-CP	WG	ARO	0.99	0.19	0.13	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.01**
	103-HT-CP	WG	ARO	6.97	2.90	1.67	1.68	1.81	1.51	0.57	1.27	0.95	**1.30**
	104-P-CP	WG	ARO								0.00		
	105-L-CP	WG	ARO	0.21	0.14	0.04	0.27	0.20	0.13	0.27	0.15	0.17	**0.20**
	Total Value			8.33	3.36	1.85	2.08	2.22	1.81	0.91	1.49	1.20	**1.62**
	Vessel	Area	Species										
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	ARO	0.00%		0.04%	0.11%	0.05%	0.00%	0.07%	0.09%		
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	ARO	0.01%	0.97%	0.02%	0.06%	0.07%	0.01%	0.01%	0.04%		
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	ARO							0.00%	0.03%	0.07%	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	ARO						2.94%		0.04%		
	05-TCV < 60	WG	ARO					0.58%	0.31%	0.50%	0.94%	0.03%	
	06-PCV	WG	ARO	0.00%				0.16%	0.16%	0.04%	0.00%	0.01%	
	07-LCV	WG	ARO	0.89%	0.19%	0.66%	3.14%	3.48%	2.51%	4.63%	1.36%	2.86%	**2.93%**
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	ARO	0.75%	0.02%	0.04%	1.97%	4.68%	0.69%	2.17%	2.27%	3.08%	**2.55%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	ARO							0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	
	101-ST-CP	WG	ARO										
	102-FT-CP	WG	ARO	11.93%	5.77%	6.97%	0.66%	0.32%	2.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	**0.61%**
	103-HT-CP	WG	ARO	83.62%	86.38%	89.99%	81.00%	81.72%	83.80%	62.82%	85.02%	79.66%	**80.43%**
	104-P-CP	WG	ARO								0.07%		
	105-L-CP	WG	ARO	2.55%	4.18%	2.19%	12.93%	8.95%	7.48%	29.76%	10.11%	14.29%	**12.32%**

Table 4.34: Harvest of FLAT in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class (Flatfish)

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	FLAT										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	FLAT										
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	FLAT								0.07		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	FLAT			0.17	0.06	0.11	0.80		0.38		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	FLAT										
	06-PCV	EG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	EG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	FLAT				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	EG	FLAT		0.01								
	103-HT-CP	EG	FLAT	0.06		0.07	0.34	0.42			0.20		
	105-L-CP	EG	FLAT	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	Total Harvest			0.06	0.04	0.29	0.45	0.62	1.84	0.14	0.66	0.33	**0.67**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	FLAT										
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	FLAT										
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	FLAT								10.63%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	FLAT			58.65%	14.19%	18.44%	43.32%		58.17%		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	FLAT										
	06-PCV	EG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	EG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	FLAT				0.24%	0.36%	0.03%	1.07%	0.16%	0.00%	**0.00%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	EG	FLAT		19.09%								
	103-HT-CP	EG	FLAT	98.08%		24.23%	76.44%	68.30%			30.89%		
	105-L-CP	EG	FLAT	0.49%	0.00%	0.60%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	**0.00%**

Table 4.35: Wholesale Value of FLAT in the Eastern Gulf by Vessel Class (Flatfish)

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	FLAT										
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	FLAT										
	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	FLAT								0.02		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	FLAT			0.05	0.02	0.04	0.48		0.10		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	FLAT										
	06-PCV	EG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	EG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	FLAT				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	EG	FLAT		0.00								
	103-HT-CP	EG	FLAT	0.03		0.14	0.67	0.67			0.39		
	105-L-CP	EG	FLAT	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	Total Harvest			0.03	0.01	0.21	0.70	0.75	1.72	0.09	0.51	0.09	**0.64**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	EG	FLAT										
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	EG	FLAT										
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	EG	FLAT								3.46%		
	04-TCV Non-AFA	EG	FLAT			25.24%	2.85%	5.80%	28.00%		19.94%		
	05-TCV < 60	EG	FLAT										
	06-PCV	EG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	EG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	EG	FLAT			0.00%	0.04%	0.17%	0.01%	0.40%	0.06%		
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	EG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	EG	FLAT		12.51%								
	103-HT-CP	EG	FLAT	97.62%		67.21%	95.44%	88.64%			76.51%		
	105-L-CP	EG	FLAT	0.26%	0.00%	0.13%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	**0.00%**

Table 4.36: Harvest of FLAT in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class (Flatfish)

				Tons-Retained (Thousands)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	FLAT							0.00	0.00		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	FLAT	0.01	0.20	0.07	0.98	2.15	1.25	0.69	0.07	0.34	**0.91**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	FLAT	3.45	3.26	2.24	2.45	1.12	4.63	2.73	2.27	3.86	**2.84**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	FLAT	5.29	5.14	3.02	3.16	5.65	5.28	4.04	2.70	6.64	**4.58**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	FLAT	0.51	0.63	0.35	0.58	1.92	1.30	0.66	0.33	0.47	**0.88**
	06-PCV	CG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	CG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	FLAT	0.00			0.01	0.20	0.00	0.00			
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	CG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	CG	FLAT	1.57	0.95		0.77	0.74		0.04			
	103-HT-CP	CG	FLAT	2.89	4.45	3.66	3.92	9.51	2.59	3.44	3.86	7.52	**5.14**
	105-L-CP	CG	FLAT	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	Total Harvest			13.78	14.78	9.76	11.91	21.29	15.57	11.60	9.29	18.84	**14.75**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	FLAT							0.02%	0.01%		
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	FLAT	0.05%	1.35%	0.73%	8.26%	10.11%	8.01%	5.94%	0.73%	1.80%	**6.19%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	FLAT	25.06%	22.04%	22.91%	20.53%	5.26%	29.73%	23.53%	24.41%	20.51%	**19.27%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	FLAT	38.35%	34.78%	30.88%	26.53%	26.53%	33.89%	34.85%	29.05%	35.23%	**31.03%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	FLAT	3.67%	4.26%	3.56%	4.90%	9.00%	8.37%	5.66%	3.57%	2.52%	**5.95%**
	06-PCV	CG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	CG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	FLAT	0.00%			0.12%	0.93%	0.01%	0.01%			
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	CG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	CG	FLAT	11.39%	6.44%		6.50%	3.49%		0.38%			
	103-HT-CP	CG	FLAT	20.96%	30.09%	37.46%	32.88%	44.66%	16.65%	29.62%	41.56%	39.94%	**34.84%**
	105-L-CP	CG	FLAT	0.02%	0.30%	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.05%	0.01%	**0.01%**

Table 4.37: Wholesale Value of FLAT in the Central Gulf by Vessel Class (Flatfish)

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									Ave.
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	FLAT							0.00	0.00		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	FLAT	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.37	0.78	0.31	0.16	0.00	0.04	**0.28**
	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	FLAT	1.01	0.95	0.67	0.73	0.40	1.34	0.66	0.44	0.69	**0.71**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	FLAT	1.60	1.61	0.90	1.03	2.02	2.74	1.18	0.66	1.30	**1.49**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	FLAT	0.17	0.20	0.11	0.25	0.79	0.49	0.21	0.11	0.11	**0.33**
	06-PCV	CG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	CG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	FLAT	0.00			0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00			
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	CG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	CG	FLAT	1.67	1.77		2.06	1.82		0.14			
	103-HT-CP	CG	FLAT	3.36	5.84	6.58	7.02	13.20	3.05	6.01	7.46	10.05	**7.80**
	105-L-CP	CG	FLAT	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
	Total Value			7.82	10.58	9.36	11.48	19.14	9.01	8.36	8.71	12.19	**11.48**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	CG	FLAT							0.00%	0.00%		
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	CG	FLAT	0.02%	0.58%	0.25%	3.27%	4.08%	3.49%	1.87%	0.05%	0.36%	**2.43%**
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	CG	FLAT	12.86%	9.01%	7.14%	6.38%	2.07%	14.86%	7.88%	5.11%	5.62%	**6.18%**
	04-TCV Non-AFA	CG	FLAT	20.52%	15.18%	9.61%	8.96%	10.56%	30.43%	14.17%	7.56%	10.66%	**12.97%**
	05-TCV < 60	CG	FLAT	2.15%	1.92%	1.22%	2.18%	4.10%	5.49%	2.52%	1.31%	0.86%	**2.84%**
	06-PCV	CG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	CG	FLAT										
	08-FGCV 33-59	CG	FLAT	0.00%			0.01%	0.72%	0.01%	0.00%			
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	CG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	CG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	CG	FLAT	21.41%	16.72%		17.97%	9.52%		1.65%			
	103-HT-CP	CG	FLAT	42.96%	55.25%	70.30%	61.14%	68.94%	33.82%	71.91%	85.70%	82.49%	**67.93%**
	105-L-CP	CG	FLAT	0.02%	0.43%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.01%	**0.00%**

Table 4.38: Harvest of FLAT in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class (Flatfish)

							Tons-Retained (Thousands)						**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	FLAT	0.57		0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	FLAT	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	FLAT	0.72			0.01		0.03	0.02	0.00	0.07	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	FLAT						0.23	0.00	0.01	0.02	
	05-TCV < 60	WG	FLAT				0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.06	
	06-PCV	WG	FLAT									0.00	
	07-LCV	WG	FLAT	0.01			0.01	0.00					
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	FLAT			0.02	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.01			
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	WG	FLAT				0.00						
	102-FT-CP	WG	FLAT	0.02	0.00		0.11	0.19	0.22				
	103-HT-CP	WG	FLAT	0.28	0.75	0.37	0.61	1.36	1.01	1.39	1.70	4.25	**1.72**
	104-P-CP	WG	FLAT										
	105-L-CP	WG	FLAT	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	**0.02**
	Total Value			1.71	0.80	0.41	0.83	1.80	1.73	1.48	1.80	4.43	**2.01**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	FLAT	33.02%		0.50%	0.24%	0.30%	0.20%	2.35%	0.16%		
% Harvest by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	FLAT	0.52%	0.59%	1.09%	0.79%	0.09%	12.08%	0.21%	0.19%		
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	FLAT	42.25%			1.04%		1.45%	1.20%	0.27%	1.58%	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	FLAT						13.37%	0.25%	0.28%	0.47%	
	05-TCV < 60	WG	FLAT				0.07%	0.33%	1.44%	0.85%	2.07%	1.43%	
	06-PCV	WG	FLAT									0.00%	
	07-LCV	WG	FLAT	0.57%			0.92%	0.04%					
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	FLAT			4.11%	0.04%	12.29%	0.03%	0.44%			
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	WG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	WG	FLAT	1.29%	0.42%		13.72%	10.74%	12.91%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	FLAT	16.61%	93.50%	88.77%	74.26%	75.84%	58.27%	94.17%	94.88%	96.06%	**85.73%**
	104-P-CP	WG	FLAT										
	105-L-CP	WG	FLAT	1.15%	3.99%	2.38%	8.63%	0.16%	0.26%	0.23%	0.28%	0.42%	**0.88%**

Table 4.39: Wholesale Value of FLAT in the Western Gulf by Vessel Class (Flatfish)

				Wholesale Value of Production ($Millions)									**Ave.**
	Vessel	Area	Species	V1992	V1993	V1994	V1995	V1996	V1997	V1998	V1999	V2000	**95-00**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	FLAT	0.14		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	FLAT	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00		
	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	FLAT	0.18			0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	FLAT						0.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	05-TCV < 60	WG	FLAT				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	**0.00**
	06-PCV	WG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	WG	FLAT	0.01			0.02	0.00					
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	FLAT			0.01	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.02**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	WG	FLAT				0.00						
	102-FT-CP	WG	FLAT	0.02	0.00		0.25	0.47	0.31				
	103-HT-CP	WG	FLAT	0.50	1.10	0.59	0.96	1.92	1.14	1.76	2.27	4.47	**2.09**
	104-P-CP	WG	FLAT										
	105-L-CP	WG	FLAT	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	**0.02**
	Total Value			1.02	1.12	0.61	1.35	2.52	1.88	1.78	2.30	4.49	**2.39**
	01-TCV BSP ¡ Ã 1 2	WG	FLAT	13.44%		0.01%	0.01%	0.03%	0.01%	0.07%	0.01%		
% Value by	02-TCV BSP 60-124	WG	FLAT	0.09%	0.03%	0.42%	0.04%	0.01%	1.15%	0.01%	0.01%		
Vessel Class	03-TCV Div. AFA	WG	FLAT	17.34%			0.13%		0.24%	0.16%	0.01%	0.17%	
	04-TCV Non-AFA	WG	FLAT						20.88%	0.06%	0.04%	0.02%	
	05-TCV < 60	WG	FLAT				0.01%	0.04%	0.24%	0.03%	0.46%	0.07%	**0.14%**
	06-PCV	WG	FLAT										
	07-LCV	WG	FLAT	0.54%			1.11%	0.02%					
	08-FGCV 33-59	WG	FLAT			1.54%	0.01%	5.01%	0.01%	0.21%	0.03%	0.00%	**0.91%**
	09-FGCV ¡ Â 3	WG	FLAT										
	101-ST-CP	WG	FLAT										
	102-FT-CP	WG	FLAT	1.85%	0.09%		18.40%	18.53%	16.70%				
	103-HT-CP	WG	FLAT	49.04%	97.60%	97.26%	70.96%	76.25%	60.67%	98.78%	98.82%	99.51%	**87.41%**
	104-P-CP	WG	FLAT										
	105-L-CP	WG	FLAT	1.22%	1.74%	0.25%	9.32%	0.10%	0.11%	0.07%	0.22%	0.23%	**1.03%**

PART 5. Fishing and Processing Presence in Small Gulf Communities

The Council motion to rationalize the GOA P. cod and rockfish fisheries include a community allocation option. Eligibility was defined as all communities in the GOA that are undeveloped or underdeveloped would be eligible to receive allocations. Eligibility criteria for communities would need to be further defined, but could be modeled after the definitions used in the Halibut Charter IFQ Program. There are 23 communities proposed in Area 2C, 15 communities proposed in Area 3A, and 6 communities proposed in Area 3B that meet the Coalition's criteria for eligible communities. The four criteria for eligibility are: (1) coastal, (2) fisheries-dependent, (3) no road access, and (4) less than 2,500 residents. The 42 communities currently identified are the same communities currently being considered as eligible communities for purchasing halibut and sablefish quota share under GOA Plan Amendment 66.Three additional communities are identified under this proposed action, for a total of 45. These 45 communities are in Area 2C, 3A, and 3B (Table 5.1).

While it is premature to analyze a community allocation option at this time, it is useful to briefly examine the current level of fishing and processing activity within these communities. Knowing if a commercial base exists may aid the Council in its decision to include this option in the analysis. An examination of the Alaska Community Data Base developed by the Department of Community and Business Development showed the number of permit holders, numbers of persons employed in fishing, farming and forestry (all one category). The database also includes a list of business licenses in the community. The following discussion is relevant to Amendment 66.

Table 5.2 (2.14 from the EA/RIR/IRFA for Amendment 66) provides aggregate gross earnings by fisheries from the 45 communities in 1999 for the halibut, sablefish, and other commercial fisheries(from CFEC data). Gross earnings are attributed to each community based on the permanent residence reported by the permit holder. For each area (2C, 3A, or 3B), both the number of unique permit holders and the percent breakdowns are provided to show relative reliance on the halibut, sablefish, and other fisheries. Several communities' earnings are aggregated and a few others are concealed, for confidentiality purposes.

In Area 2C, 22 of the 23 of the target communities reported gross earnings from commercial fisheries in 1999 (not Hollis). Total gross earnings from Area 2C target communities (excluding confidential earnings) were $61.2 million: 22% from halibut, 13% from sablefish, and the balance (64%) from other commercial fisheries. Of all the 2C communities, Petersburg's gross earnings represented more than half of the total (62%), followed by Wrangell (12%), and Craig (7%).

In Area 3A, 14 of the 15 target communities reported gross earnings from commercial fisheries in 1999 (not Karluk), the great majority of which (90%) came from fisheries other than halibut or sablefish. Total gross earnings were $37.9 million. Three communities reported no commercial landings of halibut or sablefish in 1999 (Chenega Bay, Larsen Bay, and Tyonek). Compared to Area 2C communities, target communities in Area 3A have a higher reliance on other commercial fisheries, such as salmon. Communities in 3A with the largest market share include Cordova (68%) and Seldovia (12%).

In Area 3B, the 7 target communities reported the majority of their 1999 gross earnings from commercial fisheries other than halibut and sablefish (95%), with the remainder earned in the halibut fishery. These communities did not report any gross earnings from sablefish in 1999. Total gross earnings were about $44 million, about 72% of the gross earnings for target communities in Area 2C, and slightly more than was reported for 3A. Sand Point and King Cove held the greatest market share of 48% and 23%, respectively, with the rest earned by the five remaining communities in the Chignik area.

All 45 communities appear to qualify as fishing-dependent, although the Council has not yet determined a preferred alternative for the eligibility criteria. The current proposed criteria by which to determine fishery-dependence, is relatively ambiguous and not well suited to a quantitative assessment. Even if the criteria specified a way to define "principal source of revenue of employment," it would be very difficult to accurately determine the exact percentage of annual revenues or employment for each community that may be attributed to fisheries. Further, it may not be a necessary step to determining fishing-dependence, as annual revenues and other economic indices are not the only relevant indicators to determine fishing dependence. The NRC (1999a) report notes on the issue of fishing-dependent communities, that for small, isolated communities such as many of those in Alaska: "the notion of dependency may include geographic isolation; lack of employment alternatives; social, economic, and cultural systems that have developed in these locations; and their dependence on fishing as a source of nutrition, livelihood, and life-style" (p. 19).

Under the proposed criteria, it also does not appear necessary to discern whether a particular community is more or less "dependent" on fishing than any other. The NRC report (1999a) notes that fishing may be used as part of a diverse set of lifestyles, so the fact that these communities differ means only that they are dependent on fishing in different ways related to their social, cultural, and economic systems. Given that all of these communities are profiled by one or more sources as fishing communities, it is assumed that fishing plays a role in determining the identity of each community. Thus, all of the relevant factors identified by the NRC were considered in determining whether the target communities were qualified based on the community profiles provided by one or more sources.

The Draft Programmatic Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DPSEIS) (NMFS 2001) provides sector and regional profiles of the North Pacific fisheries that include several communities in the Alaska Peninsula, Kodiak Island, Southcentral, and Southeast regions. The DPSEIS documents the general dependency on a regional basis, whether through employment opportunities, fisheries-related revenues, local fish taxes, or the fisheries-related shared tax income from the state fish tax. Gross earnings derived from commercial fishing on an area basis will be discussed further in this section. Note that for the purposes of community eligibility, the combined sources discussed here are considered sufficient documentation of the communities' general dependence on fishing as a whole. The baseline data provided in the remainder of this section supports that conclusion.

The majority of the communities are also discussed in *Faces of the Fisheries*, a publication of community profiles by the NPFMC (1994). This report highlights the involvement of coastal communities in the fisheries off of Alaska, including commercial, recreational, and subsistence participation. Thirty-four of the target communities are also profiled in *Gulf of Alaska Coastal Communities: An Overview,* an ISER report prepared for the Gulf of Alaska Coastal Communities Coalition (ISER 1999). The communities selected for discussion in the report represent all regions along the Gulf Coast, and information is provided to assess the communities' reliance on commercial and subsistence fishing and identify the availability of economic opportunities other than fishing. In addition, all of the communities are profiled by the Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development, and the majority show some level of dependency on the commercial fishing industry, whether it be processing, harvesting, support services, or seasonal labor. The CFEC also developed a report on Gulf coastal community participation in the State limited entry and IFQ fisheries, which shows historical and current participation (CFEC 1999). The information from this report will be used later in this section to characterize the communities' participation in the IFQ fisheries.

Recall also that the criteria proposed for determining fishery dependence is not limited to *commercial* fishing. All 45 communities qualify as having customary and traditional use of halibut as determined by the Subsistence Division of ADF&G. Most of the target communities rely on subsistence fishing and hunting, as documented by DCED, CFEC, and ADF&G, either as a primary food source or to supplement other sources. The dominant subsistence species harvested are halibut, salmon, shrimp, crab, and clams. For some

communities, including Kasaan, Akhiok, Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Port Lions, Ivanof Bay, Yakutat, and the Chignik area, the majority of the residents continue to participate in subsistence fishing (and hunting) activities. Subsistence fishing does not appear to be of high importance for a few communities that have alternative income sources, including Hollis (which relies mostly on logging) and Halibut Cove (primarily an artist community), Pelican, Wrangell, Port Graham, Petersburg, Cordova, and Seldovia. The level of reliance on the fishing industry varies by community, but because of the limited economic opportunities in these smaller, remote communities, fishing, whether commercial or subsistence, represents a significant factor in the overall economy.

The broad conclusion gathered from these collective sources is that fishing plays a role in the identity of all of the proposed communities–nearly all of the communities are reliant on subsistence harvests, and commercial fishing, whether for sablefish, halibut, or otherwise, is the dominant source of jobs and income in most of these communities.

For this discussion paper, ADF&G staff examined the data on a community-by-community level, the level of current fishing and processing activity varied and that the communities could be easily grouped for purposes of an overview. Using the number of salmon permit holders as a guide, the communities are grouped into three levels of participation – some fishing activity, modest fishing and buying presence, and significantly more fishing and processing activity.

Since part of the Council motion suggested removing Southeast Outside from any GOA Rationalization program, this brief community profile is divided into two sections – Area 2C which includes 23 communities in Southeast Alaska and Area 3A and 3B which combined includes 22 communities from Yakutat to Sand Point.

Area 2C

Some Fishing Activity

Communities that have less than 10 salmon permit holders and/or persons employed in the fishing/farming/forestry sector includes Coffman Cove, Hollis, Kassan, Meyers Chuck, Port Protection and Whale Pass. The communities of Coffman Cove, Hollis and Whale Pass do not list any resident permit holders. Table 2.14 in the Initial Review Draft for Amendment reveals a similar, modest level of participation in the halibut and sablefish fisheries. These communities provided residence to a total of 4 halibut fishermen and 3 sablefish fishermen. Only one community, Meyers Chuck listed any fishing charter business. Coffman Cove is doing a feasibility study for a marine related development project.

Modest Fishing and Processing Presence

Communities with 10 – 50 salmon permit holders and/or persons employed in the fishing/farming/forestry sector includes Edna Bay, Elfin Cove, Gustavus, Hydaburg, Klawock, Metlakatla, Pelican, Point Baker, Port Alexander, Tenakee Springs and Thorne Bay. Each community lists a fishing charter business. Five of these communities, Edna Bay, Elfin Cove, Pelican, Metlakatla and Tenakee Springs, have seasonal fish buying and processing centers. When examining halibut and sablefish participation, each community has some participation. On the low end is Thorne Bay with 4 halibut fishermen and on the high end is Pelican with 18 halibut fishermen and 13 blackcod fishermen.

Significantly More Fishing and Processing Activity

Within area 2C there are five communities with over 50 salmon permit holders and/or persons employed in the fishing/farming/ forestry sector. These communities are Angoon, Craig, Hoonah, Kake and Wrangell. All five have multiple fish buying and processing operations. Fish guide services are prominent in each of these communities. While halibut and sablefish is less dominant, all five communities exhibit a higher rate of participation than the other communities in area 2C (except for Pelican). On the low end is Kake with 18 halibut fishermen and 1 sablefish fishermen. Wrangell tops the list with 91 halibut fishermen.

Area 3A and 3B

Some Fishing Activity

Eight coastal communities have less than 10 permit holders and/or persons employed in the fishing/farming/forestry sector. These communities include Akhiok, Chenega Bay, Chignik Lake, Halibut Cove, Ivanof Bay, Karluk, Nanwalek, Tatitlek. Two communities, Karluk and Chignik Lake do not list any resident permit holders. However, Karluk is the site of a recently idled cannery. Halibut Cove and Tatitlek both have a local fish buying business in their community. The community of Akhiok notes that it wants to develop a smoking and cold storage facility. Most of these communities have one or two fishing guide businesses. In regards to halibut and blackcod, current participation by residents of these communities is minimal. Table 2.14 shows one person in Halibut Cove and Tatitlek participating in these fisheries.

Modest Fishing and Processing Presence

Communities with 10 – 50 permit holders and/or persons employed in the fishing/farming/forestry sector include Chignik, Chignik Lagoon, Larsen Bay, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Perryville, Port Graham, Port Lions, and Tyonek. Fish buying and processing capabilities exist within the communities of Old Harbor, Port Graham, Port Lions, Larsen Bay and Chignik. Two communities, Perryville and Tyonek, do not list any fishing guide business within their community; the rest of the communities host several fishing guides. About 26 halibut fishermen reside in the communities of Akhiok, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Port Graham and Port Lions. Nine halibut fishermen reside within the Chignik area.

Significantly More Fishing and Processing Activity

The communities of Cordova, King Cove, Sand Point, Seldovia and Yakutat all have more than 50 salmon permit holders residing in their community. All five communities have a significant fish buying and processing center within their boundaries. All five list 3 or more fishing guide businesses. All communities show active participation in the halibut fishery. At the high end is Cordova with 50 halibut fishermen and 9 sablefish fishermen. At the low end is King Cove, with 12 halibut fishermen.

Table 5.1 List of Proposed Eligible Communities for Community Purchase of Halibut and Sablefish Quota Share (from GOA Plan Amendment 66)

General Qualifying Criteria: Area 2C, 3A, and 3B Gulf coastal communities with populations less than 2,500 (based on the 2000 census), not connected to the road system, and with historic participation[1] in the halibut or sablefish fisheries.

Area 2C

Community	Population[2]
Angoon	572
Coffman Cove	199
Craig	1,397
Edna Bay	49
Elfin Cove	32
Gustavus	429
Hollis	139
Hoonah	860
Hydaburg	382
Kake	710
Kassan	39
Klawock	854
Metlakatla	1,375
Meyers Chuck	21
Pelican	163
Point Baker	35
Port Alexander	81
Port Protection	63
Tenakee Springs	104
Thorne Bay	557
Whale Pass	58
Wrangell	2,308
22 communities	10,427

Area 3A

Community	Population
Akhiok	80
Chenega Bay	86
Cordova	2,454
Halibut Cove	35
Karluk	27
Larsen Bay	115
Nanwalek	177
Old Harbor	237
Ouzinkie	225
Port Graham	171
Port Lions	256
Seldovia	286
Tatitlek	107
Tyonek	193
Yakutat	680
15 communities	5,165

Area 3B

Community	Population
Chignik	79
Chignik Lagoon	103
Chignik Lake	145
Ivanof Bay	22
King Cove	792
Perryville	107
Sand Point	952
7 communities	2,200

[1]As documented by CFEC, DCED, or reported by ADF&G in *Alaska Rural Places in Areas with Subsistence Halibut Uses*.

[2]2000 census data–Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development.

Note: A total of 44 Gulf communities may qualify under the general criteria proposed under Element 1. At the time of the Coalition proposal, the estimated populations of Wrangell and Cordova were above 2,500. While Wrangell and Cordova are still considered "larger communities" in the CFEC report, the 2000 census reports populations less than 2,500.

There are also 3 suboptions that could be applied to the above criteria under Element 1. The total number of communities would change as follows:

Under Suboption 1 (fishery-dependent): all of the above communities would continue to qualify

Under Suboption 2 (decrease community size < 1,500): Cordova and Wrangell would drop out.

Under Suboption 3 (increase community size < 5,000): Petersburg (population 3,224) would be included.

Table 5.2: 1999 Gross Earnings (1999 dollars) from Commercial Fisheries for 45 Target Communities1

Area	Community	$Halibut	# Persons Halibut	$Sablefish	# Persons Sablefish	$Other	# Persons Other	$Total**	# Persons Total
2C	Craig	$575,029	44	$175,778	12	$3,501,661	138	$4,252,468	146
	Edna Bay	$75,871	7	**	1	$197,887	9	$273,758	10
	Hoonah	$559,948	26	$596,149	11	$1,491,014	68	$2,647,111	74
	Hydaburg	$69,882	7	$0	0	$434,203	20	$504,085	23
	Kake	$286,581	18	**	1	$802,184	21	$1,088,765	28
	Metlakatla	$102,052	8	$0	0	$837,428	30	$939,480	32
	Misc. Southeast*	$389,952	36	$231,073	7	$1,111,738	58	$1,732,763	76
	Pelican	$553,752	18	$586,803	13	$560,871	34	$1,701,426	38
	Petersburg	$8,668,439	207	$5,887,733	59	$23,127,177	320	$37,683,349	384
	Point Baker	$88,925	10	$0	0	$439,643	22	$528,568	23
	Port Alexander	$288,930	17	$139,528	4	$663,096	20	$1,091,554	26
	Prince of Wales Area*	$117,032	4	**	3	$901,654	36	$1,018,686	36
	Thorne Bay	$79,902	4	$0	0	$240,226	12	$320,128	13
	Wrangell	$1,872,879	91	$230,176	4	$5,336,176	156	$7,439,231	185
Subtotal**		$13,729,174		$7,847,240		$39,644,958		$61,221,372	
% breakdown		**22%**		**13%**		**64%**			
3A	Chenega Bay	$0	0	$0	0	**	2	**	2
	Cordova	$1,288,903	50	$257,195	9	$24,144,988	313	$25,691,086	330
	Halibut Cove	**	1	$0	0	$132,863	4	$132,863	4
	Kodiak Area*	$354,394	26	**	2	$3,870,399	53	$4,224,793	65
	Larsen Bay	$0	0	$0	0	$839,959	13	$839,959	13
	Seldovia	$943,334	16	$616,505	5	$2,826,936	34	$4,386,775	42
	Tatitlek	$0	0	**	1	**	3	**	3
	Tyonek	$0	0	$0	0	$99,499	17	$99,499	17
	Yakutat	$298,185	27	**	1	$2,223,570	134	$2,521,755	142
Subtotal**		$2,884,816		$873,700		$34,138,214		$37,896,730	
% breakdown		**8%**		**2%**		**90%**			
3B	Chignik Area*	$315,774	9	$0	0	$12,448,888	50	$12,764,662	50
	King Cove	$393,438	12	$0	0	$9,941,739	50	$10,335,177	50
	Sand Point	$1,413,191	43	$0	0	$19,452,218	96	$20,865,409	100
Subtotal**		$2,122,403		$0		$41,842,845		$43,965,248	
% breakdown		**5%**		**0%**		**95%**			

*Combines gross earnings for several communities for confidentiality reasons. Misc. Southeast = Angoon, Elfin Cove, Gustavus; Prince of Wales Area = Coffman Cove, Kassan, Klawock, Meyers Chuck; Kodiak Area = Akhiok, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Port Graham, Port

**Masked for confidentiality reasons. Gross earnings totals and subtotals do not include confidential data.

[1]Based on reported permanent residence of permit holder.

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Document A
Gulf of Alaska Rationalization
Alternative Descriptions

This paper describes several alternatives (or types of programs) that could be formulated from the elements and options in the April 2003 motion. For each alternative, a brief description of the alternative is provided, followed by a list of the elements and options from the proposed revision to the motion that could be retained in the motion to define the alternative for analysis. The listing of elements and options is not an attempt to narrow the options, but identifies elements and options that could be retained to identify the alternative for further analysis. The April 2003 motion contains at least 12 primary alternatives, each with several permutations. Most of the alternatives are cooperative alternatives, which arise from selecting various combinations of the cooperative elements and options. Several alternatives are very similar to one another, providing little analytical contrast.

Staff is hopeful that the Council will use this meeting to narrow the number of alternatives substantially. A reasonable range of contrasting alternatives for analysis could be four or five selected from the April 2003 motion. Within those alternatives, options may be retained for some aspects, but those options should not pertain to the general structure of the program.[1] If the Council chooses to delay narrowing the selection of alternatives for analysis, the completion of the analysis will be delayed. Staff can work on several different aspects of the analysis, but the comparison of alternatives will be extended several months.

1. Harvester Only IFQ

Harvest shares would be allocated to harvesters. The processing sector would not be subject to any limits on entry or participation (i.e., no direct processor protection, such as a closed class of processors).

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 only for harvest provisions

2. Harvester IFQ with a Closed Class of Processors

Harvest shares would be allocated to harvesters. A specific percentage of each harvester's allocation would be required to be delivered to qualified processors. Processor qualification would be based on historic processing activity.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 3.1 for processing provisions

[1] For example, a few options can remain for choosing different eligibility requirements for purchasing harvest shares or histories.

Note: The analysis of company based licenses differs substantially from the analysis of facility based licenses. Qualification and regionalization issues will need to be addressed.

3. Two-Pie IFQ (Harvest Shares and Processing Shares)

Harvest shares would be allocated to harvesters for the entire TAC. Processing shares would be allocated to processors for a specified portion of the TAC. Harvest shares would be issued in two classes. Class A shares would require delivery to a processor holding processing shares. Class B shares could be delivered to any processor. Class A shares would be issued for the same portion of the TAC as processor shares to establish a one-to-one correspondence between Class A shares and processing shares.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 3.2 for processing provisions
Section 3.2.1 - binding arbitration provision is very incomplete

4. Harvester-Only IFQ with Voluntary Cooperatives - No Direct Processor Protection

Harvest shares would be allocated to harvesters for the entire TAC. Harvesters would be permitted to form cooperatives, but would not be required to form cooperatives to receive a share allocation. Any limitation on the ability of harvesters to co-op with different gear groups or vessel types and sizes could be adopted (from 4.2.1). No delivery requirement or direct processor protection would be provided.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 4.1, Option 1
Section 4.2.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3
Section 4.2.2 i
Section 4.2.3
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.4, 4.4.3
Section 4.5.1

5. Harvester Shares with Mandatory Cooperatives - No Direct Processor Protection - No Open Access Fishery

Harvest shares would be allocated to cooperatives for the entire TAC. Harvesters would be required to join cooperatives to receive a share allocation (which would be made to the cooperative). Any limitation on the ability of harvesters to co-op with different gear groups or vessel types and sizes could be adopted (from 4.2.1). No delivery requirement or direct processor protection would be provided. No open access fishery would be provided for harvesters that choose not to join a cooperative.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 4.1, Option 2

Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2 i or ii, 4.2.3
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2,4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4, 4.4
Section 4.6, Option 2

6. Harvester Shares with Mandatory Cooperatives - No Direct Processor Protection - Open Access Fishery for Non-Members of Cooperatives

Harvest shares would be allocated to cooperatives for the entire TAC. Harvesters would be required to join cooperatives to receive a share allocation (which would be made to the cooperative). No delivery requirement or direct processor protection would be provided. An open access fishery would be provided for harvesters that choose not to join a cooperative. Any limitation on the ability of harvesters to co-op with different gear groups or vessel types and sizes could be adopted (from 4.2.1). Those limitations can be used to defined the different open access fisheries (in 4.6, Option 1).

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 4.1, Option 2
Section 4.1, Option 2
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2 i or ii, 4.2.3
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2,4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4, 4.4
Section 4.6, Option 1

7. Harvester Shares with Mandatory Cooperatives - Processor Protections

Harvest shares would be allocated to cooperatives for the entire TAC. Harvesters would be required to join cooperatives to receive a share allocation (which would be made to the cooperative). Processor protection would be provided by requiring harvesters to enter price agreements with a processor prior to receiving an allocation.[2] Any limitation on the ability of harvesters to co-op with different gear groups or vessel types and sizes could be adopted (from 4.2.1). This option could provide for an open access fishery, if desired (see 4.6).

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 4.1, Option 2
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2 i or ii, 4.2.3
Section 4.2.4
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4, 4.4
Section 4.6, Option 1 or 2

[2] Staff is concerned that as written the current provision could not be meaningfully analyzed. Additional comments are provided in the discussion of options.

8. True Sector Cooperatives

Under this alternative, allocations will be made to sectors, which could be defined by gear, vessel type (CV or C/P), vessel length, and/or area. If the holders of a minimum percentage of the qualified history of the sector enters a cooperative, the allocation would be made to the cooperative. Non-members receive no allocation and are not permitted to fish in an open access fisheries. Processor associations and delivery requirements could be imposed on CV cooperatives.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 (including 2.3.1, Option 1)
Section 4.2, Option 2
Section 4.2.1 - define sectors
Section 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3
Section 4.2.2 ii (define portion of sector need to form cooperative)
Section 4.2.3
Section 4.3.1, Option 2
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2,4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4
Section 4.6.1, Option 2

9. Sector Allocations with Cooperatives

Under this alternative, all fisheries would be divided into sectors, which could be defined by gear, vessel type (CV or C/P), vessel length, and/or area. Harvest share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives subject to minimum membership requirements (i.e., minimum number of shareholders or percent of total shares held by members). Cooperatives are mandatory (i.e., harvesters that are not in cooperatives will not receive share allocations). Allocations would be made to cooperatives based on members' histories. Any non-members could fish in an open access fishery, which is comprised of all history of sector members that chose not to join cooperatives. Processor associations and delivery requirements could be imposed on CV cooperatives.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2
Section 4.1, Option 2
Section 4.2.1 (defines sector)
Sections 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2 i or ii, 4.2.3
Section 4.2.4
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4, 4.4, 4.5.1, 4.5.2
Section 4.6, Option 1 (would create open access fishery)

10. Harvester Shares with a Closed Class of Processors (Cooperatives are Mandatory)

Harvest shares would be allocated to cooperatives based on members' histories. A specific percentage of each harvester's allocation would be required to be delivered to a qualified processor associated with the cooperative. Processor qualification would be based on historic processing activity. Harvesters may suffer a one-year share reduction for moving between cooperatives.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvester provisions
Section 3.1 for processing provisions
Section 4.1, Option 2
Section 4.2.1 (defines sector)
Sections 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2 i or ii, 4.2.3
Section 4.2.4
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4
Section 4.3.2.6
Section 4.4
Section 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3

Note: a) The options do not include a one-year open access requirement for movement between cooperatives.
b) The analysis of company-based licenses differs substantially from the analysis of facility-based licenses. Qualification and regionalization issues will need to be addressed.

11. Two-Pie IFQ with Voluntary Cooperatives

Harvest shares would be allocated to harvesters for the entire TAC. Processing shares would be allocated to processors for a specified portion of the CV TAC. CV harvest shares would be issued in two classes. Class A shares would require delivery to a processor holding processing shares. Class B shares could be delivered to any processor. Class A shares would be issued for the same portion of the TAC as processor shares to establish a one-to-one correspondence between Class A shares and processing shares.

Cooperatives could be formed among harvesters. Processor association could be required of CV cooperatives. Delivery requirements for the cooperative should not be applied because of the need for CV harvest share holders to deliver to processing share holders (further processor protection should not be necessary). Cooperatives would be voluntary. An open access fishery would disrupt the one-to-one relationship between harvest shares and processing shares.

Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 3.2 for processing provisions
Section 4.1, Option 1
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2 i or ii, 4.2.3
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4, 4.4
Section 4.2.4

12. Two-Pie Share Program with Mandatory Cooperatives and Open Access Fishery

Harvest shares would be allocated to cooperatives based on members' histories. Processing shares would be allocated to processors for a specified portion of the CV TAC. CV harvest shares would be issued in

two classes. Class A shares would require delivery to a processor holding processing shares. Class B shares could be delivered to any processor. Each coopertive's allocation would be comprised of a percentage of Class A shares equal to the percentage of the TAC for which processor shares are issued.

Processor association could be required of CV cooperatives. Delivery requirements for the cooperative should not be applied because of the need for CV harvest share holders to deliver to processing share holders (further processor protection should not be necessary).

Harvesters that do not join cooperatives could participate in an open access fishery, which would be comprised of the history of harvesters that chose not to join cooperatives. An open access fishery would disrupt the one-to-one relationship between CV harvest shares and processing shares.

<u>Provisions that could be used to establish this alternative:</u>

Section 2 for harvest provisions
Section 3.2 for processing provisions
Section 4.1, Option 2
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2 i or ii, 4.2.3
Section 4.3.1, Option 1
Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3, 4.3.2.4, 4.4
Section 4.2.4
Section 4.6, Option 1

DOCUMENT B

NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
GULF OF ALASKA GROUNDFISH RATIONALIZATION
ALTERNATIVES, ELEMENTS AND OPTIONS
APRIL 7, 2003 (RENUMBERED FOR JUNE 2003 MEETING)

(1) ALTERNATIVE 1. STATUS QUO (NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE)

(2) ALTERNATIVE 2. HARVEST SHARE PROGRAM,

(2.1) SUBALTERNATIVE 1. HARVESTER ONLY SHARE PROGRAM

Management Areas:
Areas are Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat—separate areas

SEO: exempt except for Shortraker, Rougheye, and thornyhead as bycatch species

Gear: Applies to all gear except jig gear

(2.1.1) Element 1. Qualifying periods (same for all gears in all areas)
(Option: AFA vessels assessed as a group)
Option 1. 95-01 (drop 1, or 2)
Option 2. 98-01 (drop 1)
Option 3. 95-02 (drop 1, 2, or 3)
Option 4. 95-97 (for AFA vessels)
Option 5. 98-02 (drop 1 or 2)
Option 6. 00-02 (drop 1)
The following applies to all options:
Suboption. Exclude 2000 for pot gear Pacific cod

NOTE: the above suboption, if selected, would count as 1 year dropped (if selected)
NOTE: The Council noticed the public of its intent to further reduce the above options at the June Council meeting.

(2.1.2) Element 2. Qualifying landing criteria

(2.1.2.1) Issue 1. Landings based on retained catch for all species (includes WPR for C/P sector)
NOTE: Total pounds landed will be used as the denominator.

Option 1. catch history for p. cod fisheries determined based on a <u>percentage</u> of retained catch per year (does not include meal)
Option 2. catch history determined based on the <u>poundage</u> of retained catch year (does not include meal)

(2.1.2.2) Issue 2. Eligibility to receive catch history is any person that holds a valid, permanent, fully transferable LLP license.

Option 1: Any person who held a valid interim LLP license as of January 1, 2003.

Basis for the distribution to the LLP license holder is: the catch history of the vessel on which the LLP license is based and shall be on a fishery-by-fishery basis. The underlying principle of this program is one history per license. In cases where the fishing privileges (i.e. moratorium qualification or LLP license) of an LLP qualifying (i.e. GQP, EQP, RPP and Amendment 58 combination) vessel have been transferred, the distribution of harvest shares to the LLP shall be based on the aggregate catch histories of (1) the vessel on which LLP license was based up to the date of transfer, and (2) the vessel owned or controlled by the LLP license holder and identified by the license holder as having been operated under the fishing privileges of the LLP qualifying vessel after the date of transfer. Only one catch history per LLP license.

Option 2: Any individual who has imprinted a fish ticket making non-federally permitted legal landings during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries.

Option 3: Vessel owner at time of non-federally permitted legal landing during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries.

(2.1.3) Element 3. Target Species Rationalization Plan.

Target Species by Gear

(2.1.3.1) Issue 1 Initial Allocation of catch history

Option 1: Allocate catch history by sector and gear type
Option 2: Allocate catch history on an individual basis

a. Trawl CV and CP:
   pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, Pelagic shelf rockfish
b. Longline CV and CP:
   Pacific Cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if turbot is targeted), northern rockfish, Arrowtooth flounder
c. Pot CV and CP:
   Pacific Cod

(2.1.3.2) Issue 2. Harvest share (or QS/IFQ) Designations

(2.1.3.2.1) Option 1. Vessel categories
Suboption 1. No Categories
Suboption 2. Vessel Categories as follows
Vessels < 60’
Vessels >= 60’ and < 125’
Vessels >= 125’

(2.1.3.2.2) Option 2. Harvest share sector designations:

Suboption 1. No designation of harvest shares (or QS/IFQ) as CV or CP

Suboption 2. Designate harvest shares (or QS/IFQ) as CV or CP. Annual CV harvest share allocation (or IFQ) convey a privilege to harvest a specified amount. Annual CP harvest share allocation (or IFQ) conveys the privilege to harvest and process a specified amount. Designation will be based on:

a. Actual amount of catch harvested and processed onboard a vessel by species.

b. All catch in a given year if any was legally processed onboard the vessel by species.

(2.1.3.2.3) Option 3. Harvest share gear designations

Suboption 1. No gear designation

Suboption 2. Designate harvest shares as Longline, Pot, or Trawl

Suboption 3. Longline and pot gear harvest shares (or IFQ) may not be harvested using trawl gear.

Suboption 4. Pot gear harvest shares (or IFQ) may not be harvested using longline gear

(2.1.3.3) Issue 3. Transferability and Restrictions on Ownership of Harvest shares (or QS/IFQ)

(2.1.3.3.1) Option 1. Persons eligible to receive harvest shares by transfer must be (not mutually exclusive):

Suboption 1. US citizens who have had at least 150 days of sea time

Suboption 2. Entities that have a U. S. citizen with 20% or more ownership and at least 150 days of sea time

Suboption 3. Entities that have a US citizenship with 20% or more ownership

Suboption 4. Initial recipients of CV or C/P harvest share

Suboption 5. US Citizens eligible to document a vessel.

Suboption 6. Communities would be eligible to receive harvest shares by transfer (see Element 9 (2.1.9))

(2.1.3.3.2) Option 2. Restrictions on transferability of CP harvest shares

Suboption 1. CP harvest shares maintain their designation upon transfer

Suboption 2. CP harvest shares maintain their designation when transferred to persons who continue to catch and process CP harvest shares at sea, if CP harvest shares are processed onshore after transfer, CP harvest shares converts to CV harvest shares

(2.1.3.3.3) Option 3. Redesignate CP shares as CV shares upon transfer to a person who is not an initial issuee of CP shares:

a. all CP shares

b. trawl CP shares

c. longline CP shares

(2.1.3.3.4) Option 4. Vertical integration (See also placeholder under Option 6)

Harvest shares initial recipients with more than 10% limited threshold ownership by any holder of processing shares or licenses are:

Suboption 1. capped at initial allocation of harvest CV and CP shares

Suboption 2. capped at 115-150% of initial allocation of harvest CV shares

Suboption 3. capped at 115-150% of initial allocation of harvest of CP shares

(2.1.3.3.5) Option 5. Definition of sea time

Sea time in any of the U.S. commercial fisheries in a harvesting capacity.

(2.1.3.3.6) Option 6. Leasing of QS ("leasing of QS" is defined as the transfer of annual IFQ permit to a person who is not the holder of the underlying QS for use on any vessel and use of IFQ by an individual designated by the QS holder on a vessel which the QS holder owns less that 20% -- same as "hired skipper" requirement in halibut/sablefish program).

Suboption 1. No leasing of CV QS (QS holder must be on board or own at least 20% of the vessel upon which a designated skipper fishes the IFQ).

Suboption 2. No leasing of CP QS (QS holder must be on board or own at least 20% of the vessel upon which a designated skipper fishes the IFQ).

Suboption 3. Allow leasing of CV QS, but only to individuals eligible to receive QS/IFQ by transfer.

Suboption 4. Allow leasing of CP QS, but only to individuals eligible to receive QS/IFQ by transfer.

Suboption 5. Sunset [CP – CV] QS leasing provisions [3 – 5 – 10] years after program implementation.

(2.1.3.3.7) Option 7. Separate and distinct harvest share use ("ownership") caps

NOTE: The Council gave notice that it will revisit the language in this option to address the CV and CP sectors in June 2003.

Vessel Use caps on harvest shares harvested on any given vessel shall be set at <u>two times</u> the use cap for each species. Initial issuees that exceed the use cap are grandfathered at their current level as of a control date of April 3, 2003; including transfers by contract entered into as of that date. Caps apply to all harvesting categories by species with the following provisions:

Apply individually and collectively to all harvest share holders in each sector and fishery.

Percentage-caps by species are as follows (a different percentage cap may be chosen for each fishery):

i. Trawl CV and/or CP (can be different caps):

Use cap based at the following percentile of catch history for the following species: (i.e., 75th percentile represents the amount of harvest shares that is greater than the amount of harvest shares for which 75% of the fleet will qualify.)

pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, pelagic shelf rockfish

Suboption 1. 75 %

Suboption 2. 85%

Suboption 3. 95 %

ii. Longline and Pot CV and/or CP (can be different caps)

based on the following percentiles of catch history for the following species:

Pacific cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if Greenland turbot is targeted), northern rockfish

Suboption 1. 75 %

Suboption 2. 85%
Suboption 3. 95 %

iii. Conversion of CP shares:
1. CP shares converted to CV shares
Option 1: will count toward CV caps
Option 2: will not count toward CV caps at the time of conversion.
2. Caps will be applied to prohibit acquisition of shares in excess of the cap. Conversion of CP shares to CV shares alone will not require a CP shareholder to divest CP shares for exceeding the CP share cap.

(2.1.3.3.8) Option 8. Owner On Board Provisions

Provisions may vary depending on the sector or fishery under consideration (this provision may be applied differently pending data analysis)

All initial issues (individuals and corporations) would be grandfathered as not being required to be aboard the vessel to fish shares initially issued as "owner on board" shares. This exemption applies only to those initially issued harvest share units.

Suboption 1. No owner on board restrictions.

Suboption 2. A portion (range of 5-100%) of the quota shares initially issued to fishers/ harvesters would be designated as "owner on board."

NOTE: The Council may revise the upper end of the range.

Suboption 3. All initial issuees (individual and corporate) would be grandfathered as not being required to be aboard the vessel to fish shares initially issued as "owner on board" shares for a period of 5 years after implementation.

Suboption 4. Shares transferred to initial issuees in the first 5 years of the program would be considered the same as shares initially issued (range of 5 – 100% of the quota shares). See above NOTE

Suboption 5. "owner on board" shares transferred by initial issuees, after the grace period, would require the recipient to be aboard the vessel to harvest the IFQ.

Suboption 6. In cases of hardship (injury, medical incapacity, loss of vessel, etc.) a holder of "owner on board" quota shares may, upon documentation and approval, transfer/lease his or her shares a maximum period of (Range 1-3 years).

(2.1.3.3.9) Option 9. Overage Provisions

a. Trawl CV and CP:

Suboption 1. Overages up to 15% or 20% of the last trip will be allowed— greater than a 15% or 20% overage result in forfeiture and civil penalties. An overage of 15% or 20% or less, results in the reduction of the subsequent year's annual allocation or IFQ. Underages up to 10% of last trip harvest shares (or IFQ) will be allowed with an increase in the subsequent year's annual allocation (or IFQ).

Suboption 2. Overage provisions would not be applicable in fisheries where there is an incentive fishery that has not been fully utilized for the year. (i.e., no overages would be charged if a harvest share (or IFQ) holder goes over his/her annual allocation (or IFQ) when incentive fisheries are still available).

b. Longline and pot CV and CP :

Overages up to 10% of the last trip will be allowed with rollover provisions for underages— greater than a 10% overage results in forfeiture and civil penalties.

An overage of less than 10% results in the reduction of the subsequent year's annual allocation or IFQ. This provision is similar to that currently in place for the Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program (CFR 679.40(d)).

Suboption. Overages would not be applicable in fisheries where there is an incentive fishery that has not been fully utilized for the year. (i.e., no overages would be allowed if a harvest share (or IFQ) holder goes over his/her annual allocation (or IFQ) when incentive fisheries are still available).

(2.1.3.3.10) Option 10. Retention requirements for rockfish, sablefish and Atka mackerel:
- Suboption 1. no retention requirements
- Suboption 2. require retention (all species) until the annual allocation (or IFQ) for that species is taken with discards allowed for overages
- Suboption 3. require 100% retention (all species) until the annual allocation (or IFQ) for that species is taken and then stop fishing.

(2.1.3.3.11) Option 11. Limited processing for CVs
- Suboption 1. No limited processing
- Suboption 2. Limited processing of rockfish species by owners of CV harvest shares is allowed consistent with limits set in the LLP program which allows up to 1 mt of round weight equivalent of groundfish to be processed per day on a vessel less than or equal to 60ft LOA.

(2.1.3.3.12) Option 12. Processing Restrictions
- Suboption 1. CPs may buy CV fish
  - a. 3 year sunset
- Suboption 2. CPs would be prohibited from buying CV fish
  - a. 3 year sunset
- Suboption 3. CPs are not permitted to buy fully utilized species (cod, pollock, rockfish, sablefish, and allocated portion of flatfish) from CVs.
  - a. Exempt bycatch amounts of these species delivered with flatfish

(2.1.4) Element 4. Allocation of Bycatch Species

Thornyhead, rougheye, shortraker, other slope rockfish, Atka mackerel, and trawl sablefish Includes SEO Shortraker, Rougheye, and Thornyhead rockfish.

Option 1. Allocation of shares
- a. Allocate shares to all fishermen (including sablefish & halibut QS fishermen) based on fleet bycatch rates by gear:
  - Suboption 1. based on average catch history by area and target fishery
  - Suboption 2 based on 75th percentile by area by target fishery
- b. Allocation of shares will be adjusted pro rata to allocate 100% of the annual TAC for each bycatch species.
  - Suboption. Other slope rockfish in the Western Gulf will not be allocated, but will be managed by MRB and will go to PSC status when the TAC is reached.

Option 2. Include these species for one gear type only (e.g., trawl). Deduct the bycatch from gear types from TAC. If deduction is not adequate to cover bycatch in other gear types, on a seasonal basis, place that species on PSC status until overfishing is reached.

Option 3. Retain these species on bycatch status for all gear types with current MRAs.
Option 4. Allow trawl sablefish catch history to be issued as a new category of sablefish harvest shares ("T" shares) by area. "T" shares would be fully leasable, exempt from vessel size and block restrictions, and retain sector designation upon sale.
Suboption. These shares may be used with either fixed gear or trawl gear.

(2.1.5) Element 5. PSC Species

(2.1.5.1) Issue 1. Accounting of Halibut Bycatch
Pot vessels continue their exemption from halibut PSC caps.
Hook and line and trawl entities
Option 1. Same as that under IFQ sablefish and halibut programs
Option 2. Cooperatives would be responsible for ensuring the collective halibut bycatch cap was not exceeded
Option 3. Individual share or catch history owners would be responsible to ensure that their halibut bycatch allotment was not exceeded

(2.1.5.2) Issue 2. Halibut PSC Allocation
Each recipient of fishing history would receive an allocation of halibut mortality (harvest shares) based on their allocation of the directed fishery harvest shares. Bycatch only species would receive no halibut allocation.
Initial allocation based on average halibut bycatch by directed target species during the qualifying years. Allocations will be adjusted pro rata to equal the existing PSC cap.
Option 1. By sector average bycatch rates by area by gear
a) Both sectors
b) Catcher processor/Catcher Vessel

(2.1.5.3) Issue 3. Annual transfer/Leasing of Trawl or Fixed Gear Halibut PSC mortality
Halibut PSC harvest share are separable from target groundfish harvest shares and may be transferred independently. When transferred separately, the amount of Halibut PSC allocation would be reduced, for that year, by:
Option 1 0%
Option 2 . 5%
Option 3 . 7%
Option 4 . 10%
Option 5 . Exclude any halibut PSC transferred for participation in the incentive fisheries

(2.1.5.4) Issue 4. Permanent transfer of Halibut PSC harvest share mortality
Option 1. Groundfish harvest shares and Halibut PSC harvest shares are non-separable and must be transferred as a unit
Suboption. exempt Pacific cod
Option 2. Groundfish harvest shares and Halibut PSC harvest shares are separable and may be transferred separately

(2.1.5.5) Issue 5. Retention of halibut bycatch by longline vessels
Halibut bycatch may be retained outside the halibut season from Jan 30 to start of commercial fishery, and from end of commercial fishery through December 15.
Option 1. retention is limited to (range 10-20%) of target species
Option 2. permit holder must have sufficient harvest shares (or IFQ) to cover landing

(2.1.6) Element 6. Incentive species
Arrowtooth flounder, deepwater flatfish, flathead sole, rex sole, shallow water flatfish.

Owners of shares must utilize all their shares before participating in incentive fisheries.

Option: The portion of historic unharvested West Yakutat TAC will be made available as an incentive fishery, subject to provision of incentive fisheries

PLACEHOLDER language for eligibility: The incentive fishery is limited to persons that hold harvest shares and adequate PSC and bycatch species shares to prosecute these fisheries.

(2.1.6.1) Issue 1. Eligibility to fish in the incentive fisheries
- Option 1. Any person with a valid LLP
- Option 2. Entities that have 20% or more U.S. ownership and at least 150 days of sea time with 10 mt of fixed gear harvest shares or 50 mt of trawl harvest shares
- Option 3. Entities that have 20% or more U.S. ownership with 10 mt of fixed gear harvest shares or 50 mt of trawl harvest shares

(2.1.6.2) Issue 2. Allocation of underutilized species in the incentive fisheries
- Option 1. Allocate catch share to the historical participants (closed class) of the underutilized species for the qualifying years. Available incentive fishery quota is the available TAC for that fishing year minus the closed class fishery quota allocation as outlined below. Incentive fishery quota creates an incentive for fishermen to fish cleaner, either by gear conversion or reduction in halibut bycatch rates in other directed fisheries. If no halibut is allocated to the fishery through an incentive set aside the only entry mechanism is halibut savings.)
  - Suboption 1. Allocate harvest shares as a fixed allocation in metric tons. If available TAC is less than the total fixed allocation in metric tons then reduce participants' allocation pro-rata amongst closed class harvest share holders.
  - Suboption 2. Catch history is based on 125% of catch history. If available TAC is less than the allocation in metric tons then reduce participants' allocation pro-rata amongst closed class harvest share holders.
  - Suboption 3. For underutilized species, the combined total of all pounds landed during the qualifying years will be compared with the total TAC for the qualifying years to determine the *percent of the fishery utilized.* During each successive year the *percent of the fishery utilized* is applied to the total TAC with the resulting sum apportioned among qualifying vessels. The remaining TAC is available for an incentive fishery.

(2.1.7) Element 7. Entry level rockfish program
- Option 1. Allow entry level jig and < 60 ft CV longline harvests of Pelagic shelf rockfish
  - Suboption 1. include Pacific ocean perch
  - Suboption 2. a range of 3 to 15% of the TAC will be set aside to accommodate this fishery
  - Suboption 3. Determine catch accounting methods. Then, defer decisions on remainder of program to a trailing amendment.
  - Suboption 4. Catch of these vessels would be deducted from the following years TAC prior to distributing harvest shares. After initial allocation, defer design of program to trailing amendment.
- Option 2. No entry level rockfish fishery for:

Suboption 1. Gulf wide
Suboption 2. Central Gulf including West Yakutat
Suboption 3. Western Gulf

(2.1.8) Element 8. Skipper/Crew and Second Generation

A skipper is defined as the individual owning the Commercial Fishery Entry Permit and signing the fish ticket.
NOTE: Skipper definitions needed to distinguish differences between sectors

Option 1. No skipper and crew provisions
Option 2. Allocate percentage to captain:
Suboption 1. Initial allocation of 2% shall be reserved to qualified captains
Suboption 2. Initial allocation of 5% shall be reserved to qualified captains
Suboption 3. Initial allocation of 7% shall be reserved to qualified captains

Defer remaining issues to a trailing amendment and assumes simultaneous implementation with rationalization program.

(2.1.9) Element 9. Communities
NOTE: Bering Sea and Western Alaska CDQ communities may be excluded from community programs.

(2.1.9.1) Option 1. Regionalization
The following applies to both Central and Western Gulf areas:

If adopted, all processing share allocated to shorebased processors will be categorized by region.

- Processing shares that are regionally designated cannot be reassigned to another region.
- Catcher vessel harvest shares are regionalized based on where the catch was processed, not where it was caught.
- Catcher processor shares and incentive fisheries are not subject to regionalization.
- Qualifying years to determine the distribution of shares between regions will be consistent with the preferred alternative under "Element 1, Qualifying Periods".

Central Gulf: Two regions are proposed to classify harvesting and (if adopted) processing shares: North - South line at 58° 51.10' North Latitude (Cape Douglas corner for Cook Inlet bottom trawl ban area).

The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased catch and subject to the North - South distribution: Pollock in Area 630; CGOA flatfish (excludes arrowtooth flounder); CGOA Pacific ocean perch; CGOA northern rockfish and pelagic shelf rockfish (combined); CGOA Pacific cod (inshore); GOA sablefish (trawl); WY pollock

Western Gulf: The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased catch: Pacific cod in Area 610; pollock in Area 610; pollock in Area 620

Option 1. Dutch Harbor (Akutan)/Sand Point
Option 2. Kodiak/Sand Point
Option 3. Both

NOTE: Boundaries will be defined in June based on public testimony (staff will attach a detailed map of the GOA to aid in boundary identification.

(2.1.9.2) Option 2. Community Fisheries Quota (CFQ)

(2.1.9.2.1) Issue 1. Administrative Entity
- Option 1. Gulf wide administrative entity
- Option 2. Regional administrative entities (Western Gulf, Central Gulf, Eastern Gulf)
- Option 3. Community level

(2.1.9.2.2) Issue 2. Eligible Communities

Option 1. Population:
- a. Less than 1,500 residents
- b. Less than 2,500 residents
- c. Less than 5,000 residents
- d. Less than 7,500 residents

Option 2. Geography
- a. Coastal Communities without road connections to larger community highway network
- b. Coastal communities adjacent to salt water
- c. Communities within 10 miles of the Gulf Coast
- d. Communities on the south side of the Alaska Peninsula that are adjacent to Central and Western GOA management areas (including Yakutat) within 5 nmi from the water, but not to include Bering Sea communities included under the Western Alaska CDQ program.

Option 3. Economy (based on all fish).

Staff will analyze other proxies that could be used to describe fishery dependence, such as the number of permits as a proportion of the population, historic processing or fishing data, or other data sources.
- a. GOA fisheries dependant communities defined as communities with range of 10-30% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related (includes all fisheries).
- b. GOA fisheries supplemented communities defined as communities with a range of 5-10% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related. (includes <u>all</u> fisheries
- c. All GOA communities

(2.1.9.2.3) Issue 3. Species
- Option 1. All rationalized groundfish species
- Option 2. Limited to species that can be caught without (hard on) bottom trawling

(2.1.9.2.4) Issue 4. Allocation

Harvester shares

Option 1. 5% of annual TAC
Option 2. 10% of annual TAC
Option 3. 15% of annual TAC
Option 4. 20% of annual TAC

Processing shares

Option 5 5% of annual processing allocation
Option 6. 10% of annual processing allocation
Option 7. 15% of annual processing allocation
Option 8. 20% of annual processing allocation

(2.1.9.2.5) Issue 5. Harvesting of Shares

Option 1. Limited to residents of eligible communities that own their vessels
Option 2. Limited to residents of eligible communities
Option 3. No limitations on who harvests shares

Issue 6. Use of Revenue

Option 1. Community development projects that tie directly to fisheries or fishery related projects and education.
Option 2. Community development projects that tie directly to fisheries and fisheries related projects, education and government functions.
Option 3. Education, social and capital projects within eligible communities as well as governmental functions.

(2.1.9.3) Option 3. Community Purchase Program

Eligible communities**.**

Option 1. Population:

a. Less than 1,500 residents
b. Less than 2,500 residents
c. Less than 5,000 residents
d. Less than 7,500 residents

Option 2. Geography

a. Coastal Communities without road connections to larger community highway network
b. Coastal communities adjacent to salt water
c. Communities within 10 miles of the Gulf Coast

Option 3. Economy (based on all fish).

Staff will analyze other proxies that could be used to describe fishery dependence, such as the number of permits as a proportion of the population, historic processing or fishing data, or other data sources.

a. GOA fisheries dependant communities defined as communities with a range of 10-30% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related (includes all fisheries).
b. GOA fisheries supplemented communities defined as communities with a range of 5-10% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related. (includes <u>all</u> fisheries
c. All GOA communities

(2.1.9.4) Option 4. Community Incentive Fisheries Trust (CIFT)

The CIFT has full ownership of CIFT harvest shares and holds these shares in trust for the communities, processors and crew members in the region to use as leverage to mitigate impact directly associated with implementation of a rationalization program.

(2.1.9.4.1) Issue 1. Harvest Share Distribution

10-30 % of harvest shares shall be originally reserved for GOA CIFT associations. These harvest shares will be a pool off the top before individual distribution of harvest shares.

(2.1.9.4.2) Issue 2. CIFT Designation

- Option 1. One CV CIFT for entire GOA (exclude SEO)
- Option 2. Regional CV CIFTs :
  - Suboption 1. Central GOA (Kodiak, Chignik)
  - Suboption 2. Western GOA
  - Suboption 3. North Gulf Coast (Homer to Yakutat)
- Option 3. CP-based CIFT

Defer remaining issues to a trailing amendment

(2.1.10) Element 10. PSC Crab, Salmon, and Other Species (Excluding Halibut)

Prepare a discussion paper to describe processes currently underway to address bycatch of salmon, crab and herring and other forage fish species (including FMP amendments and PSEIS options for crab bycatch). The paper should (1) provide timelines and how they relate to the GOA rationalization timeline; (2) describe fishery, survey, and habitat data sources that will be used. Based on the recommendations in the paper, the Council would determine if (1) existing processes are sufficient or if some measures need to be more closely linked to rationalization decisions, and (2) if other or additional management approaches are appropriate to include in a rationalized fishery in a trailing amendment.

Put Element 10 (2.1.10) (PSC Crab and Salmon) on the same status with other trailing amendments (including skipper/crew shares; fee and loan program; CIFT issues). The discussion paper would be done parallel to the EIS similarly to how analysis of the other trailing amendments is planned.

(2.1.11) Element 11. Review and Evaluation

(2.1.11.1) Issue 1. Data collection.

A mandatory data collection program would be developed and implemented. The program would collect cost, revenue, ownership and employment data on a periodic basis to provide the information necessary to study the impacts of the program. Details of this program will be developed in the analysis of the alternatives.

(2.1.11.2) Issue 2. Review and Sunset

Option 1. The program would sunset unless the Council decides to continue or amend the program. The decision of whether to continue or amend would be based on a written review and evaluation of the program's performance compared to its objectives.

- Suboption 1. 5 year after fishing under the program
- Suboption 2. 7 year after fishing under the program
- Suboption 3. 10 year schedule after fishing under the program
- Suboption 4. No sunset provision.

Option 2. Formal program review at the first Council Meeting in the 5th year after implementation to objectively measure the success of the program, including benefits and impacts to harvesters (including vessel owners, skippers and crew), processors and communities by addressing concerns, goals and objectives identified in the problem statement and the Magnuson Stevens Act standards. This review shall include analysis of post-rationalization impacts to coastal communities, harvesters and processors in terms of economic impacts and options for mitigating those impacts. Subsequent reviews are required every 5 years.

(2.1.12) Element 12. Sideboards

Participants in the GOA rationalized fisheries are limited to their historical participation based on GOA rationalized qualifying years in BSAI and SEO groundfish fisheries.

(2.2) ALTERNATIVE 2. HARVEST SHARE PROGRAM,
SUBALTERNATIVE 2: HARVESTER ONLY SHARE PROGRAM WITH A COOPERATIVE.

(2.2.1-12) ELEMENTS 1 – 11 (2.1.1 – 2.1.12) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED OPTIONS FROM ALTERNATIVE 2, SUBALTERNATIVE 1 ARE INCLUDED.

(2.2.13) Element 12. Harvester only (1-Pie) Cooperatives

Option 1. Harvest Share (QS/IFQ) Holder Voluntary Cooperatives

1. Co-op formation is voluntary
2. Allocation of harvest shares (QS/IFQ) is determined under Alternative 3, Subalternative1 (Alternative 2 Subalternative 1 (2.1))
3. Co-ops can be formed between:
    a. Eligible Harvesters only
    b. Harvesters and a Processor
        i. At least 4 harvesters none of whom are owned by the co-op processor (using the 10% threshold rule)
        ii. Processors can associate with more than one co-op each comprised of 4 or more harvesters none of whom are owned by the co-op processor (using the 10% threshold rule)
        iii. Processors are limited to 1 co-op per plant for each specific gear type
    c. CVs and CPs
        i. Cooperatives will be segregated into CVs and CPs.
        ii. Cooperatives will not be segregated into CVs and CPs.
4. Eligible processors are any legally licensed processing facility
5. Set co-op use caps at 25 to 75% of total TAC by species

6. Vessel use caps would be set at 1.5-2 X the individual cap if participating in the co-op and grandfather initial issuees at their initial allocation
7. Overage and underage limits would be applied in the aggregate at the co-op level
8. Monitoring and enforcement requirements would be shared by co-op
9. Annual allocation (IFQ) permit would be issued to the co-op
10. Duration of cooperative agreements
    a. 1 year
    b. 3 year
    c. 5 year
11. Vessels (Steel) and LLPs used to generate harvest shares used in a co-op may not participate in other federally managed open access fisheries in excess of sideboard allotments
12. Co-op allocations. Co-op members may internally allocate and manage the co-op's allocation per the co-op membership agreement. Subject to any harvesting caps that may be adopted, member allocations may be transferred and consolidated within the co-op to the extent permitted under the membership agreement. Co-op members are jointly and severally responsible for co-op vessels harvesting in the aggregate no more than their co-op's allocation of target species, non-target species and halibut mortality, as may be adjusted by interco-op transfers. Co-ops may adopt and enforce fishing practice codes of conduct as part of their membership agreement. Co-ops may penalize or expel members who fail to comply with their membership agreement.

Option 2. Mandatory Co-ops (*includes all co-op formation provisions from Suboption 1. Voluntary Co-ops, with the following additional provisions*)

1. Co-ops must be formed before any annual harvest share (IFQ) allocation is allocated (a harvester can only receive an annual harvest share (IFQ) allocation by joining a cooperative).
2. CPs would be allowed to form a sector co-op which does not need to meet conditions 3-8 below.
3. Annual harvest allocation (IFQ) to harvesters who elect to join a co-op is determined under Alternative 3, Subalternative1.
4. Allocations to Co-ops will only be made under the following conditions: Required Co-op agreement elements:

   Harvesters and processors are both concerned that rationalization will diminish their current respective bargaining positions. Therefore, a pre-season co-op agreement between eligible, willing harvesters and an eligible, and willing processor is a pre-requisite This co-op agreement must contain:

   1) A price setting formula for all fish harvested by the co-op
   2) A fishing plan for the harvest of all co-op fish
5. Eligible harvesters who are also eligible processors cannot participate in price setting negotiations. A 10% ownership trigger will be used to determine the linkage between the harvester and the processor.
6. Eligible harvesters who are also eligible processors must participate in the co-op. A 10% ownership trigger will be used to determine the linkage between the harvester and the processor.
7. Harvesters must declare prior to fishing which Co-op they will deliver to in a given year.

1) No share reduction for moving between co-ops year to year
2) A one year 10-20% share reduction each time a harvester moves to a different co-op. There shall be a limit on the voluntary migration of harvesters from co-op to co-op such that no co-op loses more than 20% of its annual allocation in any single year

8. Ownership and Usage of Co-op allocations
    a. At least 20% of the harvester allocation share owned by the co-op processor-owned vessels must be available for lease to other co-op harvesters, at prevailing market lease rates.
    b. No mandatory leasing provision
9. Harvest share holders that do not choose to join a co-op
    a. May fish in open access
    b. Are not allowed to participate in the rationalized fisheries until they join a co-op

(2.2.14) Element 13. SECTOR ALLOCATION PROGRAM WITH COOPERATIVES

NOTE: In June 2003, staff will provide recommendations for incorporating the following issues into this subalternative.

(2.2.14.1) Issue 1. Sector Identification

The following sectors are eligible to receive a sectoral allocation by area:

Option 1. CP Trawl
Option 2. CP Longline
Option 3. CP Pot

(2.2.14.2) Issue 2. Target Species

As listed in Alternative 2, Subalternative 1, Element 3, Issue 1 – a, b, c and Issue 3, Option 1, 9, and 11. (2.1.3.1a,b,and c and 2.1.2.2 Options 1,9, and 11)

(2.2.14.3) Issue 3. Bycatch Species

As listed in Alternative 2, Subalternative 1, Element 4 (2.1.4.4)

Option 1. Allocation of quota shares.

a) Allocate quota to all sectors based on sector bycatch rates.
    Suboption 1. Based on average catch history by area and target fishery
    Suboption 2. Based on 75th percentile by area by target fishery
b) Allocation will be adjusted pro rata to allocate 100% of the annual TAC for each bycatch species.
    Suboption. Other rockfish in the Western Gulf will not be allocated, but will be managed by MRB and will go to PSC status when the TAC is reached.

Option 2. Retain these species on bycatch status for all sectors with current MRAs.

(2.2.14.4) Issue 4. PSC Species

(2.2.14.4.1) Issue 1. Accounting of Halibut Bycatch

Option 1. Halibut bycatch would be managed by NMFS at the sector level.

Option 2. Halibut bycatch would be managed at the coop level

(2.2.14.4.2) Issue 2. Halibut PSC Allocation

Option 1. Initial allocation based on sector average bycatch rates for the qualifying years.

Option 2. Allocations will be adjusted pro rata to equal the existing PSC.

(2.2.14.5) Issue 5. Incentive Species

Option 1. Underutilized unallocated species are available for harvest by any sector with sufficient PSC and bycatch to prosecute the fishery, once that sector's allocation of that underutilized species has been used.

Option 2. Incentive species are available for harvest, providing the vessel has adequate PSC and bycatch species, under the following conditions:

Suboption 1. If a sector does not form a coop, the unallocated incentive species are available for harvest by the sector once the sector's allocation of the incentive species has been used.

Suboption 2. If a coop is formed in a sector, the individual coop member's apportionment of that species has to be used prior to that individual gaining access to the unallocated portion of the incentive species. The coop member does not have to wait until all coop members have used their individual apportionments.

Suboption 3. For vessels not participating in a sector coop, the unallocated incentive species are available for harvest once the non-coop sector's allocation of the incentive species has been used.

(2.2.14.6) Issue 6. Communities

As in Alternative 2, Subalternative 1, Element 9 (Areas) and Option 2 (2.1.9.2) (Community Fisheries Quota).

(2.2.14.7) Issue 7. Review and Evaluation

Option 1. The program would sunset unless the Council decides to continue or amend the program. The decision of whether to continue or amend would be based on a written review and evaluation of the program's performance compared to its objectives.

Suboption 1. 5 year after fishing under the program

Suboption 2. 7 year after fishing under the program

Suboption 3. 10 year schedule after fishing under the program

Suboption 4. No sunset provision.

Option 2. Formal program review at the first Council Meeting in the 5th year after implementation to objectively measure the success of the program, including benefits and impacts to harvesters (including vessel owners, skippers and crew), processors and communities by addressing concerns, goals and objectives identified in the problem statement and the Magnuson Stevens Act standards. This review shall include analysis of post-rationalization impacts to coastal communities, harvesters and processors in terms of economic impacts and options for mitigating those impacts. Subsequent reviews are required every 5 years.

(2.2.14.8) Issue 8. Sideboards

Participants in the GOA rationalized fisheries are limited to their aggregate historical participation based on GOA rationalized qualifying years in BSAI and SEO groundfish fisheries.

(2.2.14.9) Issue 9. Cooperatives

- Members of a sector may choose to form a cooperative with a civil contract to manage harvest levels and other issues as determined by agreement of the cooperative.
- NMFS will allocate quota to the cooperative based on the aggregate historical catch of target, bycatch and PSC species.
- Cooperative will be responsible for managing the aggregate catch of the cooperative so as not to exceed the cooperatives allocation of target, bycatch and PSC species.
- Vessels that choose not to participate in the cooperative are allocated the remaining sectoral TAC, bycatch and PSC allocations after deduction of the cooperative allocation and any other sector-wide deductions.
- NMFS may establish a minimum level of cooperative membership by sector
  Option 1: Minimum number of license holders
  Option 2: Minimum percentage of catch history

(2.2.14.9.1) Issue 1. Co-op participation

Option 1. Co-ops are voluntary

Suboption 1. Co-op may be formed upon agreement of 100% of sector (AFA Offshore type co-op)

Suboption 2. One or more co-ops may form per sector upon agreement of a minimum percentage (50, 75, 80%) of:

a. eligible vessels in order to form co-op(s)

b. catch history in order to form co-op(s)

Option 2. Co-ops can be comprised of one sector/gear type only

Option 3. Co-ops from different gear groups may enter into inter co-op agreements.

(2.2.14.9.2) Issue 2. Co-op Allocations

Co-op allocations will be based on same formula as used for sectoral allocations

(2.2.14.9.3) Issue 3. Open Access

Any vessels that do not want to enter into co-op agreements will fish in open access. The aggregate catch history from non-participating vessels, based on same qualifying years, will go into the open access pool.

(3) ALTERNATIVE 3. HARVEST SHARE PROGRAM WITH CLOSED PROCESSOR CLASS

(3.1) SUBALTERNATIVE 1. HARVESTER SHARE PROGRAM WITH CLOSED PROCESSOR CLASS

(3.1-12) ELEMENTS 1–11 (2.1.1-12) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED OPTIONS FROM ALTERNATIVE 2, SUBALTERNATIVE 1 ARE INCLUDED. THIS APPLIES ONLY TO CV SHARES.

(3.1.13) Element 12. Harvester Delivery requirements

50-90% of harvest share allocation will be reserved for delivery to the qualified closed trawl or fixed class processor. The other 50 -10% of harvest share allocation can be delivered to:

i. any processor including CPs

ii. any processor excluding CPs

(3.1.14) Element 13. Closed Class Processor Qualifications

(3.1.14.1) Issue 1. To purchase groundfish must have purchased and processed a minimum amount of groundfish as described below in at least 4 of the years
Option 1. 1995 – 1999.
Option 2. 1995 – 2001
Option 3. 1995 – 2002

a. Trawl eligible Processors
Option 1. 2000 mt
Option 2. 1000 mt
Option 3. 500 mt

b. Fixed gear eligible Processors
Option 1. 500 mt
Option 2. 200 mt
Option 3. 50 mt

c. Trawl and Fixed gear eligible processors
i) Meet criteria for both the closed class trawl process catch and closed class fixed gear process catch as described above
ii) Total catch - Trawl and fixed catch combined
Option 1. 2,500 mt
Option 2. 1,200 mt
Option 3. 550 mt

d. Processors are defined at:
Option 1. Processors are defined at the entity level
Option 2. Processors are defined at the plant level

(3.1.14.2) Issue 2. Processor licenses would be issued to
Option 1. Operator – must hold a federal or state processor permit.
Option 2. Custom processing history would count for purposes of limiting
Option 3. Facility owner

(3.1.14.3) Issue 3. Transferability of eligible processor licenses
Processor licenses can be sold, leased, or transferred.
Option 1. Within the same community
Option 2. Within the same region

(3.1.14.4) Issue 4: Processing Use caps by closed class processor type (trawl, fixed or trawl and fixed), by CGOA and WGOA regulatory areas:
Range 70% to 130% of TAC processed for all groundfish species for the largest closed class processor

(3.1.14.5) Issue 5. Processing Caps may apply at:
Option 1. the facility level
Option 2. the entity level

ALTERNATIVE 3. Harvest Share Program with Closed Processor Class
(3.2) Subalternative 2 - Harvester Share Program with Closed Processor Class Cooperative

(3.2.1-12) ELEMENTS 1 –11 (SEE 2.1.1-12) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED OPTIONS FROM ALTERNATIVE 3, SUBALTERNATIVE 1 ARE INCLUDED. THIS APPLIES ONLY TO CV SHARES.

Option 1. Same provisions as Alternative 2, Subalternative 2, Option 1, (2.2.13 Option 1) Voluntary Cooperatives
Option 2. Same provisions as Alternative 2, Subalternative 2, Option 2, (2.2.13 Option 2) Mandatory Cooperatives

(3.2.13) Element 12. Closed processor class cooperatives

(3.2.13.1) Issue 1. Co-op delivery provisions.
50-90% of the co-op allocation will be delivered to their linked trawl or fixed gear processor (see vessel – processor linkage below). The remaining 50 -10% can be delivered to any qualified closed class processor of the same type

(3.2.13.2) Issue 2. Initial Co-op allocations.
Option 1. Each harvester is eligible to join a co-op with a qualified fixed gear or trawl closed class processor.
Option 2. Each harvester is initially eligible to join a co-op with the qualified fixed gear or trawl closed class processor to which the harvester delivered the largest amount of groundfish during the year prior to implementation.
Option 3. Each harvester is initially eligible to join a co-op formed with the qualified fixed or trawl closed class processor in to which the harvester delivered the largest amount of groundfish during the last [1, 2, or 3] years of the harvester allocation base period. If the processor with whom the harvester is eligible to form a co-op is no longer operating, the harvester is eligible to join a co-op with any qualified processor.
i. Largest amount by species groupings (rockfish, flatfish, pollock, cod)
ii. Largest amount by aggregate

(3.2.14) Element 13. SECTOR ALLOCATION PROGRAM WITH COOPERATIVES

See Alternative 2, Subalternative 2, Element 13 (2.2.14).

(4) ALTERNATIVE 4. HARVESTER AND PROCESSOR SHARE PROGRAM (2-PIE)
(4.1) SUBALTERNATIVE 1. HARVESTER AND PROCESSOR SHARE PROGRAM

(4.1.1-12) ELEMENTS 1–11 (2.1.1-12) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED OPTIONS FROM ALTERNATIVE 2, SUBALTERNATIVE 1, ARE INCLUDED.

NOTE: OPTIONS FOR PROCESSORS WILL NEED TO BE ADDED

(4.2) SUBALTERNATIVE 2, VOLUNTARY CO-OP WITH ALLOCATED IFQ/IPQ

(4.2.1-12) ELEMENTS 1–11 (SEE 2.1.1-12) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED OPTIONS FROM ALTERNATIVE 2, SUBALTERNATIVE 2, ARE INCLUDED.

(4.2.13) Element 12. Processing Sector– Applicable to Two pie (IFQ/IPQ) Cooperatives

Catcher Processor harvest shares would be for all gear types & vessel class.

Binding Arbitration process, for failed price negotiation, between fishermen and processors.

Processor Purchase Requirements. Any processor within any Gulf community can buy IPQ shares from the Catcher processor sector.

(4.2.13.1) Issue 1. Eligible processors

Option 1. U.S. Corporation or partnership (not individual facilities)

Suboption 1. owner
Suboption 2. operator – must hold a Federal or State processor permit
Suboption 3. custom processor

Option 2. Individual processing facility by community

Suboption 1. owner
Suboption 2. operator - must hold a Federal or State processor permit
Suboption 3. custom processor

Option 3. Processed Groundfish for any Groundfish fishery in the rationalization program for

Suboption 1. 2000 or 2001
Suboption 2. Any year 1998-2002
Suboption 3. 2001 or 2002

(4.2.13.2) Issue 2. Categories of Processing Quota shares

Option 1. Target Species (Species where there is a significant historical processor participation) Area 610 pollock, Area 620 pollock, Area 630 pollock, WGOA Pacific cod, CGOA Arrowtooth flounder, CGOA Flatfish (excludes Arrowtooth flounder), CGOA POP, CGOA Pelagic Shelf Rockfish & Northern rockfish (combined), CGOA Pacific cod (inshore), WY Pollock

Option 2. Non-target Species (Species on Bycatch status throughout the year (e.g., Sablefish – trawl, Other rockfish, thornyhead, shortraker/rougheye).

Suboption 1. Allocate IPQ shares based on the Fleet bycatch rates by gear:

a. based on average catch history by area and target fishery
b. based on 75th percentile by area by target fishery

Suboption 2. Exclude non-target species from IPQ awards

Option 3. Regional categories – processing quota shares will be regionalized by species grouping as shown in the regionalization section if regionalization is adopted.

Option 4. C/P will be issued C/P harvest shares which combine the privilege of catching and processing product.

(4.2.13.3) Issue 3. Qualifying periods

(Option: AFA vessels assessed as a group)

Option 1. 95-01 (drop 1 or 2)
Option 2. 98-01 (drop 1)
Option 3. 95-02 (drop 1, 2, or 3)
Option 4. 95-97 (for AFA vessels)
Option 5. 98-02 (drop 1 or 2)

Option 6. 00-02 (drop 1)
The following applies to all options:
Suboption. Exclude 2000 for pot gear Pacific cod

NOTE: the above suboption, if selected, would count as 1 year dropped (if selected)
NOTE: The Council noticed the public of its intent to further reduce the above options at the June Council meeting.

(4.2.13.4) Issue 4. Percentage of season's TAC for which IPQs are distributed:
Option 1. 100%
Option 2. 90% - the remaining 10% would be considered open delivery.
Option 3. 80% - the remaining 20% would be considered open delivery.
Option 4. 50% - the remaining 50% would be considered open delivery.
The following applies to all suboptions:
Processors that receive IPQ awards will be allowed to buy open access fish.

(4.2.13.5) Issue 5. Processing Shares Cap categories:
Option 1. Applied by species groupings – Pollock, Pacific cod, Flatfish (excludes Arrowtooth), and rockfish.
Option 2. Applied to all groundfish species combined

(4.2.13.6) Issue 6. Ownership Caps on Processing Shares
Option 1. Maximum share allocation in the fishery
Option 2. Maximum share allocation in the fishery plus 5%
Option 3. Maximum share allocation in the fishery plus 10%
Option 4. Maximum share allocation in the fishery plus 15%
Option 5. Select a cap between the average and maximum allocation with initial allocations grandfathered

(4.2.13.7) Issue 7. Use Caps: may select different options depending on sector, gear, etc.
Annual use caps on a company (facility) basis of
Option 1. 30 percent to 60 percent of the TAC
Option 2. The largest IPQ holding in the fishery at the time of initial allocation
Option 3. Custom processing will be allowed
a) subject to use caps
Option 4. No use caps in the event of a catastrophic event.
Option 5. Emergency transfers of IPQ for weather conditions.
Option 6. Vessel overages not counted toward IPQ use caps.

(4.2.13.8) Issue 8. Community Protection under Processing Shares

Communities will be allowed to buy processing history -- First right of refusal for communities for all processing history designated for that particular community that is sold to entities outside the community.
NOTE: The Council will use provisions similar to the right of first refusal in the Crab rationalization program.

(4.2.14) Element 13. SECTOR ALLOCATION PROGRAM WITH COOPERATIVES

See Alternative 2, Subalternative 2, Element 13 (2.2.14).

TRAILING AMENDMENTS

The Council intent is for these trailing amendments to be implemented simultaneously with the main rationalization program.

1.Fee and Loan Program

2.Skipper/Crew Share Program issues:

3.Remaining issues of CIFT program

4. PSC Crab, Salmon, and Other Species management

Document C
Gulf of Alaska Rationalization
Options Discussion Paper

The following is staff dicussion of the elements and options in the April 2003 motion of the Council concerning rationalization of the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries. Section numbers on the left hand margin are from the April motion as renumbered by the staff to provide easier referencing. In the text, reference is often made to the proposed revision to the motion. Those section numbers appear in the "staff proposed revision" to the April motion.

2.1 Harvest Share Program

(2.1)

A) The pollock TAC is allocated based on areas
610 (Western Gulf),
620 and 630 (Central Gulf),
640 (West Yakutat)

For purposes of allocating pollock, staff suggests using these areas for making harvest share allocations. A suggested clarification is included in 2.1 of the revised motion.

B) The Pacific cod allocation will need to be divided between West Yakutat area (issued as harvest shares) and SEO (not included in the program).

C) The allocation of SRRE and thornyhead might need to be divided between West Yakutat area and SEO.

These provisions appear in section 2.1 of the revised motion.

(2.1) - SEO bycatch allocations

1) How are these bycatch species to be allocated - for most bycatch species we use "average bycatch rates" in this area we have no targets to work from

2) how are these fisheries to be managed - if we allocated quota for two bycatch species that implies that target fisheries (with the exceptions of halibut and sablefish) are conducted in an "open access" manner but with bycatch IFQs

These provisions appear in section 2.1 of the revised motion.

(2.1) - Exclusion of jig gear from the program

Under this exclusion, we would need make an allocation to jig gear based on historical harvests during the qualifying period - this would be fished in an "open access" manner. A suggested clarification is

included in 2.1 of the revised motion.

(2.1.1) Qualifying landing criteria

Option 2, which would allocate Pacific cod based on annual average percentage harvests, is a suboption. Section 2.2.1 of the revised motion includes this provision as a suboption.

(2.1.2.2) - The revision clarifies that the first two eligibility provisions pertain to LLP participation. The second two provisions pertain to non-LLP participation.

(2.1.2.2) - The Council should further clarify how the program is intended to interact with State water parallel fisheries. In the current motion, a provision is made for allocations from State water parallel fisheries. These allocations would endow historic parallel fishery participants with the Federal fishery allocations. The motion is unclear as to whether and how the parallel fisheries will be accommodated after the program is implemented. Would those receiving an allocation be permitted to participate in the parallel fisheries. How would the TAC be managed if harvest share allocations are made in the federal fisheries and a competitive parallel fishery is conducted. In the current fisheries, both the Federal and parallel fisheries close when the Federal TAC is harvested from combined Federal and parallel fisheries harvests. If harvest shares are allocated and a derby parallel fishery is also conducted, an explicit allocation to the parallel fishery might be needed to regulate total harvests.

(2.1.3.1) - Allocations of target species -These allocations will be analyzed based on all retained catch (excluding meal) of the species by the gear type - regardless of whether the species is determined to be the “target” at the time of harvest. These species designations appear in 2.3.1 of the revised motion.

(2.1.3.1 and 2.1.4) - Targets and Bycatch - these sections specify the following species allocations by gear type:

Species	**Trawl**	**Longline**	**Pot**
pollock	target		
Pacific cod	target	target	target
pelagic shelf rockfish	target	target	
northern rockfish	target	target	
deepwater flatfish	target	target	
rex sole	target		
shallow water flatfish	target		
flathead sole	target		
Pacific ocean perch	target	target	
Arrowtooth flounder	target	target	
thorny head	bycatch (inc. SEO)	bycatch (inc. SEO)	bycatch (inc. SEO)

Species	Trawl	Longline	Pot
rougheye	bycatch (inc. SEO)	bycatch (inc. SEO)	bycatch (inc. SEO)
shortraker	bycatch (inc. SEO)	bycatch (inc. SEO)	bycatch (inc. SEO)
other slope rockfish	bycatch	bycatch	bycatch
Atka mackerel	bycatch	bycatch	bycatch
sablefish	bycatch	bycatch	bycatch

If a gear type does not receive an allocation of a "target species" that is required to prosecute a fishery, it is possible that an allocation could not be fished. The allocation of all species should by gear should be examined for shortcomings that might preclude a gear type from fishing its allocation because an omitted allocation of a target species. These species designations appear in 2.3.1 of the revised motion.

(2.1.3.1) - Vertical Integration - the reference to the placeholder is unclear. I do not know what it refers to. This reference appears in 2.3.3.4 of the revised motion.

(2.1.4) - Allocation of Bycatch Species

Option 1 - use "fleet bycatch rates by gear" for allocation

This can be interpreted several ways:

a) Determine average bycatch rates by gear type based on an assessment of the "targeted species" (i.e., determine targets for each fishery) - Possible bases are:

1) landing basis based on highest land (using fish tickets)
2) haul or set basis using observer data - this option would not count topping off in allocations

Once the average bycatch rate is determined, the allocation would be made based on allocation of targets by gear

b) Determine an annual statistical bycatch rate based on the amount of harvest of the bycatch species in relation to harvest of each target species. This method would not require a determination of the "target species" for any time or activity period but would instead determine bycatch as a function of harvests of the target species

Because of the unpredictability of these methods, a reasonable goal for the Council might be to examine distributions generated by the analysis and accept those numbers (instead of having numbers recalculated at the time of the allocation). In all cases, the bycatch allocations would have to be a percentage of the TAC. **Representative allocations in pounds will be provided based on recent harvest levels.** These provision appear in 2.4 of the revised motion.

(2.1.5.2) Halibut PSC Allocation

1) Allocation would be based on "average halibut bycatch by directed target species". These calculations could be made on the same basis as those for bycatch by species.
2) Option 1(b) would require the calculation to be conducted on a CV/CP sector basis **(there is no similar option for differentiating the allocation of bycatch to C/Ps from CVs.)**

These provisions appear in 2.5 of the revised motion. Bycatch provisions referred to are in 2.4 of the

revised motion.

(2.1.6)

A) The introductory sentence provides that "owners must utilize all of their shares before participating in incentive fisheries." Adding the term "incentive species" may clarify that the owner must not use all shares but only those of the incentive species. Based on prior Council discussion, this appears to be the intent. This provision with the proposed change is in 2.6 of the revised motion.

B) For West Yakutat, it might be useful to specify species - if this is intended to extend beyond the fisheries specified in the introduction to the section. The provision is in 2.6 of the revised motion.

C) In several places in this section, the term "incentive" has been substituted for the term "underutilized" to clarify the species that are covered by this aspect of the program.

(2.1.6.1) Incentive fisheries

Option 1 would permit LLP holders to enter the incentive fishery. Since the fishery would be rationalized under this alternative, LLP license would not exist. The provisions that require landings in the fishery seem to parallel the qualification requirements for an initial allocation for shares. Since share holders may change over time, these provisions also are not appropriate. **Staff suggests these provisions all be removed.** More appropriate provisions from one of the cooperative options are included in the proposed revision. Those provisions will likely need revision to make them workable in all programs. These provisions are in 2.1.6 of the revised motion.

(2.1.6.2) Incentive Fisheries

Under suboptions 1 and 2 provide for tonnage allocations to historic participants prior to allocation to the incentive fishery. These allocations are assumed to be average annual historic harvest tonnages, based on the chosen qualifying years. These provisions appear in 2.6.2 of the revised motion.

(2.1.12) Sideboards

The sideboards section is omitted from several alternatives. This seems to be an oversight in referencing. The revised motion suggested by staff includes the sideboards in all options. these options are all contained in 2.12 of the revised motion.

2.2 IFQ with Cooperatives

Options for several different cooperative programs are combined in this single section. In addition, other cooperative options appear in sections 3.2 and 4.2 of the Council's motion. The proposed revision has combined all cooperative options in Section 4. In addition, the "alternative descriptions" explain how different sets of elements work together to form coherent alternatives. The following discussion pertains to individual elements and options and discusses clarifications and possible revisions.

(2.2.13 Option 1)- Cooperatives Option 1, Paragraph 3 provides, several cooperative rules. The purpose and consequences of several provisions are not clear.

1) The provision is unclear in that "eligible harvesters" is not defined. A better term might be

"harvest share holder". This provision appears in 4.2.1 of the revised motion.

2) Processors are typically not cooperative members. If that is intended here, the language should be clear that the processor is not a cooperative member. The processor associates with the cooperative. This terminology has been corrected in several places in Section 4 of the revised motion.
3) The provision is also unclear as to which provisions are options and which are suboptions; a) and b) appear to be mutually exclusive suboptions. This provision is included in 4.2.1.2 of the revised motion.
4) Provisions b.ii and b.iii, appear to be mutually exclusive suboptions. This provision is included in 4.2.1.2 of the revised motion.
5) The provisions of i, ii, and iii do not appear to allow processor affiliated vessels to join cooperatives. Cooperatives are oriented toward harvesting coordination (not pricing). Inclusion of processor affiliated vessels could be important to achieving coordination. The AFA and the crab rationalization program both permit processors affiliated vessels to join cooperatives. A suggested provision is included in 4.2.1.1 of the revised motion.
6) The provision is unclear concerning the requirement of C/P cooperatives to associated with a processor. A suggested provision is added as 4.2.1.3 of the revised motion.
7) In addition to the rules specified, one option that could be included is to limit harvesters to forming cooperatives with fellow sector members (i.e., holders of shares for the same gear, vessel type (CV or C/P) , and/or vessel length). If share holders cannot coordinate fishing among members should they be in the same cooperative. The level of these requirements should depend on the level of coordination that is reasonable. Target species and area may also be considered for cooperative formation. These provisions are included in 4.2.1 of the revised motion.

(2.2.13, Option 1) Cooperatives Option 1, 7 provides that overages and underages would be applied in the aggregate at the cooperative level. A few problems arise with this provision:

1. Overage determinations are typically based on the last delivery of the share holder (i.e., an overage occurs if a vessel harvests more than 5 percent in excess of its unused shares in its last landing). These would be applied to the last cooperative delivery but not in the aggregate. Overage provisions from 2.3.3.9 would be used to determine the consequences of overages. The provisions of 4.3.2.2 clarifies that the cooperative unit is responsible for the harvest of its allocation (which would include any overage).

(2.2.13, Option 1) Cooperatives Option 1, 11 provides for sideboards of vessels and licenses. These should be moved to the sideboards section of the document ,so it can be considered for all alternatives. Staff's revisions to the motion includes the provision in 2.12.

(2.2.13, Option 1) Cooperatives Option 1, 12 should explicitly provide for intercooperative transfers. A provision has been added to 4.3.2.7 of the revised motion clarifying that intercooperative transfers are permitted to the extent allowed among different sectors by 2.3.2.3 of the revised motion.

(2.2.13, Option 1) - Cooperatives Option 1 should include a provision that explains how individual caps would be applied. For example, individuals caps could be applied to limit the amount of shares that an individual can bring to cooperatives. Intercooperative transfers would be subject to both an individual cap (applicable to the individual acquiring the shares) and to the cooperative cap. Once in a cooperative use of shares would be defined by the cooperative rules and any applicable limits. The staff proposed revision to the motion includes such a provision in 4.4.3..

(2.2.13 Option 2) - Mandatory Cooperatives

A) The term "IFQ" should be dropped from this option because all annual allocations are to cooperatives not individuals. The purpose of this provision might be clearer, if it says only that annual allocations are made only to cooperatives. This change is proposed in 4.1, Option 2.

B) Paragraph 2 provides that "CPs would be allowed to form a sector co-op which does not need to meet conditions 3-8 below." "Sector" must be defined for purposes of this option. Possible interpretations of the term are:

1) All holders of C/P shares (all gear types, species, areas)
2) All holders of C/P shares of a specific gear type, target species, and area
3) Any group of four or more C/P share holders with shares for use by the same gear (this is a very weak definition of a sector and perhaps should not be defined as a sector to avoid confusion)
4) Any group of four or more C/P share holders (this is a very weak definition of a sector and perhaps should not be defined as a sector to avoid confusion)

The revised motion accommodates these definitions in 4.2.1.

C) Provisions of 3, which would not be applicable to C/Ps, is needed to determine allocations.

D) Paragraph 3 is redundant since it is already included by reference in the introduction.

E) Paragraph 4 requires a price setting contract and fishing plan in the cooperative agreement. Two issues arise concerning these requirements. First, any minimum requirements for the contracts and fishing plans under this provision are unstated. Is it adequate to have a contract with a Peterburg processor for $0.01 for any deliveries that might be made (with none intended). The level of review of the agency of these contracts needs to be specified. If several small cooperatives form (4 persons to a cooperative is the minimum required) this could be a substantial burden on the agency. If this section is intended to provide reasonable protection to either sector without overburdening the administrators, substantial detail will need to be developed and included. No suggestions are made. The provision is included in 4.2.4 of the revised motion.

F) Paragraph 5 prohibits processor affiliated vessels from participating in price negotiations, where processor affiliates are defined using the 10 percent threshold rule. This provision may not be consistent with current antitrust law. Is it intended that the Council ask for a modification of antitrust law. Otherwise, the provision could be dropped or revised to specify that antitrust law should determine whether processor affiliates are permitted to participate in price negotiations. The proposed revision is included in 4.3.2.4 of the revised motion.

G) Paragraph 6 is unclear as to its purpose. If the intention is to clarify that processor affiliates can join cooperatives, as required to receive an annual allocation, that could be made clear just by stating that. A proposed provision appears in 4.2.1.1 of the revised motion.

H) Paragraph 7 provides that "Harvesters must declare prior to fishing which Co-op they will deliver to in a given year." Harvesters do not deliver to cooperatives. This seems to be directed toward requiring harvesters to join cooperatives. This provision seems redundant and can be dropped

(unless it is directed to some other goal).

I) Paragraph 7. 2) provides for share reductions in the event a harvester changes cooperatives. The provision does not specify how the reduction would be reallocated. It could be reallocated to the cooperative or redistributed among all participants in a fishery (i.e., gear type, species, area, vessel type). Two options are suggested in 4.5.2 of the revised motion.

J) Paragraph 7. 2) contains a limit on the amount that a cooperative's annual allocation can change year-to-year from members departing the cooperative. The provision does not provide for how this limit will be implemented. Several questions are raised:

1) If an cooperative agreement expires are members subject to the limitation.
2) Can harvesters leave cooperative's prior to the agreement expiration.
3) If several harvesters all wish to leave a cooperative at once, which harvesters are permitted to leave the cooperative.
4) Can a harvester belong to multiple cooperatives.
5) If the departure of a harvester from a cooperative would lead to the cooperative having less than 4 members, what happens.
6) If a harvester owns more than 20 percent of a cooperative's shares, can the harvester leave the cooperative.
7) Since a cooperative's members may hold shares in many species, how is 20 percent of the cooperative's holdings determined.

This provision is omitted from the revised motion.

J) Paragraph 8. a. provides that "processor-owned" vessels must make available at least 20 percent of their shares to other harvesters in the cooperative at market rates. This presents several problems:

1) Vessels are not the right reference in a share based fishery. "Shares held by processors" might be a better reference.
2) What constitutes processor ownership.
3) How are market lease rates determined.

Staff suggests this provision be dropped or substantially reworked. It appears in 4.3.2.5 of the revised motion.

K) Paragraph 9.a) provides that the harvesters that do not join a cooperative are permitted to participate in an open access fishery. The scope of the open access should be defined. Is the open access fishery:

1) all shares of any harvester that is not a cooperative member
2) all shares of harvesters in the area, gear, vessel type (CV or C/P), and/or species for which the harvester holds shares.

The second of these options is included in 4.6.1 of the revised motion. The motion should also be clear that an open access fishery will be conducted only if adequate allocations are available. In addition, NMFS will need to determine the distribution of those allocations among target fisheries, if members of the open access fishery have histories in more than one target species. The revision to 2.6.1 also includes these provisions.

L) Paragraph 9 defines participation of harvesters that are not in cooperatives. C/Ps should not be exempt from this provision. The provisions as revised in 4.6.1 would allow C/P participation.

(2.2.14) - Element 13. Sector Allocation Program with Cooperatives

This section primarily references other sections of the elements and options. The section appears to be more of a preferred alternative (with some options) than a new set of options. The inclusion of these options can be accomplished most straightforwardly by identifying provisions that are not covered by other portions of the motion and including them where appropriate. This particular alternative is almost entirely contained in the alternative for "Harvest Share Program with Cooperatives Alternative" (2.2). Staff proposes modification of that alternative to include all elements from this "Sector Allocation Program with Cooperatives" alternative. The following discussion of each section of this alternative shows where each element of the "Sector Allocation Program with Cooperatives" alternative is contained in the "Harvest Share Program with Cooperatives Alternative" (2.2) or suggests the appropriate location to include the element.

(2.2.14.1) Sector Identification

This section is consistent with the proposed modification of 4.2.1. That provision contains two alternatives for defining "sectors". One is the vessel type (CV or C/P) and gear definition; the other is by area, vessel type, vessel length, and/or gear. Defining these units as sectors and accommodating an open access fishery for a sector in 4.6 of the revised motion provides for the "sector allocation with cooperatives".

(2.2.14.2) Target Species

These are all incorporated into this option by reference and therefore are already contained in the motion. These are akin to selecting a preferred alternative.

(2.2.14.3) Bycatch Species

The first line incorporates by reference, so it is already contained in the motion. The two options are copied from 2.1.4 and therefore are also in the motion.

(2.2.14.4) PSC Species

2.2.14.4.2 - The provisions concerning accounting for PSC harvests are effectively contained in 2.5.1. That provision provides for cooperative management of the PSC, which would apply if cooperatives are formed. Sector management as proposed by Option 1 could only be effective if all sector members were in the same cooperative, in which case cooperative management would be adequate. So, inclusion of a "sector management" provision is redundant.

2.2.14.4.2 These provisions concerning allocation are contained in 2.5.2 of the revised motion.

(2.2.14.5) Incentive Species

Option 1 is effectively contained in 2.1.6 of the revised motion.
Option 2 provides eligibility criteria for participation in incentive fisheries. **These provisions or some other reasonable eligibility provisions should be incorporate into 2.6.1. These provisions will need revision to make them workable in all different programs.** Staff revision to the motion includes these provisions in 2.6.1 of the revised motion.

(2.2.14.6) Communities

These provisions are contained in 2.9.2 of the revised motion..

(2.2.14.7) Review and Evaluation

These provisions are contained in 2.11.2 of the revised motion..

(2.2.14.8) Sideboards

Sideboard protections are provided for in 2.12 of the revised motion..

(2.2.14.9) Cooperatives

The following bullets correspond to the bullets of this Issue in the alternative.

- The provision authorizing the formation of cooperatives is in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 of the revised motion..
- The provision for allocation of catch to a cooperative based on its members' individual histories is contained in 4.3.1 of the revised motion..
- Cooperative management of its harvests is contained in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 of the revised motion..
- The allocation of the TAC remaining after cooperative allocations to non-cooperative members is provided for in two different ways, depending on the options selected:
  1) in the voluntary cooperative model, non-cooperative members would receive IFQ in 4.1, Option 1 of the revised motion..
  2) in the mandatory cooperative model, non-cooperative members would be permitted to fish in an open access fishery, if the Council elects to create that fishery 4.6 of the revised motion..
- The use of a number of "license holders" for cooperative formation is not appropriate in a share-based fishery, since no licenses would exist. Share holders are a more appropriate reference. A requirement for a minimum number of share holders for cooperative formation is contained in 4.2.2, Option 1. The use of a minimum amount of the catch history of a sector for cooperative formation is added to 4.2.2, Option 2 of the revised motion..

(2.2.14.9.1) Co-op participation

Option 1 Voluntary cooperatives are provided for by 4.1, Option 1 of the revised motion.. The term "voluntary" raises the question of whether non-members of cooperatives can participate. To date, the Council has defined a voluntary cooperative program as one that allocates IFQs to non-members. In the event that no individual allocations are made to non-members of a cooperative, the cooperative could be referred to as mandatory with provision for non-member participation in an open access fishery. This is provided for in 4.6 a) of the revised motion. Alternatively, 4.6 b) of the revised motion provides for the option that non-members cannot participate, if that is desired.

Suboption 1 and suboption 2.

These provisions overlap significantly in themselves and with one of the bullets in the previous provision. Suboption 1 and suboption 2b. provide for a minimum catch history for cooperative formation, which is equivalent to one of the bullets. These options are provided for in 4.2.2 in the revised motion. That provision also notes that different percentages could be accommodated for different sectors. Suboption 2b provides for a minimum number of license holders for cooperative formation. As noted, license holders are not the appropriate reference in a share-based fishery. A requirement for a minimum number of share holders for cooperative formation is contained in 4.2.2 of the revise motion, as well.

Option 2 This option provides for cooperatives to be composed of share holders from the same sector. This is provided in 4.2.1 of the revised motion.

Option 3 This option provides for trading of shares among different cooperatives (implicitly sectors). Section 2.3.2.1 of the revised motion provides for no vessel length categories. Section 2.3.2.2, Option 1 of the revised motion, provides for

no CV or C/P designation of harvest shares, which effectively allows trading among those vessel types. Section 2.3.2.3 of the revised motion provides for no gear designations and use of shares allocated to one gear by another gear type. One or more of these could be adopted to effectively allow trading among any different sector that might be defined by the Council. **If some other objective is intended by this provision, it should be clarified. Otherwise, staff suggests this provision be omitted in favor of the more specific provisions in other sections of the motion.** The provision is included in Section 4.3.2.7 of the revised motion.

(2.2.14.9.2) Co-op Allocations

This provision is equivalent to the sector allocation provision of 2.3.1, Option 1 of the revised motion. This provision only applies if the Council elects a "true" sector cooperative, under which the entire allocation of a sector is made to a single cooperative of members of that sector. Since the provision is contained elsewhere, it is not necessary to include it again.

(2.2.14.9.3) Open Access

An open access fishery is provided for in 4.6a of the revised motion. Provisions defining participation in the open access fishery and the allocation to the open access fishery are suggested.

3.1 Closed Class of Processors

(3.1.13) Harvest Delivery Requirements -Under this provision, a percentage of the harvest share allocation would be deliverable to a qualified processor, with the remaining shares deliverable to any processor.

A) Designation of A shares (deliverable only to a qualified processor) and B shares (deliverable to any processor may simplify the discussion.

B) Is it intended that all QS would be of one class (with the delivery restricted portion inseparable from the free delivery portion). In that case, IFQ would be issued in a specific ratio of Class A IFQ to Class B IFQ for all QS holdings. Alternatively, the underlying QS could be severable, so that Class A QS can be sold separately from Class B QS. A provision and suboption could be added that provide:

> If a closed class of processor or processor share alternative is chosen, CV harvest shares will be issued in two classes. Class A shares will be deliverable to a qualified processor or processor share holder (as applicable). Class B shares will be deliverable to any processor.
>
> Suboption: Only the annual allocations will be subject to the Class A/Class B distinction. All long term shares or history will be of a single class.

These provisions have been added to 2.3.2.4 of the revised motion.

C) This would apply only to CV harvest shares (not C/P) harvest shares. "CV" should be added before the term "harvest shares" in this provision. This is added to 3.1.2 of the revised motion.

(3.1.14.1)

A) This paragraph should be clear that the closed class only applies to a portion of the TAC (not the whole TAC). The current language says that a processor must be qualified to "purchase groundfish" suggesting only qualified processors can participate. Suggested language is included in 3.1.2.1 of the revised motion.

B) In paragraph c it is not clear how i) and ii) work. Are they separate suboptions? (3.1.2.1 c. of the revised motion)

(3.1.14.2)

a) This provision describes who would receive licenses. These provision also determine who will receive credit for processing history. The provision should be clear as to its application. Suggested language is added to clarify that the provision determines the entity that will receive credit for landings.

b) Option 2 provides that custom processing would be "counted for purposes of limiting entry". Does this mean that
   a) a processor that processes fish under a custom processing agreement gets credit for that processing
   b) the party paying for that processing receive credit

   This also appears to be a suboption since not all processing is not custom processing. (3.1.2.2 of the revised motion)

(3.1.14.3)

a) The regionalization of processing licenses is not provided for in the regionalization section of the motion (2.9.1 of the revised motion). That section should provide for the regionalization of licenses and a method of determining the (particularly for floaters).

b) If processor license are to be regionalized or community based, the level at which eligibility rules are applied will need to be clarified. If company based, it is possible that an entity could qualify for a license through activity at multiple locations.

c) Can processors stack (or hold multiple) licenses?
   The response may depend on
   1) whether licenses are issued at the facility/plant or company level
   2) whether licenses are community or region limited

   (Clarification could be added to section 3.1 of the revised motion)

d) Will the transfer of a processor license in a cooperative program affect the cooperative association? If a license transfer also transfers all cooperative associations, the delivery obligations would also transfer. In addition, any share reduction provision would also apply, so that leaving a cooperative would result in a loss of shares in the following year. (4.5.3 of the revised motion)

(3.1.14.4) Processor use caps will be analyzed separately for each target species (3.1.2.4 of the revised motion)

3.2 Closed Class of Processors with Cooperatives

(3.2) Harvest share program with closed class of processors with cooperatives

As with some of the other sections, it might be easiest to incorporate these provisions into the cooperative options of 2.1.14. Most of the provisions are contained in that section and the few additional provisions can be easily consolidated. The provisions of 3.2.13 can be incorporated as follows:

(3.2.12.1) Added to 2.1.14, Option 2, paragraph 10.

(3.2.12.1) Initial Co-op Allocations

(this provision concerns eligibility to join a cooperative at the start of the program)
The provisions are added to 4.2.1 in the proposed revision to the motion.

4.2 Two-Pie IFQ with Cooperatives

(4.2.13) The reference to "Processor Purchase Requirements" is unclear. There is no requirement in this provision. This reference is dropped from 3.2.2 of the revised motion.

(4.2.13) The provision concerning binding arbitration is very incomplete. A program will need to be developed if one is intended (see 3.2.1 of the revised motion).

(4.2.13) The provision concerning purchase of processing shares from catcher/processors is very incomplete. No option appears for the allocation of processing shares to C/Ps. If this is intended to provide for division of C/P shares into separate harvest (CV harvest share) and processing privileges (PQS), it will need to be revised. Also, the provision should be clear concerning whether catcher/processors can merge shares once they are severed.

Also a provision should be added that identifies eligibility for purchase of processing shares, if any is contemplated.

(4.2.13.1) These provisions may differ depending on what the level of allocation is intended. If the program is plant based, the eligibility should depend on the plant operations. If the program is company based, the eligibility could depend on the company operations. In all cases the allocation of shares is to the owner. References to custom processing should be clarified. Two suboptions are suggested. A complete revision is suggested in 4.2.13.1.

(4.2.13.2) Option 1 would allocate processing shares for target species. Option 2 would allocate processing shares for bycatch species. In multispecies, in which harvesters can be expected to harvest varying amounts of different species, the coordination of harvest shares can be expected to be complicated. Establishing cooperatives may simplify that coordination by facilitating transfers within a cooperative. Intercooperative transfers are likely to be necessary to facilitate harvest of the TAC of the different harvest species because of the complexity of forecasting bycatch. The coordination of processing shares will add a layer of complexity, because of the one-to-one correspondence of processing shares and Class A harvest shares. Extension of processing shares to species that are bycatch only, would further complicate the coordination of share usage. (see 3.2.4, Option 2)

(4.2.13.2) Option 4 would allocate C/Ps shares with a harvest privilege and a processing privilege. Since this is the only provision related to C/P allocations, it cannot be an option but is a provision without option. The provision is in 3.2.4.1 of the revision.

(4.2.13.3) The provision concerning AFA vessels is removed since it doesn't apply to processors. If an issue of AFA processors exists, the Council could add a provision requesting staff to examine AFA processor allocations separately. The provision is omitted from 3.2.5 of the revised motion.

(4.2.13.4) The last sentence of this section provides that processors awarded IPQ can purchase "open access fish". This should provide that any processor can purchase fish delivered with Class B shares (open delivery fish). The provision in the revised motion is modified in 3.2.6.

(4.2.13.5) The processor caps proposed by this section combine some species into groups. This method of establishing caps does not accommodate the different changes in TACs for different species. If aggregated caps are contemplated, some method of combining TACs should be considered. An option to apply caps on a species basis is added to the revision in 3.2.7.

(4.2.13.7) It is unclear whether the inclusion of custom processing in calculating use caps is an option (option 4, clause a). **Is it intended that an option be analyzed for not including custom processing in calculating compliance with a use cap?**

Option 4 and 5 might be better worded by starting with the phrase "use caps will be waived to the extent that compliance is prevented by...." (See 3.2.9 of the revision)

(4.2.13.8) The provision concerning community purchase of processing shares should include some requirements concerning management and oversight of share holdings. Provisions similar to those of the halibut and sablefish community purchase program could be used for communities that do not receive an allocation of shares. For communities that do receive an allocation, share holdings could be governed by provisions that apply to the allocation. (see 3.2.10 of the revised motion)

STAFF PROPOSED REVISION

AGENDA C-1(e)
JUNE 2003

DOCUMENT D

NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
GULF OF ALASKA GROUNDFISH RATIONALIZATION
ALTERNATIVES, ELEMENTS AND OPTIONS

NOTE:
1) ***bolded, italicized numbering*** after each provision is a reference to the location of the provision in the Council's April 2003 motion as renumbered by staff.
2) Underlined provisions are revisions proposed by staff.

1 Status Quo (No Action Alternative) ***(1)***

2 Harvest Sector Provisions ***(2)***

2.1 Management Areas :
Areas are Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat—separate areas
For Pollock: 610 (Western Gulf), 620 and 630 (Central Gulf), 640 (West Yakutat)

SEO: exempt except for Shortraker, Rougheye, and thornyhead as bycatch species

Gear: Applies to all gear except jig gear ***(2.1)*** – the jig fishery would receive an allocation based on its historic landings in the qualifying years – the jig fishery would be conducted on an open access basis

2.2 Qualifying periods and landing criteria (same for all gears in all areas)
(The analysis will assess AFA vessels as a group)
Option 1. 95-01 (drop 1, or 2)
Option 2. 98-01 (drop 1)
Option 3. 95-02 (drop 1, 2, or 3)
Option 4. 95-97 (for AFA vessels)
Option 5. 98-02 (drop 1 or 2)
Option 6. 00-02 (drop 1)
The following applies to all options:
Suboption. Exclude 2000 for pot gear Pacific cod
NOTE: the above suboption, if selected, would count as 1 year dropped (if selected)
NOTE: The Council noticed the public of its intent to further reduce the above options at the June Council meeting. ***(2.1.1)***

2.2.1 Qualifying landing criteria ***(2.1.2)***

Landings based on retained catch for all species (includes WPR for C/P sector)
NOTE**:** Total pounds landed will be used as the denominator.

Catch history determined based on the **poundage** of retained catch year (does not include meal) ***(2.1.2.1)***

STAFF PROPOSED REVISION

Suboption: catch history for p. cod fisheries determined based on a **percentage** of retained catch per year (does not include meal)

2.2.2 Eligibility

LLP participation

Option 1 Eligibility to receive catch history is any person that holds a valid, permanent, fully transferable LLP license.

Suboption: Any person who held a valid interim LLP license as of January 1, 2003.

Basis for the distribution to the LLP license holder is: the catch history of the vessel on which the LLP license is based and shall be on a fishery-by-fishery basis. The underlying principle of this program is one history per license. In cases where the fishing privileges (i.e. moratorium qualification or LLP license) of an LLP qualifying (i.e. GQP, EQP, RPP and Amendment 58 combination) vessel have been transferred, the distribution of harvest shares to the LLP shall be based on the aggregate catch histories of (1) the vessel on which LLP license was based up to the date of transfer, and (2) the vessel owned or controlled by the LLP license holder and identified by the license holder as having been operated under the fishing privileges of the LLP qualifying vessel after the date of transfer. Only one catch history per LLP license.

Non-LLP (State water parallel fishery) participation

Option 2: Any individual who has imprinted a fish ticket making non-federally permitted legal landings during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries.

Option 3: Vessel owner at time of non-federally permitted legal landing during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries. ***(2.1.2.2)***

Management of the parallel fishery once this program is implemented must be considered. How will total harvests be managed, if a derby parallel fishery is prosecuted?

2.3 Target Species Rationalization Plan *(2.1.3)*

Target Species by Gear

2.3.1 Initial Allocation of catch history

Option 1: Allocate catch history by sector and gear type

Option 2: Allocate catch history on an individual basis

a. Trawl CV and CP:
pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, Pelagic shelf rockfish

b. Longline CV and CP:
Pacific Cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if turbot is targeted), northern rockfish, Arrowtooth flounder

c. Pot CV and CP:
Pacific Cod ***(2.1.3.1, 2.2.14.2)***

2.3.2 Harvest share (or QS/IFQ) Designations ***(2.1.3.2)***

STAFF PROPOSED REVISION

2.3.2.1 Vessel categories

Option 1. No Categories

Option 2. Vessel Categories as follows

Vessels < 60'

Vessels >= 60' and < 125'

Vessels >= 125' ***(2.1.3.2.1)***

2.3.2.2 Harvest share sector designations:

Option 1. No designation of harvest shares (or QS/IFQ) as CV or CP

Option 2. Designate harvest shares (or QS/IFQ) as CV or CP. Annual CV harvest share allocation (or IFQ) convey a privilege to harvest a specified amount. Annual CP harvest share allocation (or IFQ) conveys the privilege to harvest and process a specified amount. Designation will be based on:

Actual amount of catch harvested and processed onboard a vessel by species.

b. All catch in a given year if any was legally processed onboard the vessel by species. ***(2.1.3.2.2)***

2.3.2.3 Harvest share gear designations

Option 1. No gear designation ***(see also 2.2.14.9.1, Option 3)***

Option 2. Designate harvest shares as Longline, Pot, or Trawl

Option 3. Longline and pot gear harvest shares (or IFQ) may not be harvested using trawl gear.

Option 4. Pot gear harvest shares (or IFQ) may not be harvested using longline gear ***(2.1.3.2.3)***

2.3.2.4 <u>If a closed class of processor or processor share alternative is chosen, CV harvest shares will be issued in two classes. Class A shares will be deliverable to a qualified processor or processor share holder (as applicable). Class B shares will be deliverable to any processor.</u>

<u>Option: Only the annual allocations will be subject to the Class A/Class B distinction. All long term shares or history will be of a single class.</u>

2.3.3 Transferability and Restrictions on Ownership of Harvest shares (or QS/IFQ) ***(2.1.3.3)***

2.3.3.1 Persons eligible to receive harvest shares by transfer must be (not mutually exclusive):

Option 1. US citizens who have had at least 150 days of sea time

Option 2. Entities that have a U. S. citizen with 20% or more ownership and at least 150 days of sea time

Option 3. Entities that have a US citizenship with 20% or more ownership

Option 4. Initial recipients of CV or C/P harvest share

Option 5. US Citizens eligible to document a vessel.

Option 6. Communities would be eligible to receive harvest shares by transfer (this provision would be applicable if certain provisions of 2.9 are adopted.) ***(2.1.3.3.1, 2.2.14.2)***

2.3.3.2 Restrictions on transferability of CP harvest shares

Option 1. CP harvest shares maintain their designation upon transfer

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Option 2. CP harvest shares maintain their designation when transferred to persons who continue to catch and process CP harvest shares at sea, if CP harvest shares are processed onshore after transfer, CP harvest shares converts to CV harvest shares ***(2.1.3.3.2)***

2.3.3.3 Redesignate CP shares as CV shares upon transfer to a person who is not an initial issuee of CP shares:

a. all CP shares
b. trawl CP shares
c. longline CP shares ***(2.1.3.3.3)***

2.3.3.4 Vertical integration ***(See also placeholder under Option 6???????)***
Harvest shares initial recipients with more than 10% limited threshold ownership by any holder of processing shares or licenses are:

Option 1. capped at initial allocation of harvest CV and CP shares
Option 2. capped at 115-150% of initial allocation of harvest CV shares
Option 3. capped at 115-150% of initial allocation of harvest of CP shares
(2.1.3.3.4)

2.3.3.5 Definition of sea time
Sea time in any of the U.S. commercial fisheries in a harvesting capacity.
(2.1.3.3.5)

2.3.3.6 Leasing of QS ("leasing of QS" is defined as the transfer of annual IFQ permit to a person who is not the holder of the underlying QS for use on any vessel and use of IFQ by an individual designated by the QS holder on a vessel which the QS holder owns less that 20% -- same as "hired skipper" requirement in halibut/sablefish program).

Option 1. No leasing of CV QS (QS holder must be on board or own at least 20% of the vessel upon which a designated skipper fishes the IFQ).
Option 2. No leasing of CP QS (QS holder must be on board or own at least 20% of the vessel upon which a designated skipper fishes the IFQ).
Option 3. Allow leasing of CV QS, but only to individuals eligible to receive QS/IFQ by transfer.
Option 4. Allow leasing of CP QS, but only to individuals eligible to receive QS/IFQ by transfer.
Option 5. Sunset [CP – CV] QS leasing provisions [3 – 5 – 10] years after program implementation. ***(2.1.3.3.6)***

2.3.3.7 Separate and distinct harvest share use ("ownership") caps
NOTE: The Council gave notice that it will revisit the language in this option to address the CV and CP sectors in June 2003.
Vessel Use caps on harvest shares harvested on any given vessel shall be set at <u>two times</u> the use cap for each species. Initial issuees that exceed the use cap are grandfathered at their current level as of a control date of April 3, 2003; including transfers by contract entered into as of that date. Caps apply to all harvesting categories by species with the following provisions:

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Apply individually and collectively to all harvest share holders in each sector and fishery.

Percentage-caps by species are as follows (a different percentage cap may be chosen for each fishery):

i. Trawl CV and/or CP (can be different caps):

Use cap based at the following percentile of catch history for the following species: (i.e., 75th percentile represents the amount of harvest shares that is greater than the amount of harvest shares for which 75% of the fleet will qualify.)

pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, pelagic shelf rockfish

Suboption 1. 75 %
Suboption 2. 85%
Suboption 3. 95 %

ii. Longline and Pot CV and/or CP (can be different caps)

based on the following percentiles of catch history for the following species:

Pacific cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if Greenland turbot is targeted), northern rockfish

Suboption 1. 75 %
Suboption 2. 85%
Suboption 3. 95 %

iii. Conversion of CP shares:

1. CP shares converted to CV shares
   Option 1: will count toward CV caps
   Option 2: will not count toward CV caps at the time of conversion.
2. Caps will be applied to prohibit acquisition of shares in excess of the cap. Conversion of CP shares to CV shares alone will not require a CP shareholder to divest CP shares for exceeding the CP share cap. ***(2.1.3.3.7)***

2.3.3.8 Owner On Board Provisions

Provisions may vary depending on the sector or fishery under consideration (this provision may be applied differently pending data analysis)

All initial issues (individuals and corporations) would be grandfathered as not being required to be aboard the vessel to fish shares initially issued as "owner on board" shares. This exemption applies only to those initially issued harvest share units.

Suboption 1. No owner on board restrictions.

Suboption 2. A portion (range of 5-100%) of the quota shares initially issued to fishers/ harvesters would be designated as "owner on board."

NOTE: The Council may revise the upper end of the range.

Suboption 3. All initial issuees (individual and corporate) would be grandfathered as not being required to be aboard the vessel to fish shares initially issued as "owner on board" shares for a period of 5 years after implementation.

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Suboption 4. Shares transferred to initial issuees in the first 5 years of the program would be considered the same as shares initially issued (range of 5 –100% of the quota shares). See above NOTE

Suboption 5. "owner on board" shares transferred by initial issuees, after the grace period, would require the recipient to be aboard the vessel to harvest the IFQ.

Suboption 6. In cases of hardship (injury, medical incapacity, loss of vessel, etc.) a holder of "owner on board" quota shares may, upon documentation and approval, transfer/lease his or her shares a maximum period of (Range 1-3 years). ***(2.1.3.3.8)***

2.3.3.9 Overage Provisions

a. Trawl CV and CP:

Suboption 1. Overages up to 15% or 20% of the last trip will be allowed— greater than a 15% or 20% overage result in forfeiture and civil penalties. An overage of 15% or 20% or less, results in the reduction of the subsequent year's annual allocation or IFQ. Underages up to 10% of last trip harvest shares (or IFQ) will be allowed with an increase in the subsequent year's annual allocation (or IFQ).

Suboption 2. Overage provisions would not be applicable in fisheries where there is an incentive fishery that has not been fully utilized for the year. (i.e., no overages would be charged if a harvest share (or IFQ) holder goes over his/her annual allocation (or IFQ) when incentive fisheries are still available).

b. Longline and pot CV and CP :

Overages up to 10% of the last trip will be allowed with rollover provisions for underages— greater than a 10% overage results in forfeiture and civil penalties. An overage of less than 10% results in the reduction of the subsequent year's annual allocation or IFQ. This provision is similar to that currently in place for the Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program (CFR 679.40(d)).

Suboption. Overages would not be applicable in fisheries where there is an incentive fishery that has not been fully utilized for the year. (i.e., no overages would be allowed if a harvest share (or IFQ) holder goes over his/her annual allocation (or IFQ) when incentive fisheries are still available). ***(2.1.3.3.9, 2.2.14.2)***

2.3.3.10 Retention requirements for rockfish, sablefish and Atka mackerel:

Option 1. no retention requirements

Option 2. require retention (all species) until the annual allocation (or IFQ) for that species is taken with discards allowed for overages

Option 3. require 100% retention (all species) until the annual allocation (or IFQ) for that species is taken and then stop fishing. ***(2.1.3.3.10)***

2.3.3.11 Limited processing for CVs

Option 1. No limited processing

Option 2. Limited processing of rockfish species by owners of CV harvest shares is allowed consistent with limits set in the LLP program which allows up to 1 mt of round weight equivalent of groundfish to be processed

per day on a vessel less than or equal to 60ft LOA. ***(2.1.3.3.11, 2.2.14.2)***

2.3.3.12 Processing Restrictions

Option 1. CPs may buy CV fish

a. 3 year sunset

Option 2. CPs would be prohibited from buying CV fish

a. 3 year sunset

Option 3. CPs are not permitted to buy fully utilized species (cod, pollock, rockfish, sablefish, and allocated portion of flatfish) from CVs.

a. Exempt bycatch amounts of these species delivered with flatfish ***(2.1.3.3.12)***

2.4 Allocation of Bycatch Species *(2.1.4, 2.2.14.2)*

Thornyhead, rougheye, shortraker, other slope rockfish, Atka mackerel, and trawl sablefish Includes SEO Shortraker, Rougheye, and Thornyhead rockfish.

Option 1. Allocation of shares

a. Allocate shares to all fishermen (including sablefish & halibut QS fishermen) based on fleet bycatch rates by gear:

Suboption 1. based on average catch history by area and target fishery

Suboption 2 based on 75th percentile by area by target fishery

b. Allocation of shares will be adjusted pro rata to allocate 100% of the annual TAC for each bycatch species.

Suboption. Other slope rockfish in the Western Gulf will not be allocated, but will be managed by MRB and will go to PSC status when the TAC is reached ***(2.2.14.2, Option 3)***.

Option 2. Include these species for one gear type only (e.g., trawl). Deduct the bycatch from gear types from TAC. If deduction is not adequate to cover bycatch in other gear types, on a seasonal basis, place that species on PSC status until overfishing is reached.

Option 3. Retain these species on bycatch status for all gear types with current MRAs. ***(2.2.14.2, Option 2)***

Option 4. Allow trawl sablefish catch history to be issued as a new category of sablefish harvest shares ("T" shares) by area. "T" shares would be fully leasable, exempt from vessel size and block restrictions, and retain sector designation upon sale.

Suboption. These shares may be used with either fixed gear or trawl gear.

2.5 PSC Species *(2.1.5)*

2.5.1 Accounting of Halibut Bycatch

Pot vessels continue their exemption from halibut PSC caps.

Hook and line and trawl entities

Option 1. Same as that under IFQ sablefish and halibut programs

Option 2. Cooperatives would be responsible for ensuring the collective halibut bycatch cap was not exceeded

Option 3. Individual share or catch history owners would be responsible to ensure that their halibut bycatch allotment was not exceeded ***(2.1.5.1, 2.2.14.4)***

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2.5.2 Halibut PSC Allocation

Each recipient of fishing history would receive an allocation of halibut mortality (harvest shares) based on their allocation of the directed fishery harvest shares. Bycatch only species would receive no halibut allocation.

Initial allocation based on average halibut bycatch by directed target species during the qualifying years. Allocations will be adjusted pro rata to equal the existing PSC cap. ***(2.2.14.4.2)***

Option 1. By sector average bycatch rates by area by gear

a) Both sectors

b) Catcher processor/Catcher Vessel ***(2.1.5.2)***

2.5.3 Annual transfer/Leasing of Trawl or Fixed Gear Halibut PSC mortality

Halibut PSC harvest share are separable from target groundfish harvest shares and may be transferred independently. When transferred separately, the amount of Halibut PSC allocation would be reduced, for that year, by:

Option 1 0%

Option 2 . 5%

Option 3 . 7%

Option 4 . 10%

Option 5 . Exclude any halibut PSC transferred for participation in the incentive fisheries ***(2.1.5.3)***

2.5.4 Permanent transfer of Halibut PSC harvest share mortality

Option 1. Groundfish harvest shares and Halibut PSC harvest shares are non-separable and must be transferred as a unit

Suboption. exempt Pacific cod

Option 2. Groundfish harvest shares and Halibut PSC harvest shares are separable and may be transferred separately ***(2.1.5.4)***

2.5.5 Retention of halibut bycatch by longline vessels

Halibut bycatch may be retained outside the halibut season from Jan 30 to start of commercial fishery, and from end of commercial fishery through December 15.

Option 1. retention is limited to (range 10-20%) of target species

Option 2. permit holder must have sufficient harvest shares (or IFQ) to cover landing ***(2.1.5.5)***

2.6 Incentive species *(2.1.6)*

Arrowtooth flounder, deepwater flatfish, flathead sole, rex sole, shallow water flatfish.

Owners of shares must utilize all their shares <u>for an incentive species</u> before participating in incentive fishery <u>for that species</u>.

Option: The portion of historic unharvested West Yakutat TAC will be made available as an incentive fishery, subject to provision of incentive fisheries (***<u>Specify species if broader than those listed above)</u>***

PLACEHOLDER language for eligibility: The incentive fishery is limited to persons that hold harvest shares and adequate PSC and bycatch species shares to prosecute these fisheries.

2.6.1 Eligibility to fish in the incentive fisheries

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Staff suggests removing these options

Option 1. Any person with a valid LLP

Option 2. Entities that have 20% or more U.S. ownership and at least 150 days of sea time with 10 mt of fixed gear harvest shares or 50 mt of trawl harvest shares

Option 3. Entities that have 20% or more U.S. ownership with 10 mt of fixed gear harvest shares or 50 mt of trawl harvest shares ***(2.1.6.1)***

Incentive species are available for harvest, providing the vessel has adequate PSC and bycatch species, under the following conditions:

Suboption 1. If a sector does not form a coop, the unallocated incentive species are available for harvest by the sector once the sector's allocation of the incentive species has been used.

Suboption 2. If a coop is formed in a sector, the individual coop member's apportionment of that species has to be used prior to that individual gaining access to the unallocated portion of the incentive species. The coop member does not have to wait until all coop members have used their individual apportionments.

Suboption 3. For vessels not participating in a sector coop, the unallocated incentive species are available for harvest once the non-coop sector's allocation of the incentive species has been used. ***(2.2.14.5, Option 2)***

2.6.2 Allocation of incentive species in the incentive fisheries

Option 1. Allocate catch share to the historical participants (closed class) of the incentive species for the qualifying years. Available incentive fishery quota is the available TAC for that fishing year minus the closed class fishery quota allocation as outlined below. Incentive fishery quota creates an incentive for fishermen to fish cleaner, either by gear conversion or reduction in halibut bycatch rates in other directed fisheries. If no halibut is allocated to the fishery through an incentive set aside the only entry mechanism is halibut savings.)

Suboption 1. Allocate harvest shares as a fixed allocation in metric tons. If available TAC is less than the total fixed allocation in metric tons then reduce participants' allocation pro-rata amongst closed class harvest share holders.

Suboption 2. Catch history is based on 125% of catch history. If available TAC is less than the allocation in metric tons then reduce participants' allocation pro-rata amongst closed class harvest share holders.

Suboption 3. For incentive species, the combined total of all pounds landed during the qualifying years will be compared with the total TAC for the qualifying years to determine the *percent of the fishery utilized*. During each successive year the *percent of the fishery utilized* is applied to the total TAC with the resulting sum apportioned among qualifying vessels. The remaining TAC is available for an incentive fishery. ***(2.1.6.2)***

2.7 Entry level rockfish program

Option 1. Allow entry level jig and < 60 ft CV longline harvests of Pelagic shelf rockfish

Suboption 1. include Pacific ocean perch

Suboption 2. a range of 3 to 15% of the TAC will be set aside to accommodate this fishery

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Suboption 3. Determine catch accounting methods. Then, defer decisions on remainder of program to a trailing amendment.

Suboption 4. Catch of these vessels would be deducted from the following years TAC prior to distributing harvest shares. After initial allocation, defer design of program to trailing amendment.

Option 2. No entry level rockfish fishery for:

Suboption 1. Gulf wide

Suboption 2. Central Gulf including West Yakutat

Suboption 3. Western Gulf

(2.1.7)

2.8 Skipper/Crew and Second Generation

A skipper is defined as the individual owning the Commercial Fishery Entry Permit and signing the fish ticket.

NOTE: Skipper definitions needed to distinguish differences between sectors

Option 1. No skipper and crew provisions

Option 2. Allocate percentage to captain:

Suboption 1. Initial allocation of 2% shall be reserved to qualified captains

Suboption 2. Initial allocation of 5% shall be reserved to qualified captains

Suboption 3. Initial allocation of 7% shall be reserved to qualified captains

Defer remaining issues to a trailing amendment and assumes simultaneous implementation with rationalization program. ***(2.1.8)***

2.9 Communities *(2.1.9)*

NOTE: Bering Sea and Western Alaska CDQ communities may be excluded from community programs.

2.9.1 Regionalization

The following applies to both Central and Western Gulf areas:

If adopted, all processing shares <u>or licenses</u> allocated to shorebased <u>(and floating)</u> processors will be categorized by region.

- Processing shares <u>or licenses</u> that are regionally designated cannot be reassigned to another region.
- Catcher vessel harvest shares are regionalized based on where the catch was processed, not where it was caught.
- Catcher processor shares and incentive fisheries are not subject to regionalization.
- Qualifying years to determine the distribution of shares between regions will be consistent with the preferred alternative under "Element 1, Qualifying Periods".

<u>Central Gulf</u>: Two regions are proposed to classify harvesting and (if adopted) processing shares: North - South line at 58° 51.10' North Latitude (Cape Douglas corner for Cook Inlet bottom trawl ban area).

The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased <u>(including floating)</u> catch and subject to the North - South distribution: Pollock in Area 630; CGOA

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flatfish (excludes arrowtooth flounder); CGOA Pacific ocean perch; CGOA northern rockfish and pelagic shelf rockfish (combined); CGOA Pacific cod (inshore); GOA sablefish (trawl); WY pollock

Western Gulf: The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased (including floating) catch: Pacific cod in Area 610; pollock in Area 610; pollock in Area 620

Option 1. Dutch Harbor (Akutan)/Sand Point
Option 2. Kodiak/Sand Point
Option 3. Both

NOTE: Boundaries will be defined in June based on public testimony (staff will attach a detailed map of the GOA to aid in boundary identification. ***(2.1.9.1)***

2.9.2 Community Fisheries Quota (CFQ) ***(2.1.9.2, 2.2.14.6)***

2.9.2.1 Administrative Entity
Option 1. Gulf wide administrative entity
Option 2. Regional administrative entities (Western Gulf, Central Gulf, Eastern Gulf)
Option 3. Community level ***(2.1.9.2.1)***

2.9.2.2 Eligible Communities
Option 1. Population:
a. Less than 1,500 residents
b. Less than 2,500 residents
c. Less than 5,000 residents
d. Less than 7,500 residents
Option 2. Geography
a. Coastal Communities without road connections to larger community highway network
b. Coastal communities adjacent to salt water
c. Communities within 10 miles of the Gulf Coast
d. Communities on the south side of the Alaska Peninsula that are adjacent to Central and Western GOA management areas (including Yakutat) within 5 nmi from the water, but not to include Bering Sea communities included under the Western Alaska CDQ program.
Option 3. Economy (based on all fish).
Staff will analyze other proxies that could be used to describe fishery dependence, such as the number of permits as a proportion of the population, historic processing or fishing data, or other data sources.
a. GOA fisheries dependant communities defined as communities with range of 10-30% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related (includes all fisheries).
b. GOA fisheries supplemented communities defined as communities with a range of 5-10% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related. (includes all fisheries
c. All GOA communities ***(2.1.9.2.2)***

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2.9.2.3 Species
- Option 1. All rationalized groundfish species
- Option 2. Limited to species that can be caught without (hard on) bottom trawling

(2.1.9.2.3)

2.9.2.4 Allocation

Harvester shares
- Option 1. 5% of annual TAC
- Option 2. 10% of annual TAC
- Option 3. 15% of annual TAC
- Option 4. 20% of annual TAC

Processing shares
- Option 5 5% of annual processing allocation
- Option 6. 10% of annual processing allocation
- Option 7. 15% of annual processing allocation
- Option 8. 20% of annual processing allocation

(2.1.9.2.4)

2.9.2.5 Harvesting of Shares
- Option 1. Limited to residents of eligible communities that own their vessels
- Option 2. Limited to residents of eligible communities
- Option 3. No limitations on who harvests shares

(2.1.9.2.5)

2.9.2.6 Use of Revenue
- Option 1. Community development projects that tie directly to fisheries or fishery related projects and education.
- Option 2. Community development projects that tie directly to fisheries and fisheries related projects, education and government functions.
- Option 3. Education, social and capital projects within eligible communities as well as governmental functions.

(2.1.9.2.6)

2.9.3 Community Purchase Program

Eligible communities**.**

Option 1. Population:
- a. Less than 1,500 residents
- b. Less than 2,500 residents
- c. Less than 5,000 residents
- d. Less than 7,500 residents

Option 2. Geography
- a. Coastal Communities without road connections to larger community highway network
- b. Coastal communities adjacent to salt water
- c. Communities within 10 miles of the Gulf Coast

Option 3. Economy (based on all fish).

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Staff will analyze other proxies that could be used to describe fishery dependence, such as the number of permits as a proportion of the population, historic processing or fishing data, or other data sources.

a. GOA fisheries dependant communities defined as communities with a range of 10-30% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related (includes all fisheries).
b. GOA fisheries supplemented communities defined as communities with a range of 5-10% of their base industry economy is harvesting or processing related. (includes all fisheries
c. All GOA communities

(2.1.9.3)

2.9.4 Community Incentive Fisheries Trust (CIFT)

The CIFT has full ownership of CIFT harvest shares and holds these shares in trust for the communities, processors and crew members in the region to use as leverage to mitigate impact directly associated with implementation of a rationalization program. ***(2.1.9.4)***

2.9.4.1 Harvest Share Distribution

10-30 % of harvest shares shall be originally reserved for GOA CIFT associations. These harvest shares will be a pool off the top before individual distribution of harvest shares. ***(2.1.9.4.1)***

2.9.4.2 CIFT Designation

Option 1. One CV CIFT for entire GOA (exclude SEO)
Option 2. Regional CV CIFTs :
Suboption 1. Central GOA (Kodiak, Chignik)
Suboption 2. Western GOA
Suboption 3. North Gulf Coast (Homer to Yakutat)
Option 3. CP-based CIFT

Defer remaining issues to a trailing amendment
(2.1.9.4.2)

2.10 PSC Crab, Salmon, and Other Species (Excluding Halibut) ***(2.1.10)***

Prepare a discussion paper to describe processes currently underway to address bycatch of salmon, crab and herring and other forage fish species (including FMP amendments and PSEIS options for crab bycatch). The paper should (1) provide timelines and how they relate to the GOA rationalization timeline; (2) describe fishery, survey, and habitat data sources that will be used. Based on the recommendations in the paper, the Council would determine if (1) existing processes are sufficient or if some measures need to be more closely linked to rationalization decisions, and (2) if other or additional management approaches are appropriate to include in a rationalized fishery in a trailing amendment.

Put Section 2.10 (PSC Crab and Salmon) on the same status with other trailing amendments (including skipper/crew shares; fee and loan program; CIFT issues). The discussion paper would be done parallel to the EIS similarly to how analysis of the other trailing amendments is planned.

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2.11 Review and Evaluation *(2.1.11)*

2.11.1 Data collection.

A mandatory data collection program would be developed and implemented. The program would collect cost, revenue, ownership and employment data on a periodic basis to provide the information necessary to study the impacts of the program. Details of this program will be developed in the analysis of the alternatives. ***(2.1.11.1)***

2.11.2 Review and Sunset

Option 1. The program would sunset unless the Council decides to continue or amend the program. The decision of whether to continue or amend would be based on a written review and evaluation of the program's performance compared to its objectives.

- Suboption 1. 5 year after fishing under the program
- Suboption 2. 7 year after fishing under the program
- Suboption 3. 10 year schedule after fishin g under the program
- Suboption 4. No sunset provision.

Option 2. Formal program review at the first Council Meeting in the 5th year after implementation to objectively measure the success of the program, including benefits and impacts to harvesters (including vessel owners, skippers and crew), processors and communities by addressing concerns, goals and objectives identified in the problem statement and the Magnuson Stevens Act standards. This review shall include analysis of post-rationalization impacts to coastal communities, harvesters and processors in terms of economic impacts and options for mitigating those impacts. Subsequent reviews are required every 5 years.

(2.1.11.2, 2.2.14.7)

2.12 Sideboards *(2.1.12)*

Participants in the GOA rationalized fisheries are limited to their historical participation based on GOA rationalized qualifying years in BSAI and SEO groundfish fisheries. ***(2.1.12, 2.2.14.8)***

Vessels (Steel) and LLPs used to generate harvest shares used in a co-op may not participate in other federally managed open access fisheries in excess of sideboard allotments.
(2.2.13, Option 1, Paragraph 11)

Participants in the GOA rationalized fisheries are limited to their aggregate historical participation based on GOA rationalized qualifying years in BSAI and SEO groundfish fisheries.
(2.2.14.8)

3 Processing Sector Provisions

3.1 Provisions for a Closed Class of Processors *(3.1)*

3.1.2 Harvester Delivery requirements

50-90% of CV harvest share allocation will be reserved for delivery to the qualified closed trawl or fixed class processor. The other 50 -10% of CV harvest share allocation can be delivered to:

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i. any processor including CPs
ii. any processor excluding CPs

(Note that a different alternative could apply if a cooperative program is chosen. See 4.3.2.6)

(3.1.13)

3.1.2 Closed Class Processor Qualifications *(3.1.14)*

3.1.2.1 To purchase groundfish required to be delivered to a qualified processor must have purchased and processed a minimum amount of groundfish as described below in at least 4 of the years

Option 1. 1995 – 1999.
Option 2. 1995 – 2001
Option 3. 1995 – 2002

a. Trawl eligible Processors
Option 1. 2000 mt
Option 2. 1000 mt
Option 3. 500 mt

b. Fixed gear eligible Processors
Option 1. 500 mt
Option 2. 200 mt
Option 3. 50 mt

c. Trawl and Fixed gear eligible processors
i) Meet criteria for both the closed class trawl process catch and closed class fixed gear process catch as described above
ii) Total catch - Trawl and fixed catch combined
Option 1. 2,500 mt
Option 2. 1,200 mt
Option 3. 550 mt

d. Processors are defined at:
Option 1. Processors are defined at the entity level
Option 2. Processors are defined at the plant level

(3.1.14.1)

3.1.2.2 Processor history would be credited to (and licenses would be issued to):

Option 1. Operator – must hold a federal or state processor permit.
Option 2. Facility owner
Suboption: Custom processing history would be credited to:
i. the processor that physically processes the fish
ii. the processor that purchases the fish and pays for processing

(3.1.14.2)

3.1.2.3 Transferability of eligible processor licenses

Processor licenses can be sold, leased, or transferred.
Option 1. Within the same community
Option 2. Within the same region

(3.1.14.3)

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3.1.2.4 Processing Use caps by closed class processor type (trawl, fixed or trawl and fixed), by CGOA and WGOA regulatory areas:
Range 70% to 130% of TAC processed for all groundfish species for the largest closed class processor
(3.1.14.4)

3.1.2.5 Processing Caps may apply at:
Option 1. the facility level
Option 2. the entity level
(3.1.14.5)

3.2 Provisions for Processor Share Allocations ***(4.2.13)***

3.2.1 Binding Arbitration process, for failed price negotiation, between fishermen and processors. *This provision is very incomplete.* ***(4.2.13)***

3.2.2 Any processor within any Gulf community can buy IPQ shares from the catcher processor sector. *No option appears for the allocation of processing shares to C/Ps. If this is intended to provide for division of C/P shares into separate harvest and processing privileges, it will need to be revised. Also a provision should be added that identifies eligibility for purchase of processing shares, if any is contemplated.* ***(4.2.13)***

3.2.3 Eligible processors

3.2.3.1 Any U.S. Corporation or partnership will be eligible for an allocation based on processing at a facility provided:
Option 1 The facility processed fish from a fishery included in the program in
a. 2000 or 2001
b. Any year 1998-2002
c. 2001 or 2002
Option 2 Any facility of the company processed fish from a fishery included in the program in
1. 2000 or 2001
2. Any year 1998-2002
3. 2001 or 2002

3.2.3.2 The company that is eligible for the allocation is the :
Suboption 1. owner of the facility
Suboption 2. operator of the facility – must hold a Federal or State processor permit

3.2.3.3 In the case of custom processing, the company eligible for the allocation will be the :
Option 1 entity that processed the fish
Option 2 entity that purchased the fish

3.2.4 Categories of Processing Quota shares

Option 1. Target Species (Species where there is a significant historical processor participation)

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Area 610 pollock, Area 620 pollock, Area 630 pollock, WGOA Pacific cod, CGOA Arrowtooth flounder, CGOA Flatfish (excludes Arrowtooth flounder), CGOA POP, CGOA Pelagic Shelf Rockfish & Northern rockfish (combined), CGOA Pacific cod (inshore), WY Pollock

Option 2. Non-target Species (Species on Bycatch status throughout the year (e.g., Sablefish – trawl, Other rockfish, thornyhead, shortraker/rougheye).

Suboption 1. Allocate IPQ shares based on the Fleet bycatch rates by gear:

a. based on average catch history by area and target fishery

b. based on 75th percentile by area by target fishery

(These could be very difficult to implement)

Suboption 2. Exclude non-target species from IPQ awards

Option 3. Regional categories – processing quota shares will be regionalized by species grouping as shown in the regionalization section if regionalization is adopted (see 2.9.1). ***(4.2.13.2)***

3.2.4.1 <u>C/P will be issued C/P harvest shares, which combine the privilege of catching and processing product.</u> ***(4.2.13.2)*** ***<u>(Is this intended to be an option or a provision)</u>***

3.2.5 Qualifying periods

Option 1. 95-01 (drop 1 or 2)
Option 2. 98-01 (drop 1)
Option 3. 95-02 (drop 1, 2, or 3)
Option 4. 95-97 (for AFA vessels)
Option 5. 98-02 (drop 1 or 2)
Option 6. 00-02 (drop 1)

The following applies to all options:
Suboption. Exclude 2000 for pot gear Pacific cod

NOTE*:* the above suboption, if selected, would count as 1 year dropped (if selected) ***(4.2.13.3)***

3.2.6 Percentage of season's TAC for which IPQs are distributed:

Option 1. 100%
Option 2. 90% - the remaining 10% would be considered open delivery.
Option 3. 80% - the remaining 20% would be considered open delivery.
Option 4. 50% - the remaining 50% would be considered open delivery.

The following applies to all suboptions:
<u>All processors (including those that hold IPQ) will be allowed to buy fish harvested with Class B shares (open delivery fish)</u>. ***(4.2.13.4)***

3.2.7 Processing Shares Cap categories:

Option 1. Applied by species groupings – Pollock, Pacific cod, Flatfish (excludes Arrowtooth), and rockfish.

Option 2. Applied to all groundfish species combined ***Staff recommends that these provisions be modified to include a method for aggregating across species or omitted (4.2.13.5)***

<u>Option 3. Applied to each species for which processing shares are allocated.</u>

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3.2.8 Ownership Caps on Processing Shares

Option 1. Maximum share allocation in the fishery
Option 2. Maximum share allocation in the fishery plus 5%
Option 3. Maximum share allocation in the fishery plus 10%
Option 4. Maximum share allocation in the fishery plus 15%
Option 5. Select a cap between the average and maximum allocation with initial allocations grandfathered ***(4.2.13.6)***

3.2.9 Use Caps: may select different options depending on sector, gear, etc.

Annual use caps on a
a. company
b. facility
basis

Option 1. 30 percent to 60 percent of the TAC
Option 2. The largest IPQ holding in the fishery at the time of initial allocation
Option 3. Custom processing will be allowed
a) subject to use caps
Option 4. Use caps will be waived to the extent that compliance is prevented by a catastrophic event.
Option 5. Use caps will be waived to the extent that compliance is prevented by weather conditions.
Option 6. Vessel overages not counted toward IPQ use caps.
(4.2.13.7)

3.2.10 Community Protection under Processing Shares

Communities will be allowed to buy processing history -- First right of refusal for communities for all processing history designated for that particular community that is sold to entities outside the community.

NOTE: The Council will use provisions similar to the right of first refusal in the Crab rationalization program. ***(4.2.13.8)***

4 Cooperative Provisions

4.1 Cooperative type (voluntary or mandatory)

Option 1 Cooperative membership will be voluntary (i.e., harvest shares (IFQ) will be allocated to non-members) ***(2.2.13, Option 1 and 2.2.14.9)***
Option 2 Cooperative membership will be mandatory (i.e., harvest shares will be allocated only to cooperatives) ***(2.2.13, Option 2, Paragraphs 1 and 7)***

4.2 Cooperative formation

4.2.1 Co-ops can be formed between holders of harvest shares or history of:
i. any type
ii. the same area, gear, vessel type (CV or C/P), and/or vessel length class.
iii. the following classes of shares/history
CV trawl
CV longline

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CV pot
C/P trawl
C/P longline
C/P pot

Each group of share/history holders of a defined class that may form cooperatives is defined as a "sector".
(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 3, 2.2.14.1, 2.2.14.9, and 2.2.14.9.1, Option 2)

4.2.1.1 Processor affiliated vessels may join cooperatives. ***(2.2.13, Option 2 Paragraph 6)***

4.2.1.2 CV cooperatives must be associated with

a) a processing facility
b) a processing company

(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 3)

The associated processor must be:

a) a licensed processor ***(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 4)***
b) a qualified processor (if closed processor class is selected)
c) any processing share holder (if processor shares are selected)

Subsuboption i) Processors can associate with more than one co-op
Subsuboption ii) Processors are limited to 1 co-op per plant for each sector.

(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 3)

4.2.1.3 A processor association will not be required for a C/P cooperative.

4.2.2 Cooperatives are required to have:

i. at least 4 distinct and separate harvesters (using the 10% threshold rule) ***(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 3)***
ii. at least 50-100 percent of the harvest shares (or catch history) of its sector (may choose different percentages for different sectors). ***(2.2.14.9)***

Requirements may differ across sectors (or for CV and CP cooperatives)

4.2.3 Duration of cooperative agreements:

a. 1 year
b. 3 year
c. 5 year

(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 10)

4.2.4 Allocation Prerequisites ***(What alternatives should this apply to??)***

Allocations to CV co-ops will only be made under the following conditions:
Required Co-op agreement elements:

Harvesters and processors are both concerned that rationalization will diminish their current respective bargaining positions. Therefore, a pre-season co-op agreement between eligible, willing harvesters and an eligible, and willing processor is a pre-requisite The co-op agreement must contain:

1) A price setting formula for all fish harvested by the co-op
2) A fishing plan for the harvest of all co-op fish

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Staff is concerned that these provision are unworkable as written. Because of the lack of specificity in these provisions, little meaningful analysis can be provided.
(2.2.13, Option 2 Paragraphs 2 and 4)

4.3 Rules Governing Cooperatives

4.3.1 Annual Allocations

Option 1 Annual allocations of cooperative members would be issued to the cooperative.

Option 2 Annual allocation of the sector would be issued to the sector cooperative (if "true" sector cooperative alternative is selected)
(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 9, 2.2.14.9, and 2.2.14.9.2)

4.3.2.1 Co-op allocations.

Co-op members may internally allocate and manage the co-op's allocation per the co-op membership agreement. Subject to any harvesting caps that may be adopted, member allocations may be transferred and consolidated within the co-op to the extent permitted under the membership agreement. ***(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 12, and 2.2.14.9)***

4.3.2.2 Monitoring and Enforcement

Monitoring and enforcement requirements would be at the co-op level. Co-op members are jointly and severally responsible for co-op vessels harvesting in the aggregate no more than their co-op's allocation of target species, non-target species and halibut mortality, as may be adjusted by interco-op transfers. ***(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 8 and 12 and 2.2.14.9)***

4.3.2.3 Co-ops may adopt and enforce fishing practice codes of conduct as part of their membership agreement. Co-ops may penalize or expel members who fail to comply with their membership agreement. ***(2.2.13, Option 1, Paragraph 12)***

4.3.2.4 Processor affiliates cannot participate in price setting negotiations except as permitted by general antitrust law. ***(2.2.13, Option 2, Paragraph 5)***

4.3.2.5 *Ownership and usage of CV cooperative allocations*

a. *At least 20% of the harvester allocation share owned by the co-op processor-owned vessels must be available for lease to other co-op harvesters, at prevailing market lease rates.* ***This provision is not workable and should be revised or omitted.***

b. No mandatory leasing provision
(2.2.13, Option 2, Paragraphs 2 and 8)

4.3.2.6 Processor delivery obligations (applies if closed class of processors alternative is selected)

50-90% of a CV cooperative's harvest share allocation will be reserved for delivery to the associated qualified processor. The other 50 -10% of harvest share allocation can be delivered to:

i. any processor including CPs

ii. any processor excluding CPs

(3.1.13)

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4.3.2.7 Co-ops may engage in intercooperative transfers to the extent permitted by rules governing transfers of shares among sectors (e.g.., gear groups, vessel types). ***Staff suggests that provision concerning trading of shares among different gears be used to determine the extent of intercooperative trading permitted (see 2.3.2.3 of this revised motion).***
(2.2.14.9.1, Option 3)

4.4 Ownership and Use Caps and Underages

4.4.1 Set co-op use caps at 25 to 100% of total TAC by species (must choose 100 percent for a "true" sector cooperative) ***(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 5)***

4.4.2 Cooperative vessel use caps would be set at 1.5-2 X the individual cap. Grandfather initial issuees at their initial allocation **Note: 1.5 times is less than proposed vessel use cap in 2.3.3.7.** ***(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 6)***

4.4.3 To effectively apply individual ownership caps, the number of shares or history that each cooperative member could hold and bring to cooperatives would be subject to the individual ownership caps (with initial allocations grandfathered). Transfers between cooperatives would be undertaken by the members individually, subject to individual ownership caps.

4.4.4 Underage limits would be applied in the aggregate at the co-op level ***(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraph 7)***

4.5 Movement Between Cooperatives

4.5.1 Harvesters may move between cooperatives at:
i. the end of each year.
ii. the expiration of the cooperative agreement.

4.5.2 For holders of CV shares or history:
Option 1 No share reduction for moving between co-ops year to year
Option 2 A one year 10-20% share reduction each time a harvester moves to a different co-op. There shall be a limit on the voluntary migration of harvesters from co-op to co-op such that no co-op loses more than 20% of its annual allocation in any single year
(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraphs 2 and 7)
The share reduction shall be redistributed to:
i. The cooperative that the share holder left (if it continues to exist). If the cooperative does not exist, to all cooperatives in the sector on a pro rata basis.
ii. To all cooperatives in the sector on a pro rata basis.
(applies if mandatory cooperatives)

4.5.3 License Transfers Among Processors (applies only if closed class of processors)
On transfer of a license by a processor:

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a) any cooperative association with that license will transfer to the processor receiving the license. All harvest share/history holders will be subject to any share reduction on departing the cooperative, as would have been made in the absence of the transfer.

b) any cooperatives associated with the license will be free to associate with any qualified processor. Harvest share/history holders in the cooperative will be free to move among cooperatives without share/history reduction.

4.6 Non-Members of Cooperatives (applies only if mandatory cooperatives)

4.6.3 Harvest share/history holders that do not choose to join a co-op

Option 1. May fish in open access, provided NMFS determines that the non-cooperative allocation is sufficient to conduct an open access fishery. The open access fishery will be comprised of all shares of harvesters that are not cooperative members of the same sector (i.e., area, vessel type (CV or C/P), and/or gear). NMFS will have the discretion to determine the distribution of bycatch among target species open access fisheries from shares of harvesters holding bycatch shares for multiple target fisheries.

Option 2 Are not allowed to partic ipate in the rationalized fisheries until they join a co-op.

(2.2.13, Option 1 Paragraphs 9 and 2.2.14.9.3)

TRAILING AMENDMENTS

The Council intent is for these trailing amendments to be implemented simultaneously with the main rationalization program.

1.Fee and Loan Program

2.Skipper/Crew Share Program issues:

3.Remaining issues of CIFT program

4. PSC Crab, Salmon, and Other Species management

Gulf of Alaska Rationalization
Overview of the Alternatives and Options Discussion

The attached documents address several issues that relate to development and analysis of alternatives in the the Council motion from April 2003. First, the documents propose a reorganization of the Council motion from April 2003. The current organization of the elements and options in the motion does not lend itself to understanding the different alternatives that are created from the options. In addition, several provisions of that motion overlap with one another. To avoid overlap, each provision is included in a single location in the proposed revision. In some sections of the April 2003 motion, provisions from other sections are incorporated by reference. The interpretation of those references and their interplay with other provisions is often unclear and subject to several interpretations. The discussion in the attached documents attempts to include any reasonable interpretation for comprehensiveness.

The complexity of the different program alternatives make the development of a single document supporting those alternatives very difficult. To assist the reader in understanding the scope of alternatives being considered "alternative descriptions" are provided (Document A). These provide a brief description of each alternative supported by the motion and identify the elements of the alternative and the options that might be selected for inclusion in the alternative. The current motion contains 12 primary alternatives, each with several permutations. **Several of the alternatives in the motion are very similar to one another, providing little analytical contrast and greatly complicating the analysis. Staff is hopeful that the Council will use this meeting to narrow the number of alternatives substantially. A reasonable range of contrasting alternatives for analysis could be four or five selected from the April 2003 motion. Within those alternatives, options may be retained for some aspects, but those options should not pertain to the general structure of the program. If the Council chooses to delay narrowing the selection of alternatives for analysis, the completion of the analysis will be delayed.**

To maintain the proposed timeline, staff intends to provide the Council with preliminary analysis of several different elements and options at its October 2003 meeting. This could support and facilitate the Council's further narrowing of the elements and options to provide staff with a workable, reasonable range of alternatives for analysis in the EIS. If the Council is unable to narrow the number of options substantially at the October meeting, it is very likely that the completion of the EIS will be delayed substantially from the proposed timeline.

To aid the Council in narrowing the alternatives and reformulating the motion at this meeting, the following documents are provided:

1) A renumbered version of the April 2003 motion (Document B). The only change from the Council motion is the inclusion of a decimal numbering system, which is intended to add precision to referencing. The original number of the Council's motion is retained, with the new decimal numbering added in parentheses.

2) A discussion of some of the issues that arise under the different elements (Document C). In this document, references are made to the decimal number system in the April 2003 motion. If the provision is moved to a different section in the proposed revision to the motion the new location is referenced in italics.

3) The proposed revision of the Council's motion (Document D). This document maintains all provisions of the Council's original motion with some reorganization. Since the document is reorganized, each provision is referenced to the original motion. The document is organized as follows:

Section 1 - Status Quo

Section 2 - Harvest Sector Provisions

This section is Section 2 of the April motion and is referred to as "Harvest Share Program" in that motion. The order of this section is very similar to that of Section 2 of the April 2003 motion. Adoption of provisions of this section alone would form a harvester-only IFQ program. Since these provisions form the foundation of harvest sector management under all of the alternatives, the title is changed.

Section 3 - Processing Sector Provisions

This section derived from the elements and options of Section 3.1 ("Closed Processor Class") and Section 4 ("Processor Share Program") in the April 2003 motion. The section is divided into two parts, one for each of the different processor provisions. The adoption of provisions from Section 2 and Section 3.1 alone would establish a harvest share program with a closed class of processors. The adoption of provisions from Section 2 and Section 3.2 alone would create a two-pie IFQ program (with harvest and processing shares).

Section 4 - Cooperative Provisions

This section brings together the different cooperative provisions proposed in the April 2003 motion. Provisions are consolidated from Sections 2.2, 3.2, and 4.2. The provisions are separated into several different subsections to assist the reader in determining the type of cooperative program created by the selection of provisions in a section. In addition, the alternative descriptions provide a guide to selecting provisions to make a workable cooperative program.

Staff Recommendations for structuring EIS alternatives
Council Staff
May 2003

The rigorous standards to which the Council must prepare NEPA analyses of proposed management actions affects the Council process for developing alternatives and the accompanying environmental impact statements (EIS) or environmental assessments (EA). Under NEPA, the 22-page range of options is too broad to focus the required comparison of environmental impacts. The Council has been advised to structure discrete Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization EIS alternatives, which then can be adequately compared and contrasted. The inclusion of broadly defined alternatives and a wide range of options under numerous elements precludes the analysts from adequately assessing those impacts. While the Council only numbered three alternatives to the no action alternative, the current suite of alternatives includes at least 12 unique alternatives as identified in Item C-1(e), when factoring in subalternatives and multiple types of cooperatives. There are 30 options under one element (Qualifying periods). Narrowing the range of options will enhance the ability of the analysts to compare and contrast the environmental impacts of the proposed alternatives by sharply defining their differences and providing a clear basis for choice among the alternatives by the Council and the public.

Refining (i.e., narrowing) the alternatives means that the Council needs to make some early decisions on the wide range of alternatives and options included in its current 22-page suite of alternatives, elements, and options *prior to analysis of the EIS alternatives*. In a separate discussion prepared for this meeting, staff advised that 4 or 5 reasonable, contrasting alternatives to the no action alternative might reflect the diversity of programs currently considered by the Council and allow for adequate analysis in the timeframe discussed below. This principle also could be applied to the selection of options for analysis. A range of options is acceptable in an EIS alternative, *providing that they can be individually analyzed*. Therefore, staff recommends limiting the analysis to a *reasonable* number of alternatives and options to allow a comprehensible reading of the environmental impacts is *necessary* to select a final preferred alternative in *June 2004*, and therefore the timeline for preparation of the draft and final SEIS.

A draft timeline necessary to meet the timeline announced by the Council for its selection of a final preferred alternative in April 2004 is presented in Attachment 2. Counting backwards from April 2004, illustrates the limitations on analytical time allotted for some critical steps. There are some mandatory time allocations associated with required NEPA reviews and publication of an EIS document that are not flexible, leading to time taken away from analytical efforts. These potential difficulties are mostly associated with the revisions to the analysis that we anticipate from the Council as a result of its planned review of the preliminary SEIS in October 2003, the initial review draft SEIS in December 2003, final review of the SEIS in April 2004, and associated public comments. Staff prepared a more reasonable timeline for preparation of this EIS (Attachment 3). Staff recommends an additional consultation with the Council in October 2003, when staff will present data analyses of selected elements of the proposed alternatives that would allow the Council to make an informed decision to narrow the options, which staff has stressed is critical to preparing an adequate NEPA analysis. The revised timeline would be Council review of the preliminary SEIS in December 2003, the initial review draft SEIS in February 2003, final review of the SEIS in June 2004. Council action could not be scheduled for April 2004 as that meeting falls within the public comment period on the Draft EIS. It is important to emphasize that even this revised timeline is dependent on the Council narrowing the range of alternatives and options early.

The Council should be aware that the identification of EIS alternatives, whether noted as preferred or not,

limits the Council in its selection of a final preferred alternative to those identified. For instance, the Council has already narrowed its list of alternatives for analysis by identifying that amendments to the License Limitation Program will not adequately address the problem statement. Therefore, that alternative is now a rejected alternative and will only be briefly addressed in the EIS.

Finally, a number of occurrences could delay selection of a final preferred alternative in June 2004. The recommended timeline assumes that: (1) the Council sufficiently narrows the alternatives and options to allow for the preparation of an adequate EIS; (2) the Council does not add alternatives and options to the analysis; (3) the SSC recommends the analyses be released for public review without significant additional analysis that might delay that release; (4) the Board has taken the action necessary for the Council to select a preferred alternative on schedule; and (5) resolution on the four trailing amendments is not needed prior to selection of a preferred alternative. Any additional analysis of new alternatives or options, trailing amendments, Board actions, or to meet SSC requirements would necessitate extension of the staff proposed timeline.

Attachment 1. CEQ Regulations

(PART 1502– Environmental Impact Statement) advise the following regarding EIS alternatives:

Sec. 1502.14 Alternatives including the proposed action.

This section is the heart of the environmental impact statement. Based on the information and analysis presented in the sections on the Affected Environment (Sec. 1502.15) and the Environmental Consequences (Sec. 1502.16), it should present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public. In this section agencies shall:

(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate *all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated*.
(b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail including the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.
(c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency.
(d) Include the alternative of no action.
(e) Identify the agency's preferred alternative or alternatives, if one or more exists, in the draft statement and identify such alternative in the final statement unless another law prohibits the expression of such a preference.
(f) Include appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed action or alternatives.

Sec. 1505.1 Agency decisionmaking procedures.

Agencies shall adopt procedures (Sec. 1507.3) to ensure that decisions are made in accordance with the policies and purposes of the (National Environmental Policy) Act. Such procedures shall include but not be limited to . . .:

(e) Requiring that the alternatives considered by the decisionmaker are encompassed by the range of alternatives discussed in the relevant environmental documents and that the decisionmaker consider the alternatives described in the environmental impact statement. If another decision document accompanies the relevant environmental documents to the decisionmaker, agencies are encouraged to make available to the public before the decision is made any part of that document that relates to the comparison of alternatives.

The phrase "range of alternatives" refers to the alternatives discussed in environmental documents. It includes *all reasonable alternatives*, which must be rigorously explored and objectively evaluated, as well as those *other alternatives, which are eliminated from detailed study* with a brief discussion of the reasons for eliminating them. Under Section 1502.14, a decisionmaker must not consider alternatives beyond the range of alternatives discussed in the relevant environmental documents. Moreover, a decisionmaker must, in fact, consider all the alternatives discussed in an EIS. Section 1505.1(e).

For some proposals, there may exist a very large or even an infinite number of possible reasonable alternatives. For example, a proposal to designate wilderness areas within a National Forest could be said to involve an infinite number of alternatives from 0 to 100 percent of the forest. When there are potentially a very large number of alternatives, only a *reasonable number* of examples, covering the full spectrum of alternatives, must be analyzed and compared in the EIS. An appropriate series of alternatives might include dedicating 0, 10, 30, 50, 70, 90, or 100 percent of the Forest to wilderness. *What constitutes a reasonable range of alternatives depends on the nature of the proposal and the facts in each case*.

Attachment 2. **Date**	**PROPOSED COUNCIL TIMELINE for SEIS PREPARATION** **Action**	**EIS Require-ment**	**Time between dates**	**Potential for Slippage**
June 11, 2003	Council modifies suite of alternatives, elements, and options; selects EIS alternatives for analysis			
July 1, 2003	Request for proposals for economic/social/cumulative impact analyses			
August 1, 2003	Contract for economic/social/cumulative impact analyses is awarded		4 weeks	
September 12, 2003	Contractor submits preliminary analysis to Council Executive Director		6 weeks	
September 19, 2003	Government contractor prints document		1 week	
October 8, 2003	Council reviews preliminary analysis; may modify alternatives, elements and options*			may require additional analysis
November 14, 2003	Contractor submits analysis to Council Executive Director		4 weeks	
November 21, 2003	Government contractor prints document		1 week	
December 10-12, 2003	Council reviews Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA and approves for public review; may modify alternatives, elements and options*			may require additional analysis
January 6, 2004	Contractor completes public review Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA		3 weeks	may require additional time
January 7-11, 2004	Government contractor prints analysis		1 week	
January 12-16, 2004	NMFS HQ reviews and files Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA with EPA	√	4 days	may require additional time
January 23, 2004	Notice of Availability of Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA is published in the *Federal Register* and 45-day public comment period begins*	√	2 weeks	may prefer >45 day period
February 4, 2004	no scheduled action during public comment period; <u>does not</u> modify alternatives, elements, and options			
March 8, 2004	public comment period ends	√	45 days	
March 24, 2004	NMFS staff releases summary of public comments*		2 ½ weeks	may require more than 2+ weeks to prepare summary
April 2, 2004	Council reviews public comment summary and finalizes preferred alternative*; may schedule timeline for trailing amendments			may require additional analysis
Unknown	Congress authorizes Council action, if necessary			
Unknown	NMFS releases Final SEIS/RIR/IRFA* and 30-day public comment period begins			may require additional time
Unknown	NMFS publishes Record of Decision	√		

bold indicates Council actions
***indicates where the timeline may slip**

Attachment 3. **Date**	**STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SEIS PREPARATION** **Action**	**Time for document prep between drafts**
June 11, 2003	Council modifies suite of alternatives, elements, and options; selects EIS alternatives for analysis	
July 1, 2003	Request for proposals for economic/social/cumulative impact analyses	
August 1, 2003	Contract for economic/social/cumulative impact analyses is awarded	
September 19, 2003	Council distributes discussion paper (preliminary analysis) on: (1) options and (2) salmon bycatch	7 weeks
October 8-10, 2003	**Council reviews discussion papers and modifies alternatives, elements and options**	
November 21, 2003	Council distributes preliminary Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA	9 weeks
December 10-12, 2003	**Council reviews preliminary Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA**; will likely modify alternatives, elements and options	
January 9, 2004	Contractor submits initial review Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA to Council Executive Director	4 weeks
January 16, 2004	Government contractor prints document	1 week
February 4-6, 2004	**Council initial review of Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA and release for public review**; will likely modify alternatives, elements and options	
March 9, 2004	Contractor completes public review Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA	4 weeks
March 10-14, 2004	Government contractor prints analysis	1 week
March 15-19, 2004	NMFS HQ reviews and files Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA with EPA	1 week
March 26, 2004	Notice of Availability of Draft SEIS/RIR/IRFA is published in the *Federal Register* and 45-day public comment period begins	
April 2, 2004	no scheduled action during public comment period; does not modify alternatives, elements, and options	
May 10, 2004	public comment period ends	45 days
May 26, 2004	NMFS staff releases summary of public comments	2 weeks
June 9-11, 2004	**Council reviews public comment summary and finalizes preferred alternative;** **will likely schedule timeline for trailing amendments**	
Unknown	Congress authorizes Council action, if necessary	
Unknown	NMFS releases Final SEIS/RIR/IRFA and 30-day public comment period begins	
Unknown	NMFS publishes Record of Decision	

bold indicates Council actions